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MEMOIRS

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

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MEMOIRS

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

BY

LOUIS ANTOINE FAUVELET DE BOURRIENNE
HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY

TO WHICH ARE ADDED AN ACCOUNT OF THE IMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE HUNDRED DAYS, OF NAPOLEON'S SURRENDER TO THE ENGLISH, AND OF HIS RESIDENCE AND DEATH AT ST. HELENA, WITH ANECDOTES AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM ALL THE MOST AUTHENTIC SOURCES

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MEMOIRS

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

CHAPTER I.

1805.

Abolition of the Republican calendar—Warlike preparations in Austria—Plan for re-organising the National Guard—Napoleon in Strasburg—General Mack—Proclamation—Captain Bernard's reconnoitring mission—The Emperor's pretended anger and real satisfaction—Information respecting Ragusa communicated by Bernard—Rapid and deserved promotion—General Bernard's retirement to the United States of America.

I had been three months at Hamburg when I learned that the Emperor had at last resolved to abolish the only remaining memorial of the Republic, namely, the revolutionary calendar.[1] That calendar was indeed an absurd innovation, for the new denominations of the months were not applicable in all places, even in France; the corn of Provence did not wait to be ripened by the sun of the month of Messidor. On the 9th of September a *Sénatus-consulte* decreed that on the 1st of January following the months and days should resume their own names. I read with much interest Laplace's report to the Senate, and must confess I was very glad to see the Gregorian calendar again acknowledged by law, as it had already been acknowledged in fact. Frenchmen in foreign countries experienced particular inconvenience from the adoption of a system different from all the rest of the world.

[1] See the end of the second volume.

A few days after the revival of the old calendar the Emperor departed for the army. When at Hamburg it may well be supposed that I was anxious to obtain news, and I received plenty from the interior of Germany and from some friends in Paris. This correspondence enables me to present to my readers a comprehensive and accurate picture of the state of public affairs up to the time when Napoleon took the field. I have already mentioned how artfully he always made it appear that he was anxious for peace, and that he was always the party attacked; his conduct previous to the first conquest of Vienna affords a striking example of this artifice. It was pretty evident that the transformation of the Cisalpine Republic into the kingdom of Italy, and the union of Genoa to France were infractions of treaties; yet the Emperor, nevertheless, pretended that all the infractions were committed by Austria. The truth is, that Austria was raising levies as secretly as possible, and collecting her troops on the frontiers of Bavaria. An Austrian corps even penetrated into some provinces of the Electorate; all this afforded Napoleon a pretext for going to the aid of his allies.

In the memorable sitting preceding his departure the Emperor presented a project of a *Sénatus-consulte* relative to the re-organisation of the National Guard. The Minister for Foreign Affairs read an explanation of the reciprocal conduct of France and Austria since the peace of Luneville, in which the offences of France were concealed with wonderful skill. Before the sitting broke up the Emperor addressed the members, stating that he was about to leave the capital to place himself at the head of the army to afford prompt succour to his allies, and defend the dearest interests of his people. He boasted of his wish to preserve peace, which Austria and Russia, as he alleged, had, through the influence of England, been induced to disturb.

This address produced a very powerful impression in

Hamburg. For my part, I recognised in it Napoleon's usual boasting strain; but on this occasion events seemed bent on justifying it. The Emperor may certainly have performed more scientific campaigns than that of Austerlitz, but never any more glorious in results. Everything seemed to partake of the marvellous, and I have often thought of the secret joy which Bonaparte must have felt on seeing himself at last on the point of commencing a great war in Germany, for which he had so often expressed an ardent desire. He proceeded first to Strasburg, whither Josephine accompanied him.

All the reports that I received agreed with the statements of my private correspondence in describing the incredible enthusiasm which prevailed in the army on learning that it was to march into Germany. For the first time Napoleon had recourse to an expeditious mode of transport, and 20,000 carriages conveyed his army, as if by enchantment, from the shores of the Channel to the banks of the Rhine.[1] The idea of an active campaign fired the ambition of the junior part of the army. All dreamed of glory, and of speedy promotion, and all hoped to distinguish themselves before the eyes of a chief who was idolised by his troops. Thus during his short stay at Strasburg the Emperor might with reason prophesy the success which crowned his efforts under the walls of Vienna.

[1] Much has been said about the part of the army being conveyed "en poste," but it is obvious that no very large body of men could really have been conveyed in that manner at a time when all ordinary means of transport were required for the usual accompaniments of an enormous army. Ségur (*Mémoires*, tome ii. p. 352) represents Napoleon as saying to the Mayor of Lille, "Feast my divisions on their march, and organise chariots to double their marches. Allow for 25,000 men, let them go by post: you will thus give the movement a first, great, and useful example." It is obvious that a few carriages taking weak and tired men would hasten the march of the regiments without actually carrying many. Compare the instructions, only ordinary details, given to Marmont (*Raguse*, tome ii. p. 297). Jomini (tome ii.) makes no mention of any such measure.

In 1793, after the capitulation of Mayence, the garrison, about 20,000 men, were ordered to be sent by post carriages to La Vendée (Thiers' *Revolution*, tome iii. p. 129). Miot de Melito (tome i. p. 35) says that he organised this transport under Bouchotte, then the Minister of War, but the exact numbers are not given, and the movement was across France itself.

Rapp, who accompanied him, informed me that on leaving Strasburg he observed, in the presence of several persons, "It will be said that I made Mack's plan of campaign for him. The Caudine Forks are at Ulm."[1] Experience proved that Bonaparte was not deceived; but I ought on this occasion to contradict a calumnious report circulated at that time, and since maliciously repeated. It has been said that there existed an understanding between Mack and Bonaparte, and that the general was bought over to deliver up the gates of Ulm. I have received positive proof that this assertion is a scandalous falsehood; and the only thing that could give it weight was Napoleon's intercession after the campaign that Mack might not be put on his trial. In this intercession Napoleon was actuated only by humanity.

On taking the field Napoleon placed himself at the head of the Bavarians,[2] with whom he opposed the enemy's army before the arrival of his own troops. As soon as they were assembled he published the following proclamation, which still further excited the ardour of the troops.

SOLDIERS—The war of the third coalition is commenced. The Austrian army has passed the Inn, violated treaties, attacked and driven our ally from his capital. You yourselves have been obliged to hasten, by forced marches, to the defence of our frontiers. But you have now passed the Rhine; and we will not stop till we have secured the independence of the Germanic body, succoured our allies, and humbled the pride of our unjust assailants. We will not again make peace without a sufficient guarantee! Our generosity shall not again wrong our policy. Soldiers, your Emperor is among you! You are but the advanced guard of the great people. If it be necessary they will all rise at my call to confound and dissolve

[1] This allusion to the Caudine Forks was always in Napoleon's mouth when he saw an enemy's army concentrated on a point, and foresaw its defeat.—*Bourrienne.*

[2] This, as *Erreurs* (tome i. p. 7) points out, is a mistake. The first combats in 1805 fell to Murat, Ney, and Soult, none of whom had any Bavarians under them. It was in 1809 that Napoleon, on the plateau in front of Abensberg, only escorted by Bavarian cavalry, harangued the troops of Bavaria and Wurtemburg which defiled before him (*Thiers*, tome x. p. 143).

this new league, which has been created by the malice and the gold of England. But, soldiers, we shall have forced marches to make, fatigues and privations of every kind to endure. Still, whatever obstacles may be opposed to us, we will conquer them ; and we will never rest until we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies !

In the confidential notes of his diplomatic agents, in his speeches, and in his proclamations, Napoleon always described himself as the attacked party, and perhaps his very earnestness in so doing sufficed to reveal the truth to all those who had learned to read his thoughts differently from what his words expressed them.

At the commencement of the campaign of Austerlitz a circumstance occurred from which is to be dated the fortune of a very meritorious man. While the Emperor was at Strasburg he asked General Marescot, the commander-in-chief of the engineers, whether he could recommend from his corps a brave, prudent, and intelligent young officer, capable of being entrusted with an important reconnoitring mission. The officer selected by General Marescot was a captain in the engineers, named Bernard, who had been educated in the Polytechnic School. He set off on his mission, advanced almost to Vienna, and returned to the headquarters of the Emperor at the capitulation of Ulm.

Bonaparte interrogated him himself, and was well satisfied with his replies ; but, not content with answering verbally the questions put by Napoleon, Captain Bernard had drawn up a report of what he observed, and the different routes which might be taken. Among other things he observed that it would be a great advantage to direct the whole army upon Vienna, without regard to the fortified places ; for that, once master of the capital of Austria, the Emperor might dictate laws to all the Austrian monarchy. "I was present," said Rapp to me, "at this young officer's interview with the Emperor. After reading the report,

would you believe that the Emperor flew into a furious passion? 'How!' cried he, 'you are very bold, very presumptuous! A young officer to take the liberty of tracing out a plan of campaign for me! Begone, and await my orders.'"

This, and some other circumstances which I shall have to add respecting Captain Bernard, completely reveal Napoleon's character. Rapp told me that as soon as the young officer had left the Emperor all at once changed his tone. "That," said he, "is a clever young man; he has taken a proper view of things. I shall not expose him to the chance of being shot. Perhaps I shall sometime want his services. Tell Berthier to despatch an order for his departure for Illyria."

This order was despatched, and Captain Bernard, who, like his comrades, was ardently looking forward to the approaching campaign, regarded as a punishment what was, on the Emperor's part, a precaution to preserve a young man whose merit he appreciated. At the close of the campaign, when the Emperor promoted those officers who had distinguished themselves, Bernard, who was thought to be in disgrace, was not included in Berthier's list among the captains of engineers whom he recommended to the rank of *chef de bataillon;* but Napoleon himself inscribed Bernard's name before all the rest. However, the Emperor forgot him for some time; and it was only an accidental circumstance that brought him to his recollection. I never had any personal acquaintance with Bernard, but I learned from Rapp, how he afterwards became his colleague as *aide de camp* to the Emperor; a circumstance which I shall now relate, though it refers to a later period.

Before the Emperor left Paris for the campaign of 1812 he wished to gain precise information respecting Ragusa and Illyria. He sent for Marmont, but was not satisfied with his answers. He then interrogated several other

generals, but the result of his inquiries always was, "This is all very well; but it is not what I want. I do not know Ragusa." He then sent for General Dejean, who had succeeded M. de Marescot as first inspector of the Engineers.

"Have you any one among your officers," he asked, "who is well acquainted with Ragusa?" Dejean, after a little reflection, replied, "Sire, there is a *chef de bataillon* who has been a long time forgotten, but who knows Illyria perfectly."—"What's his name?"—"Bernard."—"Ah! stop . . . Bernard! I remember that name. Where is he?"—"At Antwerp, Sire, employed on the fortifications."—"Let a telegraphic despatch[1] be immediately transmitted, desiring him to mount his horse and come with all speed to Paris."

The promptitude with which the Emperor's orders were always executed is well known. A few days after Captain Bernard was in the Emperor's cabinet in Paris. Napoleon received him very graciously. The first thing he said was, "Talk to me about Ragusa." This was a favourite mode of interrogation with him in similar cases, and I have heard him say that it was a sure way of drawing out all that a man had observed in any country that he had visited. Be that as it may, he was perfectly satisfied with M. Bernard's information respecting Illyria; and when the *chef de bataillon* had finished speaking Napoleon said, "*Colonel* Bernard, I am now acquainted with Ragusa." The Emperor afterwards conversed familiarly with him, entered into details respecting the system of fortification adopted at Antwerp, referred to the plan of the works, criticised it, and showed how he would, if he besieged the town, render the means of defence unavailing. The new Colonel explained so well how he would defend the town against the Emperor's attack that Bonaparte was delighted, and immediately bestowed upon the young officer a mark of dis-

[1] *i.e.* by semaphore arms.

tinction which, as far as I know, he never granted but upon that single occasion. The Emperor was going to preside at the Council of State, and desired Colonel Bernard to accompany him, and many times during the sittings he asked him for his opinion upon the points which were under discussion. On leaving the Council Napoleon said, "Bernard, you are in future my *aide de camp*." After the campaign he was made General of Brigade, soon after General of Division, and now he is acknowledged to be one of the ablest engineer officers in existence. Clarke's silly conduct deprived France of this distinguished man, who refused the brilliant offers of several sovereigns of Europe for the sake of retiring to the United States of America, where he commands the Engineers, and has constructed fortifications on the coast of the Floridas which are considered by engineers to be masterpieces of military art.

CHAPTER II.

1805.

Rapidity of Napoleon's victories—Murat at Wertingen—Conquest of Ney's duchy—The French army before Ulm—The Prince of Liechtenstein at the Imperial headquarters—His interview with Napoleon described by Rapp—Capitulation of Ulm signed by Berthier and Mack—Napoleon before and after a victory—His address to the captive generals—The Emperor's proclamation—Ten thousand prisoners taken by Murat—Battle of Caldiero in Italy—Letter from Duroc—Attempts to retard the Emperor's progress—Fruitless mission of M. de Giulay—The first French eagles taken by the Russians—Bold adventure of Lannes and Murat—The French enter Vienna—Savary's mission to the Emperor Alexander.

To convey an idea of the brilliant campaign of 1805 from an abstract of the reports and letters I received at Hamburg I should, like the almanac-makers, be obliged to note down a victory for every day. Was not the rapidity of the Emperor's first operations a thing hitherto unprecedented? He departed from Paris on the 24th of September, and hostilities commenced on the 2d of October. On the 6th and 7th the French passed the Danube, and turned the enemy's army. On the 8th Murat, at the battle of Wertingen, on the Danube, took 2000 Austrian prisoners, amongst whom, besides other general officers, was Count Auffemberg. Next day the Austrians fell back upon Gunsburg, retreating before our victorious legions, who, pursuing their triumphal course, entered Augsburg on the 10th, and Munich on the 12th. When I received my despatches I could have fancied I was reading a fabulous narrative. Two days after the French entered Munich—that is to say, on the 14th—an Austrian

corps of 6000 men surrendered to Marshal Soult at Memingen, whilst Ney conquered, sword in hand, his future Duchy of Elchingen. Finally, on the 17th of October, came the famous capitulation of General Mack at Ulm,[1] and on the same day hostilities commenced in

[1] Prince Maurice Liechtenstein was sent by General Mack as a flag of truce to the Imperial headquarters before Ulm. He was, according to custom, led blindfold on horseback. Rapp, who was present, together with several of Napoleon's *aides de camp*, afterwards spoke to me of the Prince's interview with the Emperor. I think he told me that Berthier was present likewise. "Picture to yourself," said Rapp, "the astonishment, or rather confusion, of the poor Prince when the bandage was removed from his eyes. He knew nothing of what had been going on, and did not even suspect that the Emperor had yet joined the army. When he understood that he was in the presence of Napoleon he could not suppress an exclamation of surprise, which did not escape the Emperor, and he ingennously acknowledged that General Mack had no idea he was before the walls of Ulm." Prince Liechtenstein proposed to capitulate on condition that the garrison of Ulm should be allowed to return into Austria. This proposal, in the situation in which the garrison stood, Rapp said, made the Emperor smile. "How can you expect," said Napoleon, "that I can accede to such a proposition? What shall I gain by it? Eight days. In eight days you will be in my power without any condition. Do you suppose I am not acquainted with everything? . . . You expect the Russians? . . . At the nearest they are in Bohemia. Were I to allow you to march out, what security can I have that you will not join them, and afterwards fight against me? Your generals have deceived me often enough, and I will no longer be duped. At Marengo I was weak enough to allow the troops of Melas to march out of Alessandria. He promised to treat for peace. What happened? Two months after Moreau had to fight with the garrison of Alessandria. Besides, this war is not an ordinary war. After the conduct of your Government I am not bound to keep any terms with it. I have no faith in its promises. You have attacked me. If I should agree to what you ask Mack would pledge his word, I know. But even relying on his good faith, would he be able to keep his promise? As far as regards himself—yes; but as regards his army—no. If the Archduke Ferdinand were still with you I could rely upon his word, because he would be responsible for the conditions, and he would not disgrace himself; but I know he has quitted Ulm and passed the Danube. I know how to reach him, however."

Rapp said it was impossible to imagine the embarrassment of Prince Liechtenstein whilst the Emperor was speaking. He, however, somewhat regained his self-possession, and observed that, unless the conditions which he proposed were granted the army would not capitulate. "If that be the case," said Napoleon, "you may as well go back to Mack, for I will never grant such conditions. Are you jesting with me? Stay; here is the capitulation of Memingen—show it to your General—let him surrender on the same conditions—I will consent to no others. Your officers may return to Austria, but the soldiers must be prisoners. Tell him to be speedy, for I have no time to lose. The more he delays the worse he will render his own condition and yours. To-morrow I shall have here the corps to which Memingen capitulated, and then we shall see what is to be done. Make Mack clearly understand that he has no alternative but to conform to my will."

The imperious tones which Napoleon employed towards his enemies almost always succeeded, and it produced the accustomed effect upon Mack. On the same day that

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Italy between the French and Austrians, the former commanded by Masséna and the latter by Prince Charles.

Napoleon, who was so violently irritated by any obstacle which opposed him, and who treated with so much hauteur everybody who ventured to resist his inflexible will, was no longer the same man when, as a conqueror, he received the vanquished generals at Ulm. He condoled with them on their misfortune; and this, I can affirm, was not the result of a feeling of pride concealed beneath a feigned generosity. Although he profited by their defeat he pitied them sincerely. How frequently has he observed to me, "How much to be pitied is a general on the day after a lost battle." He had himself experienced this misfortune when he was obliged to raise the siege of St. Jean d'Acre. At that moment he would, I believe, have strangled Djezzar; but if Djezzar had surrendered, he would have treated him with the same attention which he showed to Mack and the other generals of the garrison of Ulm. These generals were seventeen in number, and among them was Prince Liechtenstein. There were also General Klenau (Baron de Giulay), who had acquired considerable military reputation in the preceding wars, and General Fresnel, who stood in a more critical situation than his companions in misfortune, for he was a Frenchman, and an emigrant.

Rapp told me that it was really painful to see these generals. They bowed respectfully to the Emperor, having Mack at their head. They preserved a mournful silence, and Napoleon was the first to speak, which he did in the following terms: "Gentlemen, I feel sorry that such brave men as you are should be the victims of the follies

Prince Liechtenstein had been at our headquarters Mack wrote to the Emperor, stating that he would not have treated with any other on such terms; but that he yielded to the ascendency of Napoleon's fortune; and on the following day Berthier was sent into Ulm, from whence he returned with the capitulation signed. Thus Napoleon was not mistaken respecting the Caudine Forks of the Austrian army. The garrison of Ulm marched out with what are called the honours of war, and were led prisoners into France.—*Bourrienne.*

of a Cabinet which cherishes insane projects, and which does not hesitate to commit the dignity of the Austrian nation by trafficking with the services of its generals. Your names are known to me—they are honourably known wherever you have fought. Examine the conduct of those who have committed you. What could be more iniquitous than to attack me without a declaration of war? Is it not criminal to bring foreign invasion upon a country? Is it not betraying Europe to introduce Asiatic barbarities into her disputes? If good policy had been followed the Aulic Council, instead of attacking me, would have sought my alliance in order to drive back the Russians to the north. The alliance which your Cabinet has formed will appear monstrous in history. It is the alliance of dogs, shepherds, and wolves against sheep—such a scheme could never have been planned in the mind of a statesman. It is fortunate for you that I have not been defeated in the unjust struggle to which I have been provoked; if I had, the Cabinet of Vienna would have soon perceived its error, for which, perhaps, it will yet one day pay dearly."

What a change fifteen days of success, crowned by the capture of Ulm, had made in affairs! At Hamburg I knew through my agents to what a degree of folly the hopes of Napoleon's enemies had risen before he began the campaign. The security of the Cabinet of Vienna was really inexplicable; not only did they not dream of the series of victories which made Napoleon master of all the Austrian monarchy, but the assistants of Drake and all the intriguers of that sort treated France already as a conquered country, and disposed of some of our provinces. In the excess of their folly, to only give one instance, they promised the town of Lyons to the King of Sardinia, to recompense him for the temporary occupation of Piedmont.[1]

[1] In the treaties and declarations (see *Martens* and *Thiers*, tome v. p. 355) there is rather a tendency to sell the skin of the bear before killing him.

While Napoleon flattered his prisoners at the expense of their Government he wished to express satisfaction at the conduct of his own army, and with this view he published a remarkable proclamation, which in some measure presented an abstract of all that had taken place since the opening of the campaign.

This proclamation was as follows :—

Soldiers of the Grand Army—In a fortnight we have finished an entire campaign. What we proposed to do has been done. We have driven the Austrian troops from Bavaria, and restored our ally to the sovereignty of his dominions.

That army, which, with equal presumption and imprudence, marched upon our frontiers, is annihilated.

But what does this signify to England? She has gained her object. We are no longer at Boulogne, and her subsidy will be neither more nor less.

Of a hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners. They will replace our conscripts in the labours of agriculture.

Two hundred pieces of cannon, the whole park of artillery, ninety flags, and all their generals are in our power. Fifteen thousand men only have escaped.

Soldiers! I announced to you the result of a great battle; but, thanks to the ill-devised schemes of the enemy, I was enabled to secure the wished-for result without incurring any danger, and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, that result has been gained at the sacrifice of scarcely fifteen hundred men killed and wounded.

Soldiers! this success is due to your unlimited confidence in your Emperor, to your patience in enduring fatigues and privations of every kind, and to your singular courage and intrepidity.

But we will not stop here. You are impatient to commence another campaign!

The Russian army, which English gold has brought from the extremities of the universe, shall experience the same fate as that which we have just defeated.

In the conflict in which we are about to engage the honour of the French infantry is especially concerned. We shall now see another decision of the question which has already been determined in Switzerland and Holland; namely, whether the French infantry is the first or the second in Europe.

Among the Russians there are no generals in contending against whom I can acquire any glory. All I wish is to obtain the victory with the least possible bloodshed. My soldiers are my children.

This proclamation always appeared to me a masterpiece of military eloquence. While he lavished praises on his troops, he excited their emulation by hinting that the Russians were capable of disputing with them the first rank among the infantry of Europe, and he concluded his address by calling them his children.

The second campaign, to which Napoleon alleged they so eagerly looked forward, speedily ensued, and hostilities were carried on with a degree of vigour which fired the enthusiasm of the army. Heaven knows what accounts were circulated of the Russians, who, as Bonaparte solemnly stated in his proclamation, had come from the *extremity of the world*. They were represented as half-naked savages, pillaging, destroying and burning wherever they went. It was even asserted that they were cannibals, and had been seen to eat children.[1] In short, at that period was introduced the denomination of northern barbarians which has since been so generally applied to the Russians. Two days after the capitulation of Ulm Murat obtained the capitulation of Trochtelfingen

[1] The Russian army of that time must not be judged by what it became after its rough teaching from Napoleon. Puymaigre (*Souvenirs*, p. 54), who served with it in the army of Condé in 1799, says, "The Russian army was not then what we saw it afterwards; it was only emerging from barbarism. It was in long combating with or against Napoleon that foreigners learned the art of war. When we were incorporated with the Russian army its orders and manœuvres all belonged to another epoch. In a work translated into French for our use, the manœuvres of the Czar Peter at Pultowa were brought to our memories, and certainly there had been many changes since then. . . . I saw these same Russians fifteen years afterwards, and I did not recognise them. Everything was well organised; their equipment was perfect, and their artillery was especially remarkable for the lightness of the waggons and gun-carriages and the superb quality of the horses." See also Cathcart (*War in Russia*, p. 23), where he ranks the Russians, in 1813, as the best in marching, and remarks on the care taken by the Emperor Alexander for the maintenance of the proper distances between the regiments. "Up to 1806" (says *Savary*, tome ii. p. 221) "we saw the Russian infantry lay their knapsacks on the ground before commencing to fire, so that if they were repulsed they lost all their packs."

from General Warneck, and made 10,000 prisoners, so that, without counting killed and wounded, the Austrian army had sustained a diminution of 50,000 men after a campaign of twenty days. On the 27th of October the French army crossed the Inn, and thus penetrated into the Austrian territory. Salzburg and Braunau were immediately taken. The army of Italy, under the command of Masséna, was also obtaining great advantages. On the 30th of October, that is to say, the very day on which the Grand Army took the above-mentioned fortresses, the army of Italy, having crossed the Adige, fought a sanguinary battle at Caldiero, and took 5000 Austrian prisoners.

In the extraordinary campaign, which has been distinguished by the name of "the Campaign of Austerlitz," the exploits of our troops succeeded each other with the rapidity of thought. I confess I was equally astonished and delighted when I received a note from Duroc, sent by an extraordinary courier, and commencing laconically with the words, "We are in Vienna; the Emperor is well."

Duroc's letter was dated the 13th November, and the words, "We are in Vienna," seemed to me the result of a dream. The capital of Austria, which from time immemorial had not been occupied by foreigners—the city which Sobieski had saved from Ottoman violence, had become the prey of the Imperial eagle of France, which, after a lapse of three centuries, avenged the humiliations formerly imposed upon Francis I. by the *Aquila Grifagna* of Charles V.[1] Duroc had left the Emperor before the camp of Boulogne was raised; his mission to Berlin being terminated, he rejoined the Emperor at Lintz.

[1] "Aquila Grifagna, che due becchi porta per meglio divorar."

The eagle in the Austrian arms has two heads and necks.—*Editor of* 1836 *Edition.*

As soon as Bonaparte became Emperor he constituted himself the avenger of all the insults given to the sovereigns, whom he styled his predecessors. All that related to the honour of France was sacred to him. Thus he removed the column of Rosbach from the Prussian territory.—*Bourrienne.*

Before I noticed the singular mission of M. Haugwitz to the Emperor Napoleon, and the result of that mission, which circumstances rendered diametrically the reverse of its object, I will relate what came to my knowledge respecting some other negotiations on the part of Austria, the evident intent of which was to retard Napoleon's progress, and thereby to dupe him. M. de Giulay, one of the generals included in the capitulation of Ulm, had returned home to acquaint his sovereign with the disastrous event. He did not conceal, either from the Emperor Francis or the Cabinet of Vienna, the destruction of the Austrian army, and the impossibility of arresting the rapid advance of the French. M. de Giulay was sent with a flag of truce to the headquarters of Napoleon, to assure him of the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Austria, and to solicit an armistice. The snare was too clumsy not to be immediately discovered by so crafty a man as Napoleon.[1] He had always pretended a love for peace, though he was overjoyed at the idea of continuing a war so successfully commenced, and he directed General Giulay to assure the Emperor of Austria that he was not less anxious for peace than he, and that he was ready to treat for it, but without suspending the course of his operations. Bonaparte, indeed, could not, without a degree of imprudence of which he was incapable, consent to an armistice; for M. de Giulay, though entrusted with powers from Austria, had received none from Russia. Russia, therefore, might disavow the armistice and arrive in time to defend Vienna, the occupation of which was so important to the French army. The Russians, indeed, were advancing to oppose us, and the corps of our army, commanded by Mortier on the left bank of the Danube, experienced in the first engagement a check at Dirnstein, which not a

[1] Metternich (tome ii. p. 346, compare French edition, tome ii. p. 287) says, "Let us hold always the sword in one hand and the olive branch in the other; always ready to negotiate, but only negotiating while advancing. Here is Napoleon's system."

little vexed the Emperor. This was the first reverse of fortune we had sustained throughout the campaign. It was trivial, to be sure, but the capture by the Russians of three French eagles, the first that had fallen into the hands of the enemy, was very mortifying to Napoleon, and caused him to prolong for some days his stay at St. Polten, where he then was.

The rapid occupation of Vienna was due to the successful temerity of Lannes and Murat, two men alike distinguished for courage and daring spirit. A bold artifice of these generals prevented the destruction of the Thabor bridge at Vienna, without which our army would have experienced considerable difficulty in penetrating into the Austrian capital. This act of courage and presence of mind, which had so great an influence on the events of the campaign, was described to me by Lannes, who told the story with an air of gaiety, unaccompanied by any self-complacency, and seemed rather pleased with the trick played upon the Austrians than proud of the brilliant action which had been performed. Bold enterprises were so natural to Lannes that he was frequently the only person who saw nothing extraordinary in his own exploits. Alas! what men were sacrificed to Napoleon's ambition!

The following is the story of the Bridge of Thabor as I heard it from Lannes:—

I was one day walking with Murat, on the right bank of the Danube, and we observed on the left bank, which was occupied by the Austrians, some works going on, the evident object of which was to blow up the bridge on the approach of our troops. The fools had the impudence to make these preparations under our very noses; but we gave them a good lesson. Having arranged our plan, we returned to give orders, and I entrusted the command of my column of grenadiers to an officer on whose courage and intelligence I could rely. I then returned to the bridge, accompanied by Murat and two or three other officers. We advanced, unconcernedly, and entered into conversation with the commander of a post in the middle of the bridge. We spoke to

him about an armistice which was to be speedily concluded. While conversing with the Austrian officers we contrived to make them turn their eyes towards the left bank, and then, agreeably to the orders we had given, my column of grenadiers advanced on the bridge. The Austrian cannoneers, on the left bank, seeing their officers in the midst of us, did not dare to fire, and my column advanced at a quick step. Murat and I, at the head of it, gained the left bank. All the combustibles prepared for blowing up the bridge were thrown into the river, and my men took possession of the batteries erected for the defence of the bridge head. The poor devils of Austrian officers were perfectly astounded when I told them they were my prisoners.

Such, as well as I can recollect, was the account given by Lannes, who laughed immoderately in describing the consternation of the Austrian officers when they discovered the trick that had been played upon them. When Lannes performed this exploit he had little idea of the important consequences which would attend it. He had not only secured to the remainder of the French army a sure and easy entrance to Vienna, but, without being aware of it, he created an insurmountable impediment to the junction of the Russian army with the Austrian corps, commanded by Prince Charles, who, being pressed by Masséna, hastily advanced into the heart of the Hereditary States, where he fully expected a great battle would take place.[1]

As soon as the corps of Murat and Lannes had taken possession of Vienna the Emperor ordered all the divisions of the army to march upon that capital. Napoleon

[1] The story is told in much the same way in *Thiers* (tome vi. p. 260), *Rapp* (p. 57), and *Savary* (tome ii. p. 162), but as *Erreurs* (tome i. p. 314) points out, Bourrienne makes an odd mistake in believing the Thabor Bridge gave the French access to Vienna. The capital is on the right bank, and was already in their power. The possession of the bridge enabled them to pass over to the left bank, and to advance towards Austerlitz before the Archduke Charles, coming from Italy, could make his junction with the allied army. See plan 48 of Thiers' *Atlas*, or 58 of Alison's. The immediate result of the success of this rather doubtful artifice would have been the destruction of the corps of Kutusoff; but Murat in his turn was deceived by Bagration into belief in an armistice. In fact, both sides at this time fell into curious errors; see *Jomini*, tome ii. p. 159 and *Thiers*, tome vi. p. 272.

established his headquarters at Schœnbrunn, where he planned his operations for compelling the corps of Prince Charles to retire to Hungary, and also for advancing his own forces to meet the Russians. Murat and Lannes always commanded the advanced guard during the forced marches ordered by Napoleon, which were executed in a way truly miraculous.

To keep up the appearance of wishing to conclude peace as soon as reasonable propositions should be made to him, Napoleon sent for his Minister for foreign Affairs, who speedily arrived at Vienna, and General Savary was sent on a mission to the Emperor Alexander. The details of this mission I have learned only from the account of it given by the Duc de Rovigo in his apologetic Memoirs. In spite of the Duke's eagerness to induce a belief in Napoleon's pacific disposition, the very facts on which he supports his argument lead to the contrary conclusion. Napoleon wished to dictate his conditions before the issue of a battle the success of which might appear doubtful to the young Emperor of Russia, and these conditions were such as he might impose when victory should be declared in favour of our eagles. It must be clear to every reflecting person that by always proposing what he knew could not be honourably acceded to, he kept up the appearance of being a pacificator, while at the same time he ensured to himself the pleasure of carrying on the war.

CHAPTER III.

1805.

My functions at Hamburg—The King of Sweden at Stralsund—My bulletin describing the situation of the Russian armies—Duroc's recall from Berlin—General Dumouriez—Recruiting of the English in Hanover—The daughter of M. de Marbeuf and Napoleon—Treachery of the King of Naples—The Sun of Austerlitz—Prince Dolgorouki—Rapp's account of the battle of Austerlitz—Gérard's picture—Eugène's marriage.

I MUST now relate how, in conformity with my instructions, I was employed in Hamburg in aiding the success of the French army. I had sent an agent to observe the Russian troops, which were advancing by forced marches on the banks of the Elbe. This agent transmitted to me from Gadbusch an account of the routes taken by the different columns. It was then supposed that they would march upon Holland by the way of Bremen and Oldenburg. On the receipt of this intelligence the Electorate of Hanover was evacuated by the French, and General Barbou, who had commanded there, concentrated his forces in Hamelin.

On the 2d of November 1805 the King of Sweden arrived at Stralsund. I immediately intimated to our Government that this circumstance would probably give a new turn to the operations of the combined army, for hitherto the uncertainty of its movements and the successive counter-orders afforded no possibility of ascertaining any determined plan. The intention seemed to be, that all the Swedo-Russian troops should cross the Elbe at the same point, viz., Lauenburg, six miles from Hamburg.

There was not on the 5th of November a single Russian on the southern bank of the Elbe.

The first column of the grand Russian army passed through Warsaw on the 1st of November, and on the 2d the Grand-Duke Constantine was expected with the Guards. This column, which amounted to 6000 men, was the first that passed through Prussian Poland.

At this time we momentarily expected to see the Hanoverian army landed on the banks of the Weser or the Elbe, augmented by some thousands of English. Their design apparently was either to attack Holland, or to attempt some operation on the rear of our Grand Army.

The French Government was very anxious to receive accurate accounts of the march of the Swedo-Russian troops through Hanover, and of the Russian army through Poland. My agents at Warsaw and Stralsund, who were exceedingly active and intelligent, enabled me to send off a bulletin describing the state of Hanover, the movements of the Russians and Swedes, together with information of the arrival of English troops in the Elbe, and a statement of the force of the combined army in Hanover, which consisted of 15,000 Russians, 8000 Swedes, and 12,000 English ; making in all 35,000 men.

It was probably on account of this bulletin that Napoleon expressed to Duroc his satisfaction with my services. The Emperor on recalling Duroc from Berlin did not manifest the least apprehension respecting Prussia. Duroc wrote to me the following letter on the occasion of his recall :—

My dear Bourrienne—The Emperor having thought my services necessary to the army has recalled me. I yesterday had a farewell audience of the King and Queen, who treated me very graciously. His Majesty presented me with his portrait set in diamonds.

The Emperor Alexander will probably depart to-morrow, and the Archduke Anthony very speedily. We cannot but hope that their presence here will facilitate a good understanding.

(Signed) Duroc.

Whenever foreign armies were opposing France the hopes of the emigrants revived. They falsely imagined that the powers coalesced against Napoleon were labouring in their cause ; and many of them entered the Russian and Austrian armies. Of this number was General Dumouriez. I received information that he had landed at Stade on the 21st of November ; but whither he intended to proceed was not known. A man named St. Martin, whose wife lived with Dumouriez, and who had accompanied the general from England to Stade, came to Hamburg, where he observed great precautions for concealment, and bought two carriages, which were immediately forwarded to Stade. St. Martin himself immediately proceeded to the latter place. I was blamed for not having arrested this man ; but he had a commission attesting that he was in the English service, and, as I have before mentioned, a foreign commission was a safeguard, and the only one which could not be violated in Hamburg.

In December 1805 the English recruiting in Hanover was kept up without interruption, and attended with extraordinary success. Sometimes a hundred men were raised in a day. The misery prevailing in Germany, which had been ravaged by the war, the hatred against the French, and the high bounty that was offered enabled the English to procure as many men as they wished.

The King of Sweden, meditating on the stir he should make in Hanover, took with him a camp printing-press to publish the bulletins of the *grand* Swedish army. The first of these bulletins announced to *Europe* that his Swedish Majesty was about to leave Stralsund, and that his army would take up its position partly between Nelsen and Haarburg, and partly between Domitz and the frontiers of Hamburg.

Among the anecdotes of Napoleon connected with this campaign I find in my notes the following, which was

related to me by Rapp. Some days before his entrance into Vienna Napoleon, who was riding on horseback along the road, dressed in his usual uniform of the chasseurs of the Guard, met an open carriage, in which were seated a lady and a priest. The lady was in tears, and Napoleon could not refrain from stopping to ask her what was the cause of her distress. "Sir," she replied, for she did not know the Emperor, "I have been pillaged at my estate, two leagues from hence, by a party of soldiers, who have murdered my gardener. I am going to seek your Emperor, who knows my family, to whom he was once under great obligations." "What is your name?" inquired Napoleon.—"De Bunny," replied the lady. "I am the daughter of M. de Marbeuf, formerly Governor of Corsica." —"Madame," exclaimed Napoleon, "I am the Emperor. I am delighted to have the opportunity of serving you." —"You cannot conceive," continued Rapp, "the attention which the Emperor showed Madame de Bunny. He consoled her, pitied her, almost apologised for the misfortune she had sustained. 'Will you have the goodness, Madame,' said he, 'to go and wait for me at my headquarters? I will join you speedily; every member of M. de Marbeuf's family has a claim on my respect.' The Emperor immediately gave her a picquet of chasseurs of his guard to escort her. He saw her again during the day, when he loaded her with attentions, and liberally indemnified her for the losses she had sustained." [1]

[1] This incident is related in the Memoirs of Rapp, p. 54, giving some colour to the remark of *Erreurs*, tome i. p. 315, on a similar reference. The whole family of the Bonapartes certainly owed much to the Comte (Louis Charles René), later the Marquis de Marbeuf, who had been Governor of Corsica, and who had obtained permission for Napoleon to enter the military school of Brienne, and generally acted as their protector. The Comte had stood as godfather to Louis Bonaparte. See Iung's *Bonaparte*, tome i., especially p. 91. He died in 1786. When the young Napoleon, put in the cells at Brienne for some quarrel, makes a spirited appeal to M. de Marbeuf to withdraw him from Brienne, he then says, "As for the kindnesses you shower on me, they shall always be present to my memory." They were present, and Napoleon had full right to say to Madame Junot that all sovereigns were not ungrateful (*Junot*, tome ii. p. 510).

For some time previous to the battle of Austerlitz the different corps of the army intersected every part of Germany and Italy, all tending towards Vienna as a central point. At the beginning of November the corps commanded by Marshal Bernadotte arrived at Saltzburg at the moment when the Emperor had advanced his headquarters to Braunau, where there were numerous magazines of artillery and a vast quantity of provisions of every kind. The junction of the corps commanded by Bernadotte in Hanover with the Grand Army was a point of such high importance that Bonaparte had directed the Marshal to come up with him as speedily as possible, and to take the shortest road. This order obliged Bernadotte to pass through the territory of the two Margravates.

At that time we were at peace with Naples. In September the Emperor had concluded with Ferdinand IV. a treaty of neutrality. This treaty enabled Carra St. Cyr, who occupied Naples, to evacuate that city and to join Masséna in Upper Italy; both reached the Grand Army on the 28th of November. But no sooner had the troops commanded by Carra St. Cyr quitted the Neapolitan territory than the King of Naples, influenced by his Ministers, and above all by Queen Caroline, broke the treaty of neutrality, ordered hostile preparations against France, opened his ports to the enemies of the Emperor, and received into his States 12,000 Russians and 8000 English.[1] It was on the receipt of this news that Bonaparte, in one of his most violent bulletins, styled the Queen of Naples a second Fredegonda. The victory of Austerlitz having given powerful support to his threats, the fall of Naples was decided, and shortly after his brother Joseph was seated on the Neapolitan throne.

At length came the grand day when, to use Napoleon's

[1] This has been called treachery on the part of King Ferdinand, but it should be remembered that it was only by a system of treachery and violence that the French had obtained a footing in the Kingdom of Naples, and forced Ferdinand into a most disadvantageous treaty.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

expression, the *Sun of Austerlitz rose.* All our forces were concentrated on one point, at about 40 leagues beyond Vienna. There remained nothing but the wreck of the Austrian army, the corps of Prince Charles being by scientific manœuvres kept at a distance from the line of operations; but the Russians alone were superior to us in numbers, and their army was almost entirely composed of fresh troops. The most extraordinary illusion prevailed in the enemy's camp. The north of Europe has its Gascons as well as the south of France, and the junior portion of the Russian army at this period assumed an absurd braggadocio tone. On the very eve of the battle the Emperor Alexander sent one of his *aides de camp,* Prince Dolgorouki, as a flag of truce to Napoleon. The Prince could not repress his self-sufficiency even in the presence of the Emperor, and Rapp informed me that on dismissing him the Emperor said, "If you were on the heights of Montmartre,[1] I would answer such impertinence only by cannon-balls." This observation was very remarkable, inasmuch as subsequent events rendered it a prophecy.

As to the battle itself, I can describe it almost as well as if I had witnessed it, for some time after I had the pleasure of seeing my friend Rapp, who was sent on a mission to Prussia. He gave me the following account:—

"When we arrived at Austerlitz the Russians were not aware of the scientific plans which the Emperor had laid for drawing them upon the ground he had marked out; and seeing our advanced guards fall back before theirs they already considered themselves conquerors. They supposed that their Guard alone would secure an easy triumph. But the action commenced, and they experienced an energetic resistance on all points. At one o'clock the victory was yet uncertain, for they fought ad-

[1] Overlooking Paris, where, nine years later, the Russians stood as conquerors.—*Editor of the* 1836 *edition.*

mirably. They wished to make a last effort by directing close masses against our centre. Their Imperial Guard deployed; their artillery, cavalry, and infantry marched upon a bridge which they attacked, and this movement, which was concealed by the rising and falling of the ground, was not observed by Napoleon. I was at that moment near the Emperor, awaiting his orders. We heard a well-maintained firing of musketry. The Russians were repulsing one of our brigades. The Emperor ordered me to take some of the Mamelukes, two squadrons of chasseurs, and one of grenadiers of the Guard, and to go and reconnoitre the state of things. I set off at full gallop, and soon discovered the disaster. The Russian cavalry had penetrated our squares, and was sabring our men. I perceived in the distance some masses of cavalry and infantry, which formed the reserve of the Russians. At that moment the enemy advanced to meet us, bringing with him four pieces of artillery, and ranged himself in order of battle. I had the brave Morland on my left, and General D'Allemagne on my right. 'Forward, my lads!' exclaimed I to my troop. 'See how your brothers and friends are being cut to pieces. Avenge them! avenge our flag! Forward!' These few words roused my men. We advanced as swiftly as our horses could carry us upon the artillery, which was taken. The enemy's cavalry, which awaited us firmly, was repulsed by the same shock, and fled in disorder, galloping as we did over the wrecks of our squares. The Russians rallied; but a squadron of horse grenadiers came up to reinforce me, and thus enabled me to hold ground against the reserves of the Russian Guard. We charged again, and this charge was terrible. The brave Morland was killed by my side. It was downright butchery. We were opposed man to man, and were so mingled together that the infantry of neither one nor the other side could venture to fire for fear of killing its own men. At length the intre-

pidity of our troops overcame every obstacle, and the Russians fled in disorder, in sight of the two Emperors of Russia and Austria, who had stationed themselves on a height in order to witness the battle. They saw a desperate one," said Rapp, "and I trust they were satisfied. For my part, my dear friend, I never spent so glorious a day. What a reception the Emperor gave me when I returned to inform him that we had won the battle! My sword was broken, and a wound which I received on my head was bleeding copiously, so that I was covered with blood! He made me a General of Division. The Russians did not return to the charge; we had taken all their cannon and baggage, and Prince Repnin was among the prisoners." [1]

Thus it was that Rapp related to me this famous battle of which he was the hero, as Kellerman had been the hero of Marengo. What now remains of Austerlitz? The recollection, the glory, and the magnificent picture of Gérard, the idea of which was suggested to the Emperor by the sight of Rapp with the blood streaming from his wound.

I cannot forbear relating here a few particulars which I learned from Rapp respecting his mission after the cure of

[1] There is something strange about the position and behaviour of the Russian army after Austerlitz. See Savary (tome ii. chap. xvii.), in which he hints that the Russians only escaped worse defeat the day after the battle by bad faith. Jomini says nothing on the subject, but he owed much to Alexander when he wrote. On the battle itself Jomini puts the following in the mouth of Napoleon. "Such was the famous day of Austerlitz,—of all the pitched fights I have won that of which I am the proudest, as much on account of the enemy over whom I triumphed as on account of the circumstances which made all my combinations succeed as if I had commanded both armies and as if we had agreed upon the manœuvres. Ulm, Marengo, Jéna, Ratisbon, were as brilliant victories, but they were the result of strategical manœuvres and of a series of combats. The most remarkable tactical battles are Austerlitz, Rivoli, and Dresden" (*Jomini*, tome ii. p. 193). See Thiers' vivid account, tome vi. livre xxiii. Also Hamley's *Operations*, pp. 379 and 409. Jomini's opinion must be that of every soldier, but he does not do justice to the calculated daring by which Napoleon disregarded the Prussian advance and crushed the allies before Prussia could bring her power to bear. One undoubted result of Austerlitz was the death of the great English patriot, William Pitt, who is said to have been as much killed by it as if actually shot on the field. See *Alison*, chap. xl. para. 167.

his wound, and the marriage of Prince Eugène to the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. The friendship which Rapp cherished for me was of the most sincere kind. During my disgrace he did not even conceal it from Napoleon; and whoever knows anything of the Emperor's Court will acknowledge that *that* was a greater mark of courage than the carrying of a redoubt or making the most brilliant charge of cavalry. Rapp possessed courage of every kind, an excellent heart, and a downright frankness, which for a time brought him into disgrace with Napoleon. The only thing for which Rapp could be reproached was his extreme prejudice against the nobility, which I am convinced was the sole reason why he was not created a Duke.[1] The Emperor made him a Count because he wished that all his *aides de camp* should have titles.

"He had been a fortnight at Schœnbrunn," said Rapp to me, "and I had not yet resumed my duties, when the Emperor sent for me. He asked me whether I was able to travel, and on my replying in the affirmative, he said, 'Go then, and give an account of the battle of Austerlitz to Marmont, and vex him for not having been at it.' I set off, and in conformity with the instructions I had received from the Emperor I proceeded to Gratz, where I found Marmont, who was indeed deeply mortified at not having had a share in the great battle. I told him, as the Emperor had directed me, that the negotiations were commenced, but that nothing was yet concluded, and that therefore, at all events, he must hold himself in readiness. I ascertained the situation of his army in Styria, and the amount of the enemy's force before him. The Emperor wished him to send a number of spies into Hungary, and to transmit to him a detailed report from their communications. I next proceeded to Laybach, where I found Masséna at the head of the eighth corps, and I informed him that the Emperor wished him to march in all haste

[1] Or *vice versâ*?—READER.

upon Vienna, in case he should hear of the rupture of the negotiations. I continued the itinerary marked out for me until I reached Venice, and thence till I met the troops of Carra St. Cyr,[1] who had received orders to march back upon Naples as soon as the Emperor heard of the treachery of the King of Naples and the landing of the English and Russians. Having fulfilled these different missions I proceeded to Klagenfurth, where I saw Marshal Ney, and I afterwards rejoined the Emperor at Munich. There I had the pleasure of finding our friends assembled, and among them Josephine, still as affable and amiable as ever. How delighted I was when, on my arrival, I learned that the Emperor had adopted Eugène. I was present at his marriage with the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. As to me, you know I am not very fond of *fêtes*, and the Emperor might have dispensed with my performing the duties of Chamberlain; Eugène had no idea of what was going on when the Emperor sent to desire his presence at Munich with all possible speed. He, too, remains unchanged; he is still our old comrade. At first he was not much pleased with the idea of a political marriage; but when he saw his bride he was quite enchanted; and no wonder, for I assure you she is a very charming woman."

[1] Gouvion, not Carra, St. Cyr (*Erreurs*, tome ii. p. 148).

CHAPTER IV.

1805.

Depreciation of the Bank paper—Ouvrard—His great discretion—Bonaparte's opinion of the rich—Ouvrard's imprisonment—His partnership with the King of Spain—His connection with Wanlerberghe and Desprez—Bonaparte's return to Paris after the campaign of Vienna—Hasty dismissal of M. Barbé Marbois.

At the moment when the Emperor had reason to hope that the news of his extraordinary success would animate public spirit he was informed that considerable disquietude prevailed, and that the Bank of France was assailed by demands for the payment of its paper, which had fallen more than 5 per cent. I was not ignorant of the cause of this decline. I had been made acquainted, through the commercial correspondence between Hamburg and Paris, with a great financial operation, planned by M. Ouvrard, in consequence of which he was to obtain piastres from Spanish America at a price much below the real value; and I had learned that he was obliged to support this enterprise by the funds which he and his partners previously employed in victualling the forces. A fresh investment of capital was therefore necessary for this service, which, when on a large scale, requires extensive advances, and the tardy payment of the Treasury at that period was well known.

I was well acquainted with M. Ouvrard, and in what I am about to say I do not think there will be found anything offensive or disagreeable to him. I observed the greater number of the facts to which I shall refer in their origin, and the rest I learned from M. Ouvrard himself,

who, when he visited Hamburg in 1808, communicated to me a variety of details repecting his immense transaction with the King of Spain. Among other things I recollect he told me that before the 18th Brumaire he was possessed of 60,000,000, without owing a franc to any person.

This celebrated financier has been the object of great public attention.[1] The prodigious variations of fortune which he has experienced, the activity of his life, the immense commercial operations in which he has been engaged, the extent and the boldness of his enterprises, render it necessary, in forming a judgment of M. Ouvrard, to examine his conduct with due care and deliberation. The son of a stationer, who was able merely through his own resources to play so remarkable a part, could be no ordinary man. It may be said of M. Ouvrard what Beaumarchais said of himself, that his life was really a combat. I have known him long, and I saw much of him in his relations with Josephine. He always appeared to me to possess great knowledge of the world, accompanied by honourable principles, and a high degree of generosity, which added greatly to the value of his prudence and discretion. No human power, no consideration, not even the ingratitude of those whom he had obliged, could in-

[1] Bourrienne goes at great length into the curious but well-known Ouvrard affair of which he could not have had much special knowledge at the time. The company of "Négociants réunis," composed of Ouvrard, Desprez, and Wanlerberghe, had undertaken enormous contracts for the French and Spanish Governments. The French Treasury became mixed up with their affairs, and the large advances which had to be made to the company shook the public credit. This matter hung like a cloud over Napoleon during the Austerlitz campaign; see his Correspondence with Joseph in 1805, tome i. On the return of the Emperor, after the peace of Presburg, he dismissed M. Barbé Marbois, the Ministre du Trésor, but only for injudicious conduct, paying a compliment to his personal character at the time. The main wrath of the Emperor, who rightly or wrongly looked on himself as robbed, fell on Ouvrard, who was imprisoned for some years, and the fortune of himself and his associates appropriated to refunding the deficiency of the Treasury. Ouvrard afterwards pursued the same extraordinary and varied career: sometimes rich, and sometimes ruined. In 1823 he undertook the supply of the French army in Spain, and in 1830 was mixed up with the Spanish pretenders. He died in 1847. See the account of this affair by Thiers, tome vi. livres xxii. and xxiii.

duce him to disclose any sacrifice which he had made at the time when, under the Directory, the public revenue may be said to have been always at the disposal of the highest bidder, and when no business could be brought to a conclusion except by him who set about it with his hands full of money. To this security, with which M. Ouvrard impressed all official persons who rendered him services, I attribute the facility with which he obtained the direction of the numerous enterprises in which he engaged, and which produced so many changes in his fortune. The discretion of M. Ouvrard was not quite agreeable to the First Consul, who found it impossible to extract from him the information he wanted. He tried every method to obtain from him the names of persons to whom he had given those kind of subsidies which in vulgar language are called sops in the pan, and by ladies pin-money. Often have I seen Bonaparte resort to every possible contrivance to gain his object. He would sometimes endeavour to alarm M. Ouvrard by menaces, and at other times to flatter him by promises, but he was in no instance successful.

While we were at the Luxembourg, on, as I recollect, the 25th of January 1800, Bonaparte said to me during breakfast, "Bourrienne, my resolution is taken. I shall have Ouvrard arrested."—"General, have you proofs against him?"—"Proofs, indeed! He is a money-dealer, a monopoliser; we must make him disgorge. All the contractors, all the provision agents, are rogues. How have they got their fortunes? At the expense of the country, to be sure. I will not suffer such doings. They possess millions, they roll in an insolent luxury, while my soldiers have neither bread nor shoes! I will have no more of that! I intend to speak on the business to-day in the Council, and we shall see what can be done."

I waited with impatience for his return from the Council to know what had passed. "Well, General?" said I. "The

order is given." On hearing this I became anxious about the fate of M. Ouvrard, who was thus to be treated more like a subject of the Grand Turk than a citizen of the Republic; but I soon learned that the order had not been executed because he could not be found.

Next day I learned that a person, whom I shall not name, who was present at the Council, and who probably was under obligations to Ouvrard, wrote him a note in pencil to inform him of the vote for his arrest carried by the First Consul. This individual stepped out for a moment and despatched his servant with the note to Ouvrard. Having thus escaped the writ of arrest, Ouvrard, after a few days had passed over, reappeared, and surrendered himself prisoner. Bonaparte was at first furious on learning that he had got out of the way; but on hearing that Ouvrard had surrendered himself he said to me, "The fool! he does not know what is awaiting him! He wishes to make the public believe that he has nothing to fear; that his hands are clean. But he is playing a bad game; he will gain nothing in that way with me. All talking is nonsense. You may be sure, Bourrienne, that when a man has so much money he cannot have got it honestly, and then all those fellows are dangerous with their fortunes. In times of revolution no man ought to have more than 3,000,000 francs, and that is a great deal too much."

Before going to prison Ouvrard took care to secure against all the searches of the police any of his papers which might have committed persons with whom he had dealings; and I believe that there were individuals connected with the police itself who had good reason for not regretting the opportunity which M. Ouvrard had taken for exercising this precaution. Seals, however, were put upon his papers; but on examining them none of the information Bonaparte so much desired to obtain was found. Nevertheless on one point his curiosity was satisfied, for on looking over the documents he found from some of

them that Madame Bonaparte had been borrowing money from Ouvrard.

As Ouvrard had a great number of friends they bestirred themselves to get some person of influence to speak to the First Consul in his favour. But this was a commission no one was willing to undertake ; because, prejudiced as Bonaparte was, the least hint of the kind would have appeared to him to be dictated by private interest. Berthier was very earnestly urged to interfere, but he replied, "That is impossible. He would say that it was underhand work to get money for Madame Visconti."

I do not recollect to what circumstance Ouvrard was indebted for his liberty, but it is certain that his captivity did not last long. Sometime after he had left his prison Bonaparte asked him for 12,000,000, which M. Ouvrard refused.

On his accession to the Consulate Bonaparte found M. Ouvrard contractor for supplying the Spanish fleet under the command of Admiral Massaredo. This business introduced him to a correspondence with the famous Godoy, Prince of the Peace. The contract lasted three years, and M. Ouvrard gained by it a net profit of 15,000,000. The money was payable in piastres, at the rate of 3 francs and some centimes each, though the piastre was really worth 5 francs 40 centimes. But to recover it at this value it was necessary for M. Ouvrard to go and get the money in Mexico. This he was much inclined to do, but he apprehended some obstacle on the part of the First Consul, and, notwithstanding his habitual shrewdness, he became the victim of his over-precaution. On his application M. de Talleyrand undertook to ask the First Consul for authority to give him a passport. I was in the cabinet at the time, and I think I still hear the dry and decided "*No*," which was all the answer M. de Talleyrand obtained. When we were alone the First Consul said to me, "Do you not see, Bourrienne, this Ouvrard must have made a good thing of

his business with the Prince of the Peace? But the fool! Why did he get Talleyrand to ask me for a passport? That is the very thing that raised my suspicion. Why did he not apply for a passport as every one else does? Have I the giving of them? He is an ass; so much the worse for him."

I was sorry for Ouvrard's disappointment, and I own none the less so because he had intimated his willingness to give me a share in the business he was to transact in Spain; and which was likely to be very profitable. His brother went to Mexico in his stead.

In 1802 a dreadful scarcity afflicted France. M. Ouvrard took upon himself, in concert with Wanlerberghe, the task of importing foreign grain to prevent the troubles which might otherwise have been expected. In payment of the grain the foreign houses who sent it drew upon Ouvrard and Wanlerberghe for 26,000,000 francs in Treasury bills, which, according to the agreement with the Government, were to be paid. But when the bills of the foreign houses became due there was no money in the Treasury, and payment was refused. After six months had elapsed payment was offered, but on condition that the Government should retain half the profit of the commission! This Ouvrard and Wanlerberghe refused, upon which the Treasury thought it most economical to pay nothing, and the debt remained unsettled. Notwithstanding this transaction Ouvrard and Wanlerberghe engaged to victual the navy, which they supplied for six years and three months. After the completion of these different services the debt due to them amounted to 68,000,000.

In consequence of the long delay of payment by the Treasury the disbursements for supplies of grain amounted at least to more than 40,000,000; and the difficulties which arose had a serious effect on the credit of the principal dealers with those persons who supplied them. The discredit spread and gradually reached the Treasury, the

embarrassments of which augumented with the general alarm. Ouvrard, Wanlerberghe, and Séguin were the persons whose capital and credit rendered them most capable of relieving the Treasury, and they agreed to advance for that purpose 102,000,000, in return for which they were allowed bonds of the Receivers-General to the amount of 150,000,000. M. Desprez undertook to be the medium through which the 102,000,000 were to be paid into the Treasury, and the three partners transferred the bonds to him.

Spain had concluded a treaty with France, by which she was bound to pay a subsidy of 72,000,000 francs, and 32,000,000 had become due without any payment being made. It was thought advisable that Ouvrard should be sent to Madrid to obtain a settlement, but he was afraid that his business in Paris would suffer during his absence, and especially the transaction in which he was engaged with Desprez. The Treasury satisfied him on this point by agreeing to sanction the bargain with Desprez, and Ouvrard proceeded to Madrid. It was on this occasion he entered into the immense speculation for trading with Spanish America.

Spain wished to pay the 32,000,000 which were due to France as soon as possible, but her coffers were empty, and goodwill does not ensure ability ; besides, in addition to the distress of the Government, there was a dreadful famine in Spain. In this state of things Ouvrard proposed to the Spanish Government to pay the debt due to France, to import a supply of corn, and to advance funds for the relief of the Spanish Treasury. For this he required two conditions. (1.) The exclusive right of trading with America. (2.) The right of bringing from America on his own account all the specie belonging to the Crown, with the power of making loans guaranteed and payable by the Spanish Treasuries.

About the end of July 1805 the embarrassment which

sometime before had begun to be felt in the finances of Europe was alarmingly augmented. Under these circumstances it was obviously the interest of Ouvrard to procure payment as soon as possible of the 32,000,000 which he had advanced for Spain to the French Treasury. He therefore redoubled his efforts to bring his negotiation to a favourable issue, and at last succeeded in getting a deed of partnership between himself and Charles IV. which contained the following stipulation:—"Ouvrard and Company are authorised to introduce into the ports of the New World every kind of merchandise and production necessary for the consumption of those countries, and to export from the Spanish Colonies, during the continuance of the war with England, all the productions and all specie derivable from them." This treaty was only to be in force during the war with England, and it was stipulated that the profits arising from the transactions of the Company should be equally divided between Charles IV. and the rest of the Company; that is to say, one-half to the King and the other half to his partners.

The consequences of this extraordinary partnership between a King and a private individual remain to be stated. On the signing of the deed Ouvrard received drafts from the Treasury of Madrid to the extent of 52,500,000 piastres; making 262,500,000 francs; but the piastres were to be brought from America, while the terms of the treaty required that the urgent wants of the Spanish Government should be immediately supplied, and, above all, the progress of the famine checked. To accomplish this object fresh advances to an enormous amount were necessary, for M. Ouvrard had to begin by furnishing 2,000,000 of quintals of grain at the rate of 26 francs the quintal. Besides all this, before he could realise a profit and be reimbursed for the advances he had made to the Treasury of Paris, he had to get the piastres conveyed from America to Europe. After some difficulty the English

Government consented to facilitate the execution of the transaction by furnishing four frigates for the conveyance of the piastres.

Ouvrard had scarcely completed the outline of his extraordinary enterprise when the Emperor suddenly broke up his camp at Boulogne to march to Germany. It will readily be conceived that Ouvrard's interests then imperatively required his presence at Madrid; but he was recalled to Paris by the Minister of the Treasury, who wished to adjust his accounts. The Emperor wanted money for the war on which he was entering, and to procure it for the Treasury Ouvrard was sent to Amsterdam to negotiate with the House of Hope. He succeeded, and Mr. David Parish became the Company's agent.

Having concluded this business Ouvrard returned in all haste to Madrid; but in the midst of the most flattering hopes and most gigantic enterprises he suddenly found himself threatened with a dreadful crisis. M. Desprez, as has been stated, had, with the concurrence of the Treasury, been allowed to take upon himself all the risk of executing the treaty, by which 150,000,000 were to be advanced for the year 1804, and 400,000,000 for the year 1805. Under the circumstances which had arisen the Minister of the Treasury considered himself entitled to call upon Ouvrard to place at his disposal 10,000,000 of the piastres which he had received from Spain. The Minister at the same time informed him that he had made arrangements on the faith of this advance, which he thought could not be refused at so urgent a moment.

The embarrassment of the Treasury, and the well-known integrity of the Minister, M. de Barbé Marbois, induced Ouvrard to remit the 10,000,000 piastres. But a few days after he had forwarded the money a Commissioner of the Treasury arrived at Madrid with a ministerial despatch, in which Ouvrard was requested to deliver to the Commis-

sioner all the assets he could command, and to return immediately to Paris.

The Treasury was then in the greatest difficulty, and a general alarm prevailed. This serious financial distress was occasioned by the following circumstances. The Treasury had, by a circular, notified to the Receivers-General that Desprez was the holder of their bonds. They were also authorised to transmit to him all their disposable funds, to be placed to their credit in an account current. Perhaps the giving of this authority was a great error ; but, be that as it may, Desprez, encouraged by the complaisance of the Treasury, desired the Receivers-General to transmit to him all the sums they could procure for payment of interest under 8 per cent., promising to allow them a higher rate of interest. As the credit of the house of Desprez stood high, it may be easily conceived that on such conditions the Receivers-General, who were besides secured by the authority of the Treasury, would enter eagerly into the proposed plan. In short, the Receivers-General soon transmitted very considerable sums. Chests of money arrived daily from every point of France. Intoxicated by this success, Desprez engaged in speculations which in his situation were extremely imprudent. He lent more than 50,000,000 to the merchants of Paris, which left him no command of specie. Being obliged to raise money, he deposited with the Bank the bonds of the Receivers-General which had been consigned to him, but which were already discharged by the sums transmitted to their credit in the account current. The Bank, wishing to be reimbursed for the money advanced to Desprez, applied to the Receivers-General whose bonds were held in security. This proceeding had become necessary on the part of the Bank, as Desprez, instead of making his payments in specie, sent in his acceptances. The Directors of the Bank, who conducted that establishment with great integrity and discretion, began to be alarmed, and required

Desprez to explain the state of his affairs. The suspicions of the Directors became daily stronger, and were soon shared by the public. At last the Bank was obliged to stop payment, and its notes were soon at a discount of 12 per cent.

The Minister of the Treasury, dismayed, as well may be supposed, at such a state of things during the Emperor's absence, convoked a Council, at which Joseph Bonaparte presided, and to which Desprez and Wanlerberghe were summoned. Ouvrard being informed of this financial convulsion made all possible haste from Madrid, and on his arrival at Paris sought assistance from Amsterdam. Hope's house offered to take 15,000,000 piastres at the rate of 3 francs 75 centimes each. Ouvrard having engaged to pay the Spanish Government only 3 francs, would very willingly have parted with them at that rate, but his hasty departure from Madrid, and the financial events at Paris, affected his relations with the Spanish Treasury, and rendered it impossible for him to afford any support to the Treasury of France ; thus the alarm continued, until the news of the battle of Austerlitz and the consequent hope of peace tranquillised the public mind. The bankruptcy of Desprez was dreadful ; it was followed by the failure of many houses, the credit of which was previously undoubted.

To temper the exultation which victory was calculated to excite, the news of the desperate situation of the Treasury and the Bank reached the Emperor on the day after the battle of Austerlitz. The alarming accounts which he received hastened his return to France ; and on the very evening on which he arrived in Paris he pronounced, while ascending the stairs of the Tuileries, the dismissal of M. de Barbé Marbois. This Minister had made numerous enemies by the strict discharge of his duty, and yet, notwithstanding his rigid probity, he sunk under the accusation of having endangered the safety of the State by

weakness of character. At this period even Madame de Staël said, in a party where the firmness of M. Barbé Marbois was the topic of conversation—"What, he inflexible? he is only a reed bronzed!" But whatever may be the opinion entertained of the character of this Minister, it is certain that Napoleon's rage against him was unbounded. Such was the financial catastrophe which occurred during the campaign of Vienna; but all was not over with Ouvrard, and in so great a confusion of affairs it was not to be expected that the Imperial hand, which was not always the hand of justice, should not make itself somewhere felt.

In the course of the month of February 1806 the Emperor issued two decrees, in which he declared Ouvrard, Wanlerberghe, and Michel, contractors for the service of 1804, and Desprez their agent, debtors to the amount of 87,000,000, which they had misapplied in private speculations, and in transactions with Spain "for their personal interests." Who would not suppose from this phrase that Napoleon had taken no part whatever in the great financial operation between Spain and South America? He was, however, intimately acquainted with it, and was himself really and personally interested. But whenever any enterprise was unsuccessful he always wished to deny all connection with it. Possessed of title-deeds made up by himself—that is to say, his own decrees—the Emperor seized all the piastres and other property belonging to the Company, and derived from the transaction great pecuniary advantage,—though such advantage never could be regarded by a sovereign as any compensation for the dreadful state into which the public credit had been brought.[1]

[1] Bourrienne's statement is of course an *ex parte* one, and comes from an interested quarter; and the Editor has been unable to refer to the decrees in question, which probably would contain further details of the ground of this action.

CHAPTER V.

1805–1806.

Declaration of Louis XVIII.—Dumouriez watched—News of a spy—Remarkable trait of courage and presence of mind—Necessity of vigilance at Hamburg—The King of Sweden—His bulletins—Doctor Gall—Prussia covets Hamburg—Projects on Holland—Negotiations for peace—Mr. Fox at the head of the British Cabinet—Intended assassination of Napoleon—Propositions made through Lord Yarmouth—Proposed protection of the Hanse towns—Their state—Aggrandisement of the Imperial family—Neither peace nor war—Sebastiani's mission to Constantinople—Lord Lauderdale at Paris, and failure of the negotiations—Austria despoiled—Emigrant pensions—Dumouriez's intrigues—Prince of Mecklenburg-Schwerin—Loizeau.

I HAVE been somewhat diffuse respecting the vast enterprises of M. Ouvrard, and on the disastrous state of the finances during the campaign of Vienna. Now, if I may so express myself, I shall return to the Minister Plenipotentiary's cabinet, where several curious transactions occurred. The facts will not always be given in a connected series, because there was no more relation between the reports which I received on a great variety of subjects than there is in the pleading of the barristers who succeed each other in a court of justice.

On the 2d of January 1806 I learned that many houses in Hamburg had received by post packets, each containing four copies of a declaration of Louis XVIII. Dumouriez had his carriage filled with copies of this declaration when he passed through Brunswick; and in that small town alone more than 3000 were distributed. The size of this declaration rendered its transmission by post very easy, even in France.

All my letters from the Minister recommended that I should keep a strict watch over the motions of Dumouriez; but his name was now as seldom mentioned as if he had ceased to exist. The part he acted seemed to be limited to disseminating pamphlets more or less insignificant.

It is difficult to conceive the great courage and presence of mind sometimes found in men so degraded as are the wretches who fill the office of spies. I had an agent amongst the Swedo-Russians, named Chefneux, whom I had always found extremely clever and correct. Having for a long time received no intelligence from him I became very anxious,—an anxiety which was not without foundation. He had, in fact, been arrested at Lauenburg, and conducted, bound, tied hand and foot, by some Cossacks to Luneburg. There was found on him a bulletin which he was about to transmit to me, and he only escaped certain death by having in his possession a letter of recommendation from a Hamburg merchant well known to M. Alopœus, the Russian Minister in that city. This precaution, which I had taken before he set out, saved his life. M. Alopœus replied to the merchant that, in consequence of his recommendation the spy should be sent back safe and sound, but that another time neither the recommended nor the recommender should escape so easily. Notwithstanding this, Chefneux would certainly have paid with his head for the dangerous business in which he was embarked but for the inconceivable coolness he displayed under the most trying circumstances. Though the bulletin which was found upon him was addressed to M. Schramm, merchant, they strongly suspected that it was intended for me. They demanded of the prisoner whether he knew me; to which he boldly replied that he had never seen me. They endeavoured, by every possible means, to extort a confession from him, but without success. His repeated denials,

joined to the name of M. Schramm, created doubts in the minds of his interrogators; they hesitated lest they should condemn an innocent man. They, however, resolved to make a last effort to discover the truth, and Chefneux, condemned to be shot, was conducted to the plain of Luneburg. His eyes were bandaged, and he heard the command of preparation given to the platoon, which was to fire upon him; at that moment a man approaching him whispered in his ear, in a tone of friendship and compassion, "They are going to fire; but I am your friend; only acknowledge that you know M. de Bourrienne and you are safe."—"No," replied Chefneux in a firm tone; "if I said so I should tell a falsehood." Immediately the bandage was removed from his eyes, and he was set at liberty. It would be difficult to cite a more extraordinary instance of presence of mind.

Much as I execrate the system of espionage I am nevertheless compelled to admit that the Emperor was under the necessity of maintaining the most unremitting vigilance amidst the intrigues which were going forward in the neighbourhood of Hamburg, especially when the English, Swedes, and Russians were in arms, and there were the strongest grounds for suspecting the sincerity of Prussia.

On the 5th of January 1806 the King of Sweden arrived before the gates of Hamburg. The Senate of that city, surrounded on all sides by English, Swedish, and Russian troops, determined to send a deputation to congratulate the Swedish monarch, who, however, hesitated so long about receiving this homage that fears were entertained lest his refusal should be followed by some act of aggression. At length, however, the deputies were admitted, and they returned sufficiently well satisfied with their reception.

The King of Sweden then officially declared, "That all the arrangements entered into with relation to Hanover

had no reference to him, as the Swedish army was under the immediate command of its august sovereign." [1]

The King, with his 6000 men, seemed inclined to play the part of the restorer of Germany, and to make himself the Don Quixote of the treaty of Westphalia. He threatened the Senate of Hamburg with the whole weight of his anger, because on my application the colours which used to be suspended over the door of the house for receiving Austrian recruits had been removed. The poor Senate of Hamburg was kept in constant alarm by so dangerous a neighbour.

The King of Sweden had his headquarters at Boëtzenburg, on the northern bank of the Elbe. In order to amuse himself he sent for Dr. Gall, who was at Hamburg, where he delivered lectures on his system of phrenology, which was rejected in the beginning by false science and prejudice, and afterwards adopted in consequence of arguments, in my opinion, unanswerable. I had the pleasure of living some time with Dr. Gall, and I owe to the intimacy which subsisted between us the honour he conferred on me by the dedication of one of his works. I said to him, when he departed for the headquarters of the King of Sweden, "My dear doctor, you will certainly discover the bump of vanity." The truth is, that had the doctor at that period been permitted to examine the heads of the sovereigns of Europe they would have afforded very curious craniological studies.

It was not the King of Sweden alone who gave uneasiness to Hamburg; the King of Prussia threatened to seize upon that city, and his Minister publicly declared that it would very soon belong to his master. The Hamburgers were deeply afflicted at this threat; in fact, next to the loss of their independence, their greatest misfortune would have been to fall under the dominion of Prussia, as the

[1] The cession of Hanover to the King of Prussia for the two Margravates is what he alluded to.—*Bourrienne.*

niggardly fiscal system of the Prussian Government at that time would have proved extremely detrimental to a commercial city. Hanover, being evacuated by the French troops, had become a kind of recruiting mart for the British army, where every man who presented himself was enrolled, to complete the Hanoverian legion which was then about to be embodied. The English scattered gold by handfuls. One hundred and fifty carriages, each with six horses, were employed in this service, which confirmed me in the belief I had previously entertained, that the English were to join with the Russians in an expedition against Holland. The aim of the Anglo-Russians was to make a diversion which might disconcert the movements of the French armies in Germany, the allies being at that time unacquainted with the peace concluded at Presburg. Not a moment was therefore to be lost in uniting the whole of our disposable force for the defence of Holland; but it is not of this expedition that I mean to speak at present. I only mention it to afford some idea of our situation at Hamburg, surrounded, as we then were, by Swedish, English, and Russian troops. At this period the Russian Minister at Hamburg, M. Forshmann, became completely insane; his conduct had been more injurious than advantageous to his Government. He was replaced by M. Alopœus, the Russian Minister at Berlin; and they could not have exchanged a fool for a more judicious and able diplomatist.

I often received from the Minister of Marine letters and packets to transmit to the Isle of France,[1] of which the Emperor was extremely anxious to retain possession; and I had much trouble in finding any vessels prepared for that colony by which I could forward the Minister's communications. The death of Pitt and the appointment of

[1] The Ile de France (or Mauritius), taken by the English in 1810, and retained in 1814; while the Ile Bourbon (or Réunion), taken at the same time, was restored to France.

Fox as his successor had created a hope of peace. It was universally known that Mr. Fox, in succeeding to his office, did not inherit the furious hatred of the deceased Minister against France and her Emperor. There moreover existed between Napoleon and Mr. Fox a reciprocal esteem, and the latter had shown himself really disposed to treat. The possibility of concluding a peace had always been maintained by that statesman when he was in opposition to Mr. Pitt; and Bonaparte himself might have been induced, from the high esteem he felt for Mr. Fox, to make concessions from which he would before have recoiled. But there were two obstacles, I may say almost insurmountable ones. The first was the conviction on the part of England that any peace which might be made would only be a truce, and that Bonaparte *would never seriously relinquish his desire of universal dominion.* On the other side, it was believed that Napoleon had formed the design of invading England. Had he been able to do so it would have been less with the view of striking a blow at her commerce and destroying her maritime power, than of annihilating the *liberty of the press*, which he had extinguished in his own dominions. The spectacle of a free people, separated only by six leagues of sea, was, according to him, a seductive example to the French, especially to those among them who bent unwillingly under his yoke.

At an early period of Mr. Fox's ministry a Frenchman made the proposition to him of assassinating the Emperor, of which information was immediately transmitted to M. de Talleyrand. In this despatch the Minister said that, though the laws of England did not authorise the permanent detention of any individual not convicted of a crime, he had on this occasion taken it on himself to secure the miscreant till such time as the French Government could be put on its guard against his attempts. Mr. Fox said in his letter that he had at first done this

individual "the honour to take him for a spy," a phrase which sufficiently indicated the disgust with which the British Minister viewed him.

This information was the key which opened the door to new negotiations. M. de Talleyrand was ordered to express, in reply to the communication of Mr. Fox, that the Emperor was sensibly affected at the index it afforded of the principles by which the British Cabinet was actuated. Napoleon did not limit himself to this diplomatic courtesy; he deemed it a favourable occasion to create a belief that he was actuated by a sincere love of peace. He summoned to Paris Lord Yarmouth, one of the most distinguished amongst the English who had been so unjustly detained prisoners at Verdun on the rupture of the peace of Amiens. He gave his lordship instructions to propose to the British Government a new form of negotiations, offering to guarantee to England the Cape of Good Hope and Malta. Some have been inclined from this concession to praise the moderation of Bonaparte; others to blame him for offering to resign these two places, as if the Cape and Malta could be put in competition with the title of Emperor, the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy, the acquisition of Genoa and of all the Venetian States, the dethronement of the King of Naples and the gift of his kingdom to Joseph, and finally, the new partition of Germany. These transactions, of which Bonaparte said not a word, and from which he certainly had no intention of departing, were all long after the treaty of Amiens.

Every day brought with it fresh proofs of insatiable ambition. In fact, Napoleon longed to obtain possession of the Hanse Towns. I was, however, in the first place, merely charged to make overtures to the Senates of each of these towns, and to point out the advantages they would derive from the protection of Napoleon in exchange for the small sacrifice of 6,000,000 francs in his

favour. I had on this subject numerous conferences with the magistrates: they thought the sum too great, representing to me that the city was not so rich as formerly, because their commerce had been much curtailed by the war; in short, the Senate declared that, with the utmost goodwill, their circumstances would not permit them to accept the "generous proposal" of the Emperor.

I was myself, indeed, at a loss to conceive how the absurdity of employing me to make such a proposition was overlooked, for I had really no advantage to offer in return to the Hanse Towns. Against whom did Bonaparte propose to protect them? The truth is, Napoleon then wished to seize these towns by direct aggression, which, however, he was not able to accomplish until four years afterwards.

During five years I witnessed the commercial importance of these cities, and especially of Hamburg. Its geographical situation, on a great river navigable by large vessels to the city, thirty leagues from the mouth of the Elbe; the complete independence it enjoyed; its municipal regulations and paternal government, were a few amongst the many causes which had raised Hamburg to its enviable height of prosperity.[1] What, in fact, was the population of these remnants of the grand Hanseatic League of the Middle Ages? The population of Hamburg when I was there amounted to 90,000, and that of its small surrounding territory to 25,000. Bremen had 36,000 inhabitants, and 9000 in its territory; the city of Lübeck, which is smaller and its territory a little more extensive than that of Bremen, contained a population of 24,000 souls within and 16,000 without the walls. Thus the total population of the Hanse Towns amounted to only

[1] Amongst the wreck of so many States these three towns, the survivors of the great League, once consisting of eighty towns, still figure among the States of the German Empire with populations (in 1880) as follows:—Hamburg, 453,869; Bremen, 156,723; Lübeck, 63,571; total, 674,163 (*Almanach de Gotha*, 1884, p. 395). At the present day, however, Antwerp bids fair to become the Hamburg of the Continent.

200,000 individuals; and yet this handful of men carried on an extensive commerce, and their ships ploughed every sea, from the shores of India to the frozen regions of Greenland.

The Emperor arrived at Paris towards the end of January 1806. Having created kings in Germany he deemed the moment favourable for surrounding his throne with new princes. It was at this period that he created Murat, Grand Duke of Cleves and Berg; Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo; M. de Talleyrand, Duke of Benevento; and his two former colleagues, Cambacérès and Lebrun, Dukes of Parma and Piacenza.[1] He also gave to his sister Pauline, a short time after her second marriage with the Prince Borghese, the title of Duchess of Guastalla. Strange events! who could then have foreseen that the duchy of Cambacérès would become the refuge of a Princess of of Austria, the widowed wife of Napoleon Bonaparte?"[2]

In the midst of the prosperity of the Imperial family,

[1] For a list of the chief titles created by Napoleon see the *Memoirs of Madame Junot*, 1883, English edition, vol. iii. p. 512.

[2] Maria Louisa, who has the limited sovereignty of Parma and Piacenza, has, since 1815, principally resided at Parma. Ponte-Corvo and Benevento, which gave titles to Bernadotte and Talleyrand, are two towns in the interior of the kingdom of Naples which previously to the Revolution belonged to the Pope, and were governed by his Cardinal-Legate. There is a slip of territory attached to each of them, that of Beneveuto being not inconsiderable. The city of Benevento contains about 18,000 inhabitants, and is ancient and exceedingly interesting. Thero are the remains of a Roman amphitheatre and a bridge, a granite obelisk of the time of Domitian, and a magnificent triumphal arch of the Emperor Trajan. This arch, which is one of the finest in existence, is of Parian marble, and very little injured by time or violence. The town is situated in the midst of a beautiful country, and two important rivers, the Calore and the Sebato, sweep by it. It is due to that remarkable personage to state that M. de Talleyrand was a kind and generons master, and that his *régime* was exceedingly popular at Benevento. His subjects, or vassals, were exempted from the barbarous conscription law. We were there in 1816, a short time after the State had been restored to the Roman See, which still holds it, and we heard all parties speak well of M. de Talleyrand.

By creating this new order of nobility Bonaparte effaced the last traces of the revolutionary republican organisation. The princedoms and dukedoms he conferred were all accompanied with grants of extensive estates and territories in the countries he had conquered—in Germany, Italy, etc.; and the great feudatories of the new Empire, it will be observed, bore foreign, and not French titles. This showed distinctly that Napoleon wanted "to sink the memory of the Bourbon monarchy, and revive the image of Charlemagne, Emperor of the West."—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

when the eldest of the Emperor's brothers had ascended the throne of Naples, when Holland was on the eve of being offered to Louis, and Jerôme had exchanged his legitimate wife for the illegitimate throne of Westphalia, the Imperial pillow was still far from being free from anxiety. Hostilities did not actually exist with the Continental powers; but this momentary state of repose lacked the tranquillity of peace. France was at war with Russia and England, and the aspect of the Continent presented great uncertainty, while the treaty of Vienna had only been executed in part.

In the meantime Napoleon turned his eyes towards the East. General Sebastiani was sent to Constantinople. The measures he pursued and his judicious conduct justified the choice of the Emperor. He was adroit and conciliating, and peace with Turkey was the result of his mission. The negotiations with England did not terminate so happily, although, after the first overtures made to Lord Yarmouth, the Earl of Lauderdale had been sent to Paris by Mr. Fox. In fact, these negotiations wholly failed.

The Emperor had drawn enormous sums from Austria, without counting the vases, statues, and pictures with which he decorated the Louvre, and the bronze with which he clothed the column of the Place Vendôme,[1]—in my opinion the finest monument of his reign and the most

[1] Other countries were even more despoiled than Austria, and the French occupations and exactions in Italy gave rise to many bitter pasquinades; among them the following may be found in Mr. Story's charming work, *Roba di Roma*:—

"I Franchesi son tutti ladri Non tutti—ma Buona parte."	"The French are all thieves— Or at all events the *best part* of them."

A clever epigram was made on Canova's statue of Italy, which was represented as draped:—

"Questa volta Canova l'ha sbagliata Ha l'Italia vestita ed è spogliata."	"For once Canova surely has tripped, Italy is not draped, but stripped."

One also referring to the institution of the Legion of Honour is admirable in its wit:—

"In tempi men leggiadri e più feroci S'appicavano i ladri in su le Croce. In tempi men feroci e più leggiadri S'appicano le Croci in su i ladri."	"In times less pleasant, more fierce of old, The thieves were hung upon the cross, we're told: In times less fierce, more pleasant like to-day, Crosses are hung upon the thieves—they say."

beautiful one in Paris. As Austria was exhausted all the contributions imposed on her could not be paid in cash, and they gave the Emperor bills in payment. I received one for about 7,000,000 on Hamburg on account of the stipulations of the treaty of Presburg.[1]

The affairs of the Bourbon Princes became more and more unfavourable, and their finances, as well as their chances of success, were so much diminished that about this period it was notified to the emigrants in Brunswick that the pretender (Louis XVIII.) had no longer the means of continuing their pensions.[2] This produced great consternation amongst those emigrants, many of whom had no other means of existence; and notwithstanding their devotion to the cause of royalty they found a pension very useful in strengthening their zeal.

Amongst those emigrants was one whose name will occupy a certain place in history; I mean Dumouriez, of whom I have already spoken, and who had for some time employed himself in distributing pamphlets. He was then at Stralsund; and it was believed that the King of Sweden would give him a command. The vagrant life of this general, who ran everywhere begging employment from the enemies of his country without being able to obtain it, subjected him to general ridicule; in fact, he was everywhere despised.

To determine the difficulties which had arisen with regard to Holland, which Dumouriez dreamed of conquer-

[1] Was this English money? See *Savary*, tome ii. p. 239: "The Austrians for the first payment of the contributions were obliged to cede to us the amount of the subsidies which they were to receive from England. They expected them at this moment, and they gave orders at Hamburg that when the sum was received it should be handed over to the French Minister. This was M. de Bourrienne, who received the English subsidies destined for Austria, and sent them to Paris."

[2] When Louis XVIII. returned to France, and Fouché was his Minister of Police, the King asked Fouché whether during his (the King's) exile, he had not set spies over him, and who they were. Fouché hesitated to reply, but on the King insisting he said: "If your Majesty presses for an answer, it was the Duc de Blacas to whom this matter was confided."—"And how much did you pay him?" said the King. "Deux cents mille livres de rente, Sire."—"Ah, so!" said the King, "then he has played fair; *we went halves.*"—*Henry Greville's Diary*, p. 430.

ing with an imaginary army, and being discontented besides with the Dutch for not rigorously excluding English vessels from their ports, the Emperor constituted the Batavian territory a kingdom under his brother Louis. When I notified to the States of the circle of Lower Saxony the accession of Louis Bonaparte to the throne of Holland, and the nomination of Cardinal Fesch as coadjutor and successor of the Arch-chancellor of the Germanic Empire, along with their official communications, the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was the only member of the circle who forebore to reply, and I understood he had applied to the Court of Russia to know "whether" and "how" he should reply. At the same time he made known to the Emperor the marriage of his daughter, the Princess Charlotte Frederica, with Prince Christian Frederick of Denmark.

At this period it would have been difficult to foresee the way in which this union would terminate. The Prince was young and handsome, and of an amiable disposition, which seemed to indicate that he would prove a good husband. As for the Princess, she was as beautiful as love; but she was heedless and giddy; in fact, she was a spoiled child. She adored her husband, and during several years their union proved happy. I had the honour of knowing them at the period when the Duke of Mecklenburg, with his family, sought refuge at Altona. Before leaving that town the Duchess of Mecklenburg, a Princess of Saxony, paid a visit to Madame de Bourrienne and loaded her with civilities. This Princess was perfectly amiable, and was therefore generally regretted when, two years afterwards, death snatched her from her family. Before leaving Altona the Duke of Mecklenburg gave some parties by way of bidding adieu to Holstein, where he had been so kindly received; and I can never forget the distinguished reception and many kindnesses Madame de Bourrienne and myself received from that illustrious family.

It consisted of the hereditary Prince, so distinguished by his talents and acquirements (he was at that time the widower of a Grand Duchess of Russia, a sister of the Emperor Alexander), of Prince Gustavus, so amiable and graceful, and of Princess Charlotte and her husband, the Prince Royal of Denmark.

This happy couple were far from foreseeing that in two years they would be separated for ever. The Princess was at this period in all the splendour of her beauty; several *fêtes* were given on her account on the banks of the Elbe, at which the Prince always opened the ball with Madame de Bourrienne. Notwithstanding her amiability the Princess Charlotte was no favourite at the Danish Court. Intrigues were formed against her. I know not whether any foundation existed for the calumnies spread to her disadvantage, but the Court dames accused her of great levity of conduct, which, true or false, obliged her husband to separate from her; and at the commencement of 1809 he sent her to Altona, attended by a chamberlain and a maid of honour. On her arrival she was in despair; hers was not a silent grief, for she related her story to every one. This unfortunate woman really attracted pity, as she shed tears for her son, three years of age, whom she was doomed never again to behold. But her natural levity returned; she did not always maintain the reserve suitable to her rank, and some months afterwards was sent into Jutland, where I believe she still lives.

The enemies of the French Government did not confine themselves to writing and publishing invectives against it. More than one wretch was ready to employ daggers against the Emperor. Among this number was a man named Louis Loizeau, recently arrived from London. He repaired to Altona, there to enjoy the singular privilege which that city afforded of sheltering all the ruffians, thieves, and bankrupts who fled from the justice of their own Governments. On the 17th of July Loizeau pre-

sented himself to Comte de Gimel, who resided at Altona, as the agent of the Comte de Lille. He offered to repair to Paris and assassinate the Emperor. Comte de Gimel rejected the proposal with indignation ; and replied, that if he had no other means of serving the Bourbons than cowardly assassination he might go elsewhere and find confederates. This fact, which was communicated to me by a friend of M. de Gimel, determined me to arrest Loizeau. Not being warranted, however, to take this step at Altona, I employed a trusty agent to keep watch, and draw him into a quarrel the moment he should appear on the Hamburg side of a public walk which divides that city from Altona, and deliver him up to the nearest Hamburg guard-house. Loizeau fell into the snare ; but finding that he was about to be conducted from the guard-house to the prison of Hamburg, and that it was at my request he had been arrested, he hastily unloosed his cravat, and tore with his teeth the papers it contained, part of which he swallowed. He also endeavoured to tear some other papers which were concealed under his arm, but was prevented by the guard. Furious at this disappointment, he violently resisted the five soldiers who had him in custody, and was not secured until he had been slightly wounded. His first exclamation on entering prison was, "I am undone!" Loizeau was removed to Paris, and, though I am ignorant of the ultimate fate of this wretch, I am pretty certain that Fouché would take effectual means to prevent him from doing any further mischief.[1]

[1] Fouché, in all probability, had the man murdered,—or *suicided*,—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

CHAPTER VI.

1806.

Menaces of Prussia—Offer for restoring Hanover to England—Insolent ultimatum—Commencement of hostilities between France and Prussia—Battle of Auerstädt—Death of the Duke of Brunswick—Bernadotte in Hamburg—Davoust and Bernadotte—The Swedes at Lübeck—Major Amiel—Service rendered to the English Minister at Hamburg—My appointment of Minister for the King of Naples—New regulation of the German post-offices—The Confederation of the North—Devices of the Hanse Towns—Occupation of Hamburg in the name of the Emperor—Decree of Berlin—The military governors of Hamburg—Brune, Michaud, and Bernadotte.

The moment now approached when war was about to be renewed in Germany, and in proportion as the hopes of peace diminished Prussia redoubled her threats, which were inspired by the recollection of the deeds of the great Frederick. The idea of peace was hateful to Prussia. Her measures, which till now had been sufficiently moderate, suddenly assumed a menacing aspect on learning that the Minister of the King of England had declared in Parliament that France had consented to the restitution of Hanover. The French Ministry intimated to the Prussian Government that this was a preliminary step towards a general peace, and that a large indemnity would be granted in return. But the King of Prussia, who was well informed, and convinced that the House of Hanover clung to this ancient domain, which gave to England a certain preponderance in Germany, considered himself trifled with, and determined on war.

Under these circumstances Lord Lauderdale was recalled from Paris by his Government. War continued with England, and was about to commence with Prus-

sia.[1] The Cabinet of Berlin sent an ultimatum which could scarcely be regarded in any other light than a defiance, and from the well-known character of Napoleon we may judge of his irritation at this ultimatum. The Emperor, after his stay of eight months in Paris passed in abortive negotiations for peace, set out on the 25th of September for the Rhine.

Hostilities commenced on the 10th of October 1806 between France and Prussia, and I demanded of the Senate that a stop should be put to the Prussians recruiting. The news of a great victory gained by the Emperor over the Prussians on the 14th of October reached Hamburg on the 19th, brought by some fugitives, who gave such exaggerated accounts of the loss of the French army that it was not until the arrival of the official despatches on the 28th of October that we knew whether to mourn or to rejoice at the victory of Jena.

The Duke of Brunswick, who was dangerously wounded at the battle of Auerstädt, arrived on the 29th of October at Altona.[2] His entrance into that city afforded a striking example of the vicissitudes of fortune. That Prince entered Altona on a wretched litter, borne by ten men, without officers, without domestics, followed by a troop of

[1] The severity with which Bonaparte treated the press may be inferred from the case of Palm the publisher. In 1806 Johann Phillip Palm, of Nuremberg, was shot by Napoleon's order for issuing a pamphlet against the rule of the French in Germany.

It is rather singular that Bourrienne should have omitted to mention the murder of Palm, which contributed so largely to exasperate the people against the French. This unfortunate man, who was not even a temporary subject by the always questionable right of conquest, had published in the free city of Nuremberg, where he resided, a pamphlet reflecting on the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte. The despot no sooner heard of this than he sent a party of French gendarmes across the frontier, and seized the unsuspecting bookseller, exactly as the Duc d'Enghien had been arrested on the neutral territory of Ettingen, and Sir George Rumbold at Hamburg, the year before. Poor Palm, whose blood was terribly avenged by the implacable Prussians eight or nine years later, was tried at Brannau by a French *court-martial* for *a libel* against Napoleon, found guilty, condemned to death, and shot immediately, in pursuance of his sentence, by French gendarmes. The story of Campbell making this act a reason for giving the health of Napoleon at a dinner of authors is well known.

[2] This Prince was in the seventy-second year of his age, and extremely infirm.

vagabonds and children, who were drawn together by curiosity. He was lodged in a wretched inn, and so much worn out by fatigue and the pain of his eyes that on the day after his arrival a report of his death very generally prevailed. Doctor Unzer was immediately sent for to attend the unfortunate Duke, who, during the few days that he survived his wounds, saw no one else except his wife, who arrived on the 1st of November. He expired on the 10th of the same month.[1]

At this juncture Bernadotte returned to Hamburg. I asked him how I was to account for his conduct while he was with Davoust, who had left Nuremberg to attack the Prussian army; and whether it was true that he had refused to march with that general, and afterwards to aid him when he attacked the Prussians on the Weimar road. "The letters I received," observed I, "state that you took no part in the battle of Auerstädt; that I did not believe, but I suppose you saw the bulletin which I received a little after the battle, and which stated that Bonaparte said at Nuremberg, in the presence of several officers, 'Were I to bring him before a court-martial he would be shot. I shall say nothing to him about it, but I will take care he shall know what I think of his behaviour. He has too keen a sense of honour not to be aware that he acted disgracefully.'"—"I think him very likely," rejoined Bernadotte, "to have made these observations. He hates me because he knows I do not like him; but let him speak to me and he shall have his answer. If I am a Gascon, he is a greater one. I might have felt piqued at receiving something like orders from Davoust, but I did my duty."[2]

[1] Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (1735–1806), who had commanded the allies in their advance into France in 1792, and who died from wounds received at Auerstädt. He was the father of the Duke William Frederick, killed at Quatre-Bras. For the mistimed but rather pathetic belief of the old dying Duke in the courtesy with which he and his States would be treated by the French, see *Beugnot*, tome i. p. 307: "I feel sure that there is a courier of the Emperor's on the road to know how I am."

[2] This is a mistake. Bernadotte did not go to Hamburg till much later (see

In the beginning of November the Swedes entered Lübeck ; but on the 8th of that month the town was taken by assault, and the Swedes, as well as the rest of the corps which had escaped from Jena, were made prisoners.

A troop of Prussians had advanced within four leagues of Hamburg, and that town had already prepared for a vigorous resistance, in case they should attempt an entrance, when Major Amiel attacked them at Zollenspieker and made some prisoners. Hamburg was, however, threatened with another danger, for Major Amiel expressed his intention of entering with all his prisoners, notwithstanding the acknowledged neutrality of the town. Amiel was a partisan leader in the true sense of the word; he fought rather on his own account than with the intention of contributing to the success of the operations of the army. His troop did not consist of more than forty men, but that was more than sufficient to spread terror and devastation in the surrounding villages. He was a bold fellow, and when, with his handful of men, he threw himself upon Hamburg, the worthy inhabitants thought he had 20,000 troops with him. He had pillaged every place through which he passed, and brought with him 300 prisoners, and a great many horses he had taken on his road. It was night when he presented himself at the gates of the city, which he entered alone, having left his men and booty

Erreurs, tome i. p. 9). The complaints of Bernadotte's conduct on the 14th of October 1806, when he gave no assistance to Davoust in repulsing the main body of the Prussians at Auerstädt, are well known. Jomini (tome ii. p. 290) says that Davoust proposed to Bernadotte to march with him, and even offered him the command of the two corps. Bernadotte refused, and marched away to Dornburg, where he was of no use. "This obstinacy, difficult to explain, nearly compromised both Davoust and the success of the battle." See also Thiers (tome vii. p. 132), who attributes Bernadotte's conduct to a profound aversion for Davoust conceived on the most frivolous grounds. Bernadotte had frequently given cause of complaint to Napoleon in the two compaigns of 1805 and 1806. In the movement on Vienna Napoleon considered he showed want of activity and of zeal. These complaints seem to have been made in good faith, for in a letter to Bernadotte's brother-in-law, Joseph, Napoleon suggests that health may have been the cause (*Du Casse*, tome i. p. 322). Bernadotte was equally unfortunate in putting in his appearance too late at Eylau (see *Duc de Rovigo's Memoirs*, tome ii. p. 48), and also incurred the displeasure of Napoleon at Wagram (see later on).

at the last village. He proceeded to the French Embassy. I was not there at the time, but I was sent for, and about seven o'clock in the evening I had my first interview with the Major. He was the very *beau ideal* of a bandit, and would have been an admirable model for a painter. I was not at all surprised to hear that on his arrival his wild appearance and huge mustachios had excited some degree of terror among those who were in the *salon.* He described his exploits on the march, and did not disguise his intention of bringing his troops into Hamburg next day. He talked of the Bank and of pillage. I tried for some time to divert him from this idea, but without effect, and at length said to him, "Sir, you know that this is not the way the Emperor wishes to be served. During the seven years that I have been about him, I have invariably heard him express his indignation against those who aggravate the misery which war naturally brings in her train. It is the express wish of the Emperor that no damage, no violence whatever, shall be committed on the city or territory of Hamburg." These few words produced a stronger effect than any entreaties I could have used, for the mere name of the Emperor made even the boldest tremble, and Major Amiel next thought of selling his booty. The Senate were so frightened at the prospect of having Amiel quartered upon them that to get rid of him they determined to purchase his booty at once, and even furnished him with guards for his prisoners. I did not learn till some time afterwards that among the horses Major Amiel had seized upon the road were those of the Countess Walmoden. Had I known this fact at the time I should certainly have taken care to have had them restored to her. Madame Walmoden was then a refugee at Hamburg, and between her and my family a close intimacy existed. On the very day, I believe, of the Major's departure the Senate wrote me a letter of thanks for the protection I afforded the town.

Before the commencement of the Prussian campaign, while anxiety was entertained respecting the designs of the Cabinet of Berlin, my task was not an easy one. I exerted all my efforts to acquaint the French Government with what was passing on the Spree. I announced the first intelligence of an unexpected movement which had taken place among the Prussian troops cantoned in the neighbourhood of Hamburg. They suddenly evacuated Lauenburg, Platzburg, Haarburg, Stade, Twisenfelth, and Cuxhaven. This extraordinary movement gave rise to a multitude of surmises. I was not wrong when I informed the French Government that, according to every probability, Prussia was about to declare hostilities against France, and to enter into an alliance with England.

I much regretted that my situation did not allow me more frequent opportunities of meeting Mr. Thornton, the English Minister to the circle of Lower Saxony. However, I saw him sometimes, and had on two different occasions the opportunity of rendering him some service. Mr. Thornton had requested me to execute a little private business for him, the success of which depended on the Emperor. I made the necessary communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, adding in my letter that Mr. Thornton's conduct towards the French who had come in any way in contact with him had ever been just and liberal, and that I should receive great pleasure in being able to announce to him the success of his application. His request was granted.

On another occasion Mr. Thornton applied to me for my services, and I had once more the pleasure of rendering them. He wished to procure some information respecting an Englishman named Baker, who had gone to Terracina, in the Campagna di Roma, for the benefit of sea-bathing. He was there arrested, without any cause assigned, by order of the commandant of the French troops in Terracina. The family of Mr. Baker, not having heard from him for

some months, became very uneasy respecting him, for they had not the least idea of his arrest. His relations applied to Mr. Thornton, and that gentleman, notwithstanding the circumstances which, as I have stated, prevented our frequent intercourse, hesitated not a moment in requesting me to furnish him with some information respecting his countryman. I lost no time in writing to M. Alquier, our Ambassador at Rome, and soon enabled Mr. Thornton to ease the apprehension of Mr. Baker's friends.

I had every apportunity of knowing what was passing in Italy, for I had just been invested with a new dignity. As the new King of Naples, Joseph, had no Minister in Lower Saxony, he wished that I should discharge the function of Minister Plenipotentiary for Naples. His Ministers accordingly received orders to correspond with me upon all business connected with his government and his subjects. The relations between Hamburg and Naples were nearly nil, and my new office made no great addition to my labours.

I experienced, however, a little more difficulty in combining all the post-offices of Hamburg in the office of the Grand Duchy of Berg, thus detaching them from the offices of Latour and Taxis, so named after the German family who for a length of time had had the possession of them, and who were devoted to Austria.

After some days of negotiation I obtained the suppression of these offices, and their union with the post-office of the Grand Duc de Berg (Murat), who thus received letters from Italy, Hungary, Germany, Poland, part of Russia, and the letters from England for these countries.

The affair of the post-offices gained for me the approbation of Napoleon. He expressed his satisfaction through the medium of a letter I received from Duroc, who at the same time recommended me to continue informing the Emperor of all that was doing in Germany with relation to the plans of the Confederation of the North. I therefore despatched to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a

detailed letter, announcing that Baron Grote, the Prussian Minister at Hamburg, had set off on a visit to Bremen and Lübeck. Among those who accompanied him on this excursion was a person wholly devoted to me; and I knew that Baron Grote's object was to offer to these towns verbal propositions for their union with the Confederation of the North, which the King of Prussia wished to form as a counterpoise to the Confederation of the Rhine, just created by Napoleon.[1] Baron Grote observed the strictest secrecy in all his movements. He showed, in confidence, to those to whom he addressed himself, a letter from M. Haugwitz, the Minister of the King of Prussia, who en-

[1] In July 1806, after Austerlitz, Napoleon had formed the "Confédération du Rhin," to include the smaller States of Germany, who threw off all connection with the German Empire, and formed a Confederation furnishing a considerable army. It eventually included the following States, with contingents as stated opposite each. The Princes against whom no figures are given furnished altogether 4000 men.

PROTECTOR.—Napoleon, 200,000.

PRESIDENT of the Diet and of the College of Kings.—The Prince Primate, Karl von Dalberg, formerly Archbishop of Mayence, then Archbishop of Regensburg, now Grand Duke of Frankfort (2800, as below).

KINGS, sitting in the College of Kings with the Grand Dukes.—Bavaria, 30,000; Saxony, 20,000; Westphalia, 26,000; Würtemberg, 12,000.

GRAND DUKES, sitting in the College of Kings.—Baden, 8000; Berg et Clèves, 5000; Frankfort, 2800; Hesse-Darmstadt, 4000; Warsaw, 30,000; Würzburg, 2000.

DUKES, sitting in the College of Princes under the presidency of the Duke of Nassau (Nassau-Usingen).—Anhalt-Bernburg, Anhalt-Cöthen, Anhalt-Dessau, 800; D'Arenberg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, contingent not given; Mecklenburg-Strelitz, contingent not given; Nassau-Usingen, Oldenburg; Saxe-Coburg, Saxe-Gotha; Saxe-Hildburghausen, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar, 2800.

PRINCES, sitting in the College of Princes with the Dukes: Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Isemburg-Birstein, Leyen, Lichtenstein; Lippe-Detmold, Lippe-Schaumburg, 650; Nassau-Weilburg, Reuss, Reuss-Ebersdorf, Reuss-Greiz, Reuss-Lobenstein; Reuss-Schleiz, 450; Salm-Kyrburg, Salm-Salm, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, 650; Waldeck, 400.

The Emperor of Germany, Francis II., had already in 1804, on Napoleon taking the title of Emperor, declared himself Hereditary Emperor of Austria. After the formation of the Rhenish Confederation and Napoleon's refusal to acknowledge the German Empire any longer, he released the States of the Holy Roman Empire from their allegiance, declared the Empire dissolved, and contented himself with the title of Emperor of Austria, as Francis I.

The Confédération du Nord, as already stated, was to have been formed of Prussia, Saxony, Hesse, and the Hanse Towns.

deavoured to point out to the Hanse Towns how much the Confederation of the North would turn to their advantage, it being the only means of preserving their liberty, by establishing a formidable power. However, to the first communication only an evasive answer was returned. M. Van Sienen, the Syndic of Hamburg, was commissioned by the Senate to inform the Prussian Minister that the affair required the concurrence of the burghers, and that before he could submit it to them it would be necessary to know its basis and conditions. Meanwhile the Syndic Doormann proceeded to Lübeck, where there was also a deputy from Bremen. The project of the Confederation, however, never came to anything.

I scrupulously discharged the duties of my functions, but I confess I often found it difficult to execute the orders I received, and more than once I took it upon myself to modify their severity. I loved the frank and generous character of the Hamburgers, and I could not help pity-the fate of the Hanse Towns, heretofore so happy, and from which Bonaparte had exacted such immense sacrifices.

On the principal gate of the Hanse Towns is inscribed the following motto, well expressing the pacific spirit of the people: *Da nobis pacem, Domine, in diebus nostris.* The paternal and elected government, which did everything to secure the happiness of these towns, was led to believe that the sacrifices imposed on them would be recompensed by the preservation of their neutrality. No distrust was entertained, and hope was kept alive by the assurances given by Napoleon. He published in the *Moniteur* that the Hanse Towns could not be included in any particular Confederation. He thus strangled in its birth the Confederation of the North, to which those feeble States would otherwise have been obliged to consent. When in 1806 Napoleon marched against Prussia, he detached Marshal Mortier from the Grand Army when it had passed the Rhine, and directed him to invade the Electorate of

Hesse, and march on Hamburg. On the 19th of November the latter town was occupied by the French army in the name of the Emperor, amidst the utmost order and tranquillity.

I must acknowledge that I was under much apprehension as to this event. At the intelligence of the approach of the French army consternation was great and universal in Hamburg, which was anxious to maintain its neutrality unimpaired. At the urgent request of the magistrates of the city I assumed functions more than diplomatic, and became, in some respects, the first magistrate of the town. I went to meet Marshal Mortier to endeavour to dissuade him from entering. I thought I should by this means better serve the interests of France than by favouring the occupation of a neutral town by our troops. But all my remonstrances were useless. Marshal Mortier had received formal orders from the Emperor.

No preparations having been made at Hamburg for the reception of Marshal Mortier, he quartered himself and his whole staff upon me. The few troops he had with him were disposed of in my courtyard, so that the residence of a Minister of peace was all at once converted into headquarters. This state of things continued until a house was got ready for the Marshal.

Marshal Mortier had to make very rigorous exactions, but my representations suspended for a while Napoleon's orders for taking possession of the Bank of Hamburg. I am here bound to bear testimony to the Marshal's honourable principles and integrity of character. The representations which I had sent to Marshal Mortier were transmitted by the latter to the Emperor at Berlin ; and Mortier stated that he had suspended the execution of the orders until he should receive others. The Emperor approved of this. It was, indeed, a happy event for France and for Europe, even more so than for Hamburg. Those who suggested to the Emperor the idea of pillaging that fine

establishment must have been profoundly ignorant of its importance. They thought only of the 90,000,000 of marks banco deposited in its cellars.

By the famous decree of Berlin, dated 21st November 1806, Mortier was compelled to order the seizure of all English merchandise in the Hanse Towns, but he enforced the decree only so far as to preserve the appearance of having obeyed his orders.

Mortier, on leaving Hamburg for Mecklenburg, was succeeded by General Michaud, who in his turn was succeeded by Marshal Brune in the beginning of 1807. I am very glad to take the present opportunity of correcting the misconceptions which arose through the execution of certain acts of Imperial tyranny. The truth is, Marshal Brune, during his government, constantly endeavoured to moderate, as far as he could, the severity of the orders he received. Bernadotte became Governor of Hamburg when the battle of Jena rendered Napoleon master of Prussia and the north of Germany.

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo lightened, as far as possible, the unjust burdens and vexations to which that unfortunate town was subject. He never refused his assistance to any measures which I adopted to oppose a system of ruin and persecution. He often protected Hamburg against exorbitant exactions. The Hanse Towns revived a little under his government, which continued longer than that of Mortier, Michaud, and Brune. The memory of Bernadotte will always be dear to the Hamburgers ; and his name will never be pronounced without gratitude. His attention was especially directed to moderate the rigour of the custom-houses ; and perhaps the effect which his conduct produced on public opinion may be considered as having, in some measure, led to the decision which, four years after, made him Hereditary Prince of Sweden.[1]

[1] Marshal Brune was believed by the Hamburgers to have made money out of his command there, but Bernadotte was esteemed by them. See *Puymaigre*, p. 135.

CHAPTER VII.

1806.

Ukase of the Emperor of Russia—Duroc's mission to Weimar—Napoleon's views defeated—Triumphs of the French armies—Letters from Murat—False report respecting Murat—Resemblance between Moreau and M. Billaud—Generous conduct of Napoleon—His interview with Madame Hatzfeld at Berlin—Letter from Bonaparte to Josephine—Blucher my prisoner—His character—His confidence in the future fate of Germany—Prince Paul of Würtemberg taken prisoner—His wish to enter the French service—Distinguished emigrants at Altona—Deputation of the Senate to the Emperor at Berlin—The German Princes at Altona—Fauche-Borel and the Comte de Gimel.

In September 1806 it became very manifest that, as soon as war should break out between France and Prussia, Russia would not be slow in forming an alliance with the latter power. Peace had, however, been re-established between Napoleon and Alexander by virtue of a treaty just signed at Paris. By that treaty Russia was to evacuate the Bouches du Cattaro,[1] a condition with which she was in no hurry to comply. I received a number of the Court Gazette of St. Petersburg, containing a ukase of the Emperor of Russia, in which Alexander pointed out the danger which again menaced Europe,

[1] The Bouches du Cattaro, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, had formed part of the Dalmatian possessions of Venice. By the treaty of Campo Formio, 17th October 1797, and of Luneville, 9th February 1801, they fell to Austria, who, however, had to cede them to France by the Treaty of Presburg, 26th December 1805, after Austerlitz. The Russians, assisted by an English fleet, with some complicity on the part of the Austrian garrison, then occupied them; and it was not till the 12th August 1807, after the treaty of Tilsit, concluded July 1807, that they were handed over to Marmont (see *Raguse*, tome iii. p. 57). In 1815 they fell to Austria, and they have only lately been the subject of disputes between her and the Turks in the last Montenegrin affair.

showed the necessity of adopting precautions for general tranquillity and the security of his own Empire, and declared his determination of not only completing but augmenting his army. He therefore ordered a levy of four men out of every 500 inhabitants.

Before the commencement of hostilities Duroc was sent to the King of Prussia with the view of discovering whether there was any possibility of renewing negotiations; but affairs were already too much embarrassed. All Duroc's endeavours were in vain, and perhaps it was no longer in the power of the King of Prussia to avoid war with France. Besides, he had just grounds of offence against the Emperor. Although the latter had given him Hanover in exchange for the two Margravates, he had, nevertheless, offered to England the restoration of that province as one of the terms of the negotiations commenced with Mr. Fox. This underhand work was not unknown to the Berlin Cabinet, and Napoleon's duplicity rendered Duroc's mission useless. At this time the King of Prussia was at Weimar.

Victory everywhere favoured the French arms. Prince Hohenlohe, who commanded a corps of the Prussian army, was forced to capitulate at Prentzlau. After this capitulation General Blucher took the command of the remains of the corps, to which he joined the troops whose absence from Prentzlau exempted them from the capitulation. These corps, added to those which Blucher had at Auerstädt, were then almost the only ramparts of the Prussian monarchy. Soult and Bernadotte received orders from Murat to pursue Blucher, who was using all his efforts to draw from Berlin the forces of those two generals. Blucher marched in the direction of Lübeck.

General Murat pursued the wreck of the Prussian army which had escaped from Saxony by Magdeburg. Blucher was driven upon Lübeck. It was very important to the army at Berlin that this numerous corps should be destroyed, commanded as it was by a skilful and brave

general, who drew from the centre of the military operations numerous troops, with which he might throw himself into Hanover, or Hesse, or even Holland, and by joining the English troops harass the rear of the Grand Army. The Grand Duke of Berg explained to me his plans and expectations, and soon after announced their fulfilment in several letters which contained, among other things, the particulars of the taking of Lübeck.

In two of these letters Murat, who was probably deceived by his agents, or by some intriguer, informed me that General Moreau had passed through Paris on the 12th of October, and had arrived in Hamburg on the 28th of October. The proof which Murat possessed of this circumstance was a letter of Fauche-Borel, which he had intercepted. I recollect a curious circumstance which serves to show the necessity of mistrusting the vague intelligence furnished to persons in authority. A fortnight before I received Murat's first letter a person informed me that General Moreau was in Hamburg. I gave no credit to the intelligence, yet I endeavoured to ascertain whether it had any foundation, but without effect. Two days later I was assured that an individual had met General Moreau, that he had spoken to him, that he knew him well from having served under him,—together with various other circumstances, the truth of which there appeared no reason to doubt. I immediately sent for the individual in question, who told me that he knew Moreau, that he had met him, that the General had inquired of him the way to the Jungfersteige (a promenade at Hamburg), that he had pointed it out to him, and then said, "Have I not the honour to speak to General Moreau?" upon which the General answered, "Yes, but say nothing about having seen me; I am here incognito." All this appeared to me so absurd that, pretending not to know Moreau, I asked the person to describe him to me. He described a person bearing little resemblance to Moreau, and added that he

wore a braided French coat and the national cockade in his hat. I instantly perceived the whole was a mere scheme for getting a little money. I sent the fellow about his business. In a quarter of an hour after I had got rid of him M. la Chevardière called on me, and introduced M. Billaud, the French Consul at Stettin. This gentleman wore a braided coat and the national cockade in his hat. He was the hero of the story I had heard from the informer. A slight personal resemblance between the Consul and the General had caused several persons to mistake them for each other.

During the Prussian campaign nothing was talked of throughout Germany but Napoleon's generous conduct with respect to Prince Hatzfeld. I was fortunate enough to obtain a copy of a letter which the Emperor wrote to Josephine on the subject, and which I shall presently lay before the reader. In conformity with the inquisitorial system which too frequently characterised the Emperor's government, and which he extended to every country of which he had military possession, the first thing done on entering a town was to take possession of the post-office, and then, Heaven knows how little respect was shown to the privacy of correspondence.[1] Among the letters thus seized at Berlin and delivered to Napoleon was one addressed to the King of Prussia by Prince Hatzfeld, who had imprudently remained in the Prussian capital. In this letter the Prince gave his Sovereign an account of all that had occurred in Berlin since he had been compelled to quit it; and at the same time he informed him of the force and situation of the corps of the French army. The Emperor, after reading this letter, ordered that the Prince

[1] The seizure of the enemy's correspondence, private or public, is an undoubted and necessary right of war. It would, of course, have been absurd to neglect this means of obtaining information. Frequent and amusing instances of information obtained by seizing the telegraph wires were given in the late American War of Secession, and no one would have expected the Germans to respect the correspondence in the balloons sent irom Paris.

CAULAINCOURT

DUC DE VICENCE

should be arrested, and tried by a court-martial on the charge of being a spy.

The Court was summoned, and little doubt could be entertained as to its decision when Madame Hatzfeld repaired to Duroc, who on such occasions was always happy when he could facilitate communication with the Emperor. On that day Napoleon had been at a review. Duroc knew Madame Hatzfeld, whom he had several times seen on his visits to Berlin. When Napoleon returned from the review he was astonished to see Duroc at the palace at that hour, and inquired whether he had brought any news. Duroc answered in the affirmative, and followed the Emperor into his Cabinet, where he soon introduced Madame Hatzfeld. The remainder of the scene is described in Napoleon's letter. It may easily be perceived that this letter is an answer to one from Josephine reproaching him for the manner in which he spoke of women, and very probably of the beautiful and unfortunate Queen of Prussia, respecting whom he had expressed himself with too little respect in one of his bulletins. The following is Napoleon's letter:—

I have received your letter, in which you seem to reproach me for speaking ill of women. It is true that I dislike female intriguers above all things. I am used to kind, gentle, and conciliatory women. I love them, and if they have spoiled me it is not my fault, but yours. However, you will see that I have done an act of kindness to one deserving woman. I allude to Madame de Hatzfeld. When I showed her her husband's letter she stood weeping, and in a tone of mingled grief and ingenuousness said, "It is indeed his writing!" This went to my heart, and I said, "Well, madame, throw the letter into the fire, and then I shall have no proof against your husband." She burned the letter, and was restored to happiness. Her husband now is safe: two hours later, and he would have been lost. You see, therefore, that I like women who are simple, gentle, and amiable; because they alone resemble you.[1]

November 6, 1806, 9 o'clock P.M.

[1] Rapp sustained a prominent part in the affair; and though his account of it, and that given by Bourrienne, be not precisely similar they nevertheless correspond in all important particulars.

"Prince Hatzfeld had come to Potsdam as a deputy from the city of Berlin, and

When Marshal Bernadotte had driven Blucher into Lübeck and made him prisoner, he sent to inform me of the circumstance; but I was far from expecting that the prisoner would be confided to my charge. Such, however, was the case. After his capitulation he was sent to Hamburg, where he had the whole city for his prison.

had been well received. He rendered an account of his mission, as well as I can recollect, to Count Hohenlohe, and reported to him the state of the troops, artillery, and ammunition that were in the capital, or which he had met on the road. His letter was intercepted. Napoleon delivered it to me, with orders immediately to arrest the Prince and send him to the headquarters of Marshal Davoust, which were two leagues distant. Berthier, Duroc, Caulaincourt, and I vainly endeavoured to appease the anger of Napoleon. He refused to listen to our representations. Prince Hatzfeld had transmitted reports relative to military affairs which were quite unconnected with his mission: he had evidently been acting the part of a spy. Savary, who, in his quality as commander of the military gendarmerie, usually took cognisance of affairs of this kind, was then on a mission. I was obliged to assume his functions during his absence. I gave orders for the arrest of the Prince; but instead of having him conducted to the headquarters of Davoust I placed him in the chamber of the officer commanding the palace-guard, whom I directed to treat him with every mark of respect.

"Caulaincourt and Duroc withdrew from the Emperor's apartment. Napoleon was left alone with Berthier, and he directed him to sit down and write the order by which M. de Hatzfeld was to be arraigned before a military commission. The major-general made some representations in his favour. 'Your Majesty will not, for so trivial an offence, shoot a man who is connected with the first families in Berlin. The thing is impossible, you will not think of it.' The Emperor grew more angry. Neufchatel persisted in his intercession; Napoleon lost all patience, and Berthier quitted the room. I was called in. I had overheard the scene that had just taken place. I was afraid to hazard the least reflection: I was in a state of agony. Besides the repugnance I felt in being instrumental to so harsh a measure, it was necessary to write as rapidly as the Emperor spoke; and I must confess I never possessed that talent. He dictated to me the following order:—

"'Our cousin Marshal Davoust will appoint a military commission, consisting of seven colonels of his corps, of which he will be the president, to try Prince Hatzfeld on a charge of treason and espionage. The sentence must be pronounced and executed before six o'clock in the evening.'

"It was about noon. Napoleon directed me to despatch the order immediately, and to send with it Prince Hatzfeld's letter. The latter part of the instruction I did not, however, obey. My mind was racked by the most painful emotions. I trembled for the Prince, and I trembled for myself, since, instead of sending him to Davoust's headquarters, I had lodged him in the palace.

"Napoleon wished to have his horse saddled, as he intended to visit Prince and Princess Ferdinand. As I was going out to give the necessary orders I was informed that the Princess of Hatzfeld had fainted in the antechamber, and that she had previously expressed a wish to speak to me. I went to her. I did not conceal from her the displeasure of Napoleon. I told her that we were going to ride out on horseback, and I directed her to repair to Prince Ferdinand, and to interest him in favour of her husband. I know not whether she did so; but on our arrival at the palace

I was curious to become acquainted with this celebrated man, and I saw him very frequently. I found that he was an enthusiastic Prussian patriot—a brave man, enterprising even to rashness, of limited education, and almost to an incredible degree devoted to pleasure, of which he took an ample share while he remained in Hamburg. He sat an enormous time at table, and, notwithstanding his exclusive patriotism, he rendered full justice to the wines of France. His passion for women was unbounded, and one of his most favourite sources of amusement was the gaming-table, at which he spent a considerable portion of his time. Blucher was of an extremely gay disposition; and considered merely as a companion he was very agreeable. The original style of his conversation pleased me much. His confidence in the deliverance of Germany remained unshaken in spite of the disasters of the Prussian army. He often said to me, "I place great reliance on the public spirit of Germany—on the enthusiasm which prevails in our universities. The events of war are daily changing, and even defeats con-

we found her in one of the corridors, and she threw herself, in tears, at the feet of the Emperor, to whom I announced her name.

"The Princess was *enceinte*. Napoleon was moved by her situation, and directed her to proceed to the château. He at the same time desired me to write to Davoust to order the trial to be suspended. He thought Prince Hatzfeld had departed.

"Napoleon returned to the palace, where Madame Hatzfeld was waiting for him. He desired her to enter the *salon:* I was present. 'Your husband, madame,' said he, 'has brought himself into an unfortunate scrape. According to our laws he deserves to be sentenced to death. General Rapp, give me his letter. Here, madame read this.' The lady trembled exceedingly. Napoleon immediately took the letter from her hand, tore it, and threw the fragments into the fire. 'I have no other proof against Prince Hatzfeld, madame, therefore he is at liberty.' He ordered me immediately to release him from his confinement at headquarters. I acknowledged that I had not sent him there; but he did not reproach me; he even seemed pleased at what I had done.

"In this affair Berthier, Duroc, and Caulaincourt behaved as they did on all occasions, that is to say, like gallant men: Berthier's conduct was particularly praiseworthy.

"No sooner had Prince Hatzfeld returned to his family than he was made acquainted with all that had passed. He wrote me a letter expressive of his gratitude, and the emotions by which he was agitated" (*Memoirs of General Rapp*, p. 107; see also *Savary*, tome ii. p. 314).

tribute to nourish in a people sentiments of honour and national glory. You may depend upon it that when a whole nation is determined to shake off a humiliating yoke it will succeed. There is no doubt but we shall end by having a landwehr very different from any militia to which the subdued spirit of the French people could give birth. England will always lend us the support of her navy and her subsidies, and we will renew alliances with Russia and Austria. I can pledge myself to the truth of a fact of which I have certain knowledge, and you may rely upon it; namely, that none of the allied powers engaged in the present war entertain views of territorial aggrandisement. All they unanimously desire is to put an end to the system of aggrandisement which your Emperor has established and acts upon with such alarming rapidity. In our first war against France, at the commencement of your Revolution, we fought for questions respecting the rights of sovereigns, for which, I assure you, I care very little ; but now the case is altered, the whole population of Prussia makes common cause with its Government. The people fight in defence of their homes, and reverses destroy our armies without changing the spirit of the nation. I rely confidently on the future because I foresee that fortune will not always favour your Emperor. It is impossible ; but the time will come when all Europe, humbled by his exactions, and impatient of his depredations, will rise up against him. The more he enslaves nations, the more terrible will be the reaction when they break their chains. It cannot be denied that he is tormented with an insatiable desire of acquiring new territories. To the war of 1805 against Austria and Russia the present war has almost immediately succeeded. We have fallen. Prussia is occupied ; but Russia still remains undefeated. I cannot foresee what will be the termination of the war ; but, admitting that the issue should be favourable to you, it will end only to break out again speedily. If we con-

tinue firm, France, exhausted by her conquests, must in the end fall. You may be certain of it. You wish for peace. Recommend it! By so doing you will give strong proofs of love for your country."

In this strain Blucher constantly spoke to me; and as I never thought it right to play the part of the public functionary in the drawing-room I replied to him with the reserve necessary in my situation. I could not tell him how much my anticipations frequently coincided with his; but I never hesitated to express to him how much I wished to see a reasonable peace concluded.[1]

Blucher's arrival at Hamburg was preceded by that of Prince Paul of Würtemberg, the second son of one of the two kings created by Napoleon, whose crowns were not yet a year old. This young Prince, who was imbued with the ideas of liberty and independence which then prevailed in Germany, had taken a headlong step. He had quitted Stuttgart to serve in the Prussian campaign without having asked his father's permission, which inconsiderate proceeding might have drawn Napoleon's anger upon the King of Würtemberg. The King of Prussia advanced Prince Paul to the rank of general, but he was taken prisoner at the very commencement of hostilities. Prince Paul was not, as has been erroneously stated, conducted to Stuttgart by a captain of gendarmerie. He came to Hamburg, where I received many visits from him. He did not yet possess very definite ideas as to what he wished; for after he was made prisoner he expressed to me his strong desire to enter the French service, and

[1] Rapp mentions the following particulars relative to Blucher after his capture. At that time Rapp had been appointed Governor of Thorn, and he says:—

"I was now the Providence of the Prussian generals. They wrote to me entreating my intercession in their behalf. Blucher himself did not disdain to solicit the *grace* of His Majesty, the Emperor and King of Italy. He was at first to have been conducted to Dijon; but he had laid down arms, and therefore it signified little whether he was at Dijon or elsewhere. He was permitted to retire to Hamburg; but he soon grew tired of that city, and begged to be allowed to go to the neighbourhood of Berlin. However, the Emperor did not grant his request" (Rapp's *Memoirs*, p. 130).

often asked me to solicit for him an interview with the Emperor. He obtained this interview, and remained for a long time in Paris, where I know he has frequently resided since the Restoration.[1]

The individuals whom I had to observe in Hamburg gave me much less trouble than our neighbours at Altona. The number of the latter had considerably augmented, since the events of the war had compelled a great number of emigrants who had taken refuge at Munster to leave that town. They all proceeded to Altona. Conquered countries became as dangerous to them as the land which they had forsaken. The most distinguished amongst the individuals assembled at Altona were Vicomte de Sesmaisons, the Bailly d'Hautefeuille, the Duchess of Luxembourg, the Marquis de Bonnard, the Duc d'Aumont [then Duc de Villequier], the wife of Marshal de Broglie and her daughter, Cardinal de Montmorency, Madame de Cossé, her two daughters and her son (and a priest), and the Bishop of Boulogne.

Bonaparte stayed long enough at Berlin to permit of the arrival of a deputation from the French Senate to congratulate him on his first triumphs. I learned that in this instance the Senatorial deputation, departing from its accustomed complaisance, ventured not to confine itself to compliments and felicitations, but went so far as to interfere with the Emperor's plan of the campaign, to speak of the danger that might be incurred in passing the Oder, and finally to express a desire to see peace concluded. Napoleon received this communication with a very bad grace. He thought the Senators very bold to meddle with his affairs, treated the conscript fathers of France as if they had been inconsiderate youths, protested, according to custom, his sincere love of peace, and told the

[1] Rapp (p. 116) gives a different account, and says that the Prince came to Custrin and wished to see Napoleon, who refused the interview, and had him arrested and sent into his father's States, where he was detained for several years.

deputation that it was Prussia, backed by Russia, and not he, who wished for war!

All the German Princes who had taken part against Napoleon fled to Altona after the battle of Jena with as much precipitation as the emigrants themselves. The Hereditary Prince of Weimar, the Duchess of Holstein, Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli, and a multitude of other persons distinguished for rank and fortune, arrived there almost simultaneously. Among the persons who took refuge in Altona were some intriguers, of whom Fauche-Borel was one. I remember receiving a report respecting a violent altercation which Fauche had the audacity to enter into with Comte de Gimel because he could not extort money from the Count in payment of his intrigues. Comte de Gimel had only funds for the payment of pensions, and, besides, he had too much sense to suppose there was any utility in the stupid pamphlets of Fauche-Borel, and therefore he dismissed him with a refusal. Fauche was insolent, which compelled Comte de Gimel to send him about his business as he deserved. This circumstance, which was first communicated to me in a report, has since been confirmed by a person who witnessed the scene. Fauche-Borel merely passed through Hamburg, and embarked for London on board the same ship which took Lord Morpeth back to England.[1]

[1] Louis Fauche-Borel (1762–1829), a Swiss who devoted himself to the cause of the Royalists. As Louis stepped on the shore of France in 1814 Fauche-Borel was ready to assist him from the boat, and was met with the gracious remark that he was always at hand when a service was required. His services were however left unrewarded!

CHAPTER VIII.

1806.

Alarm of the city of Hamburg—The French at Bergdorff—Favourable orders issued by Bernadotte—Extortions in Prussia—False endorsements—Exactions of the Dutch—Napoleon's concern for his wounded troops—Duroc's mission to the King of Prussia—Rejection of the Emperor's demands—My negotiations at Hamburg—Displeasure of the King of Sweden—M. Netzel and M. Wetterstedt.

At this critical moment Hamburg was menaced on all sides; the French even occupied a portion of its territory. The French troops, fortunately for the country, were attached to the corps commanded by the Prince de Ponte-Corvo.[1] This military occupation alarmed the town of Hamburg, to which, indeed, it proved very injurious. I wrote to Marshal Bernadotte on the subject. The grounds on which the Senate appealed for the evacuation of their territory were such that Bernadotte could not but acknowledge their justice. The prolonged stay of the French troops in the bailiwick of Bergdorff, which had all the appearance of an occupation, might have led to the confiscation of all Hamburg property in England, to the laying an embargo on the vessels of the Republic, and consequently to the ruin of a great part of the trade of France and Holland, which was carried on under the flag of Hamburg. There was no longer any motive for occupying the bailiwick of Bergdorff when there were no Prussians in that quarter. It would have been an absurd misfortune that eighty men stationed in that bailiwick should, for the sake of a few louis and a few ells of Eng-

[1] Bernandotte.

lish cloth, have occasioned the confiscation of Hamburg, French, and Dutch property to the amount of 80,000,000 francs.

Marshal Bernadotte replied to me on the 16th of November, and said, "I hasten to inform you that I have given orders for the evacuation of the bailiwick of Bergdorff and all the Hamburg territory. If you could obtain from the Senate of Hamburg, by the 19th of this month, two or three thousand pairs of shoes, you would oblige me greatly. They shall be paid for in goods or in money."

I obtained what Bernadotte required from the Senate, who knew his integrity, while they were aware that that quality was not the characteristic of all who commanded the French armies! What extortions took place during the occupation of Prussia! I will mention one of the means which, amongst others, was employed at Berlin to procure money. Bills of exchange were drawn, on which endorsements were forged, and these bills were presented to the bankers on whom they were purported to be drawn. One day some of these forged bills to a large amount were presented to Messrs. Mathiesen and Silleine of Hamburg, who, knowing the endorsement to be forged, refused to cash them. The persons who presented the bills carried their impudence so far as to send for the gendarmes, but the bankers persisted in their refusal. I was informed of this almost incredible scene, which had drawn together a great number of people. Indignant at such audacious robbery, I instantly proceeded to the spot and sent away the gendarmes, telling them it was not their duty to protect robbers, and that it was my business to listen to any just claims which might be advanced. Under Clarke's government at Berlin the inhabitants were subjected to all kinds of oppression and exaction. Amidst these exactions and infamous proceedings, which are not the indispensable consequences of war, the Dutch generals distinguished themselves by a degree of rapacity which brought

to mind the period of the French Republican peculations in Italy. It certainly was not their new King who set the example of this conduct. His moderation was well known, and it was as much the result of his disposition as of his honest principles. Louis Bonaparte, who was a King in spite of himself, afforded an example of all that a good man could suffer upon a usurped throne.

When the King of Prussia found himself defeated at every point he bitterly repented having undertaken a war which had delivered his States into Napoleon's power in less time than that in which Austria had fallen the preceding year. He wrote to the Emperor, soliciting a suspension of hostilities. Rapp was present when Napoleon received the King of Prussia's letter. "It is too late," said he; "but, no matter, I wish to stop the effusion of blood; I am ready to agree to anything which is not prejudicial to the honour or interests of the nation." Then calling Duroc, he gave him orders to visit the wounded, and see that they wanted for nothing. He added, "Visit every man on my behalf; give them all the consolation of which they stand in need; afterwards find the King of Prussia, and if he offers reasonable proposals let me know them."

Negotiations were commenced, but Napoleon's conditions were of a nature which was considered inadmissible. Prussia still hoped for assistance from the Russian forces. Besides, the Emperor's demands extended to England, who at that moment had no reason to accede to the pretensions of France. The Emperor wished England to restore to France the colonies which she had captured since the commencement of the war, that Russia should restore to the Porte Moldavia and Wallachia, which she then occupied; in short, he acted upon the advice which some tragedy-king gives to his ambassador: "Demand everything, that you may obtain nothing." The Emperor's demands were, in fact, so extravagant that it was scarcely

possible he himself could entertain the hope of their being accepted. Negotiations, alternately resumed and abandoned, were carried on with coldness on both sides until the moment when England prevailed on Russia to join Prussia against France; they then altogether ceased: and it was for the sake of appearing to wish for their renewal, on bases still more favourable to France, that Napoleon sent Duroc to the King of Prussia. Duroc found the King at Osterode, on the other side of the Vistula. The only answer he received from His Majesty was, "The time is passed;" which was very much like Napoleon's observation, "It is too late."

Whilst Duroc was on his mission to the King of Prussia I was myself negotiating at Hamburg. Bonaparte was very anxious to detach Sweden from the coalition, and to terminate the war with her by a separate treaty. Sweden, indeed, was likely to be very useful to him if Prussia, Russia, and England should collect a considerable mass of troops in the north. Denmark was already with us, and by gaining over Sweden also the union of those two powers might create a diversion, and give serious alarm to the coalition, which would be obliged to concentrate its principal force to oppose the attack of the grand army in Poland. The opinions of M. Peyron, the Swedish Minister at Hamburg, were decidedly opposed to the war in which his sovereign was engaged with France. I was sorry that this gentleman left Hamburg upon leave of absence for a year just at the moment I received my instructions from the Emperor upon this subject. M. Peyron was succeeded by M. Netzel, and I soon had the pleasure of perceiving that his opinions corresponded in every respect with those of his predecessor.

As soon as he arrived M. Netzel sought an interview to speak to me on the subject of the Swedes, who had been taken prisoners on the Drave. He entreated me to allow the officers to return to Sweden on their parole. I was

anxious to get M. Netzel's demand acceded to, and availed myself of that opportunity to lead him gradually to the subject of my instructions. I had good reason to be satisfied with the manner in which he received my first overtures. I said nothing to him of the justice of which he was not previously convinced. I saw he understood that his sovereign would have everything to gain by a reconciliation with France, and he told me that all Sweden demanded peace. Thus encouraged, I told him frankly that I was instructed to treat with him. M. Netzel assured me that M. de Wetterstedt, the King of Sweden's private secretary, with whom he was intimate, and from whom he showed me several letters, was of the same opinion on the subject as himself. He added, that he had permission to correspond with the King, and that he would write the same evening to his sovereign and M. de Wetterstedt, to acquaint them with our conversation.

It will be perceived, from what I have stated, that no negotiation was ever commenced under more favourable auspices ; but who could foresee what turn the King of Sweden would take? That unlucky Prince took M. Netzel's letter in very ill part, and M. de Wetterstedt himself received peremptory orders to acquaint M. Netzel with his sovereign's displeasure at his having presumed to visit a French Minster, and, above all, to enter into a political conversation with him, although it was nothing more than *conversation.* The King did not confine himself to reproaches ; M. Netzel came in great distress to inform me he had received orders to quit Hamburg immediately, without even awaiting the arrival of his successor. He regarded his disgrace as complete. I had the pleasure of seeing M. Netzel again in 1809 at Hamburg, where he was on a mission from King Charles XIII.

CHAPTER IX.

1806.

The Continental system—General indignation excited by it—Sale of licences by the French Government—Custom-house system at Hamburg—My letter to the Emperor—Cause of the rupture with Russia—Bernadotte's visit to me—Trial by a court-martial for the purchase of a sugar-loaf—Davoust and the captain "rapporteur"—Influence of the Continental system on Napoleon's fall.

I HAVE a few remarks to make on the famous Continental system, which was a subject of such engrossing interest. I had, perhaps, better opportunities than any other person of observing the fraud and estimating the fatal consequences of this system. It took its rise during the war in 1806, and was brought into existence by a decree, dated from Berlin. The project was conceived by weak counsellors, who, perceiving the Emperor's just indignation at the duplicity of England, her repugnance to enter into negotiations with him, and her constant endeavours to raise enemies against France, prevailed upon him to issue the decree, which I could only regard as an act of madness and tyranny. It was not a decree, but fleets, that were wanting. Without a navy it was ridiculous to declare the British Isles in a state of blockade, *whilst the English fleets were in fact blockading all the French ports.* This declaration was, however, made in the Berlin Decree. This is what was called the Continental system! which, in plain terms, was nothing but a system of fraud and pillage.

One can now scarcely conceive how Europe could for a single day endure that fiscal tyranny which extorted ex-

orbitant prices for articles which the habits of three centuries had rendered indispensable to the poor as well as to the rich. So little of truth is there in the pretence that this system had for its sole and exclusive object to prevent the sale of English goods, that licences for their disposal were procured at a high price by whoever was rich enough to pay for them. The number and quality of the articles exported from France were extravagantly exaggerated. It was, indeed, necessary to take out some of those articles in compliance with the Emperor's wishes, but they were only thrown into the sea. And yet no one had the honesty to tell the Emperor that England sold on the Continent, but bought scarcely anything. The speculation in licences was carried to a scandalous extent only to enrich a few, and to satisfy the short-sighted views of the contrivers of the system.

This system proves what is written in the annals of the human heart and mind, that the cupidity of the one is insatiable, and the errors of the other incorrigible. Of this I will cite an example, though it refers to a period posterior to the origin of the Continental system. At Hamburg, in 1811, under Davoust's government, a poor man had well-nigh been shot for having introduced into the department of the Elbe a small loaf of sugar for the use of his family, while at the same moment Napoleon was perhaps signing a licence for the importation of a million of sugar-loaves.[1]

[1] In this same year (1811) Murat, as King of Naples, not only winked at the infringement of the Continental system, but almost openly broke the law himself. His troops in Calabria, and all round his immense line of sea-coast, carried on an active trade with Sicilian and English smugglers. This was so much the case that an officer never set out from Naples to join, without being requested by his wife, his relations or friends, to bring them some English muslins, some sugar and coffee, together with a few needles, penknives, and razors. Some of the Neapolitan officers embarked in really large commercial operations, going shares with the custom-house people who were there to enforce the law, and making their soldiers load and unload the contraband vessels.

The Comte de ——, a French officer on Murat's staff, was very noble, but very poor, and excessively extravagant. After making several vain efforts to set him up in the world, the King told him one day he would give him the command of all the

Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, whilst the Government themselves carried it on extensively. The same cause filled the Treasury with money, and the prisons with victims.

The custom-house laws of this period, which waged open war against rhubarb, and armed the coasts of the Continent against the introduction of senna, did not save the Continental system from destruction.[1] Ridicule attended the installation of the odious prevotal courts. The president of the Prevotal Court at Hamburg, who was a Frenchman, delivered an address, in which he endeavoured to prove that in the time of the Ptolemies there had existed extraordinary fiscal tribunals, and that it was to those Egypt owed her prosperity. Terror was thus introduced by the most absurd folly. The ordinary custom-house officers, formerly so much abhorred in Hamburg, declared with reason that they would soon be regretted, and that the difference between them and the prevotal courts would soon be felt. Bonaparte's counsellors led him to commit the folly of requiring that a ship which had obtained a licence should export merchandise equivalent to that of the colonial produce to be imported under the authority of the licence. What was the consequence? The speculators bought at a low price old stores of silks, which change of fashion had made completely unsaleable, and as those articles were prohibited in England they were thrown into the sea without their loss being felt. The profits of the speculation made ample amends for the sacrifice. The Continental system was worthy only of the ages of ignorance and barbarism, and had it been admissible in theory, was impracticable in application. It

troops round the Gulf of Salerno; adding that the devil was in it if he could not make a fortune in such a capital smuggling district in a couple of years. The Count took the hint, and did make a fortune.—*Editor of* 1826 *edition.*

[1] Sydney Smith was struck with the ridiculous side of the war of tariffs: "We are told that the Continent is to be reconquered by the want of rhubarb and plums" (*Essays of Sydney Smith*, p. 533, edition of 1851).

cannot be sufficiently stigmatised. They were not the friends of the Emperor who recommended a system calculated to rouse the indignation of Europe, and which could not fail to create reaction. To tyrannize over the human species, and to exact uniform admiration and submission, is to require an impossibility. It would seem that fate, which had still some splendid triumphs in store for Bonaparte, intended to prepare beforehand the causes which were to deprive him of all his triumphs at once, and plunge him into reverses even greater than the good fortune which had favoured his elevation.

The prohibition of trade, the habitual severity in the execution of this odious system, made it operate like a Continental impost. I will give a proof of this, and I state nothing but what came under my own observation. The fiscal regulations were very rigidly enforced at Hamburg, and along the two lines of Cuxhaven and Travemunde. M. Eudel, the director of that department, performed his duty with zeal and disinterestedness. I feel gratified in rendering him this tribute. Enormous quantities of English merchandise and colonial produce were accumulated at Holstein, where they almost all arrived by way of Kiel and Hudsum, and were smuggled over the line at the expense of a premium of 33 and 40 per cent. Convinced of this fact by a thousand proofs, and weary of the vexations of the preventive system, I took upon myself to lay my opinions on the subject before the Emperor. He had given me permission to write to him personally, without any intermediate agency, upon everything that I might consider essential to his service. I sent an extraordinary courier to Fontainebleau, where he then was, and in my despatch I informed him that, notwithstanding his preventive guard, every prohibited article was smuggled in because the profits on the sale in Germany, Poland, Italy, and even France, into which the contrabrand goods found their way, were too considerable not to induce

DAVOUST
(PRINCE D'ECKMUHL)

persons to incur all risks to obtain them. I advised him, at the very time he was about to unite the Hanse Towns to the French Empire, to permit merchandise to be imported subject to a duty of 33 per cent., which was about equal to the amount of the premium for insurance. The Emperor adopted my advice without hesitation, and in 1811 the regulation produced a revenue of upwards of 60,000,000 francs in Hamburg alone.

This system, however, embroiled us with Sweden and Russia, who could not endure that Napoleon should exact a strict blockade from them, whilst he was himself distributing licences in abundance. Bernadotte, on his way to Sweden, passed through Hamburg in October 1810. He stayed with me three days, during which time he scarcely saw any person but myself. He asked my opinion as to what he should do in regard to the Continental system. I did not hesitate to declare to him, not as a French Minister, but as a private individual to his friend, that in his place, at the head of a poor nation, which could only subsist by the exchange of its territorial productions with England, I would open my ports, and give the Swedes gratuitously that general licence which Bonaparte sold in detail to intrigue and cupidity.

The Berlin decree could not fail to cause a reaction against the Emperor's fortune by raising up whole nations against him. The hurling of twenty kings from their thrones would have excited less hatred than this contempt for the wants of nations. This profound ignorance of the maxims of political economy caused general privation and misery, which in their turn occasioned general hostility. The system could only succeed in the impossible event of all the powers of Europe honestly endeavouring to carry it into effect. A single free port would have destroyed it. In order to ensure its complete success it was necessary to conquer and occupy all countries, and never to evacuate them. As a means of ruining England it was contempti-

ble. It was necessary that all Europe should be compelled by force of arms to join this absurd coalition, and that the same force should be constantly employed to maintain it. Was this possible? The captain "rapporteur" of a court-martial allowed a poor peasant to escape the punishment due to the offence of having bought a loaf of sugar beyond the custom-house barrier. This officer was some time afterwards at a dinner given by Marshal Davoust; the latter said to him, "You have a very scrupulous conscience, sir; go to headquarters and you will find an order there for you." This order sent him eighty leagues from Hamburg. It is necessary to have witnessed, as I have, the numberless vexations and miseries occasioned by the unfortunate Continental system to understand the mischief its authors did in Europe, and how much that mischief contributed to Napoleon's fall.[1]

[1] The so-called Continental system was framed by Napoleon in revenge for the English very extended system of blockades, after Trafalgar had put it out of his power to attempt to keep the seas. The principal decrees were dated Berlin, 21st November 1806; Milan, 17th December 1807; Paris, 11th January 1808; Antwerp, 25th July 1810; Trianon, 5th August 1810; Fontainebleau, 19th October 1810. By these decrees all ports occupied by the French were closed to the English, and all English goods were to be destroyed wherever found in any country occupied by the French. All States under French influence had to adopt this system. It must be remembered that Napoleon eventually held or enforced his system on all the coast-lines of Europe, except that of Spain and Turkey; but as Bourrienne shows, the plan of giving licences to break his own system was too lucrative to be resisted by him, or, still more, by his officers. For the working of the system in the occupied lands see *Beugnot*, tome ii. p. 42. Lafitte the banker told Savary it was a grand idea, but impracticable (*Savary*, tome v. p. 110). The Emperor Alexander is reported to have said, after visiting England in 1814, that he believed the system would have reduced England if it had lasted another year (*Savary*, tome iv. p. 345). The English, who claimed the right of blockading any coast with but little regard to the effectiveness of the blockade, retaliated by orders in Council, the chief of which are dated 7th January 1807, and 11th November 1807, by which no ships of any power were allowed to trade between any French ports, or the ports of any country closed to England. Whatever the real merits of the system, and although it was the cause of war between the United States and England, its execution did most to damage France and Napoleon, and to band all Europe against it. It is curious that even in 1831 a treaty had to be made to settle the claims of the United States on France for unjust seizures under these decrees; see Guizot's *Memoirs*, tome iii. p. 233.

CHAPTER X.

1806–1807.

New system of war—Winter quarters—The Emperor's proclamation—Necessity of marching to meet the Russians—Distress in the Hanse Towns—Order for 50,000 cloaks—Seizure of Russian corn and timber—Murat's entrance into Warsaw—Re-establishment of Poland—Duroc's accident—M. de Talleyrand's carriage stopped by the mud—Napoleon's power of rousing the spirit of his troops—His mode of dictating—The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin—His visits to Hamburg—The Duke of Weimar—His letter and present—Journey of the Hereditary Prince of Denmark to Paris—Butler, the English spy—Travelling clerks—Louis Bonaparte and the Berlin decree—Creation of the Kingdom of Saxony—Veneration of Germany for the King of Saxony—The Emperor's uncertainty respecting Poland—*Fêtes* and reviews at Warsaw—The French Government at the Emperor's headquarters—Ministerial portfolios sent to Warsaw—Military preparations during the month of January—Difference of our situation during the campaigns of Vienna and Prussia—News received and sent—Conduct of the Cabinet of Austria similar to that of the Cabinet of Berlin—Battle of Eylau—Unjust accusation against Bernadotte—Death of General d'Hautpoult—*Te Deum* chanted by the Russians—Gardanne's mission to Persia.

Bonaparte was not only beyond all comparison the greatest captain of modern times, but he may be said to have wrought a complete change in the art of war. Before his time the most able generals regulated the fighting season by the almanac. It was customary in Europe to brave the cannon's mouth only from the first fine days of spring to the last fine days of autumn; and the months of rain, snow, and frost were passed in what were called winter quarters. Pichegru, in Holland, had set the example of indifference to temperature. At Austerlitz, too, Bonaparte had braved the severity of winter; this answered

his purpose well, and he adopted the same course in 1806. His military genius and activity seemed to increase, and, proud of his troops, he determined to commence a winter campaign in a climate more rigorous than any in which he had yet fought. The men, chained to his destiny, were now required to brave the northern blast, as they had formerly braved the vertical sun of Egypt.[1] Napoleon, who, above all generals, was remarkable for the choice of his fields of battle, did not wish to wait tranquilly until the Russian army, which was advancing towards Germany, should come to measure its strength with him in the plains of conquered Prussia; he resolved to march to meet it, and to reach it before it should cross the Vistula; but before he left Berlin to explore, as a conqueror, Poland and the confines of Russia, he addressed a proclamation to his troops, in which he stated all that had hitherto been achieved by the French army, and at the same time announced his future intentions. It was especially advisable that he should march forward; for, had he waited until the Russians had passed the Vistula, there could

[1] A curious meteorological coincidence may be noted here. The passage of the Niemen by the French army, and its consequent entry on Russian territory, may be said to have been Napoleon's first step towards his ultimate defeat and ruin. A terrible thunderstorm occurred on this occasion, according to M. de Ségur's account of the Russian campaign. When Napoleon commenced the retreat by which he yielded all the country beyond the Elbe (and which may be therefore reckoned the second step towards his downfall), it was accompanied by a thunderstorm more remarkable from occurring at such a season. [Odelben says "C'était un phénomène bien extraordinaire dans une pareille saison et avec le froid qu'on venait d'éprouver," etc., *Campaign of* 1813, vol. i. p. 289.] The first step towards his second downfall, or the third towards his final ruin, was his advance against the British force at Quatre-Bras on the 17th of June 1815. This also was accompanied by an awful thunderstorm, which (though gathering all the forenoon) commenced at the very moment he made his attack on the British rear-guard with Ney's corps about 3 p.m., when the first gun fired was instantly responded to by a tremendous peal of thunder. Again at St. Helena, where thunderstorms are unknown, the last breath of Napoleon passed away in the midst of a furious tempest.

Thunder to Wellington was the precursor of victory and triumph. Witness the above-mentioned introduction to the crowning victory of Waterloo, the terrible thunder that scattered the horses of the dragoons on the eve of Salamanca, also the similar storm on the night preceding Sabugal; see *Notes and Queries*, 13th August 1853.

probably have been no winter campaign, and he would have been obliged either to take up miserable winter quarters between the Vistula and the Oder, or to recross the Oder to combat the enemy in Prussia. Napoleon's military genius and indefatigable activity served him admirably on this occasion, and the proclamation just alluded to, which was dated from Berlin before his departure from Charlottenburg, proves that he did not act fortuitously, as he frequently did, but that his calculations were well made.[1]

A rapid and immense impulse given to great masses of men by the will of a single individual[2] may produce

[1] Before leaving the capital of Prussia Bonaparte stole from the monument of Frederick the Great his sword and military orders. He also plundered the galleries of Berlin and Potsdam of their best pictures and statues, thus continning the iniquitous system he had begun in Italy. All these things he sent to Paris as trophies of victory and glory.—*Editor of the* 1836 *edition.*

[2] Napoleon had one great advantage over his adversaries of combining in his person the powers of the head of the State and of a commander possessing the full confidence of the army. The Czar Alexander, even when nominally in command of his own army, had to reckon with his generals, Metternich remarking that he did not believe the Russian army would have advanced beyond the Oder in 1813 if old Kntusow had been alive. Most generals are subject to have to work on plans not fully approved by them, and thus see even their own defeats with mixed feelings, as Jourdan, after Vittoria, commenced his supper with the remark, "Well, they wished to give battle, and they have lost it" (*Miot*, tome iii. p. 320). Wellington, after gaining the confidence of the Government in Spain, and thus obtaining a position unique amongst English commanders, made some valuable remarks on his and on Napoleon's position. "Wellington said the other day that he had great advantages now over every other general. He could do what others dare not attempt, and he got the confidence of the three allied powers, so that what he said or ordered was, right or wrong, always thought right. And it is the same," said he, "with the troops. When I come myself, the soldiers think what they have to do the most important, since I am there, and that all will depend on their exertions. Of course these are increased in proportion, and they will do for me what, perhaps, no one else can make them do." He said "he had several of the advantages possessed by Bonaparte in regard to his freedom of action and power of risking, without being constantly called to account. Bonaparte was quite free from all inquiry, and that he himself was in fact very much so. The other advantage which Napoleon possessed, and of which he made so much use," Lord Wellington said, "was his full latitude of lying; *that*, if so disposed," he said, "he could not do" (Larpent's *Journal*, p. 227). It is only fair to remember this last remark when the falsehoods contained in Napoleon's bulletins are attacked. If he did lie, who ever had such great opportunities of lying, though perhaps some modern reports of *strategic movements* might compete with his statements? Savary assumed the same advantages for Napoleon when he advised the evacuation of Madrid after Baylen, allowing that Napoleon would not have with

transient lustre and dazzle the eyes of the multitude; but when, at a distance from the theatre of glory, we see only the melancholy results which have been produced, the genius of conquest can only be regarded as the genius of destruction. What a sad picture was often presented to my eyes! I was continually doomed to hear complaints of the general distress, and to execute orders which augmented the immense sacrifices already made by the city of Hamburg. Thus, for example, the Emperor desired me to furnish him with 50,000 cloaks, which I immediately did. I felt the importance of such an order at the approach of winter, and in a climate the rigour of which our troops had not yet encountered. I also received orders to seize at Lübeck (which town, as I have already stated, had been alternately taken and retaken by Blucher and Bernadotte) 400,000 *lasts* of corn,[1] and to send them to Magdeburg. This corn belonged to Russia. Marshal Mortier, too, had seized some timber for building, which also belonged to Russia, and which was estimated at 1,400,000 francs.

Meanwhile our troops continued to advance with such rapidity that before the end of November Murat arrived at Warsaw, at the head of the advanced guard of the Grand Army, of which he had the command. The Emperor's headquarters were then at Posen, and he received deputations from all parts soliciting the re-establishment and independence of the Kingdom of Poland.

drawn. "I well know," said Savary to Joseph, "that if the Emperor were here he would not dream of retiring; but wherever he himself is, every one obeys at once, and no one complains. Here we are in a very different case. If we were to ask that anything should be done, every one would be tired or sick, while one glance of the Emperor would set all these idlers to work. No one can do what the Emperor is able to do, and whoever would try to imitate him would only ruin himself" (*Savary*, tome iii. pp. 423–424). But it must be remembered that Napoleon assumed an independent position from the very beginning, and when a simple general in his first command in Italy would not submit to any of the usual checks. His letter to Carnot on refusing to serve if his army were divided, and his determined opposition to the plans of the Directory for marching into the south of Italy, are well known.

[1] A *last* weighs 2000 kilogrammes.

Rapp informed me that after receiving the deputation from Warsaw the Emperor said to him, "I love the Poles; their enthusiastic character pleases me; I should like to make them independent, but that is a difficult matter. Austria, Russia, and Prussia have all had a slice of the cake; when the match is once kindled who knows where the conflagration may stop? My first duty is towards France, which I must not sacrifice to Poland; we must refer this matter to the sovereign of all things—Time; he will presently show us what we must do." Had Sulkowsky lived Napoleon might have recollected what he had said to him in Egypt, and in all probability he would have raised up a power, the dismemberment of which, towards the close of the last century, began to overturn the political equilibrium which had subsisted in Europe since the peace of Westphalia in 1648.

It was at the headquarters at Posen that Duroc rejoined the Emperor after his mission to the King of Prussia. His carriage overturned on the way, and he had the misfortune to break his collar-bone. All the letters I received were nothing but a succession of complaints on the bad state of the roads. Our troops were absolutely fighting in mud, and it was with extreme difficulty that the artillery and caissons of the army could be moved along. M. de Talleyrand had been summoned to headquarters by the Emperor, in the expectation of treating for peace, and I was informed that his carriage stuck in the mud and he was detained on his journey for twelve hours. A soldier having asked one of the persons in M. de Talleyrand's suite who the traveller was, was informed that he was the Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Ah! bah!" said the soldier, "why does he come with his diplomacy to such a devil of a country as this?"

The Emperor entered Warsaw on the 1st of January 1807. Most of the reports which he had received previous to his entrance had concurred in describing the dissatis-

faction of the troops, who for some time had had to contend with bad roads, bad weather, and all sorts of privations.[1] Bonaparte said to the generals who informed him that the enthusiasm of his troops had been succeeded by dejection and discontent, "Does their spirit fail them when they come in sight of the enemy?"—"No, Sire."—"I knew it; my troops are always the same." Then turning to Rapp he said, "I must rouse them;" and he dictated the following proclamation:—

SOLDIERS—It is a year this very hour since you were on the field of Austerlitz, where the Russian battalions fled in disorder, or surrendered up their arms to their conquerors. Next day proposals of peace were talked of; but they were deceptive. No sooner had the Russians escaped by, perhaps, blamable generosity from the disasters of the the third coalition than they contrived a fourth. But the ally on whose tactics they founded their principal hope was no more. His capital, his fortresses, his magazines, his arsenals, 280 flags, and 700 fieldpieces have fallen into our power. The Oder, the Wartha, the deserts of Poland, and the inclemency of the season have not for a moment retarded your progress. You have braved all; surmounted all; every obstacle has fled at your approach. The Russians have in vain endeavoured to defend

[1] Rapp thus describes the entrance of the French into Warsaw, and adds a few anecdotes connected with that event:—

"At length we entered the Polish capital. The King of Naples had preceded us, and had driven the Russians from the city. Napoleon was received with enthusiasm. The Poles thought that the moment of their regeneration had arrived, and that their wishes were fulfilled. It would be difficult to describe the joy thus evinced, and the respect with which they treated us. The French troops, however, were not quite so well pleased; they manifested the greatest repugnance to crossing the Vistula. The idea of want and bad weather had inspired them with the greatest aversion to Poland, and they were inexhaustible in their jokes on the country.

"The French used to say that the four following words constituted the whole language of the Poles:—*Kleba? niema; vota? sara.* (Some bread? there is none; some water? we will go and fetch it.) This was all that was to be heard in Poland. Napoleon one day passed by a column of infantry in the neighbourhood of Nasielsk, where the troops were suffering the greatest privations on account of the mud, which prevented the arrival of provisions. '*Papa, kleba?*' exclaimed a soldier. '*Niema,*' replied the Emperor. The whole column burst into a fit of laughter; they asked for nothing more.

"One evening at the theatre, when the curtain was very late in rising, a grenadier who was among the spectators became impatient at the delay. 'Begin!' he called out from the farther end of the pit, 'begin directly, or I will not cross the Vistula'" (Rapp's *Memoirs*, 118–120.)

the capital of ancient and illustrious Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula. The brave and unfortunate Poles, on beholding you, fancied they saw the legions of Sobieski returning from their memorable expedition.

Soldiers, we will not lay down our arms until a general peace has secured the power of our allies and restored to us our colonies and our freedom of trade. We have gained on the Elbe and the Oder, Pondicherry, our Indian establishments, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish colonies. Why should the Russians have the right of opposing destiny and thwarting our just designs? They and we are still the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz.

When Bonaparte dictated his proclamations—and how many have I not written from his dictation!—he was for the moment inspired, and he evinced all the excitement which distinguishes the Italian improvisatori. To follow him it was necessary to write with inconceivable rapidity. When I have read over to him what he has dictated I have often known him to smile triumphantly at the effect which he expected any particular phrase would produce. In general his proclamations turned on three distinct points—(1) Praising his soldiers for what they had done; (2) pointing out to them what they had yet to do; and (3) abusing his enemies. The proclamation to which I have just now alluded was circulated profusely through Germany, and it is impossible to conceive the effect it produced on the whole army. The corps stationed in the rear burned to pass, by forced marches, the space which still separated them from headquarters; and those who were nearer the Emperor forgot their fatigues and privations and were only anxious to encounter the enemy. They frequently could not understand what Napoleon said in these proclamations; but no matter for that, they would have followed him cheerfully barefooted and without provisions. Such was the enthusiasm, or rather the fanaticism, which Napoleon could inspire among his troops when he thought proper to *rouse* them, as he termed it.

When, on a former occasion, I spoke of the Duke of

Mecklenburg-Schwerin and his family, I forgot a circumstance respecting my intercourse with him which now occurs to my memory. When, on his expulsion from his States, after the battle of Jena, he took refuge in Altona, he requested, through the medium of his Minister at Hamburg, Count von Plessen, that I would give him permission occasionally to visit that city. This permission I granted without hesitation; but the Duke observed no precaution in his visits, and I made some friendly observations to him on the subject. I knew the object of his visits. It was a secret connection in Hamburg; but in consequence of my observations he removed the lady to Altona, and assured me that he adopted that determination to avoid committing me. He afterwards came very seldom to Hamburg; but as we were on the best understanding with Denmark I frequently saw his daughter and son-in-law, who used to visit me at a house I had in Holstein, near Altona.

There I likewise saw, almost every day, the Duke of Weimar, an excellent old man. I had the advantage of being on such terms of intimacy with him that my house was in some measure his. He also had lost his States. I was so happy as to contribute to their restitution, for my situation enabled me to exercise some influence on the political indulgences or severities of the Government. I entertained a sincere regard for the Duke of Weimar, and I greatly regretted his departure. No sooner had he arrived in Berlin than he wrote me a letter of thanks, to which he added the present of a diamond, in token of his grateful remembrance of me. The Duke of Mecklenburg was not so fortunate as the Duke of Weimar, in spite of his alliance with the reigning family of Denmark. He was obliged to remain at Altona until the July following, for his States were restored only by the Treaty of Tilsit. As soon as it was known that the Emperor had returned to Paris the Duke's son, the Hereditary Prince, visited me

in Hamburg, and asked me whether I thought he could present himself to the Emperor, for the purpose of expressing his own and his father's gratitude. He was a very well-educated young man. He set out, accompanied by M. Oertzen and Baron von Brandstaten. Some time afterwards I saw his name in the *Moniteur*, in one of the lists of presentations to Napoleon, the collection of which, during the Empire, might be regarded as a general register of the nobility of Europe.

It is commonly said that we may accustom ourselves to anything, but to me this remark is subject to an exception ; for, in spite of the necessity to which I was reduced of employing spies, I never could surmount the disgust I felt at them, especially when I saw men destined to fill a respectable rank in society degrade themselves to that infamous profession. It is impossible to conceive the artifices to which these men resort to gain the confidence of those whom they wish to betray. Of this the following example just now occurs to my mind.

One of those wretches who are employed in certain circumstances, and by all parties, came to offer his services to me. His name was Butler, and he had been sent from England to the Continent as a spy upon the French Government. He immediately came to me, complaining of pretended enemies and unjust treatment. He told me he had the greatest wish to serve the Emperor, and that he would make any sacrifice to prove his fidelity. The real motive of his change of party was, as it is with all such men, merely the hope of a higher reward. Most extraordinary were the schemes he adopted to prevent his old employers from suspecting that he was serving new ones. To me he continually repeated how happy he was to be revenged on his enemies in London. He asked me to allow him to go to Paris to be examined by the Minister of Police. The better to keep up the deception he requested that on his arrival in Paris he might be confined

in the Temple, and that there might be inserted in the French journals an announcement in the following terms: "*John Butler, commonly called Count Butler, has just been arrested and sent to Paris under a good escort by the French Minister at Hamburg.*" At the expiration of a few weeks Butler, having received his instructions, set out for London, but by way of precaution he said it would be well to publish in the journals another announcement, which was as follows: "*John Butler, who has been arrested in Hamburg as an English agent, and conveyed to Paris, is ordered to quit France, and the territories occupied by the French armies and their allies, and not to appear there again until the general peace.*" In England Butler enjoyed the honours of French persecution. He was regarded as a victim who deserved all the confidence of the enemies of France. He furnished Fouché with a considerable amount of information, and he was fortunate enough to escape being hanged.

Nothwithstanding the pretended necessity of employing secret agents, Bonaparte was unwilling that, even under that pretext, too many communications should be established between France and England. Fouché, nevertheless, actively directed the evolutions of his secret army. Ever ready to seize on anything that could give importance to the police and encourage the suspicions of the Emperor, Fouché wrote to me that the Government had received certain information that many Frenchmen, travelling for commercial houses in France, were at Manchester purchasing articles of English manufacture. This was true; but how was it to be prevented? These travelling clerks passed through Holland, where they easily procured a passage to England.

Louis Bonaparte, conceiving that the King of Holland ought not to sacrifice the interests of his new subjects to the wishes of his brother, was at first very lenient as to the disastrous Continental system. But at this Napoleon soon

manifested his displeasure, and about the end of the year 1806 Louis was reduced to the necessity of ordering the strict observance of the blockade. The facility with which the travellers of French commercial houses passed from Holland to England gave rise to other alarms on the part of the French Government. It was said that since Frenchmen could so easily pass from the Continent to Great Britain, the agents of the English Cabinet might, by the same means, find their way to the Continent. Accordingly the consuls were directed to keep a watchful eye, not only upon individuals who evidently came from England, but upon those who might by any possibility come from that country. This plan was all very well, but how was it to be put into execution? . . . The Continent was, nevertheless, inundated with articles of English manufacture, for this simple reason, that, however powerful may be the will of a sovereign, it is still less powerful and less lasting than the wants of a people. The Continental system reminded me of the law created by an ancient legislator, who, for a crime which he conceived could not possibly be committed, condemned the person who should be guilty of it to throw a bull over Mount Taurus.

It is not my present design to trace a picture of the state of Europe at the close of 1806. I will merely throw together a few facts which came to my knowledge at the time, and which I find in my correspondence. I have already mentioned that the Emperor arrived at Warsaw on the 1st of January. During his stay at Posen he had, by virtue of a treaty concluded with the Elector of Saxony, founded a new kingdom, and consequently extended his power in Germany, by the annexation of the new Kingdom of Saxony to the Confederation of the Rhine. By the terms of this treaty Saxony, so justly famed for her cavalry, was to furnish the Emperor with a contingent of 20,000 men and horses.[1]

[1] The Duchy of Warsaw was formed under the Treaty of Tilsit, July 1807, chiefly

It was quite a new spectacle to the Princes of Germany, all accustomed to old habits of etiquette, to see an upstart sovereign treat them as subjects, and even oblige them to consider themselves as such. Those famous Saxons, who had made Charlemagne tremble, threw themselves on the protection of the Emperor ; and the alliance of the head of the House of Saxony was not a matter of indifference to Napoleon, for the new King was, on account of his age, his tastes, and his character, more revered than any other German Prince.

From the moment of Napoleon's arrival at Warsaw until the commencement of hostilities against the Russians he was continually solicited to re-establish the throne of Poland, and to restore its chivalrous independence to the ancient empire of the Jagellons. A person who was at that time in Warsaw told me that the Emperor was in the greatest uncertainty as to what he should do respecting Poland. He was entreated to re-establish that ancient and heroic kingdom ; but he came to no decision, preferring, according to custom, to submit to events, that he might appear to command them. At Warsaw, indeed, the Emperor passed a great part of his time in *fêtes* and reviews, which, however, did not prevent him from watching, with his eagle eye, every department of the public service, both interior and exterior.[1] He him-

from the former Polish provinces of Prussia, which she had obtained after 1st January 1772, about 400,000 souls. On the 17th of September 1807 it was handed over to the King of Saxony as Grand Duke. It formed part of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the contingent of Saxony, formerly 20,000 men, was now increased to 30,000. In February 1813 the duchy was broken up, Posen was restored to Prussia, part of Galicia to Austria, Cracow was made independent, and the rest annexed to Russia, Alexander taking the title of King of Poland. Saxony had been raised from an electorate to a kingdom when it joined the Confederation of the Rhine, 11th December 1806 ; thus Bourrienne calls it the new Kingdom.

[1] "Our halt at Warsaw was delightful. With the exception of theatres, the city presented all the gaieties of Paris. Twice a week the Emperor gave a concert ; after which a court was held, which led again to numerous meetings in private parties. On these occasions the personal beauty and graceful manners of the Polish ladies were conspicuous. It may truly be said that they excited the jealousy of the most charming women of other nations. With the most polished elegance they combine a fund of information which is not usually found even among Frenchwomen ; and

self was in the capital of Poland, but his vast influence was present everywhere. I heard Duroc say, when we were conversing together about the campaign of Tilsit, that Napoleon's activity and intelligence were never more conspicuously developed.

One very remarkable feature of the imperial wars was, that, with the exception of the interior police, of which Fouché was the soul, the whole government of France was at the headquarters of the Emperor. At Warsaw Napoleon's attention was not only occupied with the affairs of his army, but he directed the whole machinery of the French Government just the same as if he had been in Paris. Daily estafettes, and frequently the useless auditors of the Council of State, brought him reports more or less correct, and curious disclosures which were frequently the invention of the police. The portfolios of the Ministers arrived every week, with the exception of those of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the War Department; the former had first stopped at Mayence with the Empress, but had been called on to Warsaw; and the latter, Clarke, was, for the misfortune of Berlin, governor of that city.[1] This state of things lasted during the ten months of the Emperor's absence from Paris. Louis XIV. said, "I am myself the State." Napoleon did not say this; but, in fact, under his reign

they are very superior to the generality of women bred in cities, to whom habit renders company almost a necessary of life. The Polish ladies of rank always pass one-half of the year in the country, where probably they apply themselves to reading and the cultivation of their minds; and they return to spend the winter season in the capital, graced with those talents and accomplishments which render them so peculiarly attractive.

"The Emperor and all the French officers paid their tribute of admiration to the charms of the fair Poles. There was one whose powerful fascinations made a deep impression on the Emperor's heart. He conceived an ardent affection for her, which she cordially returned. She received with pride the homage of a conquest which was the consummation of her happiness. It is needless to name her, when I observe that her attachment remained unshaken amidst every danger, and that at the period of Napoleon's reverses she continued his faithful friend" (*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome iii. p. 26).

[1] This is an error. Clarke was Governor of Berlin in 1806, and only succeeded Berthier as War Minister 9th August 1807, that is, after the peace of Tilsit.

the Government of France was always at his headquarters. This circumstance had well-nigh proved fatal to him, on the occasion of the extraordinary conspiracy of Malet, with some points of which I alone, perhaps, am thoroughly acquainted. The Emperor employed the month of January in military preparations for the approaching attack of the Russians, but at the same time he did not neglect the business of the cabinet: with him nothing was suffered to linger in arrear.

While Napoleon was at Warsaw a battle was not the only thing to be thought about; affairs were much more complicated than during the campaign of Vienna. It was necessary, on the one hand, to observe Prussia, which was occupied; and on the other to anticipate the Russians, whose movements indicated that they were inclined to strike the first blow. In the preceding campaign Austria, before the taking of Vienna, was engaged alone. The case was different now: Austria had had only soldiers; and Prussia, as Blucher declared to me, was beginning to have citizens.[1] There was no difficulty in returning from Vienna, but a great deal in returning from Warsaw, in case of failure, nothwithstanding the creation of the Kingdom of Saxony, and the provisional government given to Prussia, and to the other States of Germany which we had conquered. None of these considerations escaped the penetration of Napoleon: nothing was omitted in the notes, letters, and official correspondence which came to me from all quarters. Receiving, as I did, accurate information from my own correspondents of all that was passing in

[1] Speaking of the difference he remarked between the inhabitants of the provinces taken from Prussia to make up the Grand Duchy of Berg and of those taken for the other States, Beugnot (vol. i. p. 269) says, "The Prussians . . . had a love of their country amounting to idolatry. They retained that love . . . at the very time when Prussia was cut into fragments, which Napoleon was distributing to the right and left; and yet, when I took possession of the country of La Marck, I saw that all was not over with men who did not allow that they were conquered, and dreamed of victory even while their enemy had them under foot and was ready to give the finishing stroke."

Germany, it often happened that I transmitted to the Government the same news which it transmitted to me, not supposing that I previously knew it. Thus, for example, I thought I was apprising the Government of the arming of Austria, of which I received information from headquarters a few days after.

During the Prussian campaign Austria played precisely the same waiting game which Prussia had played during the campaign of Austria. As Prussia had, before the battle of Austerlitz, awaited the success or defeat of the French to decide whether she should remain neutral or declare herself against France, so Austria, doubtless supposing that Russia would be more fortunate as the ally of Prussia than she had been as *her* ally, assembled a corps of 40,000 men in Bohemia. That corps was called an army of observation ; but the nature of these armies of observation is well known ; they belong to the class of armed neutralities, like the ingenious invention of sanitary cordons. The fact is, that the 40,000 men assembled in Bohemia were destined to aid and assist the Russians in case they should be successful (and who can blame the Austrian Government for wishing to wash away the shame of the Treaty of Presburg ?). Napoleon had not a moment to lose, but this activity required no spur ; he had hastened the battle of Austerlitz to anticipate Prussia, and he now found it necessary to anticipate Russia in order to keep Austria in a state of indecision.

The Emperor, therefore, left Warsaw about the end of January, and immediately gave orders for engaging the Russian army in the beginning of February ; but, in spite of his desire of commencing the attack, he was anticipated. On the 8th of February, at seven in the morning, he was attacked by the Russians, who advanced during a terrible storm of snow, which fell in large flakes. They approached Preussich-Eylau, where the Emperor was, and the Imperial Guard stopped the Russian column. Nearly the whole

French army was engaged in that battle—one of the most sanguinary ever fought in Europe.[1] The corps commanded by Bernadotte was not engaged in the contest; it had been stationed on the left at Mohrungen, whence it menaced Dantzic. The issue of the battle would have been very different had the four divisions of infantry and the two of cavalry composing Bernadotte's corps arrived in time; but unfortunately the officer instructed to convey orders to Bernadotte to march without delay on Preussich-Eylau was taken by a body of Cossacks; Bernadotte, therefore, did not arrive. Bonaparte, who always liked to throw blame on some one if things did not turn out exactly as he wished, attributed the doubtful success of the day to the absence of Bernadotte; in this he was right; but to make his absence a reproach to that Marshal was a gross injustice.[2] Bernadotte was accused of not having been willing to march on Preussich-Eylau, though, as it was alleged, General d'Hautpoult had informed him of the necessity of his presence. But how can that fact be ascertained, since General d'Hautpoult was killed on that same day? Who can assure us that that General had been able to communicate with the Marshal?

Those who knew Bonaparte, his cunning, and the artful advantage he would sometimes take of words which he attributed to the dead, will easily solve the enigma. The battle of Eylau was terrible. Night came on—Bernadotte's corps was instantly, but in vain, expected; and after a great loss the French army had the melancholy honour of passing the night on the field of battle. Bernadotte at length arrived, but too late. He met the enemy, who were retreating without the fear of being molested towards Konigsberg, the only capital remaining to Prussia. The King of Prussia was then at Memel, a small port on the Baltic, thirty leagues from Konigsberg.

[1] Until Borodino.

[2] See a previous footnote upon p. 58.

THE CHARGE OF THE CUIRASSIERS AT EYLAU

After the battle of Eylau both sides remained stationary, and several days elapsed without anything remarkable taking place. The offers of peace made by the Emperor, with very little earnestness it is true, were disdainfully rejected, as if a victory disputed with Napoleon was to be regarded as a triumph. The battle of Eylau seemed to turn the heads of the Russians, who chanted *Te Deum* on the occasion. But while the Emperor was making preparations to advance, his diplomacy was taking effect in a distant quarter, and raising up against Russia an old and formidable enemy. Turkey declared war against her. This was a powerful diversion, and obliged Russia to strip her western frontiers to secure a line of defence on the south.[1]

Some time after General Gardanne set out on the famous embassy to Persia; for which the way had been paved by the success of the mission of my friend, Amédée Jaubert. This embassy was not merely one of those pompous legations such as Charlemagne, Louis XIV., and Louis XVI. received from the Empress Irene, the King of Siam, and Tippoo Saib. It was connected with ideas which Bonaparte had conceived at the very dawn of his power. It was, indeed, the light from the East which first enabled him to see his greatness in perspective; and

[1] On this occasion the diplomacy of England was notoriously at fault. A clever and determined ambassador at Constantinople might have kept the Turks quiet, but Mr. Arbuthnot, the resident Minister, was not the man, and he was sick with a slow fever at the moment of crisis. The year before, when the Turks were on the point of going to war with Russia about Wallachia and Moldavia, they were bullied into peace by a young English diplomatist, who has since then made himself notorious in very different ways. This was the Honourable William Long Wellesley Pole, who was then second secretary to our embassy. Knowing that the Divan were coming to a decision he left the ambassador's house at Buyukderé, mounted his horse, and galloped to Constantinople, through a torrent of rain. He never stopped till he reached the Porte, where he leaped out of his saddle and presented himself to the Divan of Ministers, with his whip in his hand and covered all over with mud. He stormed the Turks to their beards—he threatened them with annihilation, and drawing on his imagination for his facts, he swore to them that a tremendous English fleet which had already set out from Gibraltar would force the passage of the Dardanelles, and be before Constantinople in a few days, to dictate the law to the Sultan. The Turks, terrified at his menaces, came to terms for the peace. See Juchereau de St. Denis' *Révolution de Constantinople.*

that light never ceased to fix his attention and dazzle his imagination. I know well that Gardanne's embassy was at first conceived on a much grander scale than that on which it was executed. Napoleon had resolved to send to the Shah of Persia 4000 infantry, commanded by chosen and experienced officers, 10,000 muskets, and 50 pieces of cannon; and I also know that orders were given for the execution of this design. The avowed object of the Emperor was to enable the Shah of Persia to make an important diversion, with 80,000 men, in the eastern provinces of Russia. But there was likewise another, an old and constant object, which was always uppermost in Napoleon's mind, namely the wish to strike at England in the very heart of her Asiatic possessions. Such was the principal motive of Gardanne's mission, but circumstances did not permit the Emperor to give it all the importance he desired. He contented himself with sending a few officers of engineers and artillery to Persia, who, on their arrival, were astonished at the number of English they found there.

CHAPTER XI.

1807.

Abuse of military power—Defence of diplomatic rights—Marshal Brune. —Army supplies—English cloth and leather—Arrest on a charge of libel—Despatch from M. de Talleyrand—A page of Napoleon's glory —Interview between the two Emperors at Tilsit—Silesia restored to the Queen of Prussia—Unfortunate situation of Prussia—Impossibility of re-establishing Poland in 1807—Foundation of the Kingdom of Westphalia—The Duchy of Warsaw and the King of Saxony.

Meanwhile the internal affairs of the towns over which my diplomatic jurisdiction extended soon gave me more employment than ever. The greatest misfortune of the Empire was, perhaps, the abuse of the right arrogated by the wearers of epaulettes. My situation gave me an opportunity of observing all the odious character of a military government. Another in my place could not have done all that I did. I say this confidently, for my situation was a distinct and independent one, as Bonaparte had told me. Being authorised to correspond directly with the Emperor, the military chiefs feared, if they did not yield to my just representations, that I would make private reports; this apprehension was wonderfully useful in enabling me to maintain the rights of the towns, which had adopted me as their first citizen.

A circumstance occurred in which I had to defend the rights of the diplomatic and commercial agents against the pretensions of military power. Marshal Brune during his government at Hamburg, went to Bremen to watch the strict execution of the illusive blockade against England. The Marshal acting no doubt, in conformity with

the instructions of Clarke, then Minister of War and Governor of Berlin, wished to arrogate the right of deciding on the captures made by our cruisers.

He attempted to prevent the Consul Lagau from selling the confiscated ships in order to sell them himself. Of this M. Lagau complained to me. The more I observed a disposition to encroach on the part of the military authorities, the more I conceived it necessary to maintain the rights of the consuls, and to favour their influence, without which they would have lost their consideration. To the complaints of M. Lagau I replied, "That to him alone belonged the right of deciding, in the first instance, on the fate of the ships; that he could not be deprived of that right without changing the law; that he was free to sell the confiscated Prussian ships; that Marshal Brune was at Bremen only for the execution of the decree respecting the blockade of England, and that he ought not to interfere in business unconnected with that decree." Lagau showed this letter to Brune, who then allowed him to do as he wished; but it was an affair of profit, and the Marshal for a long time owed me a grudge.

Bernadotte was exceedingly disinterested, but he loved to be talked about. The more the Emperor endeavoured to throw accusations upon him, the more he was anxious to give publicity to all his actions. He sent to me an account of the brilliant affair of Braunsburg, in which a division of the first corps had been particularly distinguished. Along with this narrative he sent me a note in the following terms:—"I send you, my dear Minister, an account of the affair of Braunsburg. You will, perhaps, think proper to publish it. In that case I shall be obliged by your getting it inserted in the Hamburg journals." I did so. The injustice of the Emperor, and the bad way in which he spoke of Bernadotte, obliged the latter, for the sake of his own credit, to make the truth known to the world.

I have already mentioned that I received an order from the Emperor to supply 50,000 cloaks for the army. With this order, which was not the only one I received of the same kind, some circumstances were connected which I may take the present opportunity of explaining.

The Emperor gave me so many orders for army clothing that all that could be supplied by the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck would have been insufficient for executing the commissions. I entered into a treaty with a house in Hamburg, which I authorised, in spite of the Berlin decree, *to bring cloth and leather from England.* Thus I procured these articles in a sure and cheap way. Our troops might have perished of cold had the Continental system and the absurd mass of inexecutable decrees relative to English merchandise been observed.

The Director of the Customs at Hamburg got angry, but I held firm : my cloths and my leather arrived ; cloaks, coats, boots, all were promptly made, and our soldiers thus were sheltered from the severity of the season. To preserve peace with the Imperial Custom-house I wrote to M. Collin, then Director-General, that M. Eudel having wished to put in execution the law of the 10th Brumaire an V., complaints had been made on every side. Marshal Brune asked for my opinion on this matter, and I gave it to him. I declared to M. Collin that the full execution of the decree of 31st October 1796 was impracticable, injurious to France, and to the Hanseatic Towns, without doing harm to England. Indeed, what said article 5 of this law? "All goods imported from foreign countries, whatever may be their origin, are to be considered as coming from English manufacturers." According to this article France was a foreign country for the Hanseatic Towns, and none of the objects enumerated in this article ought to enter Hamburg! But the town received from England a large quantity of fine cloths, buttons, ironmongery, toys, china ; and from France only clocks,

bronzes, jewellery, ribbons, bonnets, gauzes, and gloves. "Let," said I to M. Eudel, "the Paris Douane be asked what that town alone exports in matters of this sort, and it will be seen how important it is not to stop a trade all the more profitable to France, as the workmanship forms the greatest part of the price of the goods which make up this trade. What would happen if the importation of these goods were absolutely prohibited in Hamburg? The consignments would cease, and one of the most productive sources of trade for France, and especially for Paris, would be cut off.

At this time neither Hamburg nor its territory had any manufacture of cloth. All woollen stuffs were prohibited, according to M. Eudel, and still my duty was to furnish, and I had furnished, 50,000 cloaks for the Grand Army. In compliance with a recent Imperial decree I had to have made without delay 16,000 coats, 37,000 waistcoats, and the Emperor required of me 200,000 pairs of boots, besides the 40,000 pairs I had sent in. Yet M. Eudel said that tanned and worked leather ought not to enter Hamburg! If such a ridiculous application of the law of 1796 had been made it would have turned the decree of 21st November 1796 against France, without fulfilling its object.

These reflections, to which I added other details, made the Government conclude that I was right, and I traded with England to the great advantage of the armies, which were well clothed and shod. What in the world can be more ridiculous than commercial laws carried out to one's own detriment?

At the beginning of 1807 my occupations at Hamburg were divided between the furnishing of supplies for the army and the inspection of the emigrants, whom Fouché pretended to dread in order to give greater importance to his office.

I never let slip an opportunity of mitigating the rigour

of Fouché's orders, which, indeed, were sometimes so absurd that I did not attempt to execute them. Of this an instance occurs to my recollection. A printer at Hamburg had been arrested on the charge of having printed a libel in the German language. The man was detained in prison because, very much to his honour, he would not disclose the name of the writer of the pamphlet. I sent for him and questioned him. He told me, with every appearance of sincerity, that he had never but once seen the man who had brought him the manuscript. I was convinced of the truth of what he said, and I gave an order for his liberation. To avoid irritating the susceptibility of the Minister of Police I wrote to him the following few lines: —"The libel is the most miserable rhapsody imaginable. The author, probably with the view of selling his pamphlet in Holstein, predicts that Denmark will conquer every other nation and become the greatest kingdom in the world. This alone will suffice to prove to you how little danger there is in rubbish written in the style of the Apocalypse."

After the battle of Eylau I received a despatch from M. de Talleyrand, to which was added an account in French of that memorable battle, which was more fatal to the conqueror than to the other party,—I cannot say the conquered in speaking of the Russians, the more especially when I recollect the precautions which were then taken throughout Germany to make known the French before the Russian version. The Emperor was exceedingly anxious that every one should view that event as he himself viewed it. Other accounts than his might have produced an unfavourable impression in the north. I therefore had orders to publish that account. I caused 2000 copies of it to be issued, which were more than sufficient for circulation in the Hanse Towns and their territories.

The reader will perhaps complain that I have been almost silent with respect to the grand manœuvres of the

French army from the battle of Eylau to that of Friedland, where, at all events, our success was indisputable. There was no necessity for printing favourable versions of that event, and, besides, its immense results were soon felt throughout Europe. The interview at Tilsit is one of the culminating points of modern history, and the waters of the Niemen reflected the image of Napoleon at the height of his glory. The interview between the two Emperors at Tilsit, and the melancholy situation of the King of Prussia, are generally known. I was made acquainted with but few secret details relative to those events, for Rapp had gone to Dantzic, and it was he who most readily communicated to me all that the Emperor said and did, and all that was passing around him.[1]

[1] Savary gives the following account of the interview between Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit:—

"The Emperor Napoleon, whose courtesy was manifest in all his actions, ordered a large raft to be floated in the middle of the river, upon which was constructed a room well covered in and elegantly decorated, having two doors on opposite sides, each of which opened into an antechamber. The work could not have been better executed in Paris. The roof was surmounted by two weathercocks: one displaying the eagle of Russia, and the other the eagle of France. The two outer doors were also surmounted by the eagles of the two countries.

"The raft was precisely in the middle of the river, with the two doors of the *salon* facing the two opposite banks.

"The two sovereigns appeared on the banks of the river, and embarked at the same moment. But the Emperor Napoleon having a good boat, manned by marines of the Guard, arrived first on the raft, entered the room, and went to the opposite door, which he opened, and then stationed himself on the edge of the raft to receive the Emperor Alexander, who had not yet arrived, not having such good rowers as the Emperor Napoleon.

"The two Emperors met in the most amicable way, at least to all appearance. They remained together for a considerable time, and then took leave of each other with as friendly an air as that with which they had met.

"Next day the Emperor of Russia established himself at Tilsit with a battalion of his Guard. Orders were given for evacuating that part of the town where he and his battalion were to be quartered: and, though we were very much pressed for room, no encroachment on the space allotted to the Russians was thought of.

"On the day the Emperor Alexander entered Tilsit the whole army was under arms. The Imperial Guard was drawn out in two lines of three deep from the landing-place to the Emperor Napoleon's quarters, and from thence to the quarters of the Emperor of Russia. A salute of 100 guns was fired the moment Alexander stepped ashore on the spot where the Emperor Napoleon was waiting to receive him. The latter carried his attention to his visitor so far as to send from his quarters the furniture for Alexander's bedchamber. Among the articles sent was a camp-bed belong-

I, however, learned one circumstance peculiarly worthy of remark which occurred in the Emperor's apartments at Tilsit the first time he received a visit from the King of Prussia. That unfortunate monarch, who was accompanied by Queen Louisa, had taken refuge in a mill beyond the town. This was his sole habitation, whilst the Emperors occupied the two portions of the town, which is divided by the Niemen. The fact I am about to relate reached me indirectly through the medium of an officer of the Imperial Guard, who was on duty in Napoleon's apartments and was an eye-witness of it. When the Emperor Alexander visited Napoleon they continued for a long time in conversation on a balcony below, where an immense crowd hailed their meeting with enthusiastic shouts. Napoleon commenced the conversation, as he did the year preceding with the Emperor of Austria, by speaking of the uncertain fate of war.[1] Whilst they were conversing the King of Prussia was announced. The King's emotion was visible, and may easily be imagined ; for as hostilities were suspended, and his territory in possession of the French, his only hope was in the generosity of the

ing to the Emperor, which he presented to Alexander, who appeared much pleased with the gift.

"This meeting, the first which history records of the same kind and of equal importance, attracted visitors to Tilsit from 100 leagues round. M. de Talleyrand arrived, and after the observance of the usual ceremonies business began to be discussed" (*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome iii. p. 117).

[1] "When," said Napoleon, "I was at Tilsit with the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, I was the most ignorant of the three in military affairs. These two sovereigns, especially the King of Prussia, were completely *au fait* as to the number of buttons there ought to be in front of a jacket, how many behind, and the manner in which the skirts ought to be cut. Not a tailor in the army knew better than King Frederick how many measures of cloth it took to make a jacket. In fact," continued he laughing, "I was nobody in comparison with them. They continually tormented me about matters belonging to tailors, of which I was entirely ignorant, although, in order not to affront them, I answered just as gravely as if the fate of an army depended upon the cut of a jacket. When I went to see the King of Prussia, instead of a library, I found that he had a large room, like an arsenal, furnished with shelves and pegs, on which were hung fifty or sixty jackets of different patterns. Every day he changed his fashion and put on a different one. He attached more importance to this than was necessary for the salvation of a kingdom (O'Meara's *Napoleon in Exile*, vol. ii. p. 48).

conqueror. Napoleon himself, it is said, appeared moved by his situation, and invited him, together with the Queen, to dinner. On sitting down to table Napoleon with great gallantry told the beautiful Queen that he would restore to her Silesia, a province which she earnestly wished should be retained in the new arrangements which were necessarily about to take place.[1]

The treaty of peace concluded at Tilsit between France and Russia on the 7th of July, and ratified two days after, produced no less striking a change in the geographical division of Europe than had been effected the year preceding by the Treaty of Presburg. The treaty contained no stipulation dishonourable to Russia, whose territory was preserved inviolate; but how was Prussia treated? Some historians, for the vain pleasure of flattering by posthumous praises the pretended moderation of Napoleon, have almost reproached him for having suffered some remnants of the monarchy of the great Frederick to survive. There is, nevertheless, a point on which Napoleon has been wrongfully condemned, at least with reference to the campaign of 1807. It has been said that he should at that period have re-established the kingdom of Poland; and certainly there is every reason to regret, for the interests of France and Europe, that it was not re-established. But when a desire, even founded on reason, is not carried into effect, should we conclude that the wished-for object ought to be achieved in defiance of

[1] Las Casas mentions that at the time of the treaty of Tilsit Napoleon wrote to the Empress Josephine as follows:—

"'The Queen of Prussia is really a charming woman. She is fond of coquetting with me; but do not be jealous: I am like oilcloth, along which everything of this sort slides without penetrating. It would cost me too dear to play the gallant.'

"On this subject an anecdote was related in the *salon* of Josephine. It was said that the Queen of Prussia one day had a beautiful rose in her hand, which the Emperor asked her to give him. The Queen hesitated for a few moments, and then presented it to him, saying, 'Why should I so readily grant what you request, while you remain deaf to all my entreaties?' (She alluded to the fortress of Magdeburg, which she had earnestly solicited)" (*Mémorial de St. Hélène*).

all obstacles? At that time, that is to say, during the campaign of Tilsit, insurmountable obstacles existed.[1]

If, however, by the Treaty of Tilsit, the throne of Poland was not restored to serve as a barrier between old Europe and the Empire of the Czars, Napoleon founded a Kingdom of Westphalia,[2] which he gave to the young *enseigne de vaisseau* whom he had scolded as a schoolboy, and whom he now made a King, that he might have another crowned prefect under his control. The Kingdom of Westphalia was composed of the States of Hesse-Cassel, of a part of the provinces taken from Prussia by the *moderation* of the Emperor, and of the States of Paderborn, Fulda, Brunswick, and a part of the Electorate of Hanover. Napoleon, at the same time, though he did not like to do things by halves, to avoid touching the Russian and Austrian provinces of old Poland, planted on the banks of the Vistula the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he gave to the King of Saxony, with the intention of increasing or destroying it afterwards as he might find convenient. Thus he allowed the Poles to hope better things for the future, and ensured to himself partisans in the north should the chances of fortune call him thither. Alexander, who was cajoled even more than his father had been by what I may call

[1] The re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland would probably have been carried out by Napoleon if the war against Russia in 1812 had been successful. He could then have come to terms with the three powers concerned. Russia and Prussia would have been crushed, at all events for the time. As for Austria, she would have been offered the Illyrian provinces instead of Galicia; indeed, the offer was actually made to Metternich in 1810, and it is evident from Metternich's answer that the bargain could have been effected. Indeed, Metternich seems to have considered Poland as practically restored. "A kingdom of Poland is nothing more than the Duchy of Warsaw with another name, and with the new boundaries for which it has striven ever since it was made." See *Metternich*, vol. i. pp. 136–140.

[2] The Kingdom of Westphalia, founded by the Treaty of Tilsit, July 1807, was chiefly composed of Westphalia, etc., taken from Prussia; Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, taken from its Duke; and of Hesse-Cassel, taken from its Elector. Hanover was added in 1810. It lost Osnabruck, etc., to France in 1810. It formed part of the Confederation of the Rhine, to which it furnished a contingent of 25,000 and eventually of 26,000 men. Jerôme Bonaparte was made its King, and was married to the Princess Catherine of Würtemberg. He had to abandon it in 1813, and it was broken up in 1814,—its States returning to their former possessors.

the political coquetry of Napoleon, consented to all these arrangements, acknowledged *in globo* all the kings crowned by the Emperor, and accepted some provinces which had belonged to his despoiled ally, the King of Prussia, doubtless by way of consolation for not having been able to get more restored to Prussia. The two Emperors parted the best friends in the world; but the Continental system was still in existence.

CHAPTER XII.

1807.

Effect produced at Altona by the Treaty of Tilsit—The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin's departure from Hamburg—English squadron in the Sound—Bombardment of Copenhagen—Perfidy of England—Remark of Bonaparte to M. Lemercier—Prussia erased from the map—Napoleon's return to Paris—Suppression of the Tribunate—Confiscation of English merchandise—Nine millions gained to France—M. Caulaincourt Ambassador to Russia—Repugnance of England to the intervention of Russia—Affairs of Portugal—Junot appointed to command the army—The Prince Regent's departure for the Brazils—The Code Napoléon—Introduction of the French laws into Germany—Leniency of Hamburg juries—The stolen cloak and the Syndic Doormann.

The Treaty of Tilsit, as soon as it was known at Altona, spread consternation amongst the emigrants. As to the German Princes, who were awaiting the issue of events either at Altona or Hamburg, when they learned that a definitive treaty of peace had been signed between France and Russia, and that two days after the Treaty of Tilsit the Prussian monarchy was placed at the mercy of Napoleon, every courier that arrived threw them into indescribable agitation. It depended on the Emperor's will whether they were to be or not to be. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin had not succeeded in getting himself re-established in his states, by an exceptional decision, like the Duke of Weimar; but at length he obtained the restitution of his territory at the request of the Emperor Alexander, and on the 28th of July he quitted Hamburg to return to his Duchy.

The Danish *chargé d'affaires* communicated to me about

the same time an official report from his Government. This report announced that on Monday, the 3d of August, a squadron consisting of twelve ships of the line and twelve frigates, commanded by Admiral Gambier, had passed the Sound. The rest of the squadron was seen in the Categat. At the same time the English troops which were in the island of Rugen had re-embarked. We could not then conceive what enterprise this considerable force had been sent upon. But our uncertainty was soon at an end. M. Didelot, the French Ambassador at Copenhagen, arrived at Hamburg, at nine o'clock in the evening of the 12th of August. He had been fortunate enough to pass through the Great Belt, though in sight of the English, without being stopped. I forwarded his report to Paris by an extraordinary courier.

The English had sent 20,000 men and twenty-seven vessels into the Baltic; Lord Cathcart commanded the troops. The coast of Zealand was blockaded by ninety vessels. Mr. Jackson, who had been sent by England to negotiate with Denmark, which she feared would be invaded by the French troops, supported the propositions he was charged to offer to Denmark by a reference to this powerful British force. Mr. Jackson's proposals had for their object nothing less than to induce the King of Denmark to place in the custody of England the whole of his ships and naval stores. They were, it is true, to be kept in deposit, but the condition contained the words, "until the conclusion of a general peace," which rendered the period of their restoration uncertain. They were to be detained until such precautions should be no longer necessary. A menace and its execution followed close upon this demand. After a noble but useless resistance, and a terrific bombardment, Copenhagen surrendered, and the Danish fleet was destroyed. It would be difficult to find in history a more infamous and revolting instance of the abuse of power against weakness.

Sometime after this event a pamphlet entitled "Germania" appeared, which I translated and sent to the Emperor. It was eloquently written, and expressed the indignation which the conduct of England had excited in the author as in every one else.[1]

I have stated what were the principal consequences of the Treaty of Tilsit; it is more than probable that if the bombardment of Copenhagen had preceded the treaty the Emperor would have used Prussia even worse than he did. He might have erased her from the list of nations; but he did not do so, out of regard to the Emperor Alexander. The destruction of Prussia was no new project with Bonaparte. I remember an observation of his to M. Lemercier upon that subject when we first went to reside at Malmaison. M. Lemercier had been reading to the First Consul some poem in which Frederick the Great was spoken of. "You seem to admire him greatly," said Bonaparte to M. Lemercier; "what do you find in him so astonishing? He is not equal to Turenne."—"General," replied M. Lemercier, "it is not merely the warrior that I esteem in Frederick; it is impossible to refrain from admiring a man who was a philosopher even on the throne." To this the First Consul replied, in a half ill-humoured tone, "Certainly, Lemercier; but Frederick's philosophy shall not prevent me from erasing his kingdom from the map of Europe." The kingdom of Frederick the Great was not, however, obliterated from the map, because the Emperor of Russia would not basely abandon a faithful

[1] "That expedition," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "showed great energy on the part of your Ministers: but setting aside the violation of the laws of nations which you committed—for in fact it was nothing but a robbery—I think that it was injurious to your interests, as it made the Danish nation irreconcilable enemies to you, and in fact shut you out of the north for three years. When I heard of it I said, I am glad of it, as it will embroil England irrecoverably with the Northern Powers. The Danes being able to join me with sixteen sail of the line was of but little consequence. I had plenty of ships, and only wanted seamen, whom you did not take, and whom I obtained afterwards, while by the expedition your Ministers established their characters as faithless, and as persons with whom no engagements, no laws were binding" (*Voice from St. Helena*).

ally who had incurred with him the chances of fortune. Prussia then bitterly had to lament the tergiversations which had prevented her from declaring herself against France during the campaign of Austerlitz.

Napoleon returned to Paris about the end of July after an absence of ten months, the longest he had yet made since he had been at the head of the French Government, whether as Consul or Emperor. The interview at Tilsit, the Emperor Alexander's friendship, which was spoken of everywhere in terms of exaggeration, and the peace established on the Continent, conferred on Napoleon a moral influence in public opinion which he had not possessed since his coronation. Constant in his hatred of deliberative assemblies, which he had often termed collections of babblers, ideologists, and phrasemongers, Napoleon, on his return to Paris, suppressed the Tribunate, which had been an annoyance to him ever since the first day of his elevation. The Emperor, who was skilful above all men in speculating on the favourable disposition of opinion, availed himself at this conjuncture of the enthusiasm produced by his interview on the Niemen. He therefore discarded from the fundamental institutions of the government that which still retained the shadow of a popular character. But it was necessary that he should possess a Senate merely to vote men ; a mute Legislative Body to vote money ; that there should be no opposition in the one and no criticism in the other ; no control over him of any description ; the power of arbitrarily doing whatever he pleased ; an enslaved press ;—this was what Napoleon wished, and this he obtained. But the month of March 1814 resolved the question of absolute power!

In the midst of these great affairs, and while Napoleon was dreaming of universal monarchy, I beheld in a less extensive sphere the inevitable consequences of the ambition of a single man. Pillage and robbery were carried

on in all parts over which my diplomatic jurisdiction extended. Rapine seemed to be legally authorised, and was perpetrated with such fury, and at the same time with such ignorance, that the agents were frequently unacquainted with the value of the articles which they seized. Thus, for example, the Emperor ordered the seizure at Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck of all English merchandise, whatever might be its nature or origin. The Prince of Neufchâtel (Berthier) wrote to me from the Emperor that I must procure 10,000,000 francs from the Hanse Towns. M. Daru, the Intendant-General, whose business it was to collect this sort of levy, which Napoleon had learned to make in Egypt, wrote to urge me to obtain a prompt and favourable decision. The unfortunate towns which I was thus enjoined to oppress had already suffered sufficiently. I had obtained, by means of negotiation, more than was demanded for the ransom of the English merchandise, which had been seized according to order. Before I received the letters of M. Daru and the Prince of Neufchâtel I had obtained from Hamburg 16,000,000 instead of 10,000,000, besides nearly 3,000,000 from Bremen and Lübeck. Thus I furnished the Government with 9,000,000 more than had been required, and yet I had so managed that those enormous sacrifices were not over-oppressive to those who made them. I fixed the value of the English merchandise because I knew that the high price at which it sold on the Continent would not only cover the proposed ransom but also leave a considerable profit. Such was the singular effect of the Continental system that when merchandise was confiscated, and when afterwards the permission to sell it freely was given, the price fetched at the sale was so large that the loss was covered, and even great advantage gained.

Peace being concluded with Russia it was necessary to make choice of an Ambassador, not only to maintain the new relations of amity between Napoleon and Alexander,

but likewise to urge on the promised intervention of Russia with England,—to bring about reconciliation and peace between the Cabinets of Paris and London. The Emperor confided this mission to Caulaincourt, with respect to whom there existed an unfounded prejudice relating to some circumstances which preceded the death of the Duc d'Enghien. This unfortunate and unjust impression had preceded Caulaincourt to St. Petersburg, and it was feared that he would not experience the reception due to the French Ambassador and to his own personal qualities. I knew at the time, from positive information, that after a short explanation with Alexander that monarch retained no suspicion unfavourable to our Ambassador, for whom he conceived and maintained great esteem and friendship.

Caulaincourt's mission was not, in all respects, easy of fulfilment, for the invincible repugnance and reiterated refusal of England to enter into negotiations with France through the medium of Russia was one of the remarkable circumstances of the period of which I am speaking. I knew positively that England was determined never to allow Napoleon to possess himself of the whole of the Continent,—a project which he indicated too undisguisedly to admit of any doubt respecting it. For two years he had indeed advanced with rapid strides; but England was not discouraged. She was too well aware of the irritation of the sovereigns and the discontent of the people not be certain that when she desired it, her lever of gold would again raise up and arm the Continent against the encroaching power of Napoleon. He, on his part, perceiving that all his attempts were fruitless, and that England would listen to no proposals, devised fresh plans for raising up new enemies against England.

It probably is not forgotten that in 1801 France compelled Portugal to make common cause with her against England. In 1807 the Emperor did again what the First

JUNOT

DUC D'ABRANTÈS

Consul had done. By an inexplicable fatality Junot obtained the command of the troops which were marching against Portugal. I say against Portugal, for that was the fact, though France represented herself as a protector to deliver Portugal from the influence of England. Be that as it may, the choice which the Emperor made of a commander astonished everybody. Was Junot, a compound of vanity and mediocrity, the fit man to be entrusted with the command of an army in a distant country, and under circumstances in which great political and military talents were requisite? For my own part, knowing Junot's incapacity, I must acknowledge that his appointment astonished me. I remember one day, when I was speaking on the subject to Bernadotte, he showed me a letter he had received from Paris, in which it was said that the Emperor had sent Junot to Portugal only for the sake of depriving him of the government of Paris. Junot annoyed Napoleon by his bad conduct, his folly, and his incredible extravagance. He was alike devoid of dignity—either in feeling or conduct. Thus Portugal was twice the place of exile selected by Consular and Imperial caprice: first, when the First Consul wished to get rid of the familiarity of Lannes; and next, when the Emperor grew weary of the misconduct of a favourite.

The invasion of Portugal presented no difficulty. It was an armed promenade and not a war; but how many events were connected with the occupation of that country! The Prince Regent of Portugal, unwilling to act dishonourably to England, to which he was allied by treaties, and unable to oppose the whole power of Napoleon, embarked for Brazil, declaring that all defence was useless. At the same time he recommended his subjects to receive the French troops in a friendly manner, and said that he consigned to Providence the consequences of an invasion which was without a motive. He was answered in the Emperor's name that, Portugal being the ally of England, we

were only carrying on hostilities against the latter country by invading his dominions.

It was in the month of November that the code of French jurisprudence, upon which the most learned legislators had indefatigably laboured, was established as the law of the State, under the title of the Code Napoléon. Doubtless this legislative monument will redound to Napoleon's honour in history;[1] but was it to be supposed that the same laws would be equally applicable throughout so vast an extent as that comprised within the French Empire? Impossible as this was, as soon as the Code Napoléon was promulgated I received or-

[1] This great code of Civil Law was drawn up under Napoleon's orders and personal superintendence. Much had been prepared under the Convention, and the chief merits of it were due to the labours of such men as Tronchet, Portalis, Bigot de Préameneu, Maleville, Cambacérès, etc. But it was debated under and by Napoleon, who took a lively interest in it. It was first called the "Code Civil," but in 1807 was named "Code Napoléon," or eventually "Les Cinq Codes de Napoléon." When completed in 1810 it included five Codes—the Code Civil, decreed March 1803; Code de Procédure Civile, decreed April 1806; Code de Commerce, decreed September 1807; Code d'Instruction Criminelle, decreed November 1808; and the Code Pénal, decreed February 1810. It had to be retained by the Bourbons, and its principles have worked and are slowly working their way into the law of every nation. Napoleon was justly proud of this work. See *Thiers*, livre xiii. tome iii. p. 298, and *Lanfrey*, tome ii. p. 409. The introduction of the Code into the conquered countries was, as Bourrienne says, made too quickly. Puymaigre, who was employed in the administration of Hamburg after Bourrienne left, says, "I shall always remember the astonishment of the Hamburgers when they were invaded by this cloud of French officials, who, under every form, made researches in their houses, and who came to apply the multiplied demands of the fiscal system. Like Proteus, the administration could take any shape. To only speak of my department, which certainly was not the least odious one, for it was opposed to the habits of the Hamburgers and annoyed all the industries, no idea can be formed of the despair of the inhabitants, subjected to perpetual visits, and exposed to be charged with contraventions of the law, of which they knew nothing.

"Remembering their former laws, they used to offer to meet a charge of fraud by the proof of their oath, and could not imagine that such a guarantee could be repulsed. When they were independent they paid almost nothing, and such was the national spirit, that in urgent cases when money was wanted the Senate taxed every citizen a certain proportion of his income, the tenth or twentieth. A Senator presided over the recovery of this tax, which was done in a very strange manner. A box, covered with a carpet, received the offering of every citizen, without any person verifying the sum, and only on the simple moral guarantee of the honesty of the debtor, who himself judged the sum he ought to pay. When the receipt was finished the Senate always obtained more than it had calculated on" (*Puymaigre*, pp. 131-132).

ders to establish it in the Hanse Towns. The long and frequent conversations I had on this subject with the Senators and the most able lawyers of the country soon convinced me of the immense difficulty I should have to encounter, and the danger of suddenly altering habits and customs which had been firmly established by time.

The jury system gave tolerable satisfaction; but the severe punishments assigned to certain offences by the Code were disapproved of. Hence resulted the frequent and serious abuse of men being acquitted whose guilt was evident to the jury, who pronounced them not guilty rather than condemn them to a punishment which was thought too severe. Besides, their leniency had another ground, which was, that the people being ignorant of the new laws were not aware of the penalties attached to particular offences. I remember that a man who was accused of stealing a cloak at Hamburg justified himself on the ground that he committed the offence in a fit of intoxication. M. Von Einingen, one of the jury, insisted that the prisoner was not guilty, because, as he said, the Syndic Doormann, when dining with him one day, having drunk more wine than usual, took away *his* cloak. This defence *per Baccho* was completely successful. An argument founded on the similarity between the conduct of the Syndic and the accused, could not but triumph, otherwise the little debauch of the former would have been condemned in the person of the latter. This trial, which terminated so whimsically, nevertheless proves that the best and the gravest institutions may become objects of ridicule when suddenly introduced into a country whose habits are not prepared to receive them.

The Romans very wisely reserved in the Capitol a place for the gods of the nations they conquered. They wished to annex provinces and kingdoms to their empire. Napoleon, on the contrary, wished to make his empire encroach upon other states, and to realise the impossible Utopia of

ten different nations, all having different customs and languages, united into a single State.[1] Could justice, that safeguard of human rights, be duly administered in the Hanse Towns when those towns were converted into French departments? In these new departments many judges had been appointed who did not understand a word of German, and who had no knowledge of law. The presidents of the tribunals of Lübeck, Stade, Bremerlehe, and Minden were so utterly ignorant of the German language that it was necessary to explain to them all the pleadings in the council-chamber. Was it not absurd to establish such a judicial system, and above all, to appoint such men in a country so important to France as Hamburg and the Hanse Towns? Add to this the impertinence of some favourites who were sent from Paris to serve official and legal apprenticeships in the conquered provinces, and it may be easily conceived what was the attachment of the people to Napoleon the Great.

[1] See map at the end of vol. iii.

CHAPTER XIII.

1807–1808.

Disturbed state of Spain—Godoy, Prince of the Peace—Reciprocal accusations between the King of Spain and his son—False promise of Napoleon—Dissatisfaction occasioned by the presence of the French troops—Abdication of Charles IV.—The Prince of the Peace made prisoner—Murat at Madrid—Important news transmitted by a commercial letter—Murat's ambition—His protection of Godoy—Charles IV. denies his voluntary abdication—The crown of Spain destined for Joseph—General disapprobation of Napoleon's conduct—The Bourbon cause apparently lost—Louis XVIII. after his departure from France—As Comte de Provence at Coblentz—He seeks refuge in Turin and Verona—Death of Louis XVII.—Louis XVIII. refused an asylum in Austria, Saxony, and Prussia—His residence at Mittau and Warsaw—Alexander and Louis XVIII.—The King's departure from Milan and arrival at Yarmouth—Determination of the King of England—M. Lemercier's prophecy to Bonaparte—Fouché's inquiries respecting Comte de Rechteren—Note from Josephine—New demands on the Hanse Towns—Order to raise 3000 sailors in Hamburg.

The disorders of Spain, which commenced about the close of the year 1807, in a short time assumed a most complicated aspect. Though far from the theatre of events I obtained an intimate knowledge of all the important facts connected with the extraordinary transactions in the Peninsula. However, as this point of history is one of the most generally, though I cannot say the best, known, I shall omit in my notes and memoranda many things which would be but repetitions to the reading portion of the public. It is a remarkable fact that Bonaparte, who by turns cast his eyes on all the States of Europe, never directed his attention to Spain as long as his greatness was confined to mere projects. Whenever he spoke of his future des-

tiny he alluded to Italy, Germany, the East, and the destruction of the English power; but never to Spain. Consequently, when he heard of the first symptoms of disorder in the Peninsula he paid but little attention to the business, and some time elapsed before he took any part in events which subsequently had so great an influence on his fate.[1]

Godoy reigned in Spain under the name of the imbecile Charles IV.[2] He was an object of execration to all who were not his creatures; and even those whose fate depended upon him viewed him with the most profound contempt. The hatred of a people is almost always the just reward of favourites. What sentiments, therefore, must have been inspired by a man who, to the knowledge of all Spain, owed the favour of the king only to the favours of the queen! Godoy's ascendency over the royal family was boundless; his power was absolute: the treasures of America were at his command, and he made the most infamous use of them. In short, he had made the Court of Madrid one of those places to which the indignant muse of Juvenal conducts the mother of Britannicus. There is no doubt that Godoy was one of the principal causes of all the misfortunes which have overwhelmed Spain under so many various forms.

[1] Mettertnich (tome ii. p. 295) puts much of the blame of the Spanish affair on the shoulders of Napoleon's advisers:—"Guided by his own insatiable ambition, encouraged by the perfidious advice of Mnrat, who aimed at nothing less than filling the throne of Spain and of the Indies, all his measures were directed to one end. Misguided by the agents of the Prince of the Peace, he believed the expulsion of the Bourbons easy." In considering this reference to Murat, Mettternich's intimate relation with Caroline Bonaparte, the wife of Murat, must be remembered. To Metternich himself Napoleon in August 1808 explained his conduct as directed solely by a wish for security. After alluding to the increase of the Spanish army Napoleon went on:—"And then the throne was occupied by Bourbons; they are my personal enemies. They and I cannot occupy thrones at the same time in Europe. . . . I must have on the throne of Spain a Prince who would have no anxiety on my account, and who on his side gives me none; the interests of Spain, even of America demand it" (*Metternich*, tome ii. pp. 252–253).

[2] Manuel Godoy, originally a private in the guards, became the paramour of Charles IV.'s Queen; then a grandee; and then the supreme ruler of the State.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

The hatred of the Spaniards against the Prince of the Peace was general. This hatred was shared by the Prince of the Asturias, who openly declared himself the enemy of Godoy. The latter allied himself with France, from which he hoped to obtain powerful protection against his enemies. This alliance gave rise to great dissatisfaction in Spain, and caused France to be regarded with an unfavourable eye. The Prince of the Asturias [1] was encouraged and supported by the complaints of the Spaniards, who wished to see the overthrow of Godoy's power. Charles IV., on his part, regarded all opposition to the Prince of the Peace as directed against himself, and in November 1807 he accused his son of wishing to dethrone him.[2]

The King of Spain did not confine himself to verbal complaints. He, or rather the Prince of the Peace, acting in his name, arrested the warmest partisans of the Prince of the Asturias. The latter, understanding the sentiments of his father, wrote to Napoleon, soliciting his support. Thus the father and son, at open war, were appealing one against another for the support of him who wished only to get rid of them both, and to put one of

[1] Afterwards Ferdinand VII.

[2] This accusation is said to have been conveyed to Napoleon in the following letter, addressed to him by Charles IV. :—

"SIRE, MY BROTHER—At the moment when I was occupied with the means of co-operating for the destruction of our common enemy, when I believed that all the plots of the late Queen of Naples had been buried with her daughter, I perceive, with a horror that makes me tremble, that the most dreadful spirit of intrigue has penetrated even into the heart of my palace. Alas! my heart bleeds at reciting so dreadful an outrage. My eldest son, the heir-presumptive to my throne, entered into a horrible plot to dethrone me ; he even went to the extreme of attempting the life of his mother. So dreadful a crime ought to be punished with the most exemplary rigour of the laws. *The law which calls him to the succession ought to be revoked ; one of his brothers will be more worthy to occupy his place, both in my heart and on the throne.* I am at this moment in search of his accomplices, in order to sift thoroughly this plan of most atrocious wickedness ; and I would not lose a moment in informing your imperial and royal Majesty of it, and beseeching you to assist me with your knowledge and counsel.

"For which I pray, etc.

"CHARLES.

"SAN LORENZO, *November* 29, 1807."

his brothers in their place, that he might have one junior more in the college of European kings: but, as I have already mentioned, this new ambition was not premeditated; and if he gave the throne of Spain to his brother Joseph it was only on the refusal of his brother Louis (King of Holland) to accept it.

The Emperor had promised to support Charles IV. against his son; and, not wishing to take part in these family quarrels, he had not answered the first letters of the Prince of the Asturias. But finding that the intrigues of Madrid were taking a serious turn, he commenced provisionally by sending troops to Spain.[1] This gave offence to the people, who were averse to the interference of France. In the provinces through which the French troops passed it was asked what was the object of the invasion. Some attributed it to the Prince of the Peace, others to the Prince of the Asturias; but it excited general indignation, and troubles broke out at Madrid accompanied by all the violence peculiar to the Spanish character.

In these fearful circumstances Godoy proposed that Charles IV. should remove to Seville, where he would be the better enabled to visit the factious with punishment. A proposition from Godoy to his master was, in fact, a command, and Charles IV. accordingly resolved to depart. The people now looked upon Godoy as a traitor. An insurrection broke out, the palace was surrounded, and the Prince of the Peace was on the point of being massacred in an upper apartment, where he had taken refuge.

[1] French troops had appeared in Spain some months before, on their way to Portugal, the conquest of which country by Junot was to be aided by Godoy and a Spanish force of 27,000 men, according to a treaty (more disgraceful to the Court of Spain than to Bonaparte) which had been ratified at Fontainebleau on the 27th of October 1807. Charles IV. was little better than an idiot, and Godoy and the French made him believe that Bonaparte would give part, or the whole of Portugal, to Spain. At the time of Junot's march on Lisbon a reserve of 40,000 French troops were assembled at Bayonne—a pretty clear indication, though the factious infatuated Court of Madrid would not see it, that Bonaparte intended to seize the whole of the Peninsula.—*Editor of 1836 edition.*

One of the mob had the presence of mind to invoke in his favour the name of the Prince of the Asturias: this saved his life.[1]

Charles IV. did not preserve his crown; he was easily intimidated, and advantage was taken of a moment of alarm to demand that abdication which he had not spirit to refuse. He surrendered up his rights to his son, and thus was overthrown the insolent power of the Prince of the Peace; the favourite was made prisoner, and the Spaniards, who, like all ignorant people, are easily excited, manifested their joy on the occasion with barbarous enthusiasm. Meanwhile the unfortunate King, who had escaped from imaginary rather than real dangers, and who was at first content with having exchanged the right of reigning for the right of living, no sooner found himself in safety than he changed his mind. He wrote to the Emperor protesting against his abdication, and appealed to him as the arbiter of his future fate.

[1] The Prince of the Peace himself pretended to be alarmed, and perhaps was really so, when he saw the advance of our troops, of whom part had arrived at Burgos, and part entered Barcelona. He declared that the royal family had no alternative but to retire to Seville, and call the Spanish nation to arms. It was said to have been arranged that he should act this part to induce the King and the royal family to depart for Seville, and that he was to escape from them clandestinely at Seville, to go and enjoy the advantages ensured to him by the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Such is the story I have heard; but I saw nothing that warranted me in believing it, at least as to the design entertained by the Prince of the Peace taking possession of the territories he had secured to himself in Portugal. Far from this, the Prince knew the decree of Milan, by which Junot was made Governor of Portugal, and authorised to exercise his functions in the name of the Emperor. The principality of the Algarves was now no longer talked of, and no doubt the Prince had ceased to flatter himself with any thought of that dominion. He assembled the King's Council at the palace of Aranjuez, and, after describing the misfortunes which threatened the monarchy, he succeeded in prevailing on the Council to adopt his advice, and decree the removal of the royal family to Seville. On quitting this Council the Prince of the Asturias said to the guards, as he passed through the hall in which they were stationed, "The Prince of the Peace is a traitor: he wishes to send away my father. Prevent his departure."

This observation of the Prince of the Asturias was rapidly reported through the town. The populace repaired to the palace of the Prince of the Peace, ransacked it, and, after vigilant search, found the Prince concealed in a garret. He would undoubtedly have fallen a victim to the fury of the mob had not some of his attendants saved him by carrying him off to prison, pretending that they did so by order of the Prince of the Asturias (*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome iii. p. 245).

During these internal dissensions the French army was continuing its march towards the Pyrenees. Those barriers were speedily crossed, and Murat entered Madrid in the beginning of April 1808. Before I received any despatch from our Government I learned that Murat's presence in Madrid, far from producing a good effect, had only increased the disorder. I obtained this information from a merchant of Lübeck who came to Hamburg on purpose to show me a letter he had received from his correspondent in Madrid. In this letter Spain was said to be a prey which Murat wished to appropriate to himself; and all that afterwards came to my knowledge served only to prove the accuracy of the writer's information. It was perfectly true that Murat wished to conquer Spain for himself, and it is not astonishing that the inhabitants of Madrid should have understood his designs, for he carried his indiscretion so far as openly to express his wish to become King of Spain. The Emperor was informed of this, and gave him to understand, in very significant terms, that the throne of Spain was not destined for him, but that he should not be forgotten in the disposal of other crowns.

However, Napoleon's remonstrances were not sufficient to restrain the imprudence of Murat; and if he did not gain the crown of Spain for himself he powerfully contributed to make Charles IV. lose it. That monarch, whom old habits attached to the Prince of the Peace, solicited the Emperor to liberate his favourite, alleging that he and his family would be content to live in any place of security provided Godoy were with them. The unfortunate Charles seemed to be thoroughly disgusted with greatness.

Both the King and Queen so earnestly implored Godoy's liberation that Murat, whose vanity was flattered by these royal solicitations, took the Prince of the Peace under his protection; but he at the same time declared that, in spite of the abdication of Charles IV., he would

acknowledge none but that Prince as King of Spain until he should receive contrary orders from the Emperor. This declaration placed Murat in formal opposition to the Spanish people, who, through their hatred of Godoy, embraced the cause of the heir of the throne, in whose favour Charles IV. had abdicated.

It has been remarked that Napoleon stood in a perplexing situation in this conflict between the King and his son. This is not correct. King Charles, though he afterwards said that his abdication had been forced from him by violence and threats, had nevertheless tendered it. By this act Ferdinand was King, but Charles declared it was done against his will, and he retracted. The Emperor's recognition was wanting, and he could give or withhold it as he pleased.

In this state of things Napoleon arrived at Bayonne. Thither Ferdinand was also invited to go, under pretence of arranging with the Emperor the differences between his father and himself. It was some time before he could form his determination, but at length his ill-advised friends prevailed on him to set off, and he was caught in the snare. What happened to him, as well as to his father, who repaired to Bayonne with his inseparable friend the Prince of the Peace is well known. Napoleon, who had undertaken to be arbiter between the father and son, thought the best way of settling the difference was to give the disputed throne to his brother Joseph, thus verifying the fable of the "Two Lawyers and the Oyster." The insurrection in Madrid on the 2d of May accelerated the fate of Ferdinand, who was accused of being the author of it; at least this suspicion fell on his friends and adherents.

Charles IV., it was said, would not return to Spain, and solicited an asylum in France. He signed a renunciation of his rights to the crown of Spain, which renunciation was also signed by the Infantas.

Napoleon now issued a decree, appointing "his dearly-

beloved brother Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples and Sicily, to the crowns of Spain and the Indies." By a subsequent decree, 15th of July, he appointed "his dearly-beloved cousin, Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, to the throne of Naples and Sicily, which remained vacant by the accession of Joseph Napoleon to the kingdoms of Spain and the Indies." Both these documents are signed Napoleon, and countersigned by the Minister Secretary of State, Maret.

The Prince Royal of Sweden, who was at Hamburg at this time, and the Ministers of all the European powers, loudly condemned the conduct of Napoleon with respect to Spain. I cannot say whether or not M. de Talleyrand advised the Emperor not to attempt the overthrow of a branch of the house of Bourbon ; his good sense and elevated views might certainly have suggested that advice. But the general opinion was that, had he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs, the Spanish revolution would have terminated with more decorum and good faith than was exhibited in the tragi-comedy acted at Madrid and Bayonne.

After the Treaty of Tilsit and the bonds of friendship which seemed likely to produce a permanent union between the Emperors of France and Russia, the cause of the Bourbons must have been considered irretrievably lost. Indeed, their only hope consisted in the imprudence and folly of him who had usurped their throne, and that hope they cherished. I will here relate what I had the opportunity of learning respecting the conduct of Louis XVIII. after his departure from France ; this will naturally bring me to the end of November 1807, at which time I read in the *Abeille du Nord* published on the 9th of the same month, that the Comte de Lille and the Duc d'Angoulême had set off for England.

The Comte de Provence,[1] as Louis' title then went, left

[1] Afterwards Louis XVIII.

Paris on the 21st of June 1791. He constantly expressed his wish of keeping as near as possible to the frontiers of France. He at first took up his abode at Coblentz, and I knew from good authority that all the emigrants did not regard him with a favourable eye. They could not pardon the wise principles he had professed at a period when there was yet time to prevent, by reasonable concession, the misfortunes which imprudent irritation brought upon France. When the emigrants, after the campaign of 1792, passed the Rhine, the Comte de Provence resided in the little town of Ham on the Lippe, where he remained until he was persuaded that the people of Toulon had called him to Provence. As he could not, of course, pass through France, Monsieur repaired to the Court of his father-in-law, the King of Sardinia, hoping to embark at Genoa, and from thence to reach the coast of Provence. But the evacuation of Toulon, where the name of Bonaparte was for the first time sounded by the breath of fame, having taken place before he was able to leave Turin, Monsieur remained there four months, at the expiration of which time his father-in-law intimated to him the impossibility of his remaining longer in the Sardinian States. He was afterwards permitted to reside at Verona, where he heard of Louis XVI.'s death. After remaining two years in that city the Senate of Venice forbade his presence in the Venetian States. Thus forced to quit Italy the Comte repaired to the army of Condé.

The cold and timid policy of the Austrian Cabinet afforded no asylum to the Comte de Provence, and he was obliged to pass through Germany; yet, as Louis XVIII. repeated over and over again, ever since the Restoration, "He never intended to shed French blood in Germany for the sake of serving foreign interests." Monsieur had, indeed, too much penetration not to see that his cause was a mere pretext for the powers at war with France. They felt but little for the misfortunes of the Prince, and merely

wished to veil their ambition and their hatred of France under the false pretence of zeal for the House of Bourbon.

When the Dauphin died, Louis XVIII. took the title of King of France, and went to Prussia, where he obtained an asylum.[1] But the pretender to the crown of France had not yet drained his cup of misfortune. After the 18th Fructidor the Directory required the King of Prussia to send away Louis XVIII., and the Cabinet of Berlin, it must be granted, was not in a situation to oppose the desire of the French Government, whose wishes were commands. In vain Louis XVIII. sought an asylum in the King of Saxony's States. There only remained Russia that durst offer a last refuge to the descendant of Louis XIV. Paul I., who was always in extremes, and who at that

[1] Meneval, tome iii. p. 378, gives the wanderings of Louis XVIII. as follows:—He emigrated 21st June 1791, the same day that Louis XVI. fled to Varennes. He stayed at Coblentz during 1791 and 1792. He followed the Prussian army into Champagne, and when it retired in 1792 he went to Ham in Westphalia. After the death of his brother, 21st January 1793, he declared himself Regent, and went to Turin for four months, and then, Sardinia dreading the displeasure of the French, he applied to the Government of Venice, who allowed him to reside in Verona, where, on the death of his nephew in the Temple in 1795, he took the title of King as Louis XVIII., but he was usually styled the Comte de Lille. Quitting Verona in 1796, when Napoleon was conquering Italy, he went to the headquarters of the army of Condé, and from there to Blankenbourg in the Duchy of Brunswick, from which he had to retire in 1797, when the Treaty of Campo Formio made Germany at peace with France, to Mittau in Russia till forced to leave it in January 1801. Thence he went to Königsberg for a brief time, and then was permitted by Prussia to reside in Warsaw, which then belonged to her. In 1804 he went to Grodno in Russia, and then to Colmar in Sweden. Thence he soon removed to Mittau in Russia, his former abode, which he left after Tilsit in 1807, when he crossed to England. He passed the time till 1810 at Gosfield Hall, a seat of the Duke of Buckingham's, and then lived at Hartwell till he returned to France in 1814. Louis XVIII. did not reside at Holyrood, which was occupied by his brother. The youngest of the three grandsons of Louis XV. (Louis XVI., Louis XVIII., Charles X.), the Comte d'Artois, afterwards Charles X., emigrated in 1789, and went to Turin and Mantua for 1789 and 1790. In 1791 and 1792 he lived at Coblentz, Worms, Brussels, Vienna, and at Turin. From 1792 to 1812 he lived at Ham on the Lippe at Westphalia, at London, and for most of the time at Holyrood, Edinburgh. During this time he visited Russia and Germany, and showed himself on the coast of France. In 1813 he went to Germany, and in 1814 entered France in rear of the allies. In risking his person in the daring schemes of the followers who were giving their lives for the cause of his family he displayed a circumspection which was characterised by them with natural warmth. "Sire, the cowardice of your brother has ruined all;" so Charette is said to have written to Louis XVIII., but see the whole matter treated in a bitter manner in the *Histoire Générale des Émigrés*, by Forneron, Paris, Plon., 1884, tome ii. pp. 131-145.

time entertained a violent feeling of hatred towards France, earnestly offered Louis XVIII. a residence at Mittau. He treated him with the honours of a sovereign, and loaded him with marks of attention and respect. Three years had scarcely passed when Paul was seized with mad enthusiasm for the man who, twelve years later, ravaged his ancient capital, and Louis XVIII. found himself expelled from that Prince's territory with a harshness equal to the kindness with which he had at first been received.

It was during his three years' residence at Mittau that Louis XVIII., who was then known by the title of Comte de Lille, wrote to the First Consul those letters which have been referred to in these Memoirs. Prussia, being again solicited, at length consented that Louis XVIII. should reside at Warsaw; but on the accession of Napoleon to the Empire the Prince quitted that residence in order to consult respecting his new situation with the only sovereign who had not deserted him in his misfortune, viz. the King of Sweden. They met at Colmar, and from that city was dated the protest which I have already noticed. Louis XVIII. did not stay long in the States of the King of Sweden. Russia was now on the point of joining her eagles with those of Austria to oppose the new eagles of imperial France. Alexander offered to the Comte de Lille the asylum which Paul had granted to him and afterwards withdrawn. Louis XVIII. accepted the offer, but after the peace of Tilsit, fearing lest Alexander might imitate the second act of his father as well as the first, he plainly saw that he must give up all intention of residing on the Continent; and it was then that I read in the *Abeille du Nord* the article before alluded to. There is, however, one fact upon which I must insist, because I know it to be true, viz. that it was of his own free will that Louis XVIII. quitted Mittau; and if he was afraid that Alexander would imitate his father's conduct that fear was without foundation. The truth is, that Alexander was ignorant

even of the King's intention to go away until he heard from Baron von Driesen, Governor of Mittau, that he had actually departed. Having now stated the truth on this point I have to correct another error, if indeed it be only an error, into which some writers have fallen. It has been falsely alleged that the King left Mittau for the purpose of fomenting fresh troubles in France. The friends of Louis XVIII., who advised him to leave Mittau, had great hopes from the last war. They cherished still greater hopes from the new wars which Bonaparte's ambition could not fail to excite, but they were not so ill-informed respecting the internal condition of France as to expect that disturbances would arise there, or even to believe in the possibility of fomenting them. *The pear was not yet ripe* for Louis XVIII.

On the 29th of November the contents of a letter which had arrived from London by way of Sweden were communicated to me. This letter was dated the 3d of November, and contained some particulars respecting the Comte de Lille's arrival in England. That Prince had arrived at Yarmouth on the 31st of October 1807, and it was stated that the King was obliged to wait some time in the port until certain difficulties respecting his landing and the continuance of his journey should be removed. It moreover appeared from this letter that the King of England thought proper to refuse the Comte de Lille permission to go to London or its neighbourhood. The palace of Holyrood in Edinburgh was assigned as his place of residence ; and Mr. Ross, secretary to Mr. Canning, conveyed the determination of the King of England to Louis XVIII. at Yarmouth.

The precaution of the English Ministry in not permitting the refugee King to go near London appeared to me remarkable, considering the relative position of the Governments of France and England, and I regarded it as a corroboration of what the Prince Wittgenstein had told me respecting Mr. Canning's inclination for an amic-

able arrangement. But the moment was approaching when the affairs of Spain were to raise an invincible obstacle to peace, to complicate more than ever the interests of the powers of Europe, and open to Napoleon that vast career of ambition which proved his ruin. He did not allow the hopes of the emigrants to remain chimerical, and the year 1814 witnessed the realisation of the prophetic remark made by M. Lemercier, in a conversation with Bonaparte a few days before the foundation of the Empire: "If you get into the bed of the Bourbons, General, you will not lie in it ten years." Napoleon occupied it for nine years and nine months.

Fouché, the grand investigator of the secrets of Europe, did not fail, on the first report of the agitations in Spain, to address to me question on question respecting the Comte de Rechteren, the Spanish Minister at Hamburg, who, however, had left that city, with the permission of his Court, four months after I had entered on my functions. This was going back very far to seek information respecting the affairs of the day. At the very moment when I transmitted a reply to Fouché which was not calculated to please him, because it afforded no ground for suspicion as to the personal conduct of M. de Rechteren, I received from the amiable Josephine a new mark of her remembrance. She sent me the following note:—

"M. Milon, who is now in Hamburg, wishes me, my dear Bourrienne, to request that you will use your interest in his favour. I feel the more pleasure in making this request as it affords me an opportunity of renewing the assurance of my regard for you."

Josephine's letter was dated from Fontainebleau, whither the Emperor used to make journeys in imitation of the old Court of France. During these excursions he sometimes partook of the pleasures of the chase, but merely for the sake of reviving an old custom, for in that exercise he found as little amusement as Montaigne did in the game of chess.

At Fontainebleau, as everywhere else, his mind was engaged with the means of augmenting his greatness, but, unfortunately, the exactions he imposed on distant countries were calculated to alienate the affections of the people. Thus, for example, I received an order emanating from him, and transmitted to me by M. Daru, the Intendant-General of the army, that the pay of all the French troops stationed in the Hanse Towns should be defrayed by these towns. I lamented the necessity of making such a communication to the Senates of Bremen, Lübeck, and Hamburg; but my duty compelled me to do so, and I had long been accustomed to fulfil duties even more painful than this. I tried every possible means with the three States, not collectively but separately, to induce them to comply with the measure, in the hope that the assent of one would help me to obtain that of the two others. But, as if they had been all agreed, I only received evasive expressions of regret.

Knowing as I did, and I may say better than any one else, the hopes and designs of Bonaparte respecting the north of Germany, it was not without pain, nor even without alarm, that I saw him doing everything calculated to convert into enemies the inhabitants of a country which would always have remained quiet had it only been permitted to preserve its neutrality. Among the orders I received were often many which could only have been the result of the profoundest ignorance. For example, I was one day directed to press 3000 seamen in the Hanse Towns. Three thousand seamen out of a population of 200,000! It was as absurd as to think of raising 500,000 sailors in France. This project being impossible, it was of course not executed; but I had some difficulty in persuading the Emperor that a sixth of the number demanded was the utmost the Hanse Towns could supply. Five hundred seamen were accordingly furnished, but to make up that number it was necessary to include many men who were totally unfit for war service.

CHAPTER XIV.

1808.

Departure of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo—Prediction and superstition—Stoppage of letters addressed to the Spanish troops—La Romana and Romanillos—Illegible notifications—Eagerness of the German Princes to join the Confederation of the Rhine—Attack upon me on account of M. Hue—Bernadotte's successor in Hamburg—Exactions and tyrannical conduct of General Dupas—Disturbance in Hamburg—Plates broken in a fit of rage—My letter to Bernadotte—His reply—Bernadotte's return to Hamburg, and departure of Dupas for Lübeck—Noble conduct of the *aide de camp* Barral.

In the spring of 1808 a circumstance occurred which gave me much uneasiness; it was the departure of Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo, who received orders to repair to Copenhagen.[1] He left Hamburg on the 8th of March, as he was to reach his destination on the 14th of the same month. The Danish *chargé d'affaires* also received orders to join the Prince, and discharge the functions of King's commissary. It was during his government at Hamburg and his stay in Jutland that Bernadotte unconsciously paved his way to the throne of Sweden. I recollect that he had also his presages and his predestinations. In short, he believed in astrology, and I shall never forget the serious tone in which he one day said to me, "Would you believe, my dear friend, that it was predicted at Paris that I should be a King, but that I must cross the sea to

[1] He was directed to take the command of the French troops whom the Emperor sent into Denmark after the bombardment of Copenhagen by the English.—*Bourrienne.* Whether the English had bombarded Copenhagen or not, Bernadotte would have been sent into Denmark, and if we had not secured the fleet he would have seized it for his then master.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

reach my throne?" I could not help smiling with him at this weakness of mind, from which Bonaparte was not far removed. It certainly was not any supernatural influence which elevated Bernadotte to sovereign rank. That elevation was solely due to his excellent character. He had no other talisman than the wisdom of his government, and the promptitude which he always showed to oppose unjust measures. This it was that united all opinions in his favour.

The bad state of the roads in the north prolonged Bernadotte's journey one day. He set out on the 8th of March; he was expected to arrive at Copenhagen on the 14th, but did not reach there till the 15th. He arrived precisely two hours before the death of Christian, King of Denmark, an event with which he made me acquainted by letter written two days after his arrival.

On the 6th of April following I received a second letter from Bernadotte, in which he desired me to order the Grand Ducal postmaster to keep back all letters addressed to the Spanish troops, who had been placed under his command, and of which the corps of Romana formed part. The postmaster was ordered to keep the letters until he received orders to forward them to their destinations. Bernadotte considered this step indispensable, to prevent the intrigues which he feared might be set on foot in order to shake the fidelity of the Spaniards he commanded. I saw from his despatch that he feared the plotting of Romanillos,[1] who, however, was not a person to cause much apprehension. Romanillos was as commonplace a man as could well be conceived; and his speeches, as well as his writings, were too innocent to create any influence on public opinion.

In addition to the functions with which the Emperor at

[1] Romanillos was secretary of the Spanish Legation at Hamburg, and *chargé d'affaires* from the Cabinet of Madrid after the departure of M. de Rechteren.—*Bourrienne.*

first invested me, I had to discharge the duties of French Consul-General at Hamburg, and in that character I was obliged to present to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a very singular request, viz. that the judicial notifications, which as Consul-General I had to make known to the people of Hamburg, might be written in a more legible hand. Many of these notifications had been disregarded on account of the impossibility of reading them. With respect to one of them it was declared that it was impossible to discover whether the writing was German, French, or Chinese.

I shall not record all the acts of spoliation committed by second-rate ambitious aspirants who hoped to come in for their share in the division of the Continent. The Emperor's lieutenants regarded Europe as a twelfth-cake,[1] but none of them ventured to dispute the best bit with Napoleon. Long would be the litany were I to enregister all the fraud and treachery which they committed, either to augment their fortunes or to win the favour of the chief who wished to have kings for his subjects. The fact is, that all the Princes of Germany displayed the greatest eagerness to range themselves under the protection of Napoleon by joining the Confederation of the Rhine.[2] I received from those Princes several letters which served to prove at once the influence of Napoleon in Germany and the facility with which men bend beneath the yoke of a new power. I must say that among the emigrants who remained faithful to their cause there were some who evinced more firmness of character than the foreign Princes. I may mention, for example, M. Hue, the *valet de chambre* of Louis XVI. I

[1] The Emperor's lieutenants regarded Europe as a twelfth-cake (*un gâteau des rois*), but none of them ventured to dispute *the bean* (*la fève*) with Napoleon. In French twelfth-cakes there is a bean concealed in the midst, and in the division of the cake the person to whose lot the bean falls is proclaimed king for the night. This stands in lieu of our custom of *drawing* for king and queen.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

[2] Many of these smaller German Princes had, it is said, to bribe Talleyrand heavily to buy their admission to the Confederation of the Rhine; see *M. de Talleyrand*, by Sainte-Beuve, p. 90.

do not intend to deny the high regard I entertained for that faithful servant of the martyred King ; but the attentions which I congratulate myself on having shown to an excellent man should not have subjected me to false imputations.

I have read the following statement in a publication: "M. Hue retired to Hamburg, where he passed nine months in perfect obscurity. He afterwards went to Holland, provided with a passport from Bourrienne, who was Napoleon's Minister, though in disgrace, and who, foreseeing what was to happen, sought to ingratiate himself in the favour of the Bourbons."

The above passage contains a falsehood in almost every line. M. Hue wished to reside in Hamburg, but he did not wish to conceal himself. I invited him to visit me, and assured him that he might remain in Hamburg without apprehension, provided he acted prudently. He wished to go to Holland, and I took upon myself to give him a passport. I left M. Hue in the free management of his business, the nature of which I knew very well, and which was very honourable ; he was deputed to pay the pensions which Louis XVIII. granted to the emigrants. As for myself, I had tendered my resignation of private secretary to Bonaparte ; and even admitting I was in disgrace in that character, I was not so as Minister and Consul-General at Hamburg. My situation, which was of little consequence at the time I was appointed to it, was later on rendered exceedingly important by circumstances. It was, in fact, a sort of watch-tower of the Government, whence all the movements of northern Germany were observed; and during my residence in the Hanse Towns I continually experienced the truth of what Bonaparte said to me at my farewell audience—"Yours is a place independent and apart."

It is absurd to say that the kindness I showed to M. Hue was an attempt to ingratiate myself with the Bour-

bons. My attentions to him were dictated solely by humanity, unaccompanied by any afterthought. Napoleon had given me his confidence, and by mitigating the severity of his orders I served him better than they who executed them in a way which could not fail to render the French Government odious. If I am accused of extending every possible indulgence to the unfortunate emigrants, I plead guilty; and, far from wishing to defend myself against the charge, I consider it honourable to me. But I defy any one of them to say that I betrayed in their favour the interests with which I was entrusted. They who urged Bonaparte to usurp the crown of France served, though perhaps unconsciously, the cause of the Bourbons. I, on the contrary, used all my endeavours to dissuade him from that measure, which I clearly saw must, in the end, lead to the restoration, though I do not pretend that I was sufficiently clear-sighted to guess that Napoleon's fall was so near at hand. The kindness I showed to M. Hue and his companions in misfortune was prompted by humanity, and not by mean speculation. As well might it be said that Bernadotte, who, like myself, neglected no opportunity of softening the rigour of the orders he was deputed to execute, was by this means working his way to the throne of Sweden.

Bernadotte had proceeded to Denmark to take the command of the Spanish and French troops who had been removed from the Hanse Towns to occupy that kingdom, which was then threatened by the English. His departure was a great loss to me, for we had always agreed respecting the measures to be adopted, and I felt his absence the more sensibly when I was enabled to make a comparison between him and his successor. It is painful to me to detail the misconduct of those who injured the French name in Germany, but in fulfilment of the task I have undertaken, I am bound to tell the truth.

In April 1808 General Dupas came to take the command

of Hamburg, but only under the orders of Bernadotte, who retained the supreme command of the French troops in the Hanse Towns. By the appointment of General Dupas the Emperor cruelly thwarted the wishes and hopes of the inhabitants of Lower Saxony. That General said of the people of Hamburg, "As long as I see those . . . driving in their carriages I can get money from them." It is, however, only just to add, that his dreadful exactions were not made on his own account, but for the benefit of another man to whom he owed his all, and to whom he had in some measure devoted his existence.

I will state some particulars respecting the way in which the generals who commanded the French troops at Hamburg were maintained. The Senate of Hamburg granted to the Marshals thirty friederichs a day for the expenses of their table exclusive of the hotel in which they were lodged by the city. The generals of division had only twenty friederichs. General Dupas wished to be provided for on the same footing as the Marshals. The Senate having, with reason, rejected this demand, Dupas required that he should be daily served with a breakfast and a dinner of thirty covers. This was an inconceivable burden, and Dupas cost the city more than any of his predecessors.

I saw an account of his expenses, which during the twenty-one weeks he remained at Hamburg amounted to 122,000 marks, or about 183,000 francs. None but the most exquisite wines were drunk at the table of Dupas. Even his servants were treated with champagne, and the choicest fruits were brought from the fine hothouses of Berlin. The inhabitants were irritated at this extravagance, and Dupas accordingly experienced the resistance of the Senate.

Among other vexations there was one to which the people could not readily submit. In Hamburg, which had formerly been a fortified town, the custom was preserved

of closing the gates at nightfall. On Sundays they were closed three-quarters of an hour later, to avoid interrupting the amusements of the people.

While General Dupas was Governor of Hamburg an event occurred which occasioned considerable irritation in the public mind, and might have been attended by fatal consequences. From some whim or other the General ordered the gates to be closed at seven in the evening, and consequently while it was broad daylight, for it was in the middle of spring; no exception was made in favour of Sunday, and on that day a great number of the inhabitants who had been walking in the outskirts of the city presented themselves at the gate of Altona for admittance. To their surprise they found the gate closed, though it was a greater thoroughfare than any other gate in Hamburg. The number of persons requiring admittance increased, and a considerable crowd soon collected. After useless entreaties had been addressed to the chief officer of the post the people were determined to send to the Commandant for the keys. The Commandant arrived, accompanied by the General. When they appeared it was supposed they had come for the purpose of opening the gates, and they were accordingly saluted with a general *hurrah!* which throughout almost all the north is the usual cry for expressing popular satisfaction. General Dupas not understanding the meaning of this *hurrah!* supposed it to be a signal for sedition, and instead of ordering the gates to be opened he commanded the military to fire upon the peaceful citizens, who only wanted to return to their homes. Several persons were killed, and others more or less seriously wounded. Fortunately, after this first discharge the fury of Dupas was appeased; but still he persisted in keeping the gates closed at night. Next day an order was posted about the city prohibiting the cry of *hurrah!* under pain of a severe punishment. It was also forbidden that more than three persons should

collect together in the streets. Thus it was that certain persons imposed the French yoke upon towns and provinces which were previously happy.

Dupas was as much execrated in the Hanse Towns as Clarke had been in Berlin when he was governor of that capital during the campaign of 1807. Clarke had burdened the people of Berlin with every kind of oppression and exaction. He, as well as many others, manifested a ready obedience in executing the Imperial orders, however tyrannical they might be; and Heaven knows what epithets invariably accompanied the name of Clarke when pronounced by the lips of a Prussian.

Dupas seemed to have taken Clarke as his model. An artillery officer, who was in Hamburg at the time of the disturbance I have just mentioned, told me that it was he who was directed to place two pieces of light artillery before the gate of Altona. Having executed this order, he went to General Dupas, whom he found in a furious fit of passion, breaking and destroying everything within his reach. In the presence of the officer he broke more than two dozen plates which were on the table before him: these plates, of course, had cost him very little!

On the day after the disturbance which had so fatal a termination I wrote to inform the Prince of Ponte-Corvo of what had taken place; and in my letter I solicited the suppression of an extraordinary tribunal which had been created by General Dupas. He returned me an immediate answer, complying with my request. His letter was as follows:—

I have received your letter, my dear Minister: it forcibly conveys the expression of your right feeling, which revolts against oppression, severity, and the abuse of power. I entirely concur in your view of the subject, and I am distressed whenever I see such acts of injustice committed. On an examination of the events which took place on the 19th it is impossible to deny that the officer who ordered the gates to be closed so soon was in the wrong; and next, it may be asked, why were not the gates opened instead of

the military being ordered to fire on the people? Bnt, on the other hand, did not the people evince decided obstinacy and insubordination? were they not to blame in throwing stones at the guard, forcing the palisades, and even refusing to listen to the voice of the magistrates? It is melancholy that they should have fallen into these excesses, from which, doubtless, they would have refrained had they listened to the civil chiefs, who ought to be their first directors. Finally, my dear Minister, the Senator who distributed money at the gate of Altona to appease the multitude would have done better had he advised them to wait patiently until the gates were opened; and he might, I think, have gone to the Commandant or the General to solicit that concession.

Whenever an irritated mob resorts to violence there is no safety for any one. The protecting power must then exert its utmost authority to stop mischief. The Senate of ancient Rome, so jealous of its prerogatives, assigned to a Dictator, in times of trouble, the power of life and death, and that magistrate knew no other code than his own will and the axe of his lictors. The ordinary laws did not resume their course until the people returned to submission.

The event which took place in Hamburg produced a feeling of agitation of which evil-disposed persons might take advantage to stir up open insurrection. That feeling could only be repressed by a severe tribunal, which, however, is no longer necessary. General Dupas has, accordingly, received orders to dissolve it, and justice will resume her usual course. J. BERNADOTTE.

DENSEL, *4th May*, 1808.

When Bernadotte returned to Hamburg he sent Dupas to Lübeck. That city, which was poorer than Hamburg, suffered cruelly from the visitation of such a guest. Dupas levied all his exactions in kind, and indignantly spurned every offer of accepting money, the very idea of which, he said, shocked his delicacy of feeling. But his demands became so extravagant that the city of Lübeck was utterly unable to satisfy them. Besides his table, which was provided in the same style of profusion as at Hamburg, he required to be furnished with plate, linen, wood, and candles; in short, with the most trivial articles of household consumption.

The Senate deputed to the incorruptible General Dupas

M. Nolting, a venerable old man, who mildly represented to him the abuses which were everywhere committed in his name, and entreated that he would vouchsafe to accept twenty louis a day to defray the expenses of his table alone. At this proposition General Dupas flew into a rage. To offer him money was an insult not to be endured! He furiously drove the terrified Senator out of the house, and at once ordered his *aide de camp* Barral to imprison him. M. de Barral, startled at this extraordinary order, ventured to remonstrate with the General, but in vain; and, though against his heart, he was obliged to obey. The *aide de camp* accordingly waited upon the Senator Nolting, and overcome by that feeling of respect which gray hairs involuntarily inspire in youth, instead of arresting him, he besought the old man not to leave his house until he should prevail on the General to retract his orders. It was not till the following day that M. de Barral succeeded in getting these orders revoked—that is to say, he obtained M. Nolting's release from confinement; for Dupas would not be satisfied until he heard that the Senator had suffered at least the commencement of the punishment to which his capricious fury had doomed him.

In spite of his parade of disinterestedness General Dupas yielded so far as to accept the twenty louis a day for the expense of his table which M. Nolting had offered him on the part of the Senate of Lübeck; but it was not without murmurings, complaints, and menaces that he made this generous concession; and he exclaimed more than once, "These *fellows* have portioned out my allowance for me." Lübeck was not released from the presence of General Dupas until the month of March 1809, when he was summoned to command a division in the Emperor's new campaign against Austria. Strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless the fact, that, oppressive as had been his presence at Lübeck, the Hanse Towns soon had reason to regret him.

CHAPTER XV.

1808.

Promulgation of the Code of Commerce—Conquests by *Sénatus-consulte*—Three events in one day—Recollections—Application of a line of Voltaire—Creation of the Imperial nobility—Restoration of the university—Aggrandisement of the Kingdom of Italy at the expense of Rome—Cardinal Caprara's departure from Paris—The interview at Erfurt.

The year 1808 was fertile in remarkable events. Occupied as I was with my own duties, I yet employed my leisure hours in observing the course of those great acts by which Bonaparte seemed determined to mark every day of his life. At the commencement of 1808 I received one of the first copies of the Code of Commerce, promulgated on the 1st of January by the Emperor's order. This code appeared to me an act of mockery ; at least it was extraordinary to publish a code respecting a subject which it was the effect of all the Imperial decrees to destroy. What trade could possibly exist under the Continental system, and the ruinous severity of the customs? The line was already extended widely enough when, by a *Sénatus-consulte*, it was still further widened. The Emperor, to whom all the Continent submitted, had recourse to no other formality for the purpose of annexing to the Empire the towns of Kehl, Cassel near Mayence, Wesel, and Flushing, with the territories depending on them.[1] These

[1] A resolution of the Senate, or a "Sénatus-consulte," was the means invented by Napoleon for altering the Imperial Constitutions, and even the extent of the Empire. By one of these, dated 21st January 1808, the towns of Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, with Flushing, all already seized, were definitely united to France. The loss of Wesel, which belonged to Murat's Grand Duchy of Berg, was a very sore point with Murat, who talked of nothing less than that he would throw himself into the town of Wesel

conquests, gained by decrees and senatorial decisions, had at least the advantage of being effected without bloodshed. All these things were carefully communicated to me by the Ministers with whom I corresponded, for my situation at Hamburg had acquired such importance that it was neccessary I should know everything.

At this period I observed among the news which I received from different places a singular coincidence of dates, worthy of being noted by the authors of ephemerides. On the same day—namely, the 1st of February —Paris, Lisbon, and Rome were the scenes of events of different kinds, but, as they all happened on one day, affording a striking example of the rapidity of movement which marked the reign of Bonaparte. At Paris the niece of Josephine, Mademoiselle de Tascher,[1] whom Napoleon had lately exalted to the rank of Princess, was married to the reigning Prince of Ahremberg, while at the same time Junot declared to Portugal that the house of Braganza had *ceased to reign*,[2] and French troops were, under the

with his army and defend it. "He should see whether the Emperor would have the face to come and besiege him before the eyes of all Europe; and as for himself, he should hold out to the last extremity. These words were all smoke, and ended in a fine treaty of exchange." See Beugnot (tome i. p. 276), who goes on to say that "this ridiculous little struggle of the Grand Duke (Murat) may have contributed somewhat to his discomfiture in the affairs of this country (Spain). Possibly the petty strife raised up by the Marshal for the town of Wesel caused the Emperor to lay aside the idea of entrusting to him a position of so much importance as Spain and the Indies. So he had to resign himself to the throne of the Two Sicilies, which he received ungraciously enough. This is worth noting for the instruction of posterity" (*Beugnot*, vol. i. p. 277).

[1] Mademoiselle d'Avrillion, when she first entered the service of Josephine, was placed about the person of Mademoiselle Tascher de la Pagerie; and in her Memoirs she draws rather an interesting character of the young and handsome creole, who was singularly attached to her aunt, then only Madame Bonaparte, wife of the First Consul. "Everybody," says the *femme de chambre*, "was satisfied with this marriage, except the bride herself, whose taste was the first that ought to have been consulted. Mademoiselle de Tascher assented to the union with the greatest repugnance: she had a thorough antipathy for the Prince d'Ahremberg, and she never could overcome it, *but she never could have dared to resist the will and command of Napoleon.*" The marriage was a wretched one: it ended in a divorce, after which Madame d'Ahremberg married the Comte de Guitry.

[2] This was a pet expression of Bonaparte's. In the same way he said, in 1806, when he made his brother Joseph King of Naples, "the Bourbons of Naples have ceased to reign."

command of General Miollis, occupying Rome. This occupation was the commencement of prolonged struggles, during which Pius VII. expiated the condescension he had shown in going to Paris to crown Napoleon.

Looking over my notes, I see it was the day after these three events occurred that Bonaparte gave to his brother-in-law, Prince Borghèse, the Governorship-General of the departments beyond the Alps which he had just founded, and of which he made the eighth Grand Dignitary of the Empire. General Menou, whom I had not seen since Egypt, was obliged by this appointment to leave Turin, where he had always remained. Bonaparte, not wishing to permit him to come to Paris, sent Menou to preside over the Junta of Tuscany, of which he soon afterwards made another General-Governorship, which he entrusted to the care of his sister Elisa.[1]

My correspondence relative to what passed in the south of France and of Europe presented to me, if I may so express myself, merely an anecdotal interest. Not so the news which came from the north. At Hamburg I was like the sentinel of an advanced post, always on the alert. I frequently informed the Government of what would take place before the event actually happened. I was one of the first to hear of the plans of Russia relative to Sweden. The courier whom I sent to Paris arrived there at the very moment when Russia made the declaration of war. About the end of February the Russian troops entered Swedish

[1] Prince Camille Philippe Louis Borghèse (1775–1832), an Italian, had married, 6th November 1803, Pauline Bonaparte, the sister of Napoleon, and the widow of General Leclerc. He had been made Prince and Duke of Guastalla when that duchy was given to his wife, 30th March 1806. He separated from his wife after a few years. Indeed Pauline was impossible as a wife if half of the stories about her are true. It was she who, finding that a lady was surprised at her having sat naked while a statue of her was being modelled for Canova, believed she had satisfactorily explained matters by saying, "*but there was a fire in the room.*"

Elisa Bonaparte had married Felix Bacciochi, and had been made Princesse de Piombino et de Lucoques 1805. In March 1809 she was made Grande Duchesse de Toscane, the dignity to which Bourrienne alludes. It was on this occasion, as has already been stated, that 900 unopened letters were found in Menou's cabinet after he had left. See *Marmont*, tome i. p. 411.

Finland, and occupied also the capital of that province, which had at all times been coveted by the Russian Government. It has been said that at the interview at Erfurt Bonaparte consented to the usurpation of that province by Alexander in return for the complaisance of the latter in acknowledging Joseph as King of Spain and the Indies.

The removal of Joseph from the throne of Naples to the throne of Madrid belongs, indeed, to that period respecting which I am now throwing together a few recollections. Murat had succeeded Joseph at Naples, and this accession of the brother-in-law of Napoleon to one of the thrones of the House of Bourbon gave Bonaparte another junior in the college of kings, of which he would have infallibly become the senior if he had gone on as he began.

I will relate a little circumstance which now occurs to me respecting the kings manufactured by Napoleon. I recollect that during the King of Etruria's stay in Paris the First Consul went with that Prince to the Comédie Française, where Voltaire's *Œdipus* was performed. This piece, I may observe, Bonaparte liked better than anything Voltaire ever wrote. I was in the theatre, but not in the First Consul's box, and I observed, as all present must have done, the eagerness with which the audience applied to Napoleon and the King of Etruria the line in which Philoctetes says—

"J'ai fait des souverains et n'ai pas voulu l'être."[1]

The application was so marked that it could not fail to become the subject of conversation between the First Consul and me. "You remarked it, Bourrienne?" . . . "Yes, General." . . . "The fools! . . . They shall see! They shall see!" We did indeed see. Not content with making kings, Bonaparte, when his brow was encircled by a double crown, after creating princes at length realised the object he had long contemplated, namely, to found a new

[1] "I have made sovereigns, but have not wished to be one myself."

nobility endowed with hereditary rights. It was at the commencement of March 1808 that he accomplished this project; and I saw in the *Moniteur* a long list of princes, dukes, counts, barons, and knights of the Empire; there were wanting only viscounts and marquises.[1]

At the same time that Bonaparte was founding a new nobility he determined to raise up the old edifice of the university, but on a new foundation. The education of youth had always been one of his ruling ideas, and I had an opportunity of observing how he was changed by the exercise of sovereign power when I received at Hamburg the statutes of the new elder daughter of the Emperor of the French, and compared them with the ideas which Bonaparte, when General and First Consul, had often expressed to me respecting the education which ought to be given youth. Though the sworn enemy of everything like liberty, Bonaparte had at first conceived a vast system of education, comprising above all the study of history, and those positive sciences, such as geology and astronomy, which give the utmost degree of development to the human mind. The Sovereign, however, shrunk from the first ideas of the man of genius, and his university, confided to the elegant suppleness of M. de Fontaines, was merely a school capable of producing educated subjects but not enlightened men.

Before taking complete possession of Rome, and making it the second city of the Empire, the vaunted moderation of Bonaparte was confined to dismembering from it the

[1] For a list of the chief titles granted by Napoleon see *Madame Junot*, London, Bentley, 1883, vol. iii. p. 512. The barons and counts were legion. It will be seen that all the territorial titles, if the phrase can be used in this case, were placed in foreign countries. This was one of the characteristic precautions taken by Napoleon in creating a fresh nobility. The passions of the Revolutionary party would have been violently excited by a creation of French titles,—a measure which would also have displeased the old nobility. But when titles such as Duc de Castiglione were given, it was difficult for any Frenchman to object to a dignity which recalled a French triumph and French ascendency. Their inconvenience was afterwards shown in the case of Marmont, whom the Court of Vienna refused to receive after the fall of Napoleon unless his title of Ragusa was dropped.

legations of Ancona, Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino, which were divided into three departments, and added to the Kingdom of Italy. The patience of the Holy See could no longer hold out against this act of violence, and Cardinal Caprara, who had remained in Paris since the coronation, at last left that capital. Shortly afterwards the Grand Duchies of Parma and Piacenza were united to the French Empire, and annexed to the government of the departments beyond the Alps. These transactions were coincident with the events in Spain and Bayonne before mentioned.

After the snare laid at Bayonne the Emperor entered Paris on the 14th of August, the eve of his birthday. Scarcely had he arrived in the capital when he experienced fresh anxiety in consequence of the conduct of Russia, which, as I have stated, had declared open war with Sweden, and did not conceal the intention of seizing Finland. But Bonaparte, desirous of actively carrying on the war in Spain, felt the necessity of removing his troops from Prussia to the Pyrenees. He then hastened the interview at Erfurt, where the two Emperors of France and Russia had agreed to meet. He hoped that this interview would insure the tranquillity of the Continent, while he should complete the subjection of Spain to the sceptre of Joseph. That Prince had been proclaimed on the 8th of June ; and on the 21st of the same month he made his entry into Madrid, but having received, ten days after, information of the disaster at Baylen, he was obliged to leave the Spanish capital.[1]

Bonaparte's wishes must at this time have been limited to the tranquillity of the Continent, for the struggle between him and England was more desperate than ever. England had just sent troops to Portugal under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. There was no longer any

[1] The important battle of Baylen, where the French, under General Dupont, were beaten by the Spaniards, was fought on the 19th of July 1808.

hope of a reconciliation with Great Britain. The interview at Erfurt having been determined on, the Emperor, who had returned from Bayonne to Paris, again left the capital about the end of September, and arrived at Metz without stopping, except for the purpose of reviewing the regiments which were echeloned on his route, and which were on their march from the Grand Army to Spain.[1]

I had heard some time previously of the interview which was about to take place, and which was so memorable in the life of Napoleon. It excited so much interest in Germany that the roads were covered with the equipages of the Princes who were going to Erfurt to witness the meeting. The French Emperor arrived there before Alexander, and went forward three leagues to meet him.[2] Napoleon was on horseback, Alexander in a carriage. They embraced, it is said, in a manner expressive of the most

[1] Talleyrand talked a great deal after dinner about Napoleon at Erfurt, where he accompanied him as chamberlain. [He had given up the Foreign Office in August 1807.] The cordiality amongst the sovereigns was more real at that time than at any other, and the adulation of Napoleon quite extraordinary. As an instance of this he told me that in all the theatrical pieces represented before the sovereigns any possible allusion to Napoleon's history was seized upon and rapturously applauded by all the Kings and Hereditary Princes present (*Leaves from Diary of Henry Greville*, p. 76).

Talleyrand at the time seems to have dreaded Napoleon's plans: thus he tried to induce the Emperor of Austria to attend, saying to Metternich, "The Prince who is not there will have the appearance of being either a neutral or an enemy. The Emperor of Austria cannot be in the first case, for nothing can take place in Europe without his offering either a hindrance or a facility. For myself, I would desire that at the right moment the Emperor Francis should arrive as a hindrance" (*Metternich*, tome ii. p. 270). As to the result of the conferences Metternich (tome ii. p. 288) says, "One truth very evident to me is that the result of the Erfurt conferences has not at all corresponded with the ideas which were taken there."

[2] The whole of the month of September 1808 was spent in settling the day for the departure of the respective sovereigns from St. Petersburg and Paris, so that each might regulate his journey so as to arrive neither too soon nor too late.

The Emperor Napoleon appointed the guards, provided the quarters, and defrayed the expenses of the tables, etc., not only for the Emperor of Russia, but also for the other sovereigns who attended the interview. Accordingly a troop of cooks, stewards, and lackeys were sent from the department of the grand marshal.

The company of the Théâtre Français also proceeded to Erfurt for the purpose of performing our best tragedies and comedies. Finally, nothing, however trifling, was neglected that could contribute to the amusement of the sovereigns during their stay at Erfurt (*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome iii. p. 452).

cordial friendship. This interview was witnessed by most of the sovereign Princes of Germany. However, neither the King of Prussia nor the Emperor of Austria was present. The latter sovereign sent a letter to Napoleon, of which I obtained a copy. It was as follows :—

SIRE, MY BROTHER—My Ambassador in Paris informs me that your Majesty is about to proceed to Erfurt to meet the Emperor Alexander. I eagerly seize the opportunity of your approach to my frontier to renew those testimonials of friendship and esteem which I have pledged to you; and I send my Lieutenant-General, Baron Vincent, to convey to you the assurance of my unalterable sentiments. If the false accounts that have been circulated respecting the internal institutions which I have established in my monarchy should for a moment have excited your Majesty's doubts as to my intentions, I flatter myself that the explanations given on that subject by Count Metternich to your Minister will have entirely removed them. Baron Vincent is enabled to confirm to your Majesty all that has been said by Count Metternich on the subject, and to add any further explanations you may wish for. I beg that your Majesty will grant him the same gracious reception he experienced at Paris and at Warsaw. The renewed marks of favour you may bestow on him will be an unequivocal pledge of the reciprocity of your sentiments, and will seal that confidence which will render our satisfaction mutual.

Deign to accept the assurance of the unalterable affection and respect with which I am, Sire, my Brother, Your imperial and royal Majesty's faithful brother and friend, (Signed) FRANCIS.

PRESSBURG, *8th September* 1808.

This letter appears to be a model of ambiguity, by which it is impossible Napoleon could have been imposed upon. However, as yet he had no suspicion of the hostility of Austria, which speedily became manifest; his grand object then was the Spanish business, and, as I have before observed, one of the secrets of Napoleon's genius was, that he did not apply himself to more than one thing at a time.

At Erfurt Bonaparte attained the principal object he had promised himself by the meeting. Alexander recog

nised Joseph in his new character of King of Spain and the Indies. It has been said that as the price of this recognition Napoleon consented that Alexander should have Swedish Finland ; but for the truth of this I cannot vouch. However, I remember that when, after the interview at Erfurt, Alexander had given orders to his ambassador to Charles IV. to continue his functions under King Joseph, the Swedish *chargé d'affaires* at Hamburg told me that confidential letters received by him from Erfurt led him to fear that the Emperor Alexander had communicated to Napoleon his designs on Finland, and that Napoleon had given his consent to the occupation. Be this as it may, as soon as the interview was over Napoleon returned to Paris, where he presided with much splendour at the opening of the Legislative Body, and set out in the month of November for Spain.

CHAPTER XVI.

1808.

The Spanish troops in Hamburg—Romana's siesta—His departure for Funen—Celebration of Napoleon's birthday—Romana's defection—English agents and the Dutch troops—Facility of communication between England and the Continent—Delay of couriers from Russia—Alarm and complaints—The people of Hamburg—Montesquieu and the Minister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany—Invitations at six months—Napoleon's journey to Italy—Adoption of Eugène—Lucien's daughter and the Prince of the Asturias—M. Auguste de Staël's interview with Napoleon.

Previous to the interview at Erfurt an event took place which created a strong interest in Hamburg and throughout Europe, an event which was planned and executed with inconceivable secrecy. I allude to the defection of the Marquis de la Romana, which I have not hitherto noticed, in order that I might not separate the different facts which came to my knowledge respecting that defection and the circumstances which accompanied it.

The Marquis de la Romana had come to the Hanse Towns at the head of an army corps of 18,000 men, which the Emperor in the preceding campaign claimed in virtue of treaties previously concluded with the Spanish Government. The Spanish troops at first met with a good reception in the Hanse Towns. The difference of language, indeed, occasionally caused discord, but when better acquainted the inhabitants and their visitors became good friends. The Marquis de la Romana was a little swarthy man, of unprepossessing and rather common appearance; but he had a considerable share of talent and information. He had travelled in almost every part of Europe,

and as he had been a close observer of all he saw his conversation was exceedingly agreeable and instructive.

During his stay at Hamburg General Romana spent almost every evening at my house, and invariably fell asleep over a game at whist. Madame de Bourrienne was usually his partner, and I recollect he perpetually offered apologies for his involuntary breach of good manners. This, however, did not hinder him from being guilty of the same offence the next evening. I will presently explain the cause of this regular siesta.

On the King of Spain's birthday the Marquis de la Romana gave a magnificent entertainment. The decorations of the ballroom consisted of military emblems. The Marquis did the honours with infinite grace, and paid particular attention to the French generals. He always spoke of the Emperor in very respectful terms, without any appearance of affectation, so that it was impossible to suspect him of harbouring disaffection. He played his part to the last with the utmost address. At Hamburg we had already received intelligence of the fatal result of the battle of the Sierra Morena,[1] and of the capitulation of Dupont, which disgraced him at the very moment when the whole army marked him out as the man most likely next to receive the *baton* of Marshal of France.

Meanwhile the Marquis de la Romana departed for the Danish island of Funen, in compliance with the order which Marshal Bernadotte had transmitted to him. There, as at Hamburg, the Spaniards were well liked, for their general obliged them to observe the strictest discipline. Great preparations were made in Hamburg on the approach of Saint Napoleon's day, which was then celebrated with much solemnity in every town in which France had representatives. The Prince de Ponte-Corvo was at Travemunde, a small seaport near Lübeck, but that did not prevent him from giving directions for the festival

[1] The surrender of General Dupont at Baylen.

of the 15th of August. The Marquis de la Romana, the better to deceive the Marshal, despatched a courier, requesting permission to visit Hamburg on the day of the *fête* in order to join his prayers to those of the French, and to receive, on the day of the *fête*, from the hands of the Prince, the grand order of the Legion of Honour, which he had solicited, and which Napoleon had granted him. Three days after Bernadotte received intelligence of the defection of de la Romana. The Marquis had contrived to assemble a great number of English vessels on the coast, and to escape with all his troops except a depôt of 600 men left at Altona. We afterwards heard that he experienced no interruption on his passage, and that he landed with his troops at Corunna. I now knew to what to attribute the drowsiness which always overcame the Marquis de la Romana when he sat down to take a hand at whist. The fact was, he sat up all night making preparations for the escape which he had long meditated, while to lull suspicion he showed himself everywhere during the day, as usual.[1]

[1] The Marquis of Londonderry's *Narrative of the Peninsular War* contains the following particulars relative to Romana's defection :—

"Whilst the naval and military commanders in the Mediterranean were exerting themselves an effort was made in the north, with complete success, to restore to the service of his country one of the ablest officers of which Spain could at that time boast. One of Bonaparte's first measures, when meditating the subjugation of the Peninsula, was to demand from Spain a corps of 16,000 veteran troops, whom, under the Marquis de la Romana, he employed for a time on the banks of the Vistula, and afterwards removed to the shores of the Great Belt. They were distributed at different points in that district when the standard of independence was raised, and one of the earliest measures of the supreme junta was to issue a proclamation calling upon them, in the name of their country, to return to its defence. This was necessarily consigned to the care of the British cruisers; and it was not given to them in vain. A scheme for its delivery, as well as for the removal of the soldiers, should they, as it was believed they would, desire to comply with its terms, was immediately devised in London; and the execution of it was committed to Vice-Admiral Keats, an officer well worthy of the trust. It succeeded to admiration; and 7,000 men, with Romana at their head, were transferred from the ranks of the enemy at a moment of critical interest to those of the patriotic army." Shut up at Funen in the Baltic the Spaniards for some time could obtain no information from their own distant country. The post-offices of Europe were in the hands of Napoleon—his spies were in the camp of Romana; but nevertheless a bold and skilful agent, a Catholic priest of Scotch extraction named Robertson, succeeded in

On the defection of the Spanish troops I received letters from Government requiring me to augment my vigilance, and to seek out those persons who might be supposed to have been in the confidence of the Marquis de la Romana. I was informed that English agents, dispersed through the Hanse Towns, were endeavouring to foment discord and dissatisfaction among the King of Holland's troops. These manœuvres were connected with the treason of the Spaniards and the arrival of Danican in Denmark. Insubordination had already broken out, but it was promptly repressed. Two Dutch soldiers were shot for striking their officers, but notwithstanding this severity desertion among the troops increased to an alarming degree. Indefatigable agents in the pay of the English Government laboured incessantly to seduce the soldiers of King Louis (of Holland) from their duty. Some of these agents being denounced to me were taken almost in the act, and positive proof being adduced of their guilt they were condemned to death.

These indispensable examples of severity did not check the manœuvres of England, though they served to cool the zeal of her agents. I used every endeavour to second the Prince of Ponte-Corvo in tracing out the persons employed by England. It was chiefly from the small island of Heligoland that they found their way to the Continent. This communication was facilitated by the numerous vessels scattered about the small islands which lie along that coast. Five or six pieces of gold defrayed the expense of the passage to or from Heligoland. Thus the Spanish news, which was printed and often fabricated at London, was profusely circulated in the north of Germany. Packets of papers addressed to merchants and well-known persons in the German towns were put into

getting ashore at Funen in disguise, and in opening communications between the Spanish general and the British Admiral Keats. The combinations then resorted to by Romana to extricate his troops are entitled to much praise.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

the post-offices of Embden, Knipphausen, Varel, Oldenburg, Delmenhorst, and Bremen. Generally speaking, this part of the coast was not sufficiently well watched to prevent espionage and smuggling; with regard to smuggling, indeed, no power could have entirely prevented it. The Continental system had made it a necessity, so that a great part of the population depended on it for subsistence.

In the beginning of December 1808 we remarked that the Russian courier who passed through Königsberg and Berlin, was regularly detained four, five, and even six hours on his way to Hamburg. The trading portion of the population, always suspicious, became alarmed at this change in the courier's hours, into which they inquired and soon discovered the cause. It was ascertained that two agents had been stationed by the postmaster of the Grand Duchy of Berg at Hamburg, in a village called Eschburg belonging to the province of Lauenburg. There the courier from Berlin was stopped, and his packets and letters opened. As soon as these facts were known in Hamburg there was a general consternation among the trading class—that is to say, the influential population of the city. Important and well-grounded complaints were made. Some letters had been suppressed, enclosures had been taken from one letter and put into another, and several bills of exchange had gone astray. The intelligence soon reached the ears of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, and was confirmed by the official report of the commissioner for the Imperial and Royal Post-office, who complained of the delay of the courier, of the confusion of the packets, and of want of confidence in the Imperial Post-office. It was impolitic to place such agents in a village where there was not even a post-office, and where the letters were opened in an inn without any supervision. This examination of the letters, sometimes, perhaps, necessary, but often dangerous, and always extremely delicate, created additional alarm, on account of the persons to whom the

business was entrusted. If the Emperor wished to be made acquainted with the correspondence of certain persons in the north it would have been natural to entrust the business to his agents and his commissioner at Hamburg, and not to two unknown individuals—another inconvenience attending *black cabinets*. At my suggestion the Prince of Ponte-Corvo gave orders for putting a stop to the clandestine business at Eschburg. The two agents were taken to Hamburg and their conduct inquired into. They were severely punished. They deserved this, however, less than those who had entrusted them with such an *honourable* mission; but leaders never make much scruple about abandoning their accomplices in the lower ranks.

But for the pain of witnessing vexations of this sort, which I had not always power to prevent, especially after Bernadotte's removal, my residence at Hamburg would have been delightful. Those who have visited that town know the advantages it possesses from its charming situation on the Elbe, and above all, the delightful country which surrounds it like a garden, and extends to the distance of more than a league along the banks of the Eyder. The manners and customs of the inhabitants bear the stamp of peculiarity; they are fond of pursuing their occupations in the open air. The old men are often seen sitting round tables placed before their doors sipping tea, while the children play before them, and the young people are at their work. These groups have a very picturesque effect, and convey a gratifying idea of the happiness of the people. On seeing the worthy citizens of Hamburg assembled round their doors I could not help thinking of a beautiful remark of Montesquieu. When he went to Florence with a letter of recommendation to the Prime Minister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany he found him sitting at the threshold of his door, inhaling the fresh air and conversing with some friends. "I see," said Montes-

quieu, "that I am arrived among a happy people, since their Prime Minister can enjoy his leisure moments thus."

A sort of patriarchal simplicity characterises the manners of the inhabitants of Hamburg. They do not visit each other much, and only by invitation; but on such occasions they display great luxury beneath their simple exterior. They are methodical and punctual to an extra-ordinary degree. Of this I recollect a curious instance. I was very intimate with Baron Woght, a man of talent and information, and exceedingly amiable manners. One day he called to make us a farewell visit as he intended to set out on the following day for Paris. On Madame de Bourrienne expressing a hope that he would not protract his absence beyond six months, the period he had fixed upon, he replied, "Be assured, madame, nothing shall prevent me getting home on the day I have appointed, for I have invited a party of friends to dine with me on the day after my return." The Baron returned at the appointed time, and none of his guests required to be reminded of his invitation at six months' date.[1]

Napoleon so well knew the effect which his presence produced that after a conquest he loved to show himself to the people whose territories he added to the Empire. Duroc, who always accompanied him when he was not engaged on missions, gave me a curious account of Napoleon's journey in 1807 to Venice and the other Italian prov-

[1] Among the peculiarities of a former Lord Guildford was a similar one: he would invite friends to dine with him at London six or eight months after the date of the invitation; he would then start for the Ionian Islands, where he was organising a university for the Greeks—stay there for months, and then, getting over to Otranto or Brindisi, he would travel back through Italy, Switzerland, and France to meet his dinner-party in London. He generally so *timed* matters as to reach his home only a few hours before the dinner was to be on table. In all this, no doubt, there was considerable calculation, and some affectation, but it amused his lordship, and did no harm to any one. He once refused an invitation to prolong his stay for a day or two in the city of Lecce, at the extremity of the Italian peninsula, because he had a party fixed for such a day in London, and must travel on in order to be punctual to the hour! This oddity certainly made the Italian gentry stare with astonishment.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

inces, which, conformably with the treaty of Presburg, were annexed to the Kingdom of Italy.

In this journey to the Kingdom of Italy Napoleon had several important objects in view. He was planning great alliances ; and he loaded Eugène with favours for the purpose of sounding him and preparing him for his mother's divorce. At the same time he intended to have an interview with his brother Lucien, because, wishing to dispose of the hand of his brother's daughter, he thought of making her marry the Prince of the Asturias (Ferdinand), who before the Spanish war, when the first dissensions between father and son had become manifest, had solicited an alliance with the Emperor in the hope of getting his support.[1] This was shortly after the eldest son of Louis had died in Holland of croup. It has been wrongly believed that Napoleon had an affection for this child beyond that of an uncle for a nephew. I have already said the truth about this.

However this may be, it is certain that Napoleon now seriously contemplated a divorce from Josephine. If there had been no other proof of this I, who from long habit knew how to read Napoleon's thoughts by his acts, found a sufficient one in the decree issued at Milan by which Napoleon adopted Eugène as his son and successor to the

[1] For Lucien's account of the interview with his brother at Mantua on the 12th December 1807 see Iung's *Lucien*, tome iii. pp. 82-157. Napoleon offered Lucien everything if he would divorce his second wife, Madame Jouberthon, and spoke of his own divorce from Josephine. He even hinted, says Lucien, that he might marry Charlotte, the daughter of Lucien. The brothers separated on fair terms, but did not see one another again till 1815. In February 1810 Lucien's daughter Charlotte was sent to the Imperial Court to be ready for a marriage with the Prince of the Asturias, later Ferdinand VII. of Spain, who had prayed Napoleon to grant him the honour of an alliance with an august princess of his family (*Du Casse*, tome iv. p. 259). *Erreurs* (tome ii. p. 172) denies this, but Bourrienne is here right. Another possible claimant of her hand was the Archduke Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Wurzburg, brother of the Emperor Francis of Austria. Napoleon seems also to have felt his way in 1810 for a marriage between her and the Austrian Prince Imperial (see *Metternich*, tome ii. p. 372). The girl disliked the Court, and ridiculed its members and their manners in her letters to her parents. These letters were opened by Napoleon, and read by him to his indignant family, and the girl was sent back to her father. She married Prince Mario Gabrielli in 1815.

crown of Italy, in default of male and legitimate children directly descended from him. Lucien went to Mantua on his brother's invitation, and this was the last interview they had before the *Cent Jours.* Lucien consented to give his daughter to the Prince of the Asturias, but this marriage did not take place. I learned from Duroc to what a height the enmity of Lucien towards the Beauharnais family, an enmity which I have often had occasion to speak of, had been renewed on this occasion. Lucien could not pardon Josephine for the rebuff of the counsels which he had given her, and which she had rejected with such proper indignation. Lucien had besides another special reason for giving his daughter to the Prince of the Asturias. He particularly wished to prevent that Prince marrying Mademoiselle de Tascher, the niece of Josephine, a marriage for which M. de Beauharnais, then Ambassador of France at Madrid, was working with all his might. Lucien also, with his Republican stolidity, submitted without too much scruple to the idea of having a Bourbon King as son-in-law. It was also during this journey of Napoleon that he annexed Tuscany to the Empire.

Bonaparte returned to Paris on the 1st of January 1808. On his way he stopped for a short time at Chambéry, where a young man had been waiting for him several days. This was Madame de Staël's son, who was then not more than seventeen years of age. M. Auguste de Staël lodged at the house of the postmaster of Chambéry, and as the Emperor was expected in the course of the night, he gave orders that he should be called up on the arrival of the first courier. The couriers, who had been delayed on the road, did not arrive until six in the morning, and were almost immediately followed by the Emperor himself, so that M. de Staël was awakened by the cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* He had just time to dress himself hastily, and fly to meet Napoleon, to whom he delivered a letter, which he had prepared beforehand for the purpose of soliciting

an audience. Lauriston, the *aide de camp* on duty, took the letter, it being his business to receive all the letters and petitions which were presented to Napoleon on his way. Before breakfast the Emperor opened the letters which Lauriston had laid on the table ; he merely looked at the signatures, and then laid them aside. On opening M. de Staël's letter he said, "Ah ! ah ! what have we here ? a letter from M. de Staël ! . . . He wishes to see me. . . . What can he want ? . . . Can there be anything in common between me and the refugees of Geneva ?"—"Sire," observed Lauriston, "he is a very young man ; and, as well as I could judge from the little I saw of him, there is something very prepossessing in his appearance."—"A very young man, say you ? . . . Oh, then I will see him. . . . Rustan, tell him to come in." M. de Staël presented himself to Napoleon with modesty, but without any unbecoming timidity. When he had respectfully saluted the Emperor a conversation ensued between them, which Duroc described to me in nearly the following manner.

As M. de Staël advanced towards the Emperor the latter said, "Whence do you come ?"—"From Geneva, Sire."—"Where is your mother ?"—"She is either in Vienna or will soon be there."—"At Vienna ! . . . Well, that is where she ought to be ; and I suppose she is happy. . . . She will now have a good opportunity of learning German."—"Sire, how can you imagine my mother is happy when she is absent from her country and her friends ? If I were permitted to lay before your Majesty my mother's confidential letter you would see how unhappy she is in her exile."—"Ah, bah ! your mother unhappy, indeed ! . . . However. I do not mean to say she is altogether a bad woman. . . . She has talent—perhaps too much ; and hers is an unbridled talent. She was educated amidst the chaos of the subverted monarchy and the Revolution ; and out of these events she makes an amalgamation of her own ! All this

might become very dangerous. Her enthusiasm is likely to make proselytes. I must keep watch upon her. She does not like me; and for the interests of those whom she would endanger I must prohibit her coming to Paris."

Young De Staël stated that his object in seeking the interview with the Emperor was to petition for his mother's return to Paris. Napoleon having listened without impatience to the reasons he urged in support of his request, said, "But supposing I were to permit your mother to return to Paris, six months would not elapse before I should be obliged to send her to the Bicêtre or to the Temple. This I should be sorry to do, because the affair would make a noise, and injure me in public opinion. Tell your mother that my determination is formed, that my decision is irrevocable. She shall never set foot in Paris as long as I live."—"Sire, I cannot believe that you would arbitrarily imprison my mother if she gave you no reason for such severity."—"She would give me a dozen! . . . I know her well."—"Sire, permit me to say that I am certain my mother would live in Paris in a way that would afford no ground of reproach; she would live retired, and would see only a very few friends. In spite of your Majesty's refusal I venture to entreat that you will give her a trial, were it only for six weeks or a month. Permit her, Sire, to pass that time in Paris, and I conjure you to come to no final decision beforehand."—"Do you think I am to be deceived by these fair promises? . . . I tell you it cannot be. She would serve as a rallying point for the Faubourg St. Germain. She see nobody, indeed! Could she make that sacrifice? She would visit and receive company. She would be guilty of a thousand follies. She would be saying things which she may consider as very good jokes, but which I should take seriously. My government is no joke: I wish this to be well known by everybody."—"Sire, will your Majesty permit me to repeat

that my mother has no wish whatever to mingle in society? She would confine herself to the circle of a few friends, a list of whom she would give to your Majesty. You, Sire, who love France so well, may form some idea of the misery my mother suffers in her banishment. I conjure your Majesty to yield to my entreaties, and let us be included in the number of your faithful subjects." —"You!"—"Yes, Sire; or if your Majesty persist in your refusal, permit a son to inquire what can have raised your displeasure against his mother. Some say that it was my grandfather's last work; but I can assure your Majesty that my mother had nothing to do with that."—"Yes, certainly," added Napoleon, with more ill-humour than he had hitherto manifested. "Yes, certainly, that work is very objectionable. Your grandfather was an ideologist, a fool, an old lunatic. At sixty years of age to think of forming plans to overthrow my constitution! States would be well governed, truly, under such theorists, who judge of men from books and the world from the map."—"Sire, since my grandfather's plans are, in your Majesty's eyes, nothing but vain theories, I cannot conceive why they should so highly excite your displeasure. There is no political economist who has not traced out plans of constitutions."—"Oh! as to political economists, they are mere visionaries, who are dreaming of plans of finance while they are unfit to fulfil the duties of a schoolmaster in the most insignificant village in the Empire. Your grandfather's work is that of an obstinate old man who died abusing all governments."—"Sire, may I presume to suppose, from the way in which you speak of it, that your Majesty judges from the report of malignant persons, and that you have not yourself read it."—"That is a mistake. I have read it myself from beginning to end."—"Then your Majesty must have seen how my grandfather renders justice to your genius."—"Fine justice, truly! . . . He calls me the indispensable

man, but, judging from his arguments, the best thing that could be done would be to cut my throat! Yes, I was indeed indispensable to repair the follies of your grandfather, and the mischief he did to France. It was he who overturned the monarchy and led Louis XVI. to the scaffold."—"Sire, you seem to forget that my grandfather's property was confiscated because he defended the King."—"Defended the King! A fine defence, truly! You might as well say that if I give a man poison and present him with an antidote when he is in the agonies of death I wish to save him! Yet that is the way your grandfather defended Louis XVI. . . . As to the confiscation you speak of, what does that prove? Nothing. Why, the property of Robespierre was confiscated! And let me tell you that Robespierre himself, Marat, and Danton did much less mischief to France than M. Necker. It was he who brought about the Revolution. You, Monsieur de Staël, did not see this; but I did. I witnessed all that passed in those days of terror and public calamity. But as long as I live those days shall never return. Your speculators trace their Utopian schemes upon paper; fools read and believe them. All are babbling about general happiness, and presently the people have not bread to eat; then comes a revolution. Such is usually the fruit of all these fine theories! Your grandfather was the cause of the saturnalia which desolated France. He is responsible for all the blood shed in the Revolution!"

Duroc informed me that the Emperor uttered these last words in a tone of fury which made all present tremble for young De Staël. Fortunately the young man did not lose his self-possession in the conflict, while the agitated expression of his countenance evidently showed what was passing in his mind. He was sufficiently master of himself to reply to the Emperor in a calm though rather faltering voice: "Sire, permit me to hope that posterity will judge of my grandfather more favourably than your

Majesty does. During his administration he was ranked by the side of Sully and Colbert; and let me repeat again that I trust posterity will render him justice."—"Posterity will, probably, say little about him."—"I venture to hope the contrary, Sire."

Then, added Duroc, the Emperor turning to us said with a smile, "After all, gentlemen, it is not for me to say too much against the Revolution since I have gained a throne by it." Then again turning to M. de Staël he said, "The reign of anarchy is at an end. I must have subordination. Respect the sovereign authority, since it comes from God.[1] You are young, and well educated, therefore, follow a better course, and avoid those bad principles which endanger the welfare of society."—"Sire, since your Majesty does me the honour to think me well educated, you ought not to condemn the principles of my grandfather and my mother, for it is in those principles that I have been brought up."—"Well, I advise you to keep right in politics, for I will not pardon any offences of the Necker kind. Every one should keep right in politics."

This conversation, Duroc informed me, had continued the whole time of breakfast, and the Emperor rose just as he pronounced these last words: "Every one should keep right in politics." At that moment young De Staël again renewed his solicitations for his mother's recall from exile. Bonaparte then stepped up to him and pinched his ear with that air of familiarity which was customary to him when he was in good humour or wished to appear so.

[1] This belief in the Divine origin of power was dear to the mind of Napoleon. "Napoleon was also much impressed with the idea of deriving the origin of supreme authority from the Divinity. He said to me one day at Compiègne, shortly after his marriage with the Archduchess, 'I see that the Empress, in writing to her father, addresses her letter to *His Sacred and Imperial Majesty*. Is this title customary with you?' I told him that it was, from the tradition of the old German Empire, which bore the title of the Holy Empire, and because it was also attached to the Apostolic crown of Hungary. Napoleon then replied in a grave tone, 'It is a fine custom and a good expression. Power comes from God, and it is that alone which places it beyond the attacks of men. Hence I shall adopt the title some day'" (*Metternich*. tome i. p. 276).

"You are young," said he; "if you had my age and experience you would judge of things more correctly. I am far from being displeased with your frankness. I like to see a son plead his mother's cause. Your mother has given you a difficult commission, and you have executed it cleverly. I am glad I have had this opportunity of conversing with you. I love to talk with young people when they are unassuming and not too fond of arguing. But in spite of that I will not hold out false hopes to you. Murat has already spoken to me on the subject, and I have told him, as I now tell you, that my will is irrevocable. If your mother were in prison I should not hesitate to liberate her, but nothing shall induce me to recall her from exile."—"But, Sire, is she not as unhappy in being banished from her country and her friends as if she were in prison?"—"Oh! these are your mother's romantic ideas. She is exceedingly unhappy, and much to be pitied, no doubt! . . . With the exception of Paris she has all Europe for her prison."—"But, Sire, her friends are in Paris."—"With her talents she may make friends anywhere. After all, I cannot understand why she should be so anxious to come to Paris. Why should she wish to place herself immediately within the reach of my tyranny? Can she not go to Rome, to Berlin, to Vienna, to Milan, or to London? Yes, let her go to London; that is the place for her. There she may libel me as much as she pleases. In short, she has my full liberty to be anywhere but in Paris. You see, Monsieur de Staël, *that* is the place of my residence, and *there* I will have only those who are attached to me. I know from experience that if I were to allow your mother to come to Paris she would spoil everybody about me. She would finish the spoiling of Garat. It was she who ruined the Tribunate. I know she would promise wonders; but she cannot refrain from meddling with politics."—"I can assure your Majesty that my mother does not now concern herself about politics.

She devotes herself exclusively to the society of her friends and to literature."—"Ah, there it is! . . . Literature! Do you think I am to be imposed upon by that word? While discoursing on literature, morals, the fine arts, and such matters, it is easy to dabble in politics. Let women mind their knitting. If your mother were in Paris I should hear all sorts of reports about her. Things might, indeed, be falsely attributed to her; but, be that as it may, I will have nothing of the kind going on in the capital in which I reside. All things considered, advise your mother to go to London. That is the best place for her. As for your grandfather, I have not spoken too severely of him. M. Necker knew nothing of the art of government. I have learned something of the matter during the last twenty years."—"All the world, Sire, renders justice to your Majesty's genius, and there is no one but acknowledges that the finances of France are now more prosperous than ever they were before your reign. But permit me to observe that your Majesty must, doubtless, have seen some merit in the financial regulations of my grandfather, since you have adopted some of them in the admirable system you have established."—"That proves nothing; for two or three good ideas do not constitute a good system. Be that as it may, I say again, I will never allow your mother to return to Paris."—"But, Sire, if sacred interests should absolutely require her presence there for a few days would not——" —"How! Sacred interests! What do you mean?"—"Yes, Sire, if you do not allow her to return I shall be obliged to go there, unaided by her advice, in order to recover from your Majesty's Government the payment of a sacred debt."—"Ah! bah! Sacred! Are not all the debts of the State sacred?"—"Doubtless, Sire; but ours is attended with circumstances which give it a peculiar character."—"A peculiar character! Nonsense! Does not every State creditor say the same of his debt? Besides, I know

nothing of your claim. It does not concern me, and I will not meddle with it. If you have the law on your side so much the better; but if you want favour I tell you I will not interfere. If I did, I should be rather against you than otherwise."—"Sire, my brother and myself had intended to settle in France, but how can we live in a country where our mother cannot visit us?"—"I do not care for that. I do not advise you to come here. Go to England. The English like wrangling politicians. Go there, for in France, I tell you candidly, that I should be rather against you than for you."

"After this conversation," added Duroc, "the Emperor got into the carriage with me without stopping to look to the other petitions which had been presented to him. He preserved unbroken silence until he got nearly opposite the cascade, on the left of the road, a few leagues from Chambéry. He appeared to be absorbed in reflection. At length he said, 'I fear I have been somewhat too harsh with this young man. . . . But no matter, it will prevent others from troubling me. These people calumniate everything I do. They do not understand me, Duroc; their place is not in France. How can Necker's family be for the Bourbons, whose first duty, if ever they returned to France, would be to hang them all."[1]

This conversation, related to me by Duroc, interested me so much that I noted it down on paper immediately after my interview.[2]

[1] After all the outcry which has been raised about the tyrannical conduct of Napoleon towards Madame de Staël, there is some point in his question as to why she was so anxious to place herself under his tyranny. Napoleon knew her as a clever, meddling, ambitious woman, and he prevented her from stirring up political strife in Paris at a time when the land called for internal even more than for external peace. As Napoleon said to Metternich, "If Madame de Staël would be, or could be, either a Royalist or a Republican, I should have nothing to say against her; but she is a machine in motion which will make a disturbance in the *salons*. It is only in France that such a woman is to be feared, and I will not agree to it (her return) (*Metternich*, tome i. p. 281).

[2] After the fall of Bonaparte Auguste de Staël became an orator and a political writer of high reputation. See his *Œuvres diverses*, Paris, 1829.

CHAPTER XVII.

1808.

The Republic of Batavia—The crown of Holland offered to Louis—Offer and refusal of the crown of Spain—Napoleon's attempt to get possession of Brabant—Napoleon before and after Erfurt—A remarkable letter to Louis—Louis summoned to Paris—His honesty and courage—His bold language—Louis' return to Holland, and his letter to Napoleon—Harsh letter from Napoleon to Louis—Affray at Amsterdam—Napoleon's displeasure and last letter to his brother—Louis' abdication in favour of his son—Union of Holland to the French Empire—Protest of Louis against that measure—Letter from M. Otto to Louis.

While Bonaparte was the chief of the French Republic he had no objection to the existence of a Batavian Republic in the north of France, and he equally tolerated the Cisalpine Republic in the south. But after the coronation all the Republics, which were grouped like satellites round the grand Republic, were converted into kingdoms subject to the Empire, if not avowedly, at least in fact. In this respect there was no difference between the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics.[1] The latter having

[1] It may be interesting to detail the various Republics formed or renamed during the Revolutionary wars. France itself, declared a Republic on 21st September 1792, became an Empire in 1804. The Batavian Republic was formed of Holland in 1795: it became a Kingdom under Louis Bonaparte in 1806, and after being annexed to the French Empire in 1810 fell to the House of Orange in 1815. Switzerland became the Helvetian Republic in 1798, and the Swiss Confederation in 1803. The Valais, occupied by the French in 1801, was made a separate Republic in 1802: it was annexed to the Empire in 1810, and restored to Switzerland in 1815. Another of the Swiss States, the Pays de Vaud, was named the République Lemanique in 1798, and ended as a separate Canton. The Republic of the Seven Islands was formed of the Ionian Islands, taken from Venice and given to France in 1797 by the Treaty of Campo-Formio. Then, having been taken by the Russians and Turks, they were formed into the République des Sept Isles in 1800, and were so recognised by the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. They were restored to France by Russia under the

been metamorphosed into the Kingdom of Italy, it was necessary to find some pretext for transforming the former into the Kingdom of Holland. The government of the Republic of Batavia had been for some time past merely the shadow of a government, but still it preserved, even in its submission to France, those internal forms of freedom which console a nation for the loss of independence. The Emperor kept up such an extensive agency in Holland that he easily got up a deputation soliciting him to choose a king for the Batavian Republic. This submissive deputation came to Paris in 1806 to solicit the Emperor, as a favour, to place Prince Louis on the throne of Holland. The address of the deputation, the answer of Napoleon, and the speech of Louis on being raised to the sovereign dignity, have all been published.

Louis became King of Holland much against his inclination, for he opposed the proposition as much as he dared, alleging as an objection the state of his health, to which certainly the climate of Holland was not favourable; but Bonaparte sternly replied to his remonstrance, "It is

Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, but were taken by the English in 1809. From 1815 the Republic remained under English protection till 1864, when the English withdrew, and the Republic joined Greece. The little Republic of Ragusa was occupied by the French in 1806, and its government was broken up in 1808, after which it became part of the Illyrian provinces, eventually falling to Austria in 1815. The Italian Republics were many. The Transpadane Republic had been intended by Napoleon to be formed of Lombardy, but in 1797 it was joined to the Cispadane to form the Cisalpine Republic. The Cispadane Republic was first formed by Napoleon in 1796 from the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, Modena, Reggio, etc. In 1797 the Cispadane and the Transpadane were united to form the Cisalpine Republic, which included Lombardy and the former Austrian and Venetian provinces of Modena, Reggio, Brescia, Mantua, the three Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, and the Valtelline, with a population of about 3,600,000. The Cisalpine became the Italian Republic in 1801, and in 1805 was changed into the Kingdom of Italy, Napoleon himself assuming the crown, which, however, was not to be again united to that of France. The Ligurian Republic was formed in 1797 of Genoa; in 1805 it was annexed to France, and in 1815 it fell to Sardinia, much to its discontent. The Roman or Tiberine Republic was formed in February 1798, when Berthier occupied the city, but it fell when Italy was reconquered from the French in 1799, again coming under the Pope. The Parthenopean Republic, formed of Naples in January 1799, only existed till July 1799, when the Bourbons retook it. The little Republic of Lucca, in 1805, was converted into a Principality for Elisa Bonaparte (Princess Bacciochi). Bâle was the Republic of Raurasia from 1792 to 1793.

better to die a king than live a prince." He was then obliged to accept the crown. He went to Holland accompanied by Hortense, who, however, did not stay long there. The new King wanted to make himself beloved by his subjects, and as they were an entirely commercial people the best way to win their affections was not to adopt Napoleon's rigid laws against commercial intercourse with England. Hence the first coolness between the two brothers, which ended in the abdication of Louis.

I know not whether Napoleon recollected the motive assigned by Louis for at first refusing the crown of Holland, namely, the climate of the country, or whether he calculated upon greater submission in another of his brothers; but this is certain, that Joseph was not called from the throne of Naples to the throne of Spain until after the refusal of Louis. I have in my possession a copy of a letter written to him by Napoleon on the subject. It is without date of time or place, but its contents prove it to have been written in March or April 1808. It is as follows:—

BROTHER—The King of Spain, Charles IV., has just abdicated. The Spanish people loudly appeal to me. Certain of obtaining no solid peace with England unless I cause a great movement on the Continent, I have determined to place a French King on the throne of Spain. The climate of Holland does not agree with you; besides, Holland cannot rise from her ruins. In the whirlwind of events, whether we have peace or not, there is no possibility of her maintaining herself. In this state of things I have thought of the throne of Spain for you. Give me your opinions categorically on this measure. If I were to name you King of Spain would you accept the offer? May I count on you? Answer me these two questions. Say, "I have received your letter of such a day, I answer *Yes*," and then I shall count on your doing what I wish; or say "*No*" if you decline my proposal. Let no one enter into your confidence, and mention to no one the object of this letter. The thing must be done before we confess having thought about it.[1]

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

[1] Garden (tome xi. p, 200) alleges that the throne of Spain was first offered by

Before finally seizing Holland Napoleon formed the project of separating Brabant and Zealand from it in exchange for other provinces, the possession of which was doubtful, but Louis successfully resisted this first act of usurpation. Bonaparte was too intent on the great business in Spain to risk any commotion in the north, where the declaration of Russia against Sweden already sufficiently occupied him. He therefore did not insist upon, and even affected indifference to, the proposed augmentation of the territory of the Empire. This at least may be collected from another letter, dated St. Cloud, 17th August, written upon hearing from M. Alexandre de la Rochefoucauld, his Ambassador in Holland, and from his brother himself, the opposition of Louis to his project.

The letter was as follows:—

BROTHER—I have received your letter relating to that of the Sieur de la Rochefoucauld. He was only authorised to make the proposals indirectly. Since the exchange does not please you, let us think no more about it. It was useless to make a parade of principles, though I never said that you ought not to consult the nation. The well-informed part of the Dutch people had already acknowledged their indifference to the loss of Brabant, which is connected with France rather than with Holland, and interspersed with expensive fortresses; it might have been advantageously exchanged for the northern provinces. But, once for all, since you do not like this arrangement, let no more be said about it. It was useless even to mention it to me, for the Sieur de la Rochefoucauld was instructed merely to hint the matter.

Though ill-humour here evidently peeps out beneath affected condescension, yet the tone of this letter is singularly moderate,—I may even say kind, in comparison with other letters which Napoleon addressed to Louis. This letter, it is true, was written previously to the interview

Napoleon to Louis on 27th March 1808. Du Casse (tome iv. p. 285) allows that this may be true, as the first hint given to Joseph of his being called to Spain is dated 18th April 1808; see *Du Casse*, tome iv. p. 227. Thiers (tome viii. p. 622) assumes that Joseph was the only choice.

at Erfurt, when Napoleon, to avoid alarming Russia, made his ambition appear to slumber. But when he got his brother Joseph recognised, and when he had himself struck an important blow in the Peninsula, he began to change his tone to Louis. On the 20th of December he wrote a very remarkable letter, which exhibits the unreserved expression of that tyranny which he wished to exercise over all his family in order to make them the instruments of his despotism. He reproached Louis for not following his system of policy, telling him that he had forgotten he was a Frenchman, and that he wished to become a Dutchman. Among other things he said :—

Your Majesty has done more: you took advantage of the moment when I was involved in the affairs of the Continent to renew the relations between Holland and England—to violate the laws of the blockade, which are the only means of effectually destroying the latter power. I expressed my dissatisfaction by forbidding you to come to France, and I have made you feel that even without the assistance of my armies, by merely closing the Rhine, the Weser, the Scheldt, and the Meuse against Holland, I should have placed her in a situation more critical than if I had declared war against her. Your Majesty implored my generosity, appealed to my feelings as a brother, and promised to alter your conduct. I thought this warning would be sufficient. I raised my custom-house prohibitions, but your Majesty has returned to your old system. . . . Your Majesty received all the American ships that presented themselves in the ports of Holland after having been expelled from those of France. I have been obliged a second time to prohibit trade with Holland. In this state of things we may consider ourselves really at war. In my speech to the Legislative Body I manifested my displeasure; for I will not conceal from you that my intention is to unite Holland with France. This will be the most severe blow I can aim against England, and will deliver me from the perpetual insults which the plotters of your Cabinet are constantly directing against me. The mouths of the Rhine and of the Meuse ought, indeed, to belong to me. The principle that the *Thalweg* (towing-path) of the Rhine is the boundary of France is a fundamental principle. Your Majesty writes to me on the 17th that you are sure of being able to prevent all trade between Holland and England. I am of opinion that your Majesty promises more than

you can fulfil. I shall, however, remove my custom-house prohibitions whenever the existing treaties may be executed. The following are my conditions :—First, The interdiction of all trade and communication with England. Second, The supply of a fleet of fourteen sail of the line, seven frigates and seven brigs or corvettes, armed and manned. Third, An army of 25,000 men. Fourth, The suppression of the rank of marshals. Fifth, The abolition of all the privileges of nobility which are contrary to the constitution which I have given and guaranteed. Your Majesty may negotiate on these bases with the Duc de Cadore, through the medium of your Minister ; but be assured that on the entrance of the first packet-boat into Holland I will restore my prohibitions, and that *the first Dutch officer who may presume to insult my flag shall be seized and hanged at the mainyard.* Your Majesty will find in me a brother if you prove yourself a Frenchman ; but if you forget the sentiments which attach you to our common country you cannot think it extraordinary that I should lose sight of those which nature created between us. In short, the union of Holland and France will be, of all things, most useful to France, to Holland, and the whole Continent, because it will be most injurious to England. This union must be effected willingly or by force. Holland has given me sufficient reason to declare war against her. However, I shall not scruple to consent to an arrangement which will secure to me the limit of the Rhine, and by which Holland will pledge herself to fulfil the conditions stipulated above.[1]

Here the correspondence between the two brothers was suspended for a time ; but Louis still continued exposed to new vexations on the part of Napoleon. About the end of 1809 the Emperor summoned all the sovereigns who might be called his vassals to Paris. Among the number

[1] Much of the manner in which Napoleon treated occupied countries such as Holland is explained by the spirit of his answer when Beugnot complained to him of the harm done to the Grand Duchy of Berg by the monopoly of tobacco. "It is extraordinary that you should not have discovered the motive that makes me persist in the establishment of the monopoly of tobacco in the Grand Duchy. The question is not about your Grand Duchy but about France. I am very well aware that it is not to your benefit, and that you very possibly lose by it, but what does that signify if it be for the good of France ? I tell you, then, that in every country where there is a monopoly of tobacco, but which is contiguous to one where the sale is free, a regular smuggling infiltration must be reckoned on, supplying the consumption for twenty or twenty-five miles into the country subject to the duty. That is what I intend to preserve France from. You must protect yourselves as well as you can from this infiltration. It is enough for me to drive it back more than twenty or twenty-five miles from my frontier (*Beugnot*, vol. ii. p. 26).

was Louis, who, however, did not show himself very willing to quit his States. He called a council of his Ministers, who were of opinion that for the interest of Holland he ought to make this new sacrifice. He did so with resignation. Indeed, every day passed on the throne was a sacrifice made by Louis.

He lived very quietly in Paris, and was closely watched by the police, for it was supposed that as he had come against his will he would not protract his stay so long as Napoleon wished. The system of espionage under which he found himself placed, added to the other circumstances of his situation, inspired him with a degree of energy of which he was not believed to be capable ; and amidst the general silence of the servants of the Empire, and even of the Kings and Princes assembled in the capital, he ventured to say, "I have been deceived by promises which were never intended to be kept. Holland is tired of being the sport of France." The Emperor, who was unused to such language as this, was highly incensed at it. Louis had now no alternative but to yield to the incessant exactions of Napoleon or to see Holland united to France. He chose the latter, though not before he had exerted all his feeble power in behalf of the subjects whom Napoleon had consigned to him ; but he would not be the accomplice of the man who had resolved to make those subjects the victims of his hatred against England. Who, indeed, could be so blind as not to see that the ruin of the Continent would be the triumph of British commerce?

Louis was, however, permitted to return to his States to contemplate the stagnating effect of the Continental blockade on every branch of trade and industry formerly so active in Holland. Distressed at witnessing evils to which he could apply no remedy, he endeavoured by some prudent remonstrances to avert the utter ruin with which Holland was threatened. On the 23d of March 1810 he wrote the following letter to Napoleon :—

If you wish to consolidate the present state of France, to obtain maritime peace, or to attack England with advantage, those objects are not to be obtained by measures like the blockading system, the destruction of a kingdom raised by yourself, or the enfeebling of your allies, and setting at defiance their most sacred rights and the first principles of the law of nations. You should, on the contrary, win their affections for France, and consolidate and reinforce your allies, making them like your brothers, in whom you may place confidence. The destruction of Holland, far from being the means of assailing England, will serve only to increase her strength, by all the industry and wealth which will fly to her for refuge. There are, in reality, only three ways of assailing England, namely, by detaching Ireland, getting possession of the East Indies, or by invasion. These two latter modes, which would be the most effectual, cannot be executed without naval force. But I am astonished that the first should have been so easily relinquished. That is a more secure mode of obtaining peace on good conditions than the system of injuring ourselves for the sake of committing a greater injury upon the enemy.

(Signed) LOUIS.

Written remonstrances were no more to Napoleon's taste than verbal ones at a time when, as I was informed by my friends whom fortune chained to his destiny, no one presumed to address a word to him except in answer to his questions. Cambacérès, who alone had retained that privilege in public as his old colleague in the Consulate, lost it after Napoleon's marriage with the daughter of Imperial Austria. His brother's letter highly roused his displeasure. Two months after he received it, being on a journey in the north, he replied from Ostend by a letter which cannot be read without a feeling of pain, since it serves to show how weak are the most sacred ties of blood in comparison with the interests of an insatiable policy. This letter was as follows :—

BROTHER—In the situation in which we are placed it is best to speak candidly. I know your secret sentiments, and all that you can say to the contrary can avail nothing. Holland is certainly in a melancholy situation. I believe you are anxious to extricate her from her difficulties: it is you, and you alone, who can do this.

When you conduct yourself in such a way as to induce the people of Holland to believe that you act under my influence, that all your measures and all your sentiments are conformable with mine, then you will be loved, you will be esteemed, and you will acquire the power requisite for re-establishing Holland: when to be my friend, and the friend of France, shall become a title of favour at your court, Holland will be in her natural situation. Since your return from Paris you have done nothing to effect this object. What will be the result of your conduct? Your subjects, bandied about between France and England, will throw themselves into the arms of France, and will demand to be united to her. You know my character, which is to pursue my object unimpeded by any consideration. What, therefore, do you expect me to do? I can dispense with Holland, but Holland cannot dispense with my protection. If, under the dominion of one of my brothers, but looking to me alone for her welfare, she does not find in her sovereign my image, all confidence in your government is at an end; your sceptre is broken. Love France, love my glory—that is the only way to serve Holland: if you had acted as you ought to have done that country, having becoming a part of my Empire, would have been the more dear to me since I had given her a sovereign whom I almost regarded as my son. In placing you on the throne of Holland I thought I had placed a French citizen there. You have followed a course diametrically opposite to what I expected. I have been forced to prohibit you from coming to France, and to take possession of a part of your territory. In proving yourself a bad Frenchman you are less to the Dutch than a Prince of Orange, to whose family they owe their rank as a nation, and a long succession of prosperity and glory. By your banishment from France the Dutch are convinced that they have lost what they would not have lost under a Schimmelpenninck or a Prince of Orange. Prove yourself a Frenchman, and the brother of the Emperor, and be assured that thereby you will serve the interests of Holland. But you seem to be incorrigible, for you would drive away the few Frenchmen who remain with you. You must be dealt with, not by affectionate advice, but by threats and compulsion. What mean the prayers and mysterious fasts you have ordered? Louis, you will not reign long. Your actions disclose better than your confidential letters the sentiments of your mind. Return to the right course. Be a Frenchman in heart, or your people will banish you, and you will leave Holland an object of ridicule.[1]

[1] It was, on the contrary, because Louis made himself a Dutchman that his people *did not* banish him, and that he carried away with him the regret of all that portion

States must be governed by reason and policy, and not by the weakness produced by acrid and vitiated humours.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

A few days after this letter was despatched to Louis, Napoleon heard of a paltry affray which had taken place at Amsterdam, and to which Comte de la Rochefoucauld gave a temporary diplomatic importance, being aware that he could not better please his master than by affording him an excuse for being angry. It appeared that the honour of the Count's coachman had been put in jeopardy by the insult of a citizen of Amsterdam, and a quarrel had ensued, which, but for the interference of the guard of the palace, might have terminated seriously since it assumed the character of a party affair between the French and the Dutch. M. de la Rochefoucauld immediately despatched to the Emperor, who was then at Lille, a full report of his coachman's quarrel, in which he expressed himself with as much earnestness as the illustrious author of the "Maxims" evinced when he waged war against kings. The consequence was that Napoleon instantly fulminated the following letter against his brother Louis :—

BROTHER—At the very moment when you were making the fairest protestations I learn that the servants of my Ambassador have been ill-treated at Amsterdam. I insist that those who were guilty of this outrage be delivered up to me, in order that their punishment may serve as an example to others. The Sieur Serrurier has informed me how you conducted yourself at the diplomatic audiences. I have, consequently, determined that the Dutch Ambassador shall not remain in Paris; and Admiral Verhuell has received orders to depart within twenty-four hours. I want no more phrases and protestations. It is time I should know whether you intend to ruin Holland by your follies. I do not choose that you should again send a Minister to Austria, or that you should dismiss the French who

of his subjects who could appreciate his excellent qualities and possessed good sense enough to perceive that he was not to blame for the evils that weighed upon Holland. —*Bourrienne.* The conduct of Bonaparte to Murat was almost a counterpart to this. When Murat attempted to consult the interests of Naples he was called a traitor to France.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

are in your service. I have recalled my Ambassador as I intend only to have a *chargé d'affaires* in Holland. The Sieur Serrurier, who remains there in that capacity, will communicate my intentions. My Ambassador shall no longer be exposed to your insults. Write to me no more of those set phrases which you have been repeating for the last three years, and the falsehood of which is proved every day.

This is the last letter I will ever write to you as long as I live.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

Thus reduced to the cruel alternative of crushing Holland with his own hands, or leaving that task to the Emperor, Louis did not hesitate to lay down his sceptre. Having formed this resolution, he addressed a message to the Legislative Body of the Kingdom of Holland explaining the motives of his abdication. The French troops entered Holland under the command of the Duke of Reggio, and that marshal, who was more a king than the King himself, threatened to occupy Amsterdam. Louis then descended from his throne, and four years after Napoleon was hurled from his.

In his act of abdication Louis declared that he had been driven to that step by the unhappy state of his Kingdom, which he attributed to his brother's unfavourable feelings towards him. He added that he had made every effort and sacrifice to put an end to that painful state of things, and that, finally, he regarded himself as the cause of the continual misunderstanding between the French Empire and Holland. It is curious that Louis thought he could abdicate the crown of Holland in favour of his son, as Napoleon only four years after wished to abdicate his crown in favour of the King of Rome.

Louis bade farewell to the people of Holland in a proclamation, after the publication of which he repaired to the waters at Tœplitz. There he was living in tranquil retirement when he learned that his brother had united Holland to the Empire. He then published a protest, of which I obtained a copy, though its circulation was

strictly prohibited by the police. In this protest Louis said:—

The constitution of the state guaranteed by the Emperor, my brother, gave me the right of abdicating in favour of my children. That abdication was made in the form and terms prescribed by the constitution. The Emperor had no right to declare war against Holland, and he has not done so.

There is no act, no dissent, no demand of the Dutch nation that can authorise the pretended union.

My abdication does not leave the throne vacant. I have abdicated only in favour of my children.

As that abdication left Holland for twelve years under a regency, that is to say, under the direct influence of the Emperor, according to the terms of the constitution, there was no need of that union for executing every measure he might have in view against trade and against England, since his will was supreme in Holland.

But I ascended the throne without any other conditions except those imposed upon me by my conscience, my duty, and the interest and welfare of my subjects. I therefore declare before God and the independent sovereigns to whom I address myself—

First, That the treaty of the 16th of March 1810, which occasioned the separation of the province of Zealand and Brabant from Holland, was accepted by compulsion, and ratified conditionally by me in Paris, where I was detained against my will; and that, moreover, the treaty was never executed by the Emperor my brother. Instead of 6000 French troops which I was to maintain, according to the terms of the treaty, that number has been more than doubled; instead of occupying only the mouths of the rivers and the coasts, the French custom-houses have encroached into the interior of the country; instead of the interference of France being confined to the measures connected with the blockade of England, Dutch magazines have been seized and Dutch subjects arbitrarily imprisoned; finally, none of the verbal promises have been kept which were made in the Emperor's name by the Duc de Cadore to grant indemnities for the countries ceded by the said treaty and to mitigate its execution, if the King would refer entirely to the Emperor, etc. I declare, in my name, in the name of the nation and my son, the treaty of the 16th of March 1810 to be null and void.

Second, I declare that my abdication was forced by the Emperor, my brother, that it was made only as the last extremity, and on this one condition—that I should maintain the rights of Holland and my children. My abdication could only be made in their favour

Third, In my name, in the name of the King, my son,[1] who is as yet a minor, and in the name of the Dutch nation, I declare the pretended union of Holland to France, mentioned in the decree of the Emperor, my brother, dated the 9th of July last, to be null, void, illegal, unjust, and arbitrary in the eyes of God and man, and that the nation and the minor King will assert their just rights when circumstances permit them.

(Signed) LOUIS.

August 1, 1810.

Thus there seemed to be an end of all intercourse between these two brothers, who were so opposite in character and disposition. But Napoleon, who was enraged that Louis should have presumed to protest, and that in energetic terms, against the union of his Kingdom with the Empire, ordered him to return to France, whither he was summoned in his character of Constable and French Prince. Louis, however, did not think proper to obey this summons, and Napoleon, mindful of his promise of never writing to him again, ordered the following letter to be addressed to him by M. Otto, who had been Ambassador from France to Vienna since the then recent marriage of the Emperor with Maria Louisa :—

SIRE—The Emperor directs me to write to your Majesty as follows :—

"It is the duty of every French Prince, and every member of the Imperial family, to reside in France, whence they cannot absent themselves without the permission of the Emperor. Before the union of Holland to the Empire the Emperor permitted the King to

[1] The eldest son of Louis, one of the fruits of his unhappy marriage with Hortense Beauharnias, the daughter of Josephine, the wife of his brother Napoleon, was little more than six years of age when his father abdicated the crown of Holland in his favour. In 1830-31 this imprudent young man joined the ill-combined mad insurrection in the States of the Pope. He was present in one or two petty skirmishes, and was, we believe, wounded ; but it was a *malaria* fever caught in the unhealthy Campagna of Rome that carried him to the grave in the twenty-seventh year of his age.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition*. The first child of Louis and of Hortense had died in 1807. The second son, Napoléon Louis (1804-1831) in whose favour he abdicated, had been created Grand Duc de Berg et de Clèves by Napoleon in 1809. He married in 1825 Charlotte, the daughter of Joseph Bonaparte, and died in 1831, while engaged in a revolutionary movement in Italy. On his death his younger brother, Charles Louis Napoleon, the future Napoleon III., first came forward as an aspirant.

reside at Tœplitz, in Bohemia. His health appeared to require the use of the waters, but now the Emperor requires that Prince Louis shall return, at the latest by the 1st of December next, under pain of being considered as disobeying the constitution of the Empire and the head of his family, and being treated accordingly."

I fulfil, Sire, word for word the mission with which I have been entrusted, and I send the chief secretary of the embassy to be assured that this letter is rightly delivered. I beg your Majesty to accept the homage of my respect, etc.

(Signed) OTTO.

What a letter was this to be addressed by a subject to a prince and a sovereign! When I afterwards saw M. Otto in Paris, and conversed with him on the subject, he assured me how much he had been distressed at the necessity of writing such a letter to the brother of the Emperor. He had employed the expressions dictated by Napoleon in that irritation which he could never command when his will was opposed.[1]

[1] With regard to Louis and his conduct in Holland Napoleon thus spoke at St. Helena:—

"Louis is not devoid of intelligence, and has a good heart, but even with these qualifications a man may commit many errors, and do a great deal of mischief. Louis is naturally inclined to be capricious and fantastical, and the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau have contributed to increase this disposition. Seeking to obtain a reputation for sensibility and beneficence, incapable by himself of enlarged views, and, at most, competent to local details, Louis acted like a prefect rather than a King.

"No sooner had he arrived in Holland than, fancying that nothing could be finer than to have it said that he was thenceforth a true Dutchman, he attached himself entirely to the party favourable to the English, promoted smuggling, and thus connived with our enemies. It became necessary from that moment to watch over him, and even threaten to wage war against him. Louis then seeking a refuge against the weakness of his disposition in the most stubborn obstinacy, and mistaking a public scandal for an act of glory, fled from his throne, declaiming against me and against my insatiable ambition, my intolerable tyranny, etc. What then remained for me to do? Was I to abandon Holland to our enemies? Ought I to have given it another King? But in that case could I have expected more from him than from my own brother? Did not all the Kings that I created act nearly in the same manner? I therefore united Holland to the Empire, and this act produced a most unfavourable impression in Europe, and contributed not a little to lay the foundation of our misfortunes" (*Mémorial de Sainte Hélène*).

CHAPTER XVIII.

1809.

Demands for contingents from some of the small States of Germany—M. Metternich—Position of Russia with respect to France—Union of Austria and Russia—Return of the English to Spain—Soult King of Portugal, and Murat successor to the Emperor—First levy of the landwehr in Austria—Agents of the *Hamburg Correspondant*—Declaration of Prince Charles—Napoleon's march to Germany—His proclamation—Bernadotte's departure for the army—Napoleon's dislike of Bernadotte—Prince Charles' plan of campaign—The English at Cuxhaven—Fruitlessness of the plots of England—Napoleon wounded—Napoleon's prediction realised—Major Schill—Hamburg threatened and saved—Schill in Lübeck—His death, and destruction of his band—Schill imitated by the Duke of Brunswick-Œls—Departure of the English from Cuxhaven.

Bonaparte, the foundations of whose Empire were his sword and his victories, and who was anxiously looking forward to the time when the sovereigns of Continental Europe should be his *juniors*, applied for contingents of troops from the States to which I was accredited.[1] The Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was to furnish a regiment of 1800 men, and the other little States, such as Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Strelitz, were to furnish regiments of less amount. All Europe was required to rise in arms to second the gigantic projects of the new sovereign. This demand for contingents, and the positive way in which the Emperor insisted upon them, gave rise to an immense correspondence, which, however, was unattended by any result. The notes and orders re-

[1] The contingents required were those the States of the Confederation of the Rhine were bound to furnish; see note on the Confederation, p. 63.

mained in the portfolios, and the contingents stayed at home.[1]

M. Metternich,[2] whose talent has since been so conspicuously displayed, had been for upwards of a year Ambassador from Austria to Paris. Even then he excelled in the art of guiding men's minds, and of turning to the advantage of his policy his external graces and the favour he acquired in the drawing-room. His father, a clever man, brought up in the old diplomatic school of Thugut and Kaunitz, had early accustomed him to the task of making other Governments believe, by means of agents, what might lead them into error and tend to the advantage of his own Government. His manœuvres tended to make Austria assume a discontented and haughty tone; and wishing, as she said, to secure her independence, she publicly declared her intention of protecting herself against any enterprise similar to those of which she had so often been the victim. This language, encouraged by the complete evacuation of Germany, and the war in Spain, the unfortunate issue of which was generally foreseen, was used in time of peace between the two empires, and when France was not threatening war to Austria.

M. Metternich, who had instructions from his Court, gave no satisfactory explanation of those circumstances to

[1] On the contrary some served in Spain for several years, and others participated in the severities of the Russian campaign.

[2] Metternich arrived in Paris as Ambassador on 4th August 1806, after Austria had been vanquished at Austerlitz. It does not seem probable, either from his views or his correspondence, that he advised the rash attempt of Austria to attack Napoleon by herself; compare *Metternich*, tome i. p. 69, on the mistake of Prussia in 1805 and 1806; see also tome ii. p. 221, "To provoke a war with France would be madness" (1st July 1808). On the other hand, the tone of his correspondence in 1808 seems calculated to make Austria believe that war was inevitable, and that her forces, "so inferior to those of France before the insurrection in Spain, will at least be equal to them immediately after that event" (tome ii. p. 308). What is curious is that Metternich's conduct towards Napoleon while Ambassador had led even such men as Duke Dalberg to believe that he was really so well disposed towards Napoleon as to serve his cause more than that of Austria; see *Memoirs of Vitrolles*, tome i. p. 69, where Vitrolles, the first messenger sent from Paris to plead the cause of the Bourbons, is advised to apply to Stadion, not Metternich; see also *Vitrolles*, tome i. p. 91.

Napoleon, who immediately raised a conscription, and brought soldiers from Spain into Germany.

It was necessary, also, to come to an understanding with Russia, who, being engaged with her wars in Finland and Turkey, appeared desirous neither to enter into alliance with Austria nor to afford her support. What, in fact, was the Emperor Alexander's situation with respect to France? He had signed a treaty of peace at Tilsit which he felt had been forced upon him, and he knew that time alone would render it possible for him to take part in a contest which it was evident would again be renewed either with Prussia or Austria.

Every person of common sense must have perceived that Austria, in taking up arms, reckoned, if not on the assistance, at least on the neutrality of Russia. Russia was then engaged with two enemies, the Swedes and the Turks, over whom she hoped to triumph. She therefore rejoiced to see France again engage in a struggle with Austria, and there was no doubt that she would take advantage of any chances favourable to the latter power to join her in opposing the encroachments of France. I never could conceive how, under those circumstances, Napoleon could be so blind as to expect assistance from Russia in his quarrel with Austria. He must, indeed, have been greatly deceived as to the footing on which the two Courts stood with reference to each other—their friendly footing and their mutual agreement to oppose the overgrowing ambition of their common enemy.

The English, who had been compelled to quit Spain, now returned there. They landed in Portugal, which might be almost regarded as their own colony, and marched against Marshal Soult, who left Spain to meet them. Any other man than Soult would perhaps have been embarrassed by the obstacles which he had to surmount. A great deal has been said about his wish to make himself King of Portugal. Bernadotte told me,

when he passed through Hamburg, that the matter had been the subject of much conversation at headquarters after the battle of Wagram. Bernadotte placed no faith in the report, and I am pretty sure that Napoleon also disbelieved it. However, this matter is still involved in the obscurity from which it will only be drawn when some person acquainted with the intrigue shall give a full explanation of it.[1]

Since I have, with reference to Soult, touched upon the subject of his supposed ambition, I will mention here what I know of Murat's expectation of succeeding the Emperor. When Romanzow returned from his useless mission of mediation to London the Emperor proceeded to Bayonne. Bernadotte, who had an agent in Paris whom he paid

[1] On the rather obscure and complicated subject of Soult's conduct in this matter see *Thiers*, tome xi. p. 70, and *Lanfrey*, tome v. p. 93. Soult was dreaming of being made King of Portugal at the request of the Portuguese; some of his officers were watching his conduct, prepared to seize him if he showed any sign of defection, while others had entered into a treacherous correspondence with the English. But Soult's own behaviour is quite consistent with loyalty: the elevation of Murat to a throne had opened a wide range of ambition to the Marshals. Metternich (tome ii. p. 463) said to Napoleon in 1810, when the choice of Bernadotte for Sweden was in question: "Your Majesty will soon be obliged to have one of them (the Marshals) shot, in order to moderate the lofty ideas of the rest." Napoleon treated the matter lightly, writing to Soult that he "only remembered Austerlitz" (*Savary*, tome iv. p. 200), but the whole matter seems to show that there must have been some truth in the reports of the existence of Republican conspiracies in the French army. The plan of Argenton, the officer who communicated with Wellington, was to let Soult proclaim himself King; the army would then revolt, not only against him but against Napoleon. This example being followed by the whole army in Spain, "the old army of the Republic and of the Empire, remembering what it had been, would be seen to abandon the Peninsula and retire to the Pyrenees, proclaiming the deliverance of France and of Europe." The plot of Malet in 1812 also points in the same direction. Meneval (tome iii. p. 73), however, denies the account of these conspiracies given by Nodier (in his *Histoire des Sociétés Secrètes de l'Armée et des Conspirations Militaires contre Bonaparte:* London, Longman, 1815); indeed Nodier is too imaginative a writer to be much trusted; see *Merlet*, tome ii. p. 72–94. Metternich (tome iii. p. 667), apparently not speaking specially of the army, says: "It was under the Empire, and as a consequence of the expurgations made by Bonaparte in the administrations that the secret societies began to be reconstituted. Strong of will, Bonaparte calculated that instead of employing useless efforts to hinder their reorganisation it would be easier for him to restrain them by subjecting them to a severe control, and even making them subserve his designs. Hence, while covering them with ridicule he managed to establish an active police in the associations which seemed to him susceptible of being guided; towards all the others, on the contrary, he displayed an inflexible severity."

SOULT.

DUC DE DALMATIE

highly, told me one day that he had received a despatch informing him that Murat entertained the idea of one day succeeding the Emperor. Sycophants, expecting to derive advantage from it, encouraged Murat in this chimerical hope. I know not whether Napoleon was acquainted with this circumstance, nor what he said of it, but Bernadotte spoke of it to me as a certain fact. It would, however, have been very wrong to attach great importance to an expression which, perhaps, escaped Murat in a moment of ardour, for his natural temperament sometimes betrayed him into acts of imprudence, the result of which, with a man like Napoleon, was always to be dreaded.

It was in the midst of the operations of the Spanish war, which Napoleon directed in person, that he learned Austria had for the first time raised the landwehr. I obtained some very curious documents respecting the armaments of Austria from the Editor of the *Hamburg Correspondant.* This paper, the circulation of which amounted to not less than 60,000, paid considerable sums to persons in different parts of Europe who were able and willing to furnish the current news. The *Correspondant* paid 6000 francs a year to a clerk in the war department at Vienna, and it was this clerk who supplied the intelligence that Austria was preparing for war, and that orders had been issued in all directions to collect and put in motion all the resources of that powerful monarchy. I communicated these particulars to the French Government, and suggested the necessity of increased vigilance and measures of defence. Preceding aggressions, especially that of 1805, were not to be forgotten. Similar information probably reached the French Government from many quarters. Be that as it may, the Emperor consigned the military operations in Spain to his generals, and departed for Paris, where he arrived at the end of January 1809. He had been in Spain only since the beginning of November 1808,[1] and his presence there had

[1] The successes obtained by Napoleon during his stay of about three months in Spain

again rendered our banners victorious. But though the insurgent troops were beaten the inhabitants showed themselves more and more unfavourable to Joseph's cause ; and it did not appear very probable that he could ever seat himself tranquilly on the throne of Madrid.

The Emperor Francis, notwithstanding his counsellors, hesitated about taking the first step ; but at length, yielding to the solicitations of England and the secret intrigues of Russia, and, above all, seduced by the subsidies of Great Britain, Austria declared hostilities, not at first against France, but against her allies of the Confederation of the Rhine. On the 9th of April Prince Charles, who was appointed commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops, addressed a note to the commander-in-chief of the French army in Bavaria, apprising him of the declaration of war.

A courier carried the news of this declaration to Strasburg with the utmost expedition, from whence it was transmitted by telegraph to Paris.[1] The Emperor, sur-

were certainly very great, and mainly resulted from his own masterly genius and lightning-like rapidity. The Spanish armies, as yet unsupported by British troops, were defeated at Gomenal, Espinosa, Reynosa, Tudela, and at the pass of the Somosierra Mountains, and at an early hour of the morning of the 4th December Madrid surrendered. On the 20th of December Bonaparte marched with far superior forces against the unfortunate Sir John Moore, who had been sent to advance into Spain both by the wrong route *and at a wrong time*. On the 29th, from the heights of Benevento, his eyes were delighted by seeing the English in full retreat. But a blow struck him from another quarter, and leaving Soult to follow up Moore he took the road to Paris.

On 16th January 1809 was fought the battle of Corunna, the results of which were the defeat of Soult, the death of the gallant Moore, and the safe embarkation of the British troops. "It excited universal surprise," says Mr. Lockhart, "that the Emperor did not immediately return from Benevento to Madrid to complete and consolidate his Spanish conquest. He, however, proceeded, not towards Madrid, but Paris, and this with his utmost speed, riding with post-horses on one occasion, not less than 75 English miles in five hours and a half, or fourteen miles an hour. The cause of this sudden change of purpose and extraordinary haste was a sufficient one, and it ere long transpired." Anstria had armed, and was on the point of declaring that war which broke out three months later.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition*.

[1] In one of De Quincey's essays a curious incident in connection with the use of the semaphore telegraphs is described. A ship had arrived at Plymouth or Portsmouth with despatches from Lord Wellington, and important news from the Peninsula. This was being transmitted in an epitomised form to London when a dense

prised but not disconcerted by this intelligence, received it at St. Cloud on the 11th of April, and two hours after he was on the road to Germany.[1] The complexity of affairs in which he was then involved seemed to give a new impulse to his activity. When he reached the army neither his troops nor his Guard had been able to come up, and under those circumstances he placed himself at the head of the Bavarian troops, and, as it were, adopted the soldiers of Maximilian. Six days after his departure from Paris the army of Prince Charles, which had passed the Inn, was threatened. The Emperor's headquarters were at Donawwerth, and from thence he addressed to his soldiers one of those energetic and concise proclamations which made them perform so many prodigies, and which was soon circulated in every language by the public journals. This complication of events could not but be fatal to Europe and France, whatever might be its result, but it presented an opportunity favourable to the development of the Emperor's genius. Like his favourite poet Ossian, who loved best to touch his lyre midst the howlings of the tempest, Napoleon required political tempests for the display of his abilities.[2]

During the campaign of 1809, and particularly at its

fog came on and interrupted, until the following morning, the transmission of the message. The words "*Wellington defeated*——" had been telegraphed to London, and the temporary ending of the message at this point gave rise to the greatest excitement in the Metropolis until the completion of the sentence, "*the French at Salamanca*," arrived the next morning, when the fog had cleared off.

[1] Jomini (tome iii. p. 158), saying that Napoleon on 12th, not 11th, April received the news of the Anstrians having crossed the Inn on 10th April, remarks on the wise foresight by which the Emperor had established a line of telegraph stations (signal-posts) throughout Germany. Thiers (tome x. p. 121) takes the same date, 12th April. Metternich (tome ii. p. 351), who was then in Paris, says 3 A.M. 13th April. For the extraordinary folly of the Anstrians in wasting time in bringing their army on to the Inn, instead of debouching from Bohemia, thus tripling their march, see Jomini (tome iii. p. 153), who attributes Napoleon's safety to this error.

[2] Joseph Bonaparte denies that Ossian was the favourite poet of Napoleon, saying that he admired much more the great French and Italian poets, Homer, Virgil, Lucan, etc. (*Erreurs*, tome ii. p. 173). But perhaps the difference between the two statements may be attributable to the fact that Bourrienne left Napoleon comparatively early in his career, and we know that Napoleon progressed in his literary education. See *Sainte Beuve*, tome i. p. 287, already quoted.

commencement, Napoleon's course was even more rapid than it had been in the campaign of 1805.[1] Every courier who arrived at Hamburg brought us news, or rather prodigies. As soon as the Emperor was informed of the attack made by the Austrians upon Bavaria orders were despatched to all the generals having troops under their command to proceed with all speed to the theatre of the war. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo was summoned to join the Grand Army with the Saxon troops under his command and for the time he resigned the government of the Hanse Towns. Colonel Damas succeeded him at Hamburg during that period, but merely as commandant of the fortress, and he never gave rise to any murmur or complaint. Bernadotte was not satisfied with his situation, and indeed the Emperor, who was never much disposed to bring him forward, because he could not forgive him for his opposition on the 18th Brumaire, always appointed him to posts in which but little glory was to be acquired, and placed as few troops as possible under his command.

It required all the promptitude of the Emperor's march upon Vienna to defeat the plots which were brewing against his government, for in the event of his arms being unsuccessful, the blow was ready to be struck.[2] The English force in the north of Germany amounted to about 10,000 men. The Archduke Charles had formed the project of concentrating in the middle of Germany a large body of troops, consisting of the corps of General Am

[1] The Archduke John defeated Eugène Beauharnais, then Viceroy of Italy, and took possession of Padua, Vicenza, and other cities, but, in consequence of Bonaparte's victories in Germany, he was obliged to retrace his steps, and being followed up by the reinforced Beauharnais into Hungary, he was defeated in a great battle near the town of Raab.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

[2] The French agents in Germany had an anxious time, while the Grand Army was cooped up in the island of Lobau, between the battle of Essling and that of Wagram. "Every State, even Denmark, assumed a hostile attitude. . . . If at this critical moment, between the battle of Essling and Wagram, Russia had made one sign, no one can tell what would have happened" (*Beugnot*, vol i. p. 302).

Eude, of General Radizwowitz, and of the English, with whom were to be joined the people who were expected to revolt. The English would have wished the Austrian troops to advance a little farther. The English agent made some representations on this subject to M. Stadion, the Austrian Minister; but the Archduke preferred making a diversion to committing the safety of the monarchy by departing from his present inactivity and risking the passage of the Danube, in the face of an enemy who never suffered himself to be surprised, and who had calculated every possible event. In concerting his plan the Archduke expected that the Czar would either detach a strong force to assist his allies, or that he would abandon them to their own defence. In the first case the Archduke would have had a great superiority, and in the second, all was prepared in Hesse and in Hanover to rise on the approach of the Austrian and English armies.

At the commencement of July the English advanced upon Cuxhaven with a dozen small ships of war. They landed 400 or 500 sailors and about 50 marines, and planted a standard on one of the outworks. The day after this landing at Cuxhaven the English, who were in Denmark evacuated Copenhagen, after destroying a battery which they had erected there. All the schemes of England were fruitless on the Continent, for with the Emperor's new system of war, which consisted in making a push on the capitals, he soon obtained negotiations for peace. He was master of Vienna before England had even organised the expedition to which I have just alluded. He left Paris on the 11th of April, was at Donawwerth on the 17th, and on the 23d he was master of Ratisbon. In the engagement which preceded his entrance into that town Napoleon received a slight wound in the heel.[1] He

[1] There was a curious belief among the English in Napoleon's time that he had never been wounded, and indeed that he carefully, if not cowardly, refrained from exposing himself. Of the incident referred to by Bourrienne, Meneval (tome i. p. 192) says, "The Emperor was sitting in a place from whence he could watch the

nevertheless remained on the field of battle. It was also between Donawwerth and Ratisbon that Davoust, by a bold manœuvre, gained and merited the title of Prince of Eckmuhl.[1]

At this period fortune was not only bent on favouring Napoleon's arms, but she seemed to take pleasure in realising even his boasting predictions; for the French troops entered Vienna within a month after a proclamation issued by Napoleon at Ratisbon, in which he said he would be master of the Austrian capital in that time.

But while he was thus marching from triumph to triumph the people of Hamburg and the neighbouring countries had a neighbour who did not leave them altogether without inquietude. The famous Prussian parti-

attack on the town of Ratisbon. He was striking the ground with his whip when a ball, believed to have come from a Tyrolean carbine, struck him on the big toe. The report of this wound spread rapidly from rank to rank, and he was obliged to get on horseback to show himself to the troops. Though his boot was not penetrated the wound was very painful; still he put a good face on it. Nature, however, claimed her rights. When after this short ride he entered a little house, some musket-shots off the place where he had been wounded, his courage was exhausted, and he fainted right off. This wound, happily, had not bad results." As for his courage, Metternich (tome i. p. 279) has some very sensible remarks on the absence of any necessity for his exposing himself. "The history of his campaigns suffices to prove that he was always at the place, dangerous or not, which was proper for the head of a great army." This place, however, was sometimes dangerous enough. At the battle of Wagram, says Savary (tome iv. p. 174), "I do not know what was in the Emperor's head, but he remained a good hour in this angle, which was regularly swept by bullets. The soldiers were stationary, and became demoralised. The Emperor knew better than any one that this situation could not last long, and he did not wish to go away, as he could remedy disorders. At the moment of greatest danger he rode along the front of the line of troops on a horse white as snow. This horse was called Euphrates, and had been given to him by the Sophi of Persia. . . . I expected to see him fall at every moment." Napoleon besides exposing himself freely when necessary to danger, as at Lodi or Arcola, was also, for a man in his position, very indifferent to precautions for his safety. On two occasions he was surrounded by Cossacks, and in imminent danger of his life, not being recognised by them, once at Malo Jaroslawitz in 1812, and once in France in 1814. See also footnote to vol. ii. p. 282.

After his death "the inspection of his body revealed several wounds, some very slight, and three very distinct. Of these three, the first was on the head, the second on the fourth finger of the left hand, the third on the left thigh. This last one was very deep, and was caused by a bayonet stab received at Toulon: it is the only one whose origin can be historically fixed (*Thiers*, tome xx. p. 708).

[1] The great battle of Eckmuhl, where 100,000 Austrians were driven from all their positions, was fought on the 22d of April.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

san, Major Schill, after pursuing his system of plunder in Westphalia, came and threw himself into Mecklenburg, whence, I understood, it was his intention to surprise Hamburg. At the head of 600 well-mounted hussars and between 1500 and 2000 infantry badly armed, he took possession of the little fort of Domitz, in Mecklenburg, on the 15th of May, from whence he despatched parties who levied contributions on both banks of the Elbe. Schill inspired terror wherever he went. On the 19th of May a detachment of 30 men belonging to Schill's corps entered Wismar. It was commanded by Count Moleke, who had formerly been in the Prussian service, and who had retired to his estate in Mecklenburg, where the Duke had kindly given him an appointment. Forgetting his duty to his benefactor, he sent to summon the Duke to surrender Stralsund.

Alarmed at the progress of the partisan Schill, the Duke of Mecklenburg and his Court quitted Ludwigsburg, their regular residence, and retired to Doberan, on the sea-coast. On quitting Mecklenburg Schill advanced to Bergdorf, four leagues from Hamburg. The alarm then increased in that city. A few of the inhabitants talked of making a compromise with Schill and sending him money to get him away. But the firmness of the majority imposed silence on this timid council. I consulted with the commandant of the town, and we determined to adopt measures of precaution. The custom-house chest, in which there was more than a million of gold, was sent to Holstein under a strong escort. At the same time I sent to Schill a clever spy, who gave him a most alarming account of the means of defence which Hamburg possessed. Schill accordingly gave up his designs on that city, and leaving it on his left, entered Lübeck, which was undefended.

Meanwhile Lieutenant-General Gratien, who had left Berlin by order of the Prince de Neufchâtel, with 2500

Dutch and 3000 Swedish troops, actively pursued Schill, and tranquillity was soon restored throughout all the neighbouring country, which had been greatly agitated by his bold enterprise. Schill, after wandering for some days on the shores of the Baltic, was overtaken by General Gratien at Stralsund, whence he was about to embark for Sweden. He made a desperate defence, and was killed after a conflict of two hours. His band was destroyed.[1] Three hundred of his hussars and 200 infantry, who had effected their escape, asked leave to return to Prussia, and they were conducted to the Prussian general commanding a neighbouring town. A war of plunder like that carried on by Schill could not be honourably acknowledged by a power having any claim to respect. Yet the English Government sent Schill a colonel's commission, and the full uniform of his new rank, with the assurance that all his troops should thenceforth be paid by England.

Schill soon had an imitator of exalted rank. In August 1809 the Duke of Brunswick-Œls sought the dangerous honour of succeeding that famous partisan. At the head of at most 2000 men he for some days disturbed the left bank of the Elbe, and on the 5th entered Bremen. On his approach the French Vice-Consul retired to Osterhulz. One of the Duke's officers presented himself at the house of the Vice-Consul and demanded 200 louis. The agent of the Vice-Consul, alarmed at the threat of the place being given up to pillage, capitulated with the officer, and with considerable difficulty got rid of him at the sacrifice of 80 louis, for which a receipt was presented to him in the name of the Duke. The Duke, who now went by the name of "the new Schill," did not remain long in Bremen.

[1] The Baron Seruzier in his *Memoirs* (Paris, Anselin), pp. 97-112, says that he was charged by General St. Hilaire to follow up Schill, whom he caught in Stralsund, when, to use his own words, "all the troop of Schill was then massacred—a half-hour of combat sufficed." Schill himself was killed by one of Seruzier's corporals, Beckmann, sent into the town before the attack in disguise. This last statement may explain the rumour mentioned by Jomini (tome iii. p. 235), that Schill was killed by his own men.

Wishing to repair with all possible speed to Holland he left Bremen on the evening of the 6th, and proceeded to Delmenhorst, where his advanced guard had already arrived. The Westphalian troops, commanded by Reubell, entered Bremen on the 7th, and not finding the Duke of Brunswick, immediately marched in pursuit of him. The Danish troops, who occupied Cuxhaven, received orders to proceed to Bremerlehe, to favour the operations of the Westphalians and the Dutch. Meanwhile the English approached Cuxhaven, where they landed 3000 or 4000 men. The persons in charge of the custom-house establishment, and the few sailors who were in Cuxhaven, fell back upon Hamburg. The Duke of Brunswick, still pursued crossed Germany from the frontiers of Bohemia to Elsfleth, a little port on the left bank of the Weser, where he arrived on the 7th, being one day in advance of his pursuers. He immediately took possession of all the transports at Elsfleth, and embarked for Heligoland.

The landing which the English effected at Cuxhaven while the Danes, who garrisoned that port, were occupied in pursuing the Duke of Brunswick, was attended by no result. After the escape of the Duke the Danes returned to their post, which the English immediately evacuated.

CHAPTER XIX.

1809.

The castle of Diernstein—Richard Cœur de Lion and Marshal Lannes—The Emperor at the gates of Vienna—The Archduchess Maria Louisa—Facility of correspondence with England—Smuggling in Hamburg—Brown sugar and sand—Hearses filled with sugar and coffee—Embargo on the publication of news—Supervision of the *Hamburg Correspondant*—Festival of Saint Napoleon—Ecclesiastical adulation—The King of Westphalia's journey through his States—Attempt to raise a loan—Jerôme's present to me—The present returned—Bonaparte's unfounded suspicions.

Rapp, who during the campaign of Vienna had resumed his duties as *aide de camp*, related to me one of those observations of Napoleon which, when his words are compared with the events that followed them, seem to indicate a foresight into his future destiny. When within some days' march of Vienna the Emperor procured a guide to explain to him every village and ruin which he observed on the road. The guide pointed to an eminence on which were a few decayed vestiges of an old fortified castle. "Those," said the guide, "are the ruins of the castle of Diernstein." Napoleon suddenly stopped, and stood for some time silently contemplating the ruins, then turning to Lannes, who was with him, he said, "See! yonder is the prison of Richard Cœur de Lion. He, like us, went to Syria and Palestine. But, my brave Lannes, the Cœur de Lion was not braver than you. He was more fortunate than I at St. Jean d'Acre. A Duke of Austria sold him to an Emperor of Germany, who imprisoned him in that castle. Those were the days of barbarism. How different

from the civilisation of modern times! Europe has seen how I treated the Emperor of Austria, whom I might have made prisoner—and I would treat him so again. I claim no credit for this. In the present age crowned heads must be respected. A conqueror imprisoned!"

A few days after the Emperor was at the gates of Vienna, but on this occasion his access to the Austrian capital was not so easy as it had been rendered in 1805 by the ingenuity and courage of Lannes and Murat. The Archduke Maximilian, who was shut up in the capital, wished to defend it, although the French army already occupied the principal suburbs. In vain were flags of truce sent one after the other to the Archduke. They were not only dismissed unheard, but were even ill-treated, and one of them was almost killed by the populace. The city was then bombarded, and would speedily have been destroyed but that the Emperor, being informed that one of the Archduchesses remained in Vienna on account of ill-health, ordered the firing to cease. By a singular caprice of Napoleon's destiny this Archduchess was no other than Maria Louisa. Vienna at length opened her gates to Napoleon, who for some days took up his residence at Schœnbrunn.

The Emperor was engaged in so many projects at once that they could not all succeed. Thus, while he was triumphant in the Hereditary States his Continental system was experiencing severe checks. The trade with England on the coast of Oldenburg was carried on as uninterruptedly as if in time of peace. English letters and newspapers arrived on the Continent, and those of the Continent found their way into Great Britain, as if France and England had been united by ties of the firmest friendship. In short, things were just in the same state as if the decree for the blockade of the British Isles had not existed. When the custom-house officers succeeded in seizing contraband goods they were again taken from

them by main force. On the 2d of July a serious contest took place at Brinskham between the custom-house officers and a party of peasantry, in which the latter remained masters of eighteen wagons laden with English goods: many were wounded on both sides.

If, however, trade with England was carried on freely along a vast extent of coast, it was different in the city of Hamburg, where English goods were introduced only by fraud; and I verily believe that the art of smuggling and the schemes of smugglers were never before carried to such perfection. Above 6000 persons of the lower orders went backward and forwards, about twenty times a day, from Altona to Hamburg, and they carried on their contraband trade by many ingenious stratagems, two of which were so curious that they are worth mentioning here.

On the left of the road leading from Hamburg to Altona there was a piece of ground where pits were dug for the purpose of procuring sand used for building and for laying down in the streets. At this time it was proposed to repair the great street of Hamburg leading to the gate of Altona. The smugglers overnight filled the sand-pit with brown sugar, and the little carts which usually conveyed the sand into Hamburg were filled with the sugar, care being taken to cover it with a layer of sand about an inch thick. This trick was carried on for a length of time, but no progress was made in repairing the street. I complained greatly of the delay, even before I was aware of its cause, for the street led to a country-house I had near Altona, whither I went daily. The officers of the customs at length perceived that the work did not proceed, and one fine morning the sugar-carts were stopped and seized. Another expedient was then to be devised.

Between Hamburg and Altona there was a little suburb situated on the right bank of the Elbe. This suburb was inhabited by sailors, labourers of the port, and land-

owners. The inhabitants were interred in the cemetery of Hamburg. It was observed that funeral processions passed this way more frequently than usual. The custom-house officers, amazed at the sudden mortality of the worthy inhabitants of the little suburb, insisted on searching one of the vehicles, and on opening the hearse it was found to be filled with sugar, coffee, vanilla, indigo, etc. It was necessary to abandon this expedient, but others were soon discovered.

Bonaparte was sensitive, in an extraordinary degree, to all that was said and thought of him, and Heaven knows how many despatches I received from headquarters during the campaign of Vienna directing me not only to watch the vigilant execution of the custom-house laws, but to lay an embargo on a thing which alarmed him more than the introduction of British merchandise, viz. the publication of news. In conformity with these reiterated instructions I directed especial attention to the management of the *Correspondant*. The importance of this journal, with its 60,000 readers, may easily be perceived. I procured the insertion of everything I thought desirable: all the bulletins, proclamations, acts of the French Government, notes of the *Moniteur*, and the semi-official articles of the French journals: these were all given *in extenso*. On the other hand, I often suppressed adverse news, which, though well known, would have received additional weight from its insertion in so widely circulated a paper. If by chance there crept in some Austrian bulletin, extracted from the other German papers published in the States of the Confederation of the Rhine, there was always given with it a suitable antidote to destroy, or at least to mitigate, its ill effect. But this was not all. The King of Würtemberg having reproached the *Correspondant*, in a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with publishing whatever Austria wished should be made known, and being conducted in a spirit hostile to the

good cause, I answered these unjust reproaches by making the Syndic censor prohibit the Hamburg papers from inserting *any* Austrian order of the day, *any* Archduke's bulletins, *any* letter from Prague; in short, anything which should be copied from the other German journals unless those articles had been inserted in the French journals.

My recollections of the year 1809 at Hamburg carry me back to the celebration of Napoleon's *fête,* which was on the 15th of August, for he had interpolated his patron saint in the Imperial calendar at the date of his birth. The coincidence of this festival with the Assumption gave rise to adulatory rodomontades of the most absurd description. Certainly the Episcopal circulars under the Empire would form a curious collection.[1] Could anything be more revolting than the sycophancy of those Churchmen who declared that "God chose Napoleon for his representative upon earth, and that God created Bonaparte, and then rested; that he was more fortunate than Augustus, more virtuous than Trajan; that he deserved altars and temples to be raised to him!" etc.

Some time after the Festival of St. Napoleon the King of Westphalia made a journey through his States. Of all Napoleon's brothers the King of Westphalia was the one with whom I was least acquainted, and he, it is pretty well known, was the most worthless of the family. His correspondence with me is limited to two letters, one of which he wrote while he commanded the *Épervier,* and another seven years after, dated 6th September 1809. In this latter he said: "*I shall be in Hanover on the* 10*th.*

[1] It will perhaps scarcely be believed that the following words were actually delivered from the pulpit: "God in his mercy has chosen Napoleon to be his representative on earth. The Queen of Heaven has marked, by the most magnificent of presents, the anniversary of the day which witnessed his glorious entrance into her domains. Heavenly Virgin! as a special testimony of your love for the French, and your all-powerful influence with your son, you have connected the first of your solemnities with the birth of the great Napoleon. Heaven ordained that the hero should spring from your sepulchre."—*Bourrienne.*

If you can make it convenient to come there and spend a day with me it will give me great pleasure. I shall then be able to smooth all obstacles to the loan I wish to contract in the Hanse Towns. I flatter myself you will do all in your power to forward that object, which at the present crisis is very important to my States. More than ample security is offered, but the money will be of no use to me if I cannot have it at least for two years." Jerôme wanted to contract at Hamburg a loan of 3,000,000 francs. However, the people did not seem to think like his Westphalian Majesty, that the contract presented *more than ample security.* No one was found willing to draw his purse-strings, and the loan was never raised.

Though I would not, without the Emperor's authority, exert the influence of my situation to further the success of Jerôme's negotiation, yet I did my best to assist him. I succeeded in prevailing on the Senate to advance one loan of 100,000 francs to pay a portion of the arrears due to his troops, and a second of 200,000 francs to provide clothing for his army, etc. This scanty supply will cease to be wondered at when it is considered to what a state of desolation the whole of Germany was reduced at the time, as much in the allied States as in those of the enemies of France. I learnt at the time that the King of Bavaria said to an officer of the Emperor's household in whom he had great confidence, "If this continues we shall have to give up, and put the key under the door." These were his very words.

As for Jerôme, he returned to Cassel quite disheartened at the unsuccessful issue of his loan. Some days after his return to his capital I received from him a snuff-box with his portrait set in diamonds, accompanied by a letter of thanks for the service I had rendered him. I never imagined that a token of remembrance from a crowned head could possibly be declined. Napoleon, however, thought otherwise. I had not, it is true, written

to acquaint our Government with the King of Westphalia's loan, but in a letter, which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 22d of September, I mentioned the present Jerôme had sent me. Why Napoleon should have been offended at this I know not, but I received orders to return Jerôme's present immediately, and these orders were acompanied with bitter reproaches for my having accepted it without the Emperor's authority. I sent back the diamonds, but kept the portrait. Knowing Bonaparte's distrustful disposition, I thought he must have suspected that Jerôme had employed threats, or at any rate, that he had used some illegal influence to facilitate the success of his loan. At last, after much correspondence, Napoleon saw clearly that everything was perfectly regular ; in a word, that the business had been transacted as between two private persons. As to the 300,000 francs which the Senate had lent to Jerôme, the fact is, that but little scruple was made about it, for this simple reason, that it was the means of removing from Hamburg the Westphalian division, whose presence occasioned a much greater expense than the loan.[1]

[1] Joseph Bonaparte here remarks that this shows that Napoleon treated his brothers as independent sovereigns, and that Bourrienne ought to have known that he had no right to accept such a present without the permission of the Emperor (*Erreurs*, tome ii. p. 175).

CHAPTER XX.

1809.

Visit to the field of Wagram—Marshal Macdonald—Union of the Papal States with the Empire—The battle of Talavera—Sir Arthur Wellesley—English expedition to Holland—Attempt to assassinate the Emperor at Schœnbrunn—Staps interrogated by Napoleon—Pardon offered and rejected—Fanaticism and patriotism—Corvisart's examination of Staps—Second interrogatory—Tirade against the illuminati—Accusation of the Courts of Berlin and Weimar—Firmness and resignation of Staps—Particulars respecting his death—Influence of the attempt of Staps on the conclusion of peace—M. de Champagny.

Napoleon went to inspect all the corps of his army and the field of Wagram, which a short time before had been the scene of one of those great battles in which victory was the more glorious in proportion as it had been valiantly contested.[1] On that day the type of French honour, Macdonald, who, after achieving a succession of prodigies, led the army of Italy into the heart of the Austrian States, was made a marshal on the field of battle. Napoleon said to him, "With us it is for life and for death." The general opinion was that the elevation of Macdonald added less to the marshal's military reputation than it redounded to the honour of the Emperor. Five days after the bombardment of Vienna, namely, on the 17th of May, the Emperor had published a decree, by virtue of which the Papal States were united to the French Em-

[1] The great battle of Wagram was fought on the 6th of July 1809. The Austrians, who committed a mistake in over-extending their line, lost 20,000 men as prisoners, besides a large number in killed and wounded. There was no day, perhaps, on which Napoleon showed more military genius or more personal courage. He was in the hottest of the fight, and for a long time exposed to showers of grape-shot.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

pire, and Rome was declared an Imperial City. I will not stop to inquire whether this was good or bad in point of policy, but it was a mean usurpation on the part of Napoleon, for the time was passed when a Julius II. laid down the keys of St. Peter and took up the sword of St. Paul. It was, besides, an injustice, and, considering the Pope's condescension to Napoleon, an act of ingratitude. The decree of union did not deprive the Pope of his residence, but he was only the First Bishop of Christendom, with a revenue of 2,000,000.

Napoleon while at Vienna heard of the affair of Talavera de la Reyna. I was informed, by a letter from headquarters, that he was much affected at the news, and did not conceal his vexation. I verily believe that he was bent on the conquest of Spain, precisely on account of the difficulties he had to surmount. At Talavera commenced the celebrity of a man who, perhaps, would not have been without some glory even if pains had not been taken to build him up a great reputation. That battle commenced the career of Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose after-success, however, has been attended by such important consequences.[1] Whilst we experienced this check in Spain the English were attempting an expedition to Holland, where they had already made themselves masters of Walcheren. It is true they were obliged to evacuate it shortly after; but as at that time the French and Austrian armies were in a state of inaction, in consequence of the armistice concluded at Znaim, in Moravia, the news unfavourable to Napoleon had the effect of raising the hopes of the Austrian negotiators, who paused in the expectation that fresh defeats would afford them better chances.

It was during these negotiations, the termination of which seemed every day to be farther distant, that Napoleon was exposed to a more real danger than the wound

[1] The battle of Talavera took place on the 28th of July, twenty-two days after the fatal defeat of the Austrians at Wagram.

he had received at Ratisbon. Germany was suffering under a degree of distress difficult to be described. Illuminism was making great progress, and had filled some youthful minds with an enthusiasm not less violent than the religious fanaticism to which Henry IV. fell a victim. A young man formed the design of assassinating Napoleon in order to rid Germany of one whom he considered her scourge. Rapp and Berthier were with the Emperor when the assassin was arrested, and in relating what I heard from them I feel assured that I am giving the most faithful account of all the circumstances connected with the event.

"We were at Schœnbrunn," said Rapp, "when the Emperor had just reviewed the troops. I observed a young man at the extremity of one of the columns just as the troops were about to defile. He advanced towards the Emperor, who was then between Berthier and me. The Prince de Neufchâtel, thinking he wanted to present a petition, went forward to tell him that I was the person to receive it as I was the *aide de camp* for the day. The young man replied that he wished to speak with Napoleon himself, and Berthier again told him that he must apply to me. He withdrew a little, still repeating that he wanted to speak with Napoleon. He again advanced and came very near the Emperor; I desired him to fall back, telling him in German to wait till after the parade, when, if he had anything to say, it would be attended to. I surveyed him attentively, for I began to think his conduct suspicious. I observed that he kept his right hand in the breast pocket of his coat; out of which a piece of paper appeared. I know not how it was, but at that moment my eyes met his, and I was struck with his peculiar look and air of fixed determination. Seeing an officer of gendarmerie on the spot, I desired him to seize the young man, but without treating him with any severity, and to convey him to the castle until the parade was ended.

All this passed in less time than I have taken to tell it, and as every one's attention was fixed on the parade the scene passed unnoticed. I was shortly afterwards told that a large carving-knife had been found on the young man, whose name was Staps. I immediately went to find Duroc, and we proceeded together to the apartment to which Staps had been taken. We found him sitting on a bed, apparently in deep thought, but betraying no symptoms of fear. He had beside him the portrait of a young female, his pocket-book, and purse containing only two pieces of gold. I asked him his name, but he replied that he would tell it to no one but Napoleon. I then asked him what he intended to do with the knife which had been found upon him? But he answered again, 'I shall tell only Napoleon.'—'Did you mean to attempt his life?'—'Yes.'—'Why?'—'I can tell none but Napoleon.'

"This appeared to me so strange that I thought right to inform the Emperor of it. When I told him what had passed he appeared a little agitated, for you know how he was haunted with the idea of assassination. He desired that the young man should be taken into his cabinet, whither he was accordingly conducted by two *gens d'armes.* Notwithstanding his criminal intention there was something exceedingly prepossessing in his countenance. I wished that he would deny the attempt; but how was it possible to save a man who was determined to sacrifice himself? The Emperor asked Staps whether he could speak French, and he answered that he could speak it very imperfectly, and as you know (continued Rapp) that next to you I am the best German scholar in Napoleon's Court, I was appointed interpreter on this occasion. The Emperor put the following questions to Staps, which I translated, together with the answers:—

"'Where do you come from?'—'From Narremburgh.'—'What is your father?'—'A Protestant minister.'—'How old are you?'—'Eighteen.'—'What did you intend to do

with your knife?'—'To kill you.'—'You are mad, young man; you are one of the illuminati?'—'I am not mad; I know not what is meant by the illuminati!'—'You are ill, then?'—'I am not; I am very well.'—'Why did you wish to kill me?'—'Because you have ruined my country.'—'Have I done you any harm?'—'Yes, you have harmed me as well as all Germans.'—'By whom were you sent? Who urged you to this crime?'—'No one; I was urged to it by the sincere conviction that by killing you I should render the greatest service to my country.'—'Is this the first time you have seen me?'—'I saw you at Erfurt, at the time of your interview with the Emperor of Russia.'—'Did you intend to kill me then?'—'No; I thought you would not again wage war against Germany. I was one of your greatest admirers.'—'How long have you been in Vienna?'—'Ten days.'—'Why did you wait so long before you attempted the execution of your project?'—'I came to Schœnbrunn a week ago with the intention of killing you, but when I arrived the parade was just over; I therefore deferred the execution of my design till to-day.'—'I tell you, young man, you are either mad or in bad health.'

"The Emperor here ordered Corvisart to be sent for. Staps asked who Corvisart was? I told him that he was a physician. He then said, 'I have no need of him.' Nothing further was said until the arrival of the doctor, and during this interval Staps evinced the utmost indifference. When Corvisart arrived Napoleon directed him to feel the young man's pulse, which he immediately did; and Staps then very coolly said, 'Am I not well, sir?' Corvisart told the Emperor that nothing ailed him. 'I told you so,' said Staps, pronouncing the words with an air of triumph.

"I was really astonished at the coolness and apathy of Staps, and the Emperor seemed for a moment confounded by the young man's behaviour. After a few moments'

pause the Emperor resumed the interrogatory as follows:—

"'Your brain is disordered. You will be the ruin of your family. I will grant you your life if you ask pardon for the crime you meditated, and for which you ought to be sorry.'—'I want no pardon. I only regret having failed in my attempt.'—'Indeed! then a crime is nothing to you?'—'To kill you is no crime: it is a duty.'—'Whose portrait is that which was found on you?'—'It is the portrait of a young lady to whom I am attached.'—'She will doubtless be much distressed at your adventure?'—'She will only be sorry that I have not succeeded. She abhors you as much as I do.'—'But if I were to pardon you would you be grateful for my mercy?'—'I would nevertheless kill you if I could.'

"I never," continued Rapp, "saw Napoleon look so confounded. The replies of Staps and his immovable resolution perfectly astonished him. He ordered the prisoner to be removed; and when he was gone Napoleon said, 'This is the result of the secret societies which infest Germany. This is the effect of fine principles and the light of reason. They make young men assassins. But what can be done against illuminism? A sect cannot be destroyed by cannon-balls.'

"This event, though pains were taken to keep it secret, became the subject of conversation in the castle of Schœnbrunn. In the evening the Emperor sent for me and said, 'Rapp, the affair of this morning is very extraordinary. I cannot believe that this young man of himself conceived the design of assassinating me. There is something under it. I shall never be persuaded that the intriguers of Berlin and Weimar are strangers to the affair.'—'Sire, allow me to say that your suspicions appear unfounded. Staps has had no accomplice; his placid countenance, and even his fanaticism, are evident proofs of that.'—'I tell you that he has been instigated by women: furies thirsting for re-

venge. If I could only obtain proof of it I would have them seized in the midst of their Court.'—'Ah, Sire, it is impossible that either man or woman in the Courts of Berlin or Weimar could have conceived so atrocious a design.'—'I am not sure of that. Did not those women excite Schill against us while we were at peace with Prussia; but stay a little; we shall see.'—'Schill's enterprise, Sire, bears no resemblance to this attempt.' You know how the Emperor likes every one to yield to his opinion when he has adopted one which he does not choose to give up; so he said, rather changing his tone of good-humoured familiarity, 'All you say is in vain, Monsieur le Général: I am not liked either at Berlin or Weimar.'—'There is no doubt of that, Sire; but because you are not liked in these two Courts, is it to be inferred that they would assassinate you?'—'I know the fury of those women; but patience. Write to General Lauer: direct him to interrogate Staps. Tell him to bring him to a confession.'

"I wrote conformably with the Emperor's orders, but no confession was obtained from Staps. In his examination by General Lauer he repeated nearly what he had said in the presence of Napoleon. His resignation and firmness never forsook him for a moment; and he persisted in saying that he was the sole author of the attempt, and that no one else was aware of it. Staps' enterprise made a deep impression on the Emperor. On the day when we left Schœnbrunn we happened to be alone, and he said to me, 'I cannot get this unfortunate Staps out of my mind. The more I think on the subject the more I am perplexed. I never can believe that a young man of his age, a German, one who has received a good education, a Protestant too, could have conceived and attempted such a crime. The Italians are said to be a nation of assassins, but no Italian ever attempted my life. This affair is beyond my comprehension. Inquire how Staps died, and let me know.'

"I obtained from General Lauer the information which the Emperor desired. I learned that Staps, whose attempt on the Emperor's life was made on the 23d of October, was executed at seven o'clock in the moning of the 27th, having refused to take any sustenance since the 24th. When any food was brought to him he rejected it, saying, 'I shall be strong enough to walk to the scaffold.' When he was told that peace was concluded he evinced extreme sorrow, and was seized with trembling. On reaching the place of execution he exclaimed loudly, 'Liberty for ever! Germany for ever! Death to the tyrant!'"

Such are the notes which I committed to paper after conversing with Rapp, as we were walking together in the garden of the former hôtel of Montmorin, in which Rapp resided. I recollect his showing me the knife taken from Staps, which the Emperor had given him; it was merely a common carving-knife, such as is used in kitchens. To these details may be added a very remarkable circumstance, which I received from another but not less authentic source. I have been assured that the attempt of the German Mutius Scaevola had a marked influence on the concessions which the Emperor made, because he feared that Staps, like him who attempted the life of Porsenna, might have imitators among the illuminati of Germany.

It is well known that after the battle of Wagram conferences were open at Raab. Although peace was almost absolutely necessary for both powers, and the two Emperors appeared to desire it equally, it was not, however, concluded. It is worthy of remark that the delay was occasioned by Bonaparte. Negotiations were therefore suspended, and M. de Champagny had ceased for several days to see the Prince of Lichtenstein when the affair of Staps took place. Immediately after Napoleon's examination of the young fanatic he sent for M. de Champagny. "How are the negotiations going on?" he inquired. The Minister having informed him, the Emperor added, "I

wish them to be resumed immediately: I wish for peace; do not hesitate about a few millions more or less in the indemnity demanded from Austria. Yield on that point. I wish to come to a conclusion: I refer it all to you." The Minister lost no time in writing to the Prince of Lichtenstein: on the same night the two negotiators met at Raab, and the clauses of the treaty which had been suspended were discussed, agreed upon, and signed that very night. Next morning M. de Champagny attended the Emperor's levee with the treaty of peace as it had been agreed on. Napoleon, after hastily examining it, expressed his approbation of every particular, and highly complimented his Minister on the speed with which the treaty had been brought to a conclusion.[1]

[1] This definitive treaty of peace, which is sometimes called the Treaty of Vienna, Raab, or Schœnbrunn, contained the following articles:—

1. Austria ceded in favour of the Confederation of the Rhine (these fell to Bavaria), Salzburg, Berchtolsgaden, and a part of Upper Austria.

2. To France directly Austria ceded her only seaport, Trieste, and all the countries of Carniola, Friuli, the circle of Villach, with parts of Croatia and Dalmatia. (By these cessions Austria was excluded from the Adriatic Sea, and cut off from all communication with the navy of Great Britain.) A small lordship, an enclave in the territories of the Grison League, was also given up.

3. To the constant ally of Napoleon, to the King of Saxony, in that character Austria ceded some Bohemian enclaves in Saxony and, in his capacity of Grand Duke of Warsaw, she added to his Polish dominions the ancient city of Cracow, and all Western Galicia.

4. Russia, who had entered with but a lukewarm zeal into the war as an ally of France, had a very moderate share of the spoils of Austria. A portion of Eastern Galicia, with a population of 400,000 souls, was allotted to her, but in this allotment the trading town of Brody (almost the only thing worth having) was specially excepted. This last circumstance gave no small degree of disgust to the Emperor Alexander, whose admiration of Napoleon was not destined to have a long duration.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

CHAPTER XXI.

1809.

The Princess Royal of Denmark—Destruction of the German Empire—Napoleon's visit to the Courts of Bavaria and Würtemberg—His return to France—First mention of the divorce—Intelligence of Napoleon's marriage with Maria Louisa—Napoleon's quarrel with Louis—Journey of the Emperor and Empress into Holland—Refusal of the Hanse Towns to pay the French troops—Decree for burning English merchandise—M. de Vergennes—Plan for turning an inevitable evil to the best account—Fall on the exchange of St Petersburg—ANNEX.

ABOUT this time I had the pleasure of again seeing the son of the reigning Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, whose arrival in the Hanse Towns was speedily followed by that of his sister, Princess Frederica Charlotte of Mecklenburg, married to the Prince Royal of Denmark, Christian Frederick. In November the Princess arrived at Altona from Copenhagen, the reports circulated respecting her having compelled her husband to separate from her. The history of this Princess, who, though perhaps blamable, was nevertheless much pitied, was the general subject of conversation in the north of Germany at the time I was at Hamburg. The King of Denmark, grieved at the publicity of the separation, wrote a letter on the subject to the Duke of Mecklenburg. In this letter, which I had an opportunity of seeing, the King expressed his regret at not having been able to prevent the scandal; for, on his return from a journey to Kiel, the affair had become so notorious that all attempts at reconciliation were vain. In the meantime it was settled that the Princess was to remain at Altona until something should be decided respecting her future condition.

It was Baron Plessen, the Duke of Mecklenburg's Minister of State, who favoured me with a sight of the King of Denmark's letters. M. Plessen told me, likewise, at the time that the Duke had formed the irrevocable determination of not receiving his daughter. A few days after her arrival the Princess visited Madame de Bourrienne. She invited us to her parties, which were very brilliant, and several times did us the honour of being present at ours. But, unfortunately, the extravagance of her conduct, which was very unsuitable to her situation, soon became the subject of general animadversion.

I mentioned at the close of the last chapter how the promptitude of M. de Champagny brought about the conclusion of the treaty known by the name of the Treaty of Schœnbrunn. Under this the ancient edifice of the German Empire was overthrown,[1] and Francis II. of Germany became Francis I., Emperor of Austria. He, however, could not say, like his namesake of France, *Tout est perdu fors l'honneur;* for honour was somewhat committed, even had nothing else been lost. But the sacrifices Austria was compelled to make were great. The territories ceded to France were immediately united into a new general government, under the collective denomination of the Illyrian Provinces. Napoleon thus became master of both sides of the Adriatic, by virtue of his twofold title of Emperor of France and King of Italy. Austria, whose external

[1] Bourrienne here nods. The German Empire had been broken up on the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806, when the Emperor Francis II. of Germany, who had already in 1804 taken the title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria, definitely abandoned the Empire and declared it dissolved. See Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, London, Macmillan, 1876, p. 365. Francis could not have done otherwise, as he was then powerless. Practically, all the States of the German Empire had joined the Confederation of the Rhine, except his own States and Prussia, which was attempting a Northern Confederation of its own. The provinces now ceded by Austria on the east of the Adriatic were joined to the former Venetian provinces which Napoleon had obtained in 1805 after Austerlitz, and were called the Illyrian Provinces. Ragusa, which Napoleon had occupied in 1806, and whose Government was overturned in 1808, was formally united to these provinces in 1810. Austria thus lost all she had gained from the partition of Venice, besides her own former possessions; but in 1815 she regained the whole of the Illyrian provinces.

commerce thus received a check, had no longer any direct communication with the sea. The loss of Fiume, Trieste, and the sea-coast appeared so vast a sacrifice that it was impossible to look forward to the duration of a peace so dearly purchased.

The affair of Staps, perhaps, made Napoleon anxious to hurry away from Schœnbrunn, for he set off before he had ratified the preliminaries of the peace, announcing that he would ratify them at Munich. He proceeded in great haste to Nymphenburg, where he was expected on a visit to the Court of Bavaria. He next visited the King of Würtemberg, whom he pronounced to be the cleverest sovereign in Europe, and at the end of October he arrived at Fontainebleau. From thence he proceeded on horseback to Paris, and he rode so rapidly that only a single chasseur of his escort could keep up with him, and, attended by this one guard, he entered the court of the Tuileries. While Napoleon was at Fontainebleau, before his return to Paris, Josephine for the first time heard the divorce mentioned;[1] the idea had occurred to the Emperor's mind while he was at Schœnbrunn.[2] It was also

[1] Josephine, as Bourrienne himself has recounted before, had for years feared a divorce. "The Empress," says Meneval (tome i. p. 225), "for two years before could not conceal from herself that, sooner or later, she would pay by the loss of her rank for the misfortune of not having given Napoleon children. This was the habitual text of her conversations with me, from whom she might get information, or with any one to whom she could speak in confidence." For the extraordinary interview with the wife of Metternich on the 2d of January 1810, when Josephine and her children, Hortense and Eugène, all assured the astonished wife of the Minister that they wished the Emperor to marry an Austrian Archduchess, see *Metternich*, vol. ii. p. 372. For the painful scene when the wretched Josephine, knowing her fate and dreading the open triumph of her enemies, had to appear in state at the Hôtel de Ville on the 2d of December 1809, see *Madame Junot*, vol. iii. p. 225, corroborated by *Meneval*, tome i. p. 226.

[2] This is confirmed by the testimony of Savary, who says:—

"Napoleon often reflected on the best mode of making this communication to the Empress; still he was reluctant to speak to her. He was apprehensive of the consequences of her susceptibility of feeling; his heart was never proof against the shedding of tears. He thought, however, that a favourable opportunity offered for breaking the subject previously to his quitting Fontainebleau. He hinted at it in a few words which he had addressed to the Empress, but he did not explain himself until the arrival of the Viceroy, whom he had ordered to join him. He was the first

while at Fontainebleau that Napoleon appointed M. de Montalivet to be Minister of the Interior. The letters which we received from Paris at this period brought intelligence of the brilliant state of the capital during the winter of 1809, and especially of the splendour of the Imperial Court, where the Emperor's levees were attended by the Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Würtemberg, all eager to evince their gratitude to the hero who had raised them to the sovereign rank.[1]

I was the first person in Hamburg who received intelligence of Napoleon's projected marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa. The news was brought to me from Vienna by two *estafettes*. It is impossible to describe the effect produced by the anticipation of this event

person who spoke openly to his mother and obtained her consent for that bitter sacrifice. He acted on the occasion like a kind son and a man grateful to his benefactor and devoted to his service, by sparing him the necessity of unpleasant explanations towards a partner whose removal was a sacrifice as painful to him as it was affecting. The Emperor, having arranged whatever related to the future condition of the Empress, upon whom he made a liberal settlement, urged the moment of the dissolution of the marriage, no doubt because he felt grieved at the condition of the Empress herself, who dined every day and passed her evenings in the presence of persons who were witnessing her descent from the throne. There existed between him and the Empress Josephine no other bond than a civil act, according to the custom which prevailed at the time of this marriage. Now the law had foreseen the dissolution of such marriage contracts. A particular day having therefore been fixed upon, the Emperor brought together into his apartments those persons whose ministry was required in this case; amongst others, the Arch-Chancellor and M. Regnault de St. Jean d'Angély. The Emperor then declared in a loud voice his intention of annulling the marriage he had contracted with Josephine, who was present; the Empress also made the same declaration, which was interrupted by her repeated sobs. The Prince Arch-Chancellor having caused the article of the law to be read, he applied it to the case before him, and declared the marriage to be dissolved" (*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*).

[1] The Electorate of Bavaria had been raised to a Kingdom by, or rather in consequence of, the Treaty of Presburg, 26th December 1805, after Austerlitz. The Duchy of Würtemberg had been made an Electorate by the Recess of the Empire, 1803, on the re-settlement of Germany under the supervision of France and Russia. It was raised to a Kingdom at the same time as Bavaria, both Kings issuing their proclamations 1st January 1806. The Electorate of Saxony was declared a Kingdom 11th December 1806, on joining the Confederation of the Rhine. It is curious that these sovereigns all retained these titles given them by Napoleon, while he at St. Helena was denied any higher rank than that of General. The allies considered that there was nothing objectionable in any gifts received from Napoleon; it was only his own gains which were immoral.

throughout the north of Germany. From all parts the merchants received orders to buy Austrian stock, in which an extraordinary rise immediately took place. Napoleon's marriage with Maria Louisa was hailed with enthusiastic and general joy.[1] The event was regarded as the guarantee of a long peace, and it was hoped there would be a lasting cessation of the disasters created by the rivalry of France and Austria. The correspondence I received showed that these sentiments were general in the interior of France, and in different countries of Europe; and, in spite of the presentiments I had always had of the return of the Bourbons to France, I now began to think that event problematic, or at least very remote.

About the beginning of the year 1810 commenced the differences between Napoleon and his brother Louis, which, as I have already stated, ended in a complete rupture. Napoleon's object was to make himself master of the navigation of the Scheldt, which Louis wished should remain free, and hence ensued the union of Holland with the French Empire. Holland was the first province of the Grand Empire which Napoleon took the new Empress to visit. This visit took place almost immediately after the marriage. Napoleon first proceeded to Compiègne, where he remained a week. He next set out for St. Quentin, and inspected the canal. The Empress Maria Louisa then joined him, and they both proceeded to Belgium. At Antwerp the Emperor inspected all the works which he had ordered, and to the execution of which he attached great importance.[2] He returned by way of

[1] For the effect of the news of the marriage, see *Metternich*, tome ii. p. 383. "Few things have ever obtained a more universal assent on the part of the real body of the (Austrian) nation." See also Beugnot (vol. i. pp. 326. 327), who was then governing the Grand-Duchy of Berg. "A great change was immediately perceptible in the disposition of the Grand Duchy. . . . I observed the increase of those relations of confidence and of future connection which are only maintained with a Government of unquestioned stability."

[2] The Royalists naturally were ready to decry his labours. "Of all the monuments raised by Napoleon," says Vitrolles (tome i. p. 216), "there was not one to

Ostend, Lille, and Normandy to St. Cloud, where he arrived on the 1st of June 1810. He there learned from my correspondence that the Hanse Towns refused to advance money for the pay of the French troops. The men were absolutely destitute. I declared that it was urgent to put an end to this state of things. The Hanse Towns had been reduced from opulence to misery by taxation and exactions, and were no longer able to provide the funds.

During this year Napoleon, in a fit of madness, issued a decree which I cannot characterise by any other epithet than infernal. I allude to the decree for burning all the English merchandise in France, Holland, the Grand Duchy of Berg, the Hanse Towns ; in short, in all places subject to the disastrous dominion of Napoleon. In the interior of France no idea could possibly be formed of the desolation caused by this measure in countries which existed by commerce ; and what a spectacle was it to the destitute inhabitants of those countries to witness the destruction of property which, had it been distributed, would have assuaged their misery !

Among the emigrants whom I was ordered to watch was M. de Vergennes, who had always remained at or near Hamburg since April 1808. I informed the Minister that M. de Vergennes had presented himself to me at this time. I even remember that M. de Vergennes gave me a letter from M. de Rémusat, the First Chamberlain of the Emperor. M. de Rémusat strongly recommended to me his connection, who was called by matters of importance to Hamburg. Residence in this town was, however, too expensive, and he decided to live at Neumühl, a little vil-

shelter a living being. It was not for them that he worked." If the sneer has some truth, it omits such foundations as the school for the daughters of the officers of the Legion d'Honneur at St. Cyr, and other similar foundations. Thus, if not exactly sheltered, Thiers was educated by one of the scholarships founded by Napoleon. M. Thiers, telling this anecodote in his clever and kindly manner, added, "In granting me this favour Napoleon no doubt did not foresee that he was forming his future historian" (*Menevat*, tome iii. p. 19).

lage on the Elbe, rather to the west of Altona. There he lived quietly in retirement with an opera dancer named Mademoiselle Ledoux, with whom he had become acquainted in Paris, and whom he had brought with him. He seemed much taken with her. His manner of living did not denote large means.[1]

One duty with which I was entrusted, and to which great importance was attached, was the application and execution of the disastrous Continental system in the north.[2] In my correspondence I did not conceal the dissatisfaction which this ruinous measure excited, and the Emperor's eyes were at length opened on the subject by the following circumstance. In spite of the sincerity with which the Danish Government professed to enforce the Continental system, Holstein contained a great quantity of colonial produce ; and, notwithstanding the measures of severity, it was necessary that that merchandise should find a market somewhere. The smugglers often succeeded in introducing it into Germany, and the whole would probably soon have passed the custom-house limits. All things considered, I thought it advisable to make the best of an evil that could not be avoided. I therefore proposed that the colonial produce then in Holstein, and which had been imported before the date of the King's edict for its

[1] Madame de Rémusat was one of the De Vergennes family, being the daughter of the Minister of Louis XIV.—*Bourrienne.* The person here referred to is not the Minister, who had died in 1787. M. de Rémusat's connection and correspondence with such *émigrés* probably had much to do with the distrust Napoleon seems to have entertained towards him. Hence M. de Rémusat did not get the promotion and appointment as Minister he considered his due, and to this we owe most of the bitter attack published by his clever wife when it was popular to abuse the man to whom M. de Rémusat had given personal service as Chamberlain in the days of the Empire.

[2] See Beugnot's account of the proceedings of one of the agents especially entrusted with carrying out this absurd system. "One fine morning he pounced on all the raw cotton that was to be found in the Grand Duchy (of Berg), and seized the whole as English merchandise. A wicked enchanter, who had paralysed the arms of 10,000 workmen with a wave of his wand, would have done just about as good a thing." An appeal to the Emperor was fruitless, "and this cruel measure, which I do not dare to call by its right name, was accomplished with all the remains of Imperial power" (*Beugnot*, vol. ii, pp. 42–44).

prohibition, should be allowed to enter Hamburg on the payment of 30, and on some articles 40, per cent. This duty was to be collected at the custom-house, and was to be confined entirely to articles consumed in Germany. The colonial produce in Altona, Glückstadt, Husum, and other towns of Holstein, had been estimated at about 30,000,000 francs, and the duty would amount to 10,000,000 or 12,000,000. The adoption of the plan I proposed would naturally put a stop to smuggling; for it could not be doubted that the merchants would give 30 or 33 per cent for the right of carrying on a lawful trade rather than give 40 per cent. to the smugglers, with the chance of seizure.

The Emperor immediately adopted my idea, for I transmitted my suggestions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 18th of September, and on the 4th of October a decree was issued conformable to the plan I proposed. Within six weeks after the decree came into operation the custom-house Director received 1300 declarations from persons holding colonial produce in Holstein. It now appeared that the duties would amount to 40,000,000 francs, that is to say, 28,000,000 or 30,000,000 more than my estimate.

Bernadotte had just been nominated Prince Royal of Sweden. This nomination, with all the circumstances connected with it, as well as Bernadotte's residence in Hamburg, before he proceeded to Stockholm, will be particularly noticed in the next chapter. I merely mention the circumstance here to explain some events which took place in the north, and which were, more or less, directly connected with it. For example, in the month of September the course of exchange on St. Petersburg suddenly fell. All the letters which arrived in Hamburg from the capital of Russia and from Riga, attributed the fall to the election of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo as Prince Royal of Sweden. Of thirty letters which I received there was not one but described the consternation which the event had

created in St. Petersburg. This consternation, however, might have been excited less by the choice of Sweden than by the fear that that choice was influenced by the French Government.[1]

[*ANNEX TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER.*]

THE MARRIAGE OF MARIA LOUISA.

Cherishing for General Lauriston, formerly his *aide de camp*, a friendship of very long standing, Napoleon commissioned him to proceed to Vienna, and to accompany the Empress to Paris as the captain of her body-guard. With the view of honouring the memory of Marshal Lannes, Duke of Montebello, he appointed his widow to be a lady of honour to the new Empress, finding it impossible to bestow upon her a more signal proof of his esteem, for she had not at that time any claim to entitle her to a situation which was to place her, all at once, at the head of the highest society.

He sent his sister, the Queen of Naples, as far as Braunau, with four ladies of honour, to meet the Empress. We had then in Braunau the corps of Marshal Davoust, who was completing measures for evacuating Austria. This corps was placed under arms upon the arrival of the Empress, and gave her as brilliant a reception as the means of so small a town could afford. The Queen of Naples received the Empress at Braunau, where the ceremony took place of delivering up her Majesty by the officers whom her father had appointed to accompany her, as well as of the delivery of her effects; and, as soon as the Empress had clothed herself in the garments brought in the wardrobe from Paris, she passed over the frontier with the ladies of the Palace who were in attendance, and gave audience of leave to all those who had accompanied her from Vienna and were about to return. All this was accomplished within an hour from the time of her arrival at Braunau. She departed immediately for Munich, Augsburg, Stuttgart, Carlsruhe, and Strasburg, and was received with great splendour at all the Foreign Courts, and at Strasburg with great enthusiasm. So many hopes were interwoven with the marriage that her arrival was sincerely greeted by all.

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[1] Bernadotte himself seems not to have believed in the merits of his elevation, for, if reported rightly to Perthes, he is said, in arguing against the existence of a god, to have urged, "How can you contend for the being of a god? If there were one, should I be here in Lübeck?" (*Memoirs of Perthes*, vol. i. p. 151).

MARIE LOUISE.
(EMPRESS OF FRANCE)

The Emperor had gone as far as Compiègne to receive her, the Court being then at that residence. He wrote to her every day by a page, who went off at full speed with his letters, and as quickly brought back her replies. I recollect that the Emperor having dropped the envelope of the first letter, it was instantly picked up, and handed about the *salon* as a specimen of the handwriting of the Empress: the eagerness to see it was as great as if her portrait had been exhibited. The pages who came from her were tormented with questions. We had, in short, been transformed at once into courtiers as assiduous as our ancestors in the days of Louis XIV., and would scarcely have been taken for the men who had laid so many nations prostrate at their feet. The Emperor was no less impatient than ourselves, and much more interested in knowing what more peculiarly concerned him; he really appeared love-stricken. He had ordered that the route of the Empress should be by way of Nancy, Chalons, Rheims, and Soissons, and could almost point out, at any hour of the day, the progress she had then made.

On the day of her arrival the Emperor took his departure in a plain carriage, with no other attendant than the Grand Marshal, after giving his instructions to Marshal Bessières, who remained at Compiègne. He travelled on the road of Soissons and Rheims until he met the carriage of the Empress, which was suddenly stopped by his courier. The Emperor alighted, ran up to the door of the Empress' carriage, opened it himself, and stepped in. On perceiving the astonishment of the Empress, who knew not the meaning of this abruptness in a stranger, the Queen of Naples said to her, "Madame, it is the Emperor." He returned to Compiègne in their company.

Marshal Bessières had ordered out all the cavalry quartered near the Palace, and advanced with it and with the general officers and the Emperor's *aides de camp* on the road to Soissons as far as a well-known stone bridge, the name of which I do not recollect; at the same bridge Louis XV. had met the Dauphiness, daughter of Maria Theresa, afterwards the unhappy Queen of France.

The people of Compiègne had succeeded in making their way to the porch of the Palace, where they ranged themselves in a double line. The Empress on her arrival was received at the foot of the principal staircase by the mother and family of the Emperor, the whole Court, the Ministers, and several personages of the highest rank. It is superfluous to name the person who attracted the attention of every one from the moment the carriage door was opened until the entrance into the apartments. No Court was held that night, and all the company withdrew at an early hour.

According to the etiquette observed at foreign Courts the Em-

peror was no doubt married to the Archduchess Maria Louisa; not so, however, with reference to our civil code; nevertheless, it is said that he followed the example of Henry IV. on his marriage with Marie de Medicis. I am only repeating here the illiberal remarks made the next morning because I am pledged to speak the truth. Had it, however, been my case, I should have followed the precedent of Henry IV. on this occasion. It happened to be my turn to sleep that night in the apartment of the officers in attendance. The Emperor had left the Palace and retired to the Chancellor's residence; and if the report had been brought to me that all Paris was on fire I should not have attempted to disturb his repose, under the apprehension that he might not be found at that residence.

The next was a very fatiguing day for the young Empress, because presentations were made of persons wholly unknown to her, by individuals with whom she was not much more acquainted. The Emperor himself presented to her his *aides de camp*, who felt highly gratified at this condescending mark of his regard; the lady of honour presented the ladies of the palace and others who were to form her retinue.

The Emperor proceeded with the Empress to St. Cloud on the day after the public presentation, the attendants of both households followed them in separate carriages. They did not pass through Paris, but took the road to St. Denis, the Bois de Boulogne, and St. Cloud: all the authorities of Paris had repaired to the boundary of the department of the Seine, in the direction of Compiègne, and were followed by a great part of the population, who gave themselves up to the joy and enthusiasm which the occasion naturally created.

An immense crowd had collected at St. Cloud to greet her arrival: first, the Princesses of the Imperial family, amongst whom were the Vice-Queen of Italy, who was then making her first appearance in Paris, the Princess of Baden, the Dignitaries, the Marshals of France, the Senators, and the Councillors of State. It was broad daylight when the Imperial retinue reached St. Cloud.

The ceremony of the civil marriage did not take place till two days afterwards, in the gallery of the Palace at St. Cloud. A platform was raised at the extremity of the gallery, with a table and armchairs upon it for the Imperial couple, as well as chairs and stools for the Princes and Princesses of his family: none were present at the ceremony except the persons attached to the respective Courts. When all the preliminary arrangements had been gone through the *cortège* moved forward from the apartments of the Empress, and crossing the grand apartments and the *salon* of Hercules, entered the gallery, where it was arranged on the platform in the

order laid down by the rules of etiquette. The place of every one had been determined beforehand, so that in an instant the utmost order and silence pervaded the assembly.

The Arch-Chancellor stood near a table with a rich velvet covering over it, npon which was a register held by Count Regnault de St. Jean d'Angély, the Secretary of the Imperial family's household. After taking the Emperor's orders the Prince Arch-Chancellor pnt the following question to him in a lond voice: "Sire, is it your Majesty's intention to take for your lawful wife her Imperial Highness the Archdnchess Maria Louisa of Austria, here present?"—"Yes, sir," was the Emperor's answer. The Arch-Chancellor then addressed the Empress: "Madame," he said, "does your Imperial Highness, of your own free consent, take the Emperor Napoleon, here present, for your lawful husband?"—"Yes, sir," she replied. The Arch-Chancellor proceeded then to declare, in the name of the law and of the institntions of the Empire, that his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon and her Imperial Highness the Archduchess Maria Louisa of Austria were duly united in marriage. Connt Regnanlt de St. Jean d'Angély presented the act for signature, first to the Emperor, afterwards to the Empress, and lastly to all the members of the family, as well as to the different personages whose official ranks entitled them to this honourable privilege.

Next morning the Imperial conple left St. Cloud in a carriage drawn by eight cream-coloured horses, preceded by an empty carriage drawn by eight gray horses, which was intended for the Empress; thirty other carriages all one mass of gilding, and drawn by superb horses, completed the *cortège;* these were filled with the ladies and officers of the honsehold, and by those whose employments gave them the privilege of being admited to the Imperial presence. The train left St. Cloud between eight and nine o'clock in the morning, and was escorted by the whole of the cavalry; it passed throngh the Bois de Boulogne, the Porte Maillot, the Champs Elysées, the Place de la Revolntion, to the garden of the Tuileries, where all the carriages stopped, to enable the company to enter the Palace.

From the iron railing of the court of the Palace of St. Clond, both sides of the road were lined with so dense a mass of people that the population of the adjacent conntry mnst have flocked to St. Clond and Paris on the occasion. The crowd increased on approaching Paris; from the barrier to the Palace of the Tuileries it baffled all calculation. Orchestras were placed at stated distances along the Champs Elysées, and played a variety of airs. France appeared to revel in a delight bordering npon frenzy. Many were the pro-

testations of fidelity and attachment made to the Emperor; and whosoever had ventured to predict at that time what has since come to pass would have been scouted as a madman.

When all the carriages had arrived, the *cortège* resumed its order of etiquette in the gallery of Diana at the Tuileries, and proceeded through a passage expressly constructed for the occasion, and terminating at the gallery of the Museum, which it entered by the door near the Pavilion of Flora.

Here began a new spectacle: both sides of that immense gallery were lined from one end to the other with a triple row of Parisian ladies of the middle class: nothing could be compared to the variegated scene presented by that assemblage of ladies, whose youthful bloom shone forth more dazzling than their elegant attire.

A balustrade extended along both sides of the gallery, in order to prevent any one from passing beyond a certain line, and the middle of this fine edifice was thus free and unobstructed, so as to admit of a passage for the *cortège* which moved along, and afforded a feast to the eyes as far as the very altar. The vast *salon* at the end of the gallery, where the exhibition of paintings generally took place, had been converted into a chapel. Its circuit was lined by a triple row of splendidly ornamented boxes, filled with the most elegant and distinguished ladies then in Paris. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies assigned to the persons composing the *cortège* their proper places as they arrived in the chapel. The strictest order was observed during the whole of this ceremony. Mass was performed by his Eminence Cardinal Fesch, after which the marriage ceremony took place.—*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome iv. p. 280.[1]

[1] For many interesting details, most admirably written, respecting Bonaparte's divorce from Josephine, and the circumstances that immediately preceded the divorce, see the *Memoirs of the Duchesse d'Abrantès*, vol. iii. chap. xvii.

CHAPTER XXII.

1809–1810.

Bernadotte elected Prince Royal of Sweden—Count Wrede's overtures to Bernadotte—Bernadotte's three days' visit to Hamburg—Particulars respecting the battle of Wagram—Secret Order of the day—Last intercourse of the Prince Royal of Sweden with Napoleon—My advice to Bernadotte respecting the Continental system—ANNEX.

I now come to one of the periods of my life to which I look back with most satisfaction, the time when Bernadotte was with me in Hamburg. I will briefly relate the series of events which led the opposer of the 18th Brumaire to the throne of Sweden.

On the 13th of March 1809 Gustavus Adolphus was arrested, and his uncle, the Duke of Sudermania, provisionally took the reins of Government. A few days afterwards Gustavus published his act of abdication,—which in the state of Sweden it was impossible for him to refuse. In May following, the Swedish Diet having been convoked at Stockholm, the Duke of Sudermania was elected King. Christian Augustus, the only son of that monarch, of course became Prince Royal on the accession of his father to the throne. He, however, died suddenly at the end of May 1810, and Count Fersen[1] (the same who at the Court of Marie Antoinette was distinguished by the appellation of *le beau Fersen*), was massacred by the populace, who suspected, perhaps unjustly, that he had been accessory

[1] Count Fersen, alleged to have been one of the favoured lovers of Marie Antoinette, and who was certainly deep in her confidence, had arranged most of the details of the attempted flight to Varennes in 1791, and he himself drove the Royal family their first stage to the gates of Paris. See Thiers' *Revolution*, vol. i. p. 172, and Campan, tome ii. p. 169.

to the Prince's death. On the 21st of August following Bernadotte was elected Prince Royal of Sweden.

After the death of the Prince Royal the Duke of Sudermania's son, Count Wrede, a Swede, made the first overtures to Bernadotte, and announced to him the intention entertained at Stockholm of offering him the throne of Sweden. Bernadotte was at that time in Paris, and immediately after his first interview with Count Wrede he waited on the Emperor at St. Cloud; Napoleon coolly replied that he could be of no service to him; that events must take their course; that he might accept or refuse the offer as he chose; that he (Bonaparte) would place no obstacles in his way, but that he could give him no advice. It was very evident that the choice of Sweden was not very agreeable to Bonaparte, and though he afterwards disavowed any opposition to it, he made overtures to Stockholm, proposing that the crown of Sweden should be added to that of Denmark.

Bernadotte then went to the waters of Plombières, and on his return to Paris he sent me a letter announcing his elevation to the rank of Prince Royal of Sweden.

On the 11th of October he arrived in Hamburg, where he stayed only three days. He passed nearly the whole of that time with me, and he communicated to me many curious facts connected with the secret history of the times, and among other things some particulars respecting the battle of Wagram. I was the first to mention to the new Prince Royal of Sweden the reports of the doubtful manner in which the troops under his command behaved. I reminded him of Bonaparte's dissatisfaction at these troops; for there was no doubt of the Emperor being the author of the complaints contained in the bulletins, especially as he had withdrawn the troops from Bernadotte's command. Bernadotte assured me that Napoleon's censure was unjust; during the battle he had complained of the little spirit manifested by the soldiers,

"He refused to see me," added Bernadotte, "and I was told, as a reason for his refusal, that he was astonished and displeased to find that, notwithstanding his complaints, of which I must have heard, I had boasted of having gained the battle, and had publicly complimented the Saxons whom I commanded."

Bernadotte then showed me the bulletin he drew up after the battle of Wagram. I remarked that I had never heard of a bulletin being made by any other than the General who was Commander-in-Chief during a battle, and asked how the affair ended. He then handed to me a copy of the Order of the day, which Napoleon said he had sent only to the Marshals commanding the different corps. As this remarkable document is but little known I may subjoin it here.

Order of the Day.

IMPERIAL CAMP OF SCHŒNBRUNN, *9th July* 1809.

His Majesty expresses his displeasure at the Prince of Ponte-Corvo's Order, dated Leopoldstadt, 7th July, and inserted on the same day in nearly all the newspapers, in the following terms:—

"*Saxons, on the 5th of July* 7000 *or* 8000 *of you pierced the enemy's centre, and marched on Deutsch-Wagram in spite of the efforts of* 40,000 *men, supported by* 60 *pieces of artillery. You fought till midnight, and bivouacked in the midst of the Austrian lines. On the 6th, at daybreak, you recommenced the battle with the same perseverance, and, in the midst of the ravages of the enemy's artillery, your columns stood firm as iron. The great Napoleon witnessed your courage, and reckons you among his bravest troops. Saxons, the fortune of a soldier consists in fulfilling his duty; you have nobly fulfilled yours!*

"(Signed) BERNADOTTE."

Independently of his Majesty having commanded his army in person, it is for him alone to award the degree of glory each has merited. His Majesty owes the success of his arms to the French troops, and to no foreigners. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo's Order of the Day has a tendency to inspire false pretensions in troops

whose merit does not rise above mediocrity; it is at variance with truth, policy, and national honour. The success of the 5th is due to the Duc de Rivoli and Marshal Oudinot, who penetrated the enemy's centre at the same time that the Duc d'Auerstadt's corps turned his left. The village of Deutsch-Wagram was not taken on the 5th, but on the 6th, by the corps of Marshal Oudinot. The corps of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo did not stand as *firm as iron.* It was the first to retreat. His Majesty was obliged to order the corps of the Viceroy to be covered by the divisions of Broussier and Lamarque, commanded by Marshal Macdonald, by the division of heavy cavalry, commanded by General Nansouty, and by a part of the cavalry of the Guard. To Marshal Macdonald and his troops is due the merit which the Prince of Ponte-Corvo takes to himself His Majesty hopes that this expression of his displeasure will henceforth deter any Marshal from appropriating to himself the glory which belongs to others. His Majesty, however, desires that the present Order of the Day, which may possibly be mortifying to the Saxon troops, though they must be aware that they are not entitled to the praises bestowed on them, shall remain private, and be sent only to the Marshals commanding the army corps.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

Bernadotte's bulletin was printed along with Bonaparte's Order of the Day, a thing quite unparalleled.[1]

Though I was much interested in this account of Bonaparte's conduct after the battle of Wagram, yet I was more curious to hear the particulars of Bernadotte's last communication with the Emperor. The Prince informed me that on his return from Plombières he attended the levee, when the Emperor asked him, before every one present, whether he had received any recent news from Sweden. He replied in the affirmative. "What is it?" inquired Napoleon. "Sire, I am informed that your Majesty's *chargé d'affaires* at Stockholm opposes my election. It is also reported to those who choose to believe it that your Majesty gives the preference to the King of Denmark." "At these words," continued Bernadotte, "the Emperor

[1] For Savary's version of the difference which arose between Bonaparte and Bernadotte at Wagram, together with some interesting anecdotes connected with the battle, the reader is referred to the conclusion of the present chapter.

affected surprise, which you know he can do very artfully. He assured me it was impossible, and then turned the conversation to another subject.

"I know not what to think of his conduct in this affair. I am aware he does not like me ; but the interests of his policy may render him favourable to Sweden. Considering the present greatness and power of France, I conceived it to be my duty to make every personal sacrifice. But I swear to Heaven that I will never commit the honour of Sweden. He, however, expressed himself in the best possible terms in speaking of Charles XIII. and me. He at first started no obstacle to my acceptance of the succession to the throne of Sweden, and he ordered the official announcement of my election to be immediately inserted in the *Moniteur*. Ten days elapsed without the Emperor's saying a word to me about my departure. As I was anxious to be off, and all my preparations were made, I determined to go and ask him for the letters patent to relieve me from my oath of fidelity, which I had certainly kept faithfully in spite of all his ill-treatment of me. He at first appeared somewhat surprised at my request, and, after a little hesitation, he said, 'There is a preliminary condition to be fulfilled : a question has been raised by one of the members of the Privy Council.'—'What condition, Sire?'—'You must pledge yourself not to bear arms against me.'—'Does your Majesty suppose that I can bind myself by such an engagement? My election by the Diet of Sweden, which has met with your Majesty's assent, has made me a Swedish subject, and that character is incompatible with the pledge proposed by a member of the Council. I am sure it could never have emanated from your Majesty, and must proceed from the Arch-Chancellor or the Grand Judge, who certainly could not have been aware of the height to which the proposition would raise me.'—'What do you mean?'—'If, Sire, you prevent me accepting a crown unless I pledge myself not

to bear arms against you, do you not really place me on a level with you as a General?'

"When I declared positively that my election must make me consider myself a Swedish subject he frowned, and seemed embarrassed. When I had done speaking he said, in a low and faltering voice, 'Well, go. Our destinies will soon be accomplished!' These words were uttered so indistinctly that I was obliged to beg pardon for not having heard what he said, and he repeated, 'Go! our destinies will soon be accomplished!' In the subsequent conversations which I had with the Emperor I tried all possible means to remove the unfavourable sentiments he cherished towards me. I revived my recollections of history. I spoke to him of the great men who had excited the admiration of the world, of the difficulties and obstacles which they had to surmount; and, above all, I dwelt upon that solid glory which is founded on the establishment and maintenance of public tranquillity and happiness. The Emperor listened to me attentively, and frequently concurred in my opinion as to the principles of the prosperity and stability of States. One day he took my hand and pressed it affectionately, as if to assure me of his friendship and protection. Though I knew him to be an adept in the art of dissimulation, yet his affected kindness appeared so natural that I thought all his unfavourable feeling towards me was at an end. I spoke to persons by whom our two families were allied, requesting that they would assure the Emperor of the reciprocity of my sentiments, and tell him that I was ready to assist his great plans in any way not hostile to the interests of Sweden.

"Would you believe, my dear friend, that the persons to whom I made these candid protestations laughed at my credulity? They told me that after the conversation in which the Emperor had so cordially pressed my hand I had scarcely taken leave of him when he was heard to say that I had made a great display of my learning to him, and that he

had humoured me like a child. He wished to inspire me with full confidence so as to put me off my guard ; and I know for a certainty that he had the design of arresting me.

"But," pursued Bernadotte, "in spite of the feeling of animosity which I know the Emperor has cherished against me since the 18th Brumaire, I do not think, when once I shall be in Sweden, that he will wish to have any differences with the Swedish Government. I must tell you also he has given me 2,000,000 francs in exchange for my principality of Ponte-Corvo. Half the sum has been already paid, which will be very useful to me in defraying the expenses of my journey and installation.[1] When I was about to step into my carriage to set off, an individual, whom you must excuse me naming, came to bid me farewell, and related to me a little conversation which had just taken place at the Tuileries. Napoleon said to the individual in question, 'Well, does not the Prince regret leaving France?'—'Certainly, Sire.'—'As to me, I should have been very glad if he had not accepted his election. But there is no help for it. . . . He does not like me.'—'Sire, I must take the liberty of saying that your Majesty labours under a mistake. I know the differences which have existed between you and General Bernadotte for the last six years. I know how he opposed the overthrow of the Directory ; but I also know that the Prince has long been sincerely attached to you.'—'Well, I dare say you are right. But we have not understood each other. It is now too late. He has his interests and his policy, and I have mine."[2]

[1] The other million stipulated in exchange for the principality of Ponte-Corvo was never paid to Bernadotte.—*Bourrienne.*

[2] See Metternich (vol. ii. pp. 460-465) for the account, already referred to, of his conversation with Napoleon on the choice of Bernadotte. Napoleon seems to have not really wished for the selection of Bernadotte, seeing the danger of the elevation of his officers. But, the choice made, he was pleased to get rid of Bernadotte, "one of those old Jacobins with his head in the wrong place," and "in any case I could not refuse my consent, were it only that a French Marshal on the throne of

"Such," added the Prince, "were the Emperor's last observations respecting me two hours before my departure. The individual to whom I have just alluded spoke truly, my dear Bourrienne. I am indeed sorry to leave France; and I never should have left it but for the injustice of Bonaparte. If ever I ascend the throne of Sweden I shall owe my crown to his ill-treatment of me; for had he not persecuted me by his animosity my condition would have sufficed for a soldier of fortune: but we must follow our fate."

During the three days the Prince spent with me I had many other conversations with him. He wished me to give him my advice as to the course he should pursue with regard to the Continental system. "I advise you," said I, "to reject the system without hesitation. It may be very fine in theory, but it is utterly impossible to carry it into practice, and it will, in the end, give the trade of the world to England. It excites the dissatisfaction of our allies, who, in spite of themselves, will again become our enemies. But no other country, except Russia, is in the situation of Sweden. You want a number of objects of the first necessity, which nature has withheld from you. You can only obtain them by perfect freedom of navigation; and you can only pay for them with those peculiar productions in which Sweden abounds. It would be out of all reason to close your ports against a nation who rules the seas. It is your navy that would be blockaded, not hers. What can France do against you? She may invade you by land. But England and Russia will exert all their efforts to oppose her. By sea it is still more impossible that she should do anything. Then you have nothing to fear but Russia and England, and it will be easy for you to keep up friendly relations with these two powers. Take

Gustavus Adolphus is one of the best possible tricks that could be played on England." See also the same volume, p. 433, where Metternich expresses his belief that Napoleon had thought of one of his own family.

my advice; sell your iron, timber, leather, and pitch; take in return salt, wines, brandy, and colonial produce. This is the way to make yourself popular in Sweden. If, on the contrary, you follow the Continental system, you will be obliged to adopt laws against smuggling, which will draw upon you the detestation of the people."

Such was the advice which I gave to Bernadotte when he was about to commence his new and brilliant career. In spite of my situation as a French Minister I could not have reconciled it to my conscience to give him any other counsel, for if diplomacy has duties so also has friendship. Bernadotte adopted my advice, and the King of Sweden had no reason to regret having done so.

[*ANNEX TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER.*]

THE BATTLE OF WAGRAM.

Early in the morning of the 9th, after despatching orders in various directions, Napoleon was taken rather seriously ill, in consequence of his fatigue and exertion. This circumstance compelled him to indulge in a little rest whilst the troops were advancing.

Marshal Bernadotte came at that time to see the Emperor, who had left orders that no one should disturb him until he called; I therefore refused to introduce the Marshal, the object of whose visit was wholly unknown to me. I had witnessed the lukewarmness which his troops had evinced in the battle: ever since the opening of the campaign he had been incessantly complaining of want of ardour in his troops, of their inexperience, and of their want of confidence in their leaders. I should therefore have exhausted every supposition before I could have imagined that, contradicting on a sudden the unfavourable opinion he had given of their courage, he could ever dream that those troops had decided the victory we had just obtained.

The Emperor was soon made acquainted with that unaccountable Order of the Day: he sent for the Marshal, and removed him from the command of his troops. This lesson was ineffectual; Bernadotte, who persisted in maintaining the justice of the ridiculous congratulations he had addressed to the Saxons, caused them to be in-

serted in the public papers. The Emperor was indignant at this conduct, being at all times inflexibly severe against every impropriety of conduct and every act of falsehood, though he was unwilling, at the same time, to wound the feelings of men who had exposed their lives in his service. The insult, however, was such that he felt it impossible to pass it by. He issued an Order of the Day, which he directed the Major-General not to circulate, either amongst the army at large or the Saxon troops, of which he had given the command to General Reynier.

At one period of the engagement the enemy's right was taking up a position in a perpendicular line to our extreme left, and compelled us to give it the form of an angle for the purpose of returning the enemy's fire. They had placed some pieces of artillery in such a manner as to fire upon the angle or elbow, whilst they were cannonading us on both sides of the angle. I know not what was the Emperor's object, but he remained a full hour at that angle, which was a perfect stream of shot; and as there was no fire of musketry kept up the soldiers became discouraged. The Emperor was more sensible than any one else that such a situation could not last long, and he remained there for the purpose of remedying the disorder. In the height of the danger he rode in front of the line upon a horse as white as snow (it was called Euphrates, and had been sent to him as a present from the Sophi of Persia). He proceeded from one extremity of the line to the other, and returned at a slow pace; it will easily be believed that shots were flying about him in every direction. I kept behind, with my eyes riveted upon him, expecting at every moment to see him drop from his horse. . . .

The Emperor ordered that as soon as the opening which he intended to make in the enemy's centre should be effected the whole cavalry should charge and wheel round upon the troops that had flanked us on the left. He had given directions, in consequence, to Marshal Bessières, and the latter had at that moment started to execute them, when he was knocked down by the most extraordinary cannon-shot ever seen. It ran along his thigh, in a zigzag direction, and the Marshal was so suddenly thrown off his horse that we fancied he was killed on the spot. The same shot forced the barrel from his pistol, and carried away both barrel and stock. The Emperor saw him fall, but not having recognised him, asked, as he usually did on similar occasions, "Who is it?"—"Bessières, Sire," was the reply. He instantly turned his horse round, saying, "Let us go, I have no time to weep. Let us avoid another scene." He alluded to the distress he had suffered at the death of Marshal Lannes. He sent me to see whether Bessières was still alive. He

LASALLE.

had been carried off the gronnd, and had recovered his senses, having merely been strnck on the thigh, which was completely paralysed. . . .

The inhabitants of Vienna had ascended to the ramparts and the roofs of the houses, from whence they witnessed the battle. In the morning the ladies of that city were flushed with the hope of our defeat. This hope was converted to general gloom towards two in the afternoon. They discerned the retreat of the Austrian army as plainly as it could be seen on the field of battle. . . .

The Emperor was going over the field of battle the same evening when intelligence was bronght him of the death of General Lasalle, who had just been killed by one of the last musket-shots fired before the final retreat of the enemy. That General had had in the morning a strange presentiment of the fate that awaited him. The acqnisition of glory had been an object of much greater solicitude to him than the advancement of his fortnne; but on the night previous to the battle he seems to have had the fate of his children strongly impressed upon his mind, and he awoke to draw np a petition to the Emperor in their behalf, which he placed in his sabre tasche. When the Emperor passed in the morning in front of his division General Lasalle did not address him, but he stopped M. Maret, who was a few paces behind, and told him that, never having asked any favonr of the Emperor, he begged he wonld take charge of the petition which he then handed to him in case any misfortune should befall him: a few hours afterwards he was no more. . . .

As Napoleon was going over the field of battle he stopped on the gronnd which had been occupied by Macdonald's two divisions; it exhibited the pictnre of a loss fully commensurate with the valour they had displayed. The Emperor recognised amongst the slain a colonel who had given him some cause for displeasure. That officer, who had made the campaign of Egypt, had misbehaved after the departnre of General Bonaparte, and proved nngrateful towards his benefactor, in hopes, no doubt, of insinuating himself into the good graces of the general who had snceeeded him. On the retnrn of the army of Egypt to France the Emperor, who had shown him many marks of kindness during the war in Italy, gave no signs of resentment, but granted him none of those favours which he heaped upon all those who had been in Egypt. The Emperor now said, on seeing him stretched npon the field of battle, "I regret not having been able to speak to him before the battle, in order to tell him that I had long since forgotten everything."

A few steps farther on he discovered a young quartermaster of

the regiment of carabineers still alive, although a shot had gone through his head; but the heat and dust had almost immediately congealed the blood, so that the brain could not be affected by the air. The Emperor dismounted, felt his pulse, and, with his handkerchief, endeavoured to clear the nostrils, which were filled with earth. He then applied a little brandy to his lips; whereupon the wounded man opened his eyes, though he appeared at first to be quite insensible to the act of humanity exercised towards him; but having again opened them, and fixed them on the Emperor, whom he now recognised, they immediately filled with tears, and he would have sobbed had not his strength forsaken him. The wretched man could not escape death, according to the opinion of the surgeons who were called to his assistance.

After having gone over the ground where the army had fought the Emperor went to place himself in the midst of the troops, which were beginning to move for the purpose of following the retreating enemy. On passing by Macdonald he stopped and held out his hand to him, saying, "Shake hands, Macdonald! no more ill-will between us: we must henceforward be friends; and, as a pledge of my sincerity, I will send you your Marshal's staff, which you so gloriously earned in yesterday's battle."[1] Macdonald had been in a kind of disgrace for many years: it would be difficult to assign any reason for it, except the intrigue and jealousy to which an elevated mind is always exposed. Malevolence had succeeded in inducing the Emperor to remove him from his presence, and the Marshal's innate pride had withheld him from taking any step towards reconciliation with a sovereign who did not treat him with that kindness to which he felt he had a claim.—*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome iv. chaps. xiii. and xiv.

[1] Macdonald nobly kept this compact in 1814, when Napoleon had fallen from power, and of all the Marshals then around the Emperor showed himself the most loyal in the hour of adversity. One of the last to give in his adherence to the Bourbons, he behaved with equal fidelity to them in 1815, withstanding all the temptations of the Hundred Days.

CHAPTER XXIII.

1810.

Bernadotte's departure from Hamburg—The Duke of Holstein-Augustenburg—Arrival of the Crown Prince in Sweden—Misunderstandings between him and Napoleon—Letter from Bernadotte to the Emperor—Plot for kidnapping the Prince Royal of Sweden—Invasion of Swedish Pomerania—Forced alliance of Sweden with England and Russia—Napoleon's overtures to Sweden—Bernadotte's letters of explanation to the Emperor—The Princess Royal of Sweden—My recall to Paris—Union of the Hanse Towns with France—Dissatisfaction of Russia—Extraordinary demand made upon me by Bonaparte—Fidelity of my old friends—Duroc and Rapp—Visit to Malmaison, and conversation with Josephine.

While Bernadotte was preparing to fill the high station to which he had been called by the wishes of the people of Sweden Napoleon was involved in his misunderstanding with the Pope,[1] and in the affairs of Portugal, which were far from proceeding according to his wishes. Bernadotte had scarcely quitted Hamburg for Sweden when the Duke

[1] It was about this time that, irritated at what he called the captive Pope's unreasonable obstinacy, Bonaparte conceived, and somewhat openly expressed, his notion of making France a Protestant country, and changing the religion of 30,000,000 of people by an Imperial decree. One or two of the good sayings of the witty, accomplished, and chivalrous Comte Louis de Narbonne have already been given in the course of these volumes. The following is another of them:—

"I tell you what I will do, Narbonne—I tell you how I will vent my spite on this old fool of a Pope, and the dotards who may succeed him," said Napoleon one day at the Tuileries. "I will make a schism as great as that of Luther—I will make France a Protestant country!"

"Sire," replied the Count, "I see difficulties in the way of this project. In the south, in the Vendée, in nearly all the west, the French are bigoted Catholics and even what little religion remains among us in our cities and great towns is of the Roman Church."

"Never mind, Narbonne—never mind! I shall at least carry a large portion of the French people with me—I will make a division."

"Sire," replied Narbonne, "I am afraid that there is not enough religion in all France to stand division!"—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

of Holstein-Augustenburg arrived. The Duke was the brother of the last Prince Royal of Sweden, whom Bernadotte was called to succeed, and he came to escort his sister from Altona to Denmark. His journey had been retarded for some days on account of the presence of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo in Hamburg: the preference granted to Bernadotte had mortified his ambition, and he was unwilling to come in contact with his fortunate rival. The Duke was favoured by the Emperor of Russia.

As soon as he arrived in Sweden Bernadotte directed his *aide de camp*, General Gentil de St. Alphonse, to inform me of his safe passage. Shortly after I received a letter from Bernadotte himself, recommending one of his *aides de camp*, M. Villatte, who was the bearer of it. This letter contained the same sentiments of friendship as those I used to receive from General Bernadotte, and formed a contrast with the correspondence of King Jerôme, who when he wrote to me assumed the regal character, and prayed that God would have me in his holy keeping. However, the following is the Prince Royal's letter:—

My dear Bourrienne—I have directed M. Villatte to see you on his way through Hamburg, and to bear my friendly remembrances to you. Gentil has addressed his letter to you, which I suppose you have already received. Adieu, care for me always, and believe in the unalterable attachment of yours,

(Signed) Charles John.

P.S.—I beg you will present my compliments to madame and all your family. Embrace my little cousin for me.

The *little cousin*, so called by Bernadotte, was one of my daughters, then a child, whom Bernadotte used to be very fond of while he was at Hamburg.

Departing from the order of date, I will anticipate the future, and relate all I know respecting the real causes of the misunderstanding which arose between Bernadotte

and Napoleon. Bonaparte viewed the choice of the Swedes with great displeasure, because he was well aware that Bernadotte had too much integrity and honour to serve him in the north as a political puppet set in motion by means of strings which he might pull at Paris or at his headquarters. His dissatisfaction upon this point occasioned an interesting correspondence, part of which, consisting of letters from Bernadotte to the Emperor, is in my possession. The Emperor had allowed Bernadotte to retain in his service, for a year at least, the French officers who were his *aides de camp;* but that permission was soon revoked, and the Prince Royal of Sweden wrote to Napoleon the following letter of remonstrance :—

At the moment when I was about to address my thanks to your Majesty for your kindness in continuing, during another year, the permission you granted to the French officers who accompanied me to Sweden, I learn that your Majesty has revoked that favour. This unexpected disappointment, and in fact everything that I learn from Paris, indicates that your Majesty is not well disposed towards me. What have I done that deserves this treatment ? I must look to calumny as the sole cause. In the new position in which fortune has placed me I am doubtless likely to be more than ever exposed to calumny if I do not find a defender in the heart of your Majesty. Whatever may be said to you, Sire, I beg of you to believe that I have nothing to reproach myself with, and that I am entirely devoted to your person, not only by the strength of old ties but by an unalterable affection. If the affairs of Sweden do not go on entirely as your Majesty wishes it is solely owing to the Constitution. It is not in the power of the King to control the Constitution, still less is it in mine. In this country there are many separate interests to be united into one great national interest; there are four orders of the State to be amalgamated into one ; and it is only by the most prudent and circumspect conduct that I can hope one day to ascend the throne of Sweden. As M. Gentil de St. Alphonse returns to France, in conformity with your Majesty's orders, I commission him to deliver you this letter. Your Majesty may question him. He has seen everything, and he will be able to explain to your Majesty how difficult is my situation. He can assure your Majesty how anxious I am to please you, and that I am in a state

of continual perplexity between my new duties and the fear of displeasing you. I am grieved that your Majesty should withdraw the officers whose services you granted me for a year, but in obedience to your commands I send them back to France. Perhaps your Majesty may be inclined to change your determination; in which case I beg that you will yourself fix the number of officers you may think proper to send me. I shall receive them with gratitude. If, on the contrary, your Majesty should retain them in France, I recommend them to your favour. They have always served me well, and they have had no share in the rewards which were distributed after the last campaign.

Napoleon's dissatisfaction with the Prince Royal now changed to decided resentment. He repented having acceded to his departure from France, and he made no secret of his sentiments, for he said before his courtiers, "That he would like to send Bernadotte to Vincennes to finish his study of the Swedish language." Bernadotte was informed of this, but he could not believe that the Emperor had ever entertained such a design. *However, a conspiracy was formed in Sweden against Bernadotte, whom a party of foreign brigands were hired to kidnap in the neighbourhood of Haga;* but the plot was discovered, and the conspirators were compelled to embark without their prey.[1] The Emperor having at the same time seized upon Swedish Pomerania, the Prince Royal wrote him a second letter in these terms:—

From the papers which have just arrived I learn that a division of the army, under the command of the Prince of Eckmuhl, invaded Swedish Pomerania on the night of the 26th of January; that the division continued to advance, entered the capital of the Duchy, and took possession of the island of Rugen. The King expects that your Majesty will explain the reasons which have induced you to act in a manner so contrary to the faith of existing treaties. My old connection with your Majesty warrants me in requesting you to declare your motives without delay, in order that I

[1] A Swedish gentleman has assured us that these brigands were in the pay of Bonaparte.—*Editor of 1836 edition.*

may give my advice to the King as to the conduct which Sweden ought hereafter to adopt. This gratuitous outrage against Sweden is felt deeply by the nation, and still more, Sire, by me, to whom is entrusted the honour of defending it. Though I have contributed to the triumphs of France, though I have always desired to see her respected and happy; yet I can never think of sacrificing the interests, honour, and independence of the country which has adopted me. Your Majesty, who has so ready a perception of what is just, must admit the propriety of my resolution. Though I am not jealous of the glory and power which surrounds you, I cannot submit to the dishonour of being regarded as a vassal. Your Majesty governs the greatest part of Europe, but your dominion does not extend to the nation which I have been called to govern; my ambition is limited to the defence of Sweden. The effect produced upon the people by the invasion of which I complain may lead to consequences which it is impossible to foresee; and although I am not a Coriolanus, and do not command the Volsci, I have a sufficiently good opinion of the Swedes to assure you that they dare undertake anything to avenge insults which they have not provoked, and to preserve rights to which they are as much attached as to their lives.

I was in Paris when the Emperor received Bernadotte's letter on the occupation of Swedish Pomerania. When Bonaparte read it I was informed that he flew into a violent rage, and even exclaimed, "You shall submit to your degradation, or die sword in hand!" But his rage was impotent. The unexpected occupation of Swedish Pomerania obliged the King of Sweden to come to a decided rupture with France, and to seek other allies, for Sweden was not strong enough in herself to maintain neutrality in the midst of the general conflagration of Europe after the disastrous campaign of Moscow. The Prince Royal, therefore, declared to Russia and England that in consequence of the unjust invasion of Pomerania Sweden was at war with France, and he despatched Comte de Lowenhjelm, the King's *aide de camp*, with a letter explanatory of his views. Napoleon sent many notes to Stockholm, where M. Alquier, his Ambassador, according to his in-

structions, had maintained a haughty and even insulting tone towards Sweden. Napoleon's overtures, after the manifestations of his anger, and after the attempt to carry off the Prince Royal, which could be attributed only to him, were considered by the Prince Royal merely as a snare. But in the hope of reconciling the duties he owed to both his old and his new country he addressed to the Emperor the following firm and moderate letter :—

I have received some notes, the contents of which induce me to come to a candid explanation with your Majesty. When by the wish of the Swedish people, I was called to the succession of the throne, I hoped, on quitting France, that I should always be able to reconcile my personal affections with the interests of my new country. My heart cherished the hope that I could identify myself with the affections of this people and at the same time preserve the recollection of my early connections, and never lose sight of the glory of France, nor of my sincere attachment to your Majesty, an attachment founded on our fraternity in arms, which was distinguished by so many great actions. Full of this hope I arrived in Sweden. I found a nation generally attached to France, but more jealous of their own liberty and laws, anxious for your friendship, Sire, but not wishing to purchase it at the expense of honour and independence. Your Majesty's Ambassador thought proper to disregard this national feeling, and has ruined all by his arrogance. His communications bore no trace of the respect due from one crowned head to another. In fulfilling, according to the dictates of his own passions, your Majesty's intentions, Baron Alquier spoke like a Roman Proconsul, forgetting that he did not address himself to slaves. This Ambassador was the cause of the distrust which Sweden began to entertain respecting your Majesty's intentions, and which subsequent events were calculated to confirm. I have already had the honour, Sire, in my letters of 19th November and 8th December 1810, to make your Majesty acquainted with the situation of Sweden, and her wish to find a protector in your Majesty. She could only attribute your Majesty's silence to an unmerited indifference, and it became her duty to take precautions against the storm which was ready to burst upon the Continent. Sire, mankind have already suffered too much; during twenty years the world has been deluged with blood, and all that is necessary to raise your Majesty's glory to the highest pitch is to put a

period to these disasters. If your Majesty wishes the King should give the Emperor Alexander to understand that there is a possibility of reconciliation I have sufficient faith in the magnanimity of that monarch to venture to assure you that he will readily listen to overtures which would be at once equitable for your Empire and for the North. If an event so unexpected, and so generally desired, should take place, what blessings would the people of the Continent invoke for your Majesty! Their gratitude would be increased in proportion to the fear now entertained of the return of a scourge which has already made such cruel ravages. One of the happiest moments I have known since I quitted France was that in which I was assured that your Majesty had not entirely forgotten me. You have truly divined my sentiments. You have perceived how deeply they would be wounded by the painful prospect of either seeing the interests of Sweden separated from those of France, or of finding myself compelled to sacrifice the interests of a country by which I have been adopted with such unlimited confidence. Sire, although a Swede by the obligations of honour, duty, and religion, yet by feeling I am still identified with France, my native country, which I have always faithfully served from my boyhood. Every step I take in Sweden, and the homage I receive here, revive those recollections of glory to which I chiefly owe my elevation, and I cannot disguise from myself the fact that Sweden, in choosing me, intended to pay a tribute of esteem to the French people.

This letter throws great light on the conduct of the Emperor with respect to Bernadotte; for Napoleon was not the man whom any one whatever would have ventured to remind of facts, the accuracy of which was in the least degree questionable. Such then were the relations between Napoleon and the Prince Royal of Sweden. When I shall bring to light some curious secrets, which have hitherto been veiled beneath the mysteries of the Restoration, it will be seen by what means Napoleon, before his fall, again sought to wreak his vengeance upon Bernadotte.

On the 4th of December I had the honour to see the Princess Royal of Sweden, who arrived that day at Hamburg.[1] She merely passed through the city on her way

[1] Madame Bernadotte, afterwards Queen of Sweden, was a Mademoiselle Clary, and younger sister to the wife of Joseph Bonaparte; hence the relationship with

to Stockholm to join her husband, but she remained but a short time in Sweden,—two months, I believe, at most, not being able to reconcile herself to the ancient Scandinavia. As to the Prince Royal, he soon became inured to the climate, having been for many years employed in the north.

After this my stay at Hamburg was not of long duration. Bonaparte's passion for territorial aggrandisement knew no bounds, and the turn of the Hanse Towns now arrived. By taking possession of these towns and territories he merely accomplished a design formed long previously. I, however, was recalled with many compliments, and under the specious pretext that the Emperor wished to hear my opinions respecting the country in

Bonaparte of which Bernandotte speaks. Monsieur Clary, the father of these two Queens, was a very respectable merchant at Marseilles. The following anecdote we have had from a near connection of the family. At a humble stage of his fortunes Napoleon sought the hand of Madame Bernadotte, his brother Joseph having already married her elder sister. But Monsieur Clary would not hear of the match. "*Pas de tout*—No, no," said he, "one poor Bonaparte in my family is quite enough!" Joseph, the to-be-hereafter King of Naples, and of Spain and the Indies, was then fagging in Clary's counting-house at invoices and bills of sales! It was some years later that Bernadotte obtained the hand of the young lady which had been refused to Napoleon. Madame Bernadotte (we speak from personal knowledge) was, even when she had become a Queen, a kind-hearted, amiable woman, with a few eccentricities of character and conduct. The reader may find a very interesting sketch of her Swedish Majesty in the *Memoirs of the Duchesse d'Abrantès.*

In the operatic company of the theatre San Carlo, at Naples, there was a poor French *danseuse*, sufficiently *passée* and miserable, who, in the vicissitudes of time and fortune, had almost sunk into the subordinate rank of a mere *figurante*. Some quarter of a century before the time when we first knew her this woman had been the much-loved mistress of the King of Sweden—then Lieutenant Bernadotte of the French Republican Army. In the ardour of his affection Bernadotte proposed marriage, but the condition and prospects of the parties were considered by Mademoiselle as too unequal. "No, no," said she, "I am improving—I am getting on in my profession—I may make a fortune, and you, *cher* Bernadotte, though a good fellow enough, are only a *pauvre soldat.*" We have heard Mademoiselle say twenty times, "Only see what is destiny! At this hour I might have been Queen of Sweden, instead of being obliged to kick my heels about here for fifteen ducats a month!" (fifteen Neapolitan ducats, or about £2 : 10s. English money). The story was universally known at Naples, and her companions on the boards almost invariably called her, in jest, the Queen of Sweden, or Your Majesty. We left her Majesty at Naples in the year 1827.

The whole story would have been an incident for Candide, or the best of Voltaire's cynical novels.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

which I had been residing. At the beginning of December I received a letter from M. de Champagny stating that the Emperor wished to see me in order to consult with me upon different things relating to Hamburg. In this note I was told "that the information I had obtained respecting Hamburg and the north of Germany might be useful to the public interest, which must be the most gratifying reward of my labours." The reception which awaited me will presently be seen. The conclusion of the letter spoke in very flattering terms of the manner in which I had discharged my duties. I received it on the 8th of December, and next day I set out for Paris. When I arrived at Mayence I was enabled to form a correct idea of the fine compliments which had been paid me, and of the Emperor's anxiety to have my opinion respecting the Hanse Towns. In Mayence I met the courier who was proceeding to announce the union of the Hanse Towns with the French Empire. I confess that, notwithstanding the experience I had acquired of Bonaparte's duplicity, or rather, of the infinite multiplicity of his artifices, he completely took me by surprise on that occasion.

On my arrival in Paris I did not see the Emperor, but the first *Moniteur* I read contained the formula of a *Sénatus-consulte*,[1] which united the Hanse Towns, Lauenburg, etc., to the French Empire by the right of the strongest. This new and important augmentation of territory could not fail to give uneasiness to Russia. Alexander manifested his dissatisfaction by prohibiting the importation of our agricultural produce and manufactures into Russia. Finally, as the Continental system

[1] On the 13th of December 1810 a *Sénatus-consulte* annexed Holland, the Hanse Towns (Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck), Lauenburg, Oldenburg, and the north of Germany, above a line drawn eastward from the junction of the Rhine and the Lippe, etc., to the Baltic. This, with previous annexations and conquests, gave Napoleon the whole coast-line of the Continent, except Russia, Turkey, Portugal, and the parts of Spain not occupied by his troops. It gave, however, deep and final offence to Russia, whose royal house was connected with that of Oldenburg.

had destroyed all trade by the ports of the Baltic, Russia showed herself more favourable to the English, and gradually reciprocal complaints of bad faith led to that war whose unfortunate issue was styled by M. Talleyrand "the beginning of the end."

I have now to make the reader acquainted with an extraordinary demand made upon me by the Emperor through the medium of M. de Champagny. In one of my first interviews with that Minister after my return to Paris he thus addressed me: "The Emperor has entrusted me with a commission to you which I am obliged to execute. 'When you see Bourrienne,' said the Emperor, 'tell him I wish him to pay 6,000,000 into your chest to defray the expense of building the new Office for Foreign Affairs.'" I was so astonished at this unfeeling and inconsiderate demand that I was utterly unable to make any reply. This then was my recompense for having obtained money and supplies during my residence at Hamburg to the extent of nearly 100,000,000, by which his treasury and army had profited in moments of difficulty! M. de Champagny added that the Emperor did not wish to receive me. He asked what answer he should bear to his Majesty. I still remained silent, and the Minister again urged me to give an answer. "Well, then," said I, "tell him he may go to the devil." The Minister naturally wished to obtain some variation from this laconic answer, but I would give no other; and I afterwards learned from Duroc that M. de Champagny was compelled to communicate it to Napoleon. "Well," asked the latter, "have you seen Bourrienne?"—"Yes, Sire."—"Did you tell him I wished him to pay 6,000,000 into your chest?"—"Yes, Sire."—"And what did he say?"—"Sire, I dare not inform your Majesty. . . ."—"What did he say? I insist upon knowing."—"Since you insist on my telling you, Sire, M. de Bourrienne said your Majesty might go to—the devil."—"Ah! ah! did he really say so?" The Emperor then re-

tired to the recess of a window, where he remained alone for seven or eight minutes, biting his nails, in the fashion of Berthier, and doubtless giving free scope to his projects of vengeance. He then turned to the Minister and spoke to him of quite another subject. Bonaparte had so nursed himself in the idea of making me pay the 6,000,000 that every time he passed the Office for Foreign Affairs he said to those who accompanied him, "Bourrienne must pay for that after all."[1]

Though I was not admitted to the honour of sharing the splendour of the Imperial Court, yet I had the satisfaction of finding that, in spite of my disgrace, those of my old friends who were worth anything evinced the same regard for me as heretofore. I often saw Duroc, who snatched some moments from his more serious occupations to come and chat with me respecting all that had occurred since my secession from Bonaparte's cabinet. I shall not attempt to give a verbatim account of my conversations with Duroc, as I have only my memory to guide me; but I believe I shall not depart from the truth in describing them as follows:—

On his return from the last Austrian campaign Napoleon, as I have already stated, proceeded to Fontainebleau,

[1] This demand of money from Bourrienne is explained in *Erreurs* (tome ii. p. 225) by the son of Davoust. Bourrienne had been suspected by Napoleon of making large sums at Hamburg by allowing breaches of the Continental system. In one letter to Davoust Napoleon speaks of an "immense fortune," and in another, that Bourrienne is reported to have gained seven or eight millions at Hamburg in giving licences or making arbitrary seizures. Napoleon also asks for information about several millions said to have been paid to some Frenchmen by the Senate of Hamburg. The replies given to these questions were so unsatisfactory that Bourrienne was recalled, and the inquiry into his conduct was continued for some time without positive result. That Napoleon claimed restitution is most probable, but Bourrienne, who did not venture upon any public familiarity in 1787, would not have dared to make the reply he reports in 1810. It is to the Emperor's inquiries being directed to Davoust that is owing the attack made on the Marshal farther on. Bourrienne's position was one of great temptation, but an honest man should have had no difficulty in clearing himself. The correspondence is significant, as showing how far the Emperor was from permitting the illegal requisitions too often made by his officers, and how difficult it was to stop or punish them. Part of the ill-will of many officers in 1814 is attributed to the severity with which Napoleon was following up their robberies.

where he was joined by Josephine. Then, for the first time, the communication which had always existed between the apartments of the husband and wife was closed. Josephine was fully alive to the fatal prognostics which were to be deduced from this conjugal separation. Duroc informed me that she sent for him, and on entering her chamber, he found her bathed in tears. "I am lost!" she exclaimed in a tone of voice the remembrance of which seemed sensibly to affect Duroc even while relating the circumstance to me: "I am utterly lost! all is over now! You, Duroc, I know, have always been my friend, and so has Rapp. It is not you who have persuaded him to part from me. This is the work of my enemies Savary and Junot! But they are more his enemies than mine. And my poor Eugène! how will he be distressed when he learns I am repudiated by an ungrateful man! . . . Yes, Duroc, I may truly call him ungrateful. . . . My God! my God! what will become of us?" . . . Josephine sobbed bitterly while she thus addressed Duroc.

Before I was acquainted with the singular demand which M. de Champagny was instructed to make to me I requested Duroc to inquire of the Emperor his reason for not wishing to see me. The Grand Marshal faithfully executed my commission, but he received only the following answer: "Do you think I have nothing better to do than to give Bourrienne an audience? that would indeed furnish gossip for Paris and Hamburg. He has always sided with the emigrants; he would be talking to me of past times; he was for Josephine! My wife, Duroc, is near her confinement; I shall have a son, I am sure! . . . Bourrienne is not a man of the day; I have made giant strides since he left France; in short, I do not want to see him. He is a grumbler by nature; and you know, my dear Duroc, I do not like men of that sort."

I had not been above a week in Paris when Duroc re-

lated this speech to me. Rapp was not in France at the time, to my great regret. Much against his inclination he had been appointed to some duties connected with the Imperial marriage ceremonies, but shortly after, having given offence to Napoleon by some observation relating to the Faubourg St. Germain, he had received orders to repair to Dantzic, of which place he had already been Governor.

The Emperor's refusal to see me made my situation in Paris extremely delicate; and I was at first in doubt whether I might seek an interview with Josephine. Duroc, however, having assured me that Napoleon would have no objection to it, I wrote requesting permission to wait upon her. I received an answer the same day, and on the morrow I repaired to Malmaison. I was ushered into the tent drawing-room, where I found Josephine and Hortense. When I entered Josephine stretched out her hand to me, saying, "Ah! my friend!" These words she pronounced with deep emotion, and tears prevented her from continuing. She threw herself on the ottoman on the left of the fireplace, and beckoned me to sit down beside her. Hortense stood by the fireplace, endeavouring to conceal her tears. Josephine took my hand, which she pressed in both her own; and, after a struggle to overcome her feelings, she said, "My dear Bourriene, I have drained my cup of misery. He has cast me off! forsaken me! He conferred upon me the vain title of Empress only to render my fall the more marked. Ah! we judged him rightly! I knew the destiny that awaited me; for what would he not sacrifice to his ambition!" As she finished these words one of Queen Hortense's ladies entered with a message to her; Hortense stayed a few moments, apparently to recover from the emotion under which she was labouring, and then withdrew, so that I was left alone with Josephine. She seemed to wish for the relief of disclosing her sorrows, which I was curious to hear from her own lips; women have such a striking way of telling their distresses.

Josephine confirmed what Duroc had told me respecting the two apartments at Fontainebleau; then, coming to the period when Bonaparte had declared to her the necessity of a separation, she said, "My dear Bourrienne, during all the years you were with us you know I made you the confidant of my thoughts, and kept you acquainted with my sad forebodings. They are now cruelly fulfilled. I acted the part of a good wife to the very last. I have suffered all, and I am resigned! . . . What fortitude did it require latterly to endure my situation, when, though no longer his wife, I was obliged to seem so in the eyes of the world! With what eyes do courtiers look upon a repudiated wife! I was in a state of vague uncertainty worse than death until the fatal day when he at length avowed to me what I had long before read in his looks! On the 30th of November 1809 we were dining together as usual, I had not uttered a word during that sad dinner, and he had broken silence only to ask one of the servants what o'clock it was. As soon as Bonaparte had taken his coffee he dismissed all the attendants, and I remained alone with him. I saw in the expression of his countenance what was passing in his mind, and I knew that my hour was come. He stepped up to me—he was trembling, and I shuddered; he took my hand, pressed it to his heart, and after gazing at me for a few moments in silence he uttered these fatal words: 'Josephine! my dear Josephine! You know how I have loved you! . . . To you, to you alone, I owe the only moments of happiness I have tasted in this world. But, Josephine, my destiny is not to be controlled by my will. My dearest affections must yield to the interests of France.' —'Say no more,' I exclaimed, 'I understand you; I expected this, but the blow is not the less mortal.' I could not say another word," continued Josephine; "I know not what happened after I seemed to lose my reason; I became insensible, and when I recovered I found myself in my chamber. Your friend Corvisart and my poor daughter

were with me. Bonaparte came to see me in the evening; and oh! Bourrienne, how can I describe to you what I felt at the sight of him; even the interest he evinced for me seemed an additional cruelty. Alas! I had good reason to fear ever becoming an Empress!"

I knew not what consolation to offer to Josephine; and knowing as I did the natural lightness of her character, I should have been surprised to find her grief so acute, after the lapse of a year, had I not been aware that there are certain chords which, when struck, do not speedily cease to vibrate in the heart of a woman. I sincerely pitied Josephine, and among all the things I said to assuage her sorrow, the consolation to which she appeared most sensible was the reprobation which public opinion had pronounced on Bonaparte's divorce, and on this subject I said nothing but the truth, for Josephine was generally beloved. I reminded her of a prediction I had made under happier circumstances, viz. on the day that she came to visit us in our little house at Ruel. "My dear friend," said she, "I have not forgotten it, and I have often thought of all you then said. For my part, I knew he was lost from the day he made himself Emperor. Adieu! Bourrienne, come and see me soon again; come often, for we have a great deal to talk about; you know how happy I always am to see you." Such was, to the best of my recollection, what passed at my first interview with Josephine after my return from Hamburg.

CHAPTER XXIV.

1811.

Arrest of La Sahla—My visit to him—His confinement at Vincennes—Subsequent history of La Sahla—His second journey to France—Detonating powder—Plot hatched against me by the Prince of Eckmuhl—Friendly offices of the Duc de Rovigo—Bugbears of the police—Savary, Minister of Police.

I HAD been in Paris about two months when a young man of the name of La Sahla was arrested on the suspicion of having come from Saxony to attempt the life of the Emperor. La Sahla informed the Duc de Rovigo, then Minister of the Police, that he wished to see me, assigning as a reason for this the reputation I had left behind me in Germany. The Emperor, I presume, had no objection to the interview, for I received an invitation to visit the prisoner. I accordingly repaired to the branch office of the Minister of the Police, in the Rue des St. Pères, where I was introduced to a young man between seventeen and eighteen years of age.

My conversation with the young man, whose uncle was, I believe, Minister to the King of Saxony, interested me greatly in his behalf; I determined, if possible, to save La Sahla, and I succeeded. I proceeded immediately to the Duc de Rovigo, and I convinced him that under the circumstances of the case it was important to make it be believed that the young man was insane. I observed that if he were brought before a court he would repeat all that he had stated to me, and probably enter into disclosures which might instigate fresh attempts at assassination. Perhaps an avenger of La Sahla might rise up amongst

the students of Leipzig, at which university he had spent his youth. These reasons, together with others, had the success I hoped for. The Emperor afterwards acknowledged the prudent course which had been adopted respecting La Sahla; when speaking at St. Helena of the conspiracies against his life he said, "I carefully concealed all that I could."[1]

In conformity with my advice La Sahla was sent to Vincennes, where he remained until the end of March 1814. He was then removed to the castle of Saumur, from which he was liberated at the beginning of April. I had heard nothing of him for three years, when one day, shortly after the Restoration, whilst sitting at breakfast with my family at my house in the Rue Hauteville, I heard an extraordinary noise in the antechamber, and before I had time to ascertain its cause I found myself in the arms of a young man, who embraced me with extraordinary ardour. It was La Sahla. He was in a transport of gratitude and joy at his liberation, and at the accomplishment of the events which he had wished to accelerate by assassination. La Sahla returned to Saxony and I saw no more of him, but while I was in Hamburg in 1815, whither I was sent by Louis XVIII., I learned that on the 5th of June a violent explosion was heard in the Chamber of Representatives at Paris, which was at first supposed to be a clap of thunder, but was soon ascertained to have been occasioned by a young Saxon having fallen with a packet of detonating powder in his pocket.

On receiving this intelligence I imagined, I know not why, that this young Saxon was La Sahla, and that he had probably intended to blow up Napoleon and even the Leg-

[1] This statement of Bourrienne is worth remarking as an unconscious refutation of the wild stories of the secret executions of the Empire. We find a man well acquainted with all the movements of the administration taking it for granted that an intended assassin would be publicly tried as a matter of course if he himself did not suggest other treatment. The case is the more noteworthy as Napoleon was anxious to hush up such attempts. The non-disappearance of this man may well answer all the absurd calumnies about the death of Captain Wright, etc.

islative Body; but I have since ascertained that I was under a mistake as to his intentions. My knowledge of La Sahla's candour induces me to believe the truth of his declarations to the police; and if there be any inaccuracies in the report of these declarations I do not hesitate to attribute them to the police itself, of which Fouché was the head at the period in question. The following is the account of the event above mentioned, which appears to be accurate, with the exception of the conclusion:—

During the sitting of the Chamber of Representatives, about half-past one o'clock, a violent explosion took place, which was at first supposed to be a clap of thunder. The following are the particulars connected with the circumstance:—A Saxon, about twenty-eight years of age, who is said to belong to a family of distinction, had in his coat-pocket about four ounces of detonating powder. He had come in a carriage to the Chamber of the Legislative Body. He entered the hall, but left it soon after, and at the corner of the Rue de Bourgogne his foot slipped, and he fell upon the packet of detonating powder. A violent explosion was the consequence; his coat and pantaloons were torn, and himself dreadfully mutilated. None of the passers-by were hurt. He was conveyed in this state to the Prefecture of the Police, where he was interrogated. He described himself to be Baron La Sahla, and is, we are told, of a rich and distinguished family.

Some years since he came to France with the intention of assassinating or poisoning the Emperor. He was arrested and confined at first in the fortress of Vincennes, and afterwards removed to the castle of Saumur. Shortly after the entrance of the Allies into Paris he was liberated, and returned to his own country. The Emperor having re-ascended the throne, he determined to return to France. He does not deny having formerly entertained the design of killing the Emperor, whom he regarded as the oppressor of Germany; but that oppression having ceased, his feelings of hatred towards the author have also disappeared. The spoliations committed upon Saxony by the Congress, and particularly by the Prussians, exasperated him greatly against the latter, and when he heard of the Emperor's landing, and the fortunate issue of his enterprise, he beheld in him, henceforth, the liberator of his unfortunate country, and he wished to render him all the service in his power.

He therefore determined to return to France. He requested an

audience of M. Hardenberg, and having obtained it, he pretended to be more than ever bent on his former plan of assassinating Napoleon. M. Hardenberg, after praising his good intentions, referred him to Marshal Blucher, whom he requested to furnish him with the means of proceeding to France. Marshal Blucher's headquarters were then at Namur, and the chief officer of his staff, who gave La Sahla a passport, advised him, with a view of facilitating his enterprise, to carry with him some detonating powder, and mentioned a shopkeeper at Namur of whom he could procure it. In order to avoid exciting suspicion La Sahla went himself to the dealer and purchased only four ounces of the fulminating powder. He then proceeded to France, and on his arrival in Paris he instantly communicated to the Government all the information he had acquired respecting the forces of the Allies, their plans, their resources, etc. By endeavouring to serve France he believed that he was serving his own country. The police was satisfied that M. de La Sahla had communicated to the Government some very valuable details, both political and military. He also informed the War Minister that he had brought with him a little packet of detonating powder, and offered, it is said, to give it up; but it seems that no one was inclined to receive the dangerous deposit. Being asked the reason why he carried the powder about him he replied that he did not wish to have it at the hotel where he lodged, for fear that any person should touch it and occasion some accident. He is further said to have given M. Metternich proofs that M. Stein, the Prussian Minister, had urged him to poison M. de Mongelas, the Bavarian Minister, and that M. Metternich appeared indignant and horror-struck at M. Stein's conduct. If these delarations be true it must be acknowledged that some members of the Prussian Cabinet then resorted to diplomatic measures of a very extraordinary nature.

There is an evident error in the above report respecting the age of M. La Sahla, who in 1815 could not be more than twenty-three. It is the latter part of the report which induced me to observe above, that if there were any inaccuracies in the statement they were more likely to proceed from Fouché's police than the false representations of young La Sahla. It is difficult to give credit without proof to such accusations. However, I decide nothing; but I consider it my duty to express doubts of the truth of these charges brought against the two Prussian Ministers, of

whom the Prince of Wittgenstein, a man of undoubted honour, has always spoken to me in the best of terms.

There is nothing to prove that La Sahla returned to France the second time with the same intentions as before. This project, however, is a mystery to me, and his detonating powder gives rise to many conjectures.[1]

I had scarcely left Hamburg when the Prince of Eckmuhl (Marshal Davoust) was appointed Governor-General of that place on the union of the Hanse Towns with the Empire. From that period I was constantly occupied in contending against the persecutions and denunciations which he racked his imagination to invent. I cannot help artributing to those persecutions the Emperor's coolness towards me on my arrival in Paris. But as Davoust's calumnies were devoid of proof, he resorted to a scheme by which a certain appearance of probability might supply the place of truth. When I arrived in Paris, at the commencement of 1811, I was informed by an excellent

[1] This account of La Sahla produced a warm remonstrance from Baron Stein, which appeared first in the Prussian *State Gazette*, and was afterwards copied into many other papers. In the Baron's reply he declares that he never saw La Sahla until that person visited him in Paris in 1814. The Baron was not then a Prussian Minister, having been dismissed by Napoleon in 1808 from that cabinet, of which he never afterwards was a member. He asks, what motive could he have for poisoning Count Mongelas, and what possible influence could such a crime have on the political questions which were agitated in the autumn of 1814 and the spring of 1815? A complete copy of the Baron's vindication was annexed to the German translation of Bourrienne's Memoirs. Baron Gagern applied to Prince Metternich for a declaration from him on the subject, and received in return the following letter:—

"The passage in M. de Bourrienne's Memoirs which has attracted Baron Stein's attention produced a similar effect on me. I never knew any individual called La Sahla, either personally or by name. Never, under any name whatever, did any person ever come to me and attribute to Baron Stein a purpose having the slightest relation to that stated in the passage in question. I honour the indignation which Baron Stein feels. An accusation which wounds honour may exist, and be considered true, while it remains uncontradicted, by the greater part of readers, who always have a predisposition to credulity. They ought to be undeceived; and the necessity for contradiction is the more pressing when an error appears in a work like M. de Bourrienne's, which is stamped with a character entirely different from the multitude of wretched publications which daily appear."

Baron Gagern afterwards corresponded with Bourrienne, who stated that he could not make the desired correction until he published a third edition. This proposal, however, was not satisfactory to Baron Stein (*Erreurs*, tome ii. p. 200).

friend I had left at Hamburg, M. Bouvier, an emigrant, and one of the hostages of Louis XVI., that in a few days I would receive a letter which would commit me, and likewise M. de Talleyrand and General Rapp. I had never had any connection on matters of business, with either of these individuals, for whom I entertained the most sincere attachment. They, like myself, were not in the good graces of Marshal Davoust, who could not pardon the one for his incontestable superiority of talent, and the other for his blunt honesty. On the receipt of M. Bouvier's letter I carried it to the Duc de Rovigo, whose situation made him perfectly aware of the intrigues which had been carried on against me since I had left Hamburg by one whose ambition aspired to the Viceroyalty ef Poland. On that, as on many other similar occasions, the Duc de Rovigo advocated my cause with Napoleon. We agreed that it would be best to await the arrival of the letter which M. Bouvier had announced. Three weeks elapsed, and the letter did not appear. The Duc de Rovigo, therefore, told me that I must have been misinformed. However, I was certain that M. Bouvier would not have sent me the information on slight grounds, and I therefore supposed that the project had only been delayed. I was not wrong in my conjecture, for at length the letter arrived. To what a depth of infamy men can descend! The letter was from a man whom I had known at Hamburg, whom I had obliged, whom I had employed as a spy. His epistle was a miracle of impudence. After relating some extraordinary transactions which he said had taken place between us, and which all bore the stamp of falsehood, he requested me to send him by return of post the sum of 60,000 francs on account of what I had promised him for some business he executed in England by the direction of M. de Talleyrand, General Rapp, and myself. Such miserable wretches are often caught in the snares they spread for others. This was the case in the present instance, for the fellow had

committed the blunder of fixing upon the year 1802 as the period of this pretended business in England, that is to say, two years before my appointment as Minister-Plenipotentiary to the Hanse Towns. This anachronism was not the only one I discovered in the letter.

I took a copy of the letter, and immediately carried the original to the Duc de Rovigo, as had been agreed between us. When I waited on the Minister he was just preparing to go to the Emperor. He took with him the letter which I brought, and also the letter which announced its arrival. As the Duc de Rovigo entered the audience-chamber Napoleon advanced to meet him, and apostrophised him thus: "Well, I have learned fine things of your Bourrienne, whom you are always defending." *The fact was, the Emperor had already received a copy of the letter, which had been opened at the Hamburg post-office.* The Duc de Rovigo told the Emperor that he had long known what his Majesty had communicated to him. He then entered into a full explanation of the intrigue, of which it was wished to render me the victim, and proved to him the more easily the falsehood of my accusers by reminding him that in 1802 I was not in Hamburg, but was still in his service at home.

It may be supposed that I was too much interested in knowing what had passed at the Tuileries not to return to the Duc de Rovigo the same day. I learned from him the particulars which I have already related. He added that he had observed to the Emperor that there was no connection between Rapp and M. de Talleyrand which could warrant the suspicion of their being concerned in the affair in question. "When Napoleon saw the matter in its true light," said Savary, "when I proved to him the palpable existence of the odious machination, he could not find terms to express his indignation. 'What baseness, what horrible villainy!' he exclaimed; and gave me orders to arrest and bring to Paris the infamous writer of

the letter; and you may rely upon it his orders shall be promptly obeyed."

Savary, as he had said, instantly despatched orders for the arrest of the writer, whom he directed to be sent to France. On his arrival he was interrogated respecting the letter. He declared that he had written it at the instigation and under the dictation of Marshal Davoust,[1] for doing which he received a small sum of money as a reward.[2] He also confessed that when the letter was put into the post the Prince of Eckmuhl ordered the Director of the Post to open it, take a copy, then seal it again, and send it to its address—that is to say, to me—and the copy to the Emperor. The writer of the letter was banished to Marseilles, or to the Island of Hyères, but the individual who dictated it continued a Marshal, a Prince, and a Governor-General, and still looked forward to the Viceroyalty of Poland! Such was the discriminating justice of the Empire; and Davoust continued his endeavours to revenge himself by other calumnies for my not having considered him a man of talent. I must do the Duc de Rovigo the justice to say that, though his fidelity to Napoleon was, as it always had been, boundless, yet whilst he executed the Emperor's orders he endeavoured to make him acquainted with the truth, as was proved by his conduct in the case I have just mentioned. He was much distressed by the sort of terror which his appointment had excited in the

[1] The explanation of these attacks on Davoust (more properly spelt Davont), has already been given in the note on the demand made on Bonrrienne on his retnrn from Hamburg. The snbject is treated at length by the Marshal's son in *Erreurs*, tome ii. p. 225. Davoust was at Paris on leave, and had not even been to Hambnrg when Napoleon first called on him for information abont Bourrienne's peculations, and the first reports against Bonrrienne, made in reply to the Emperor's qnestions, were furnished by the Marshal's Chief of the Staff, and simply forwarded by him. The letters of Davoust seem to show no special illwill towards Bonrrienne, and it would be difficult to find any reason for a man in Davonst's high position intriguing against the ex-Secretary. The Comte Alexandre de Puymaigre (*Souvenirs*, p. 135), not very favonrably disposed towards Davoust, speaks to the general and strong belief at Hamburg that Bonrrienne had made large sums of money there improperly.

[2] It does not appear at all clear why credence should be given to the informer's statement in the latter case any more than the former.

public, and he acknowledged to me that he intended to restore confidence by a more mild system than that of his predecessor. I had observed formerly that Savary did not coincide in the opinion I had always entertained of Fouché, but when once the Duc de Rovigo endeavoured to penetrate the labyrinth of police, counter-police, inspections and hierarchies of espionage, he found they were all bugbears which Fouché had created to alarm the Emperor, as gardeners put up scarecrows among the fruit-trees to frighten away the sparrows. Thus, thanks to the artifices of Fouché, the eagle was frightened as easily as the sparrows, until the period when the Emperor, convinced that Fouché was maintaining a correspondence with England through the agency of Ouvrard, dismissed him.

I saw with pleasure that Savary, the Minister of Police, wished to simplify the working of his administration, and to gradually diminish whatever was annoying in it, but, whatever might be his intentions, he was not always free to act. I acknowledge that when I read his Memoirs I saw with great impatience that in many matters he had voluntarily assumed responsibilities for acts which a word from him might have attributed to their real author. However this may be, what much pleased me in Savary was the wish he showed to learn the real truth in order to tell it to Napoleon. He received from the Emperor more than one severe rebuff. This came from the fact that since the immense aggrandisement of the Empire the ostensible Ministers, instead of rising in credit, had seen their functions diminish by degrees. Thus proposals for appointments to the higher grades of the army came from the cabinet of Berthier, and not from that of the Minister of War. Everything which concerned any part of the government of the Interior or of the Exterior, except for the administration of War and perhaps for that of Finance, had its centre in the cabinet of M. Maret, certainly an

honest man, but whose facility in saying "All is right," so much helped to make all wrong.[1]

The home trade, manufactures, and particularly several of the Parisian firms were in a state of distress the more hurtful as it contrasted so singularly with the splendour of the Imperial Court since the marriage of Napoleon with Maria Louisa. In this state of affairs a chorus of complaints reached the ears of the Duc de Rovigo every day. I must say that Savary was never kinder to me than since my disgrace; he nourished my hope of getting Napoleon to overcome the prejudices against me with which the spirit of vengeance had inspired him, and I know for certain that Savary returned to the charge more than once to manage this. The Emperor listened without anger, did not blame him for the closeness of our intimacy, and even said to him some obliging but insignificant words about me. This gave time for new machinations against me, and to fill him with fresh doubts when he had almost overcome his former ideas.[2]

[1] The evil to which Bonrrienne here allndes, the loss of power by the Ministers, was one of the great causes of the disasters of the Empire. The Minister of War was little more than a clerk, the administration of the "matériel," etc., being separated, and the higher appointments being given through Berthier without reference to him. See *Foy*, tome i. pp. 74, 75. In the absences of the Emperor from Paris the despatches of the Ministers were presented to him by Maret, Dnc de Bassano, a man ready to nndertake any responsibility. If the Emperor objected to any name submitted from Paris for an appointment, Maret was at hand to snggest another person, and the nominally responsible Ministers lost power and credit. This was especially the case in the later years of the Empire (*Savary*, tome iii. p. 35).

[2] Savary, Dnc de Rovigo, had become Minister of Police on the disgrace of Fonché in Jnne 1810, and in his own Memoirs he describes his reforms in his administration to the same effect as Bourrienne does. He corroborates Bourrienne as to their continned intimacy, and his efforts to get Bourrienne again employed, bnt his own character was not of a description to add much weight to his recommendation in this case.

CHAPTER XXV.

1811.

M. Czernischeff—Dissimulation of Napoleon—Napoleon and Alexander—Josephine's foresight respecting the affairs of Spain—My visits to Malmaison—Grief of Josephine—Tears and the toilet—Vast extent of the Empire—List of persons condemned to death and banishment in Piedmont—Observation of Alfieri respecting the Spaniards—Success in Spain—Check of Masséna in Portugal—Money lavished by the English—Bertrand sent to Illyria, and Marmont to Portugal—Situation of the French army—Assembling of the Cortès—Europe sacrificed to the Continental system—Conversation with Murat in the Champs Elysées—New titles and old names—Napoleon's dislike of literary men—Odes, etc., on the marriage of Napoleon—Chateaubriand and Lemercier—Death of Chénier—Chateaubriand elected his successor—His discourse read by Napoleon—Bonaparte compared to Nero—Suppression of the *Mercure*—M. de Chateaubriand ordered to leave Paris—MM. Lemercier and Esménard presented to the Emperor—Birth of the King of Rome—France in 1811.

Since my return to France I had heard much of the intrigues of M. Czernischeff, an *aide de camp* of the Emperor of Russia, who, under the pretext of being frequently sent to compliment Napoleon on the part of the Emperor Alexander, performed, in fact, the office of a spy. The conduct of Napoleon with regard to M. Czernischeff at that period struck me as singular, especially after the intelligence which before my departure from Hamburg I had transmitted to him respecting the dissatisfaction of Russia and her hostile inclinations. It is therefore clear to me that Bonaparte was well aware of the real object of M. Czernischeff's mission, and that if he appeared to give credit to the increasing professions of his friendship it was only because he still wished, as he formerly did, that

Russia might so far commit herself as to afford him a fair pretext for the commencement of hostilities in the north.

M. Czernischeff first arrived in Paris shortly after the interview at Erfurt, and after that period was almost constantly on the road between Paris and St. Petersburg; it has been computed that in the space of less than four years he travelled more than 10,000 leagues. For a long time his frequent journeyings excited no surmises, but while I was in Paris Savary began to entertain suspicions, the correctness of which it was not difficult to ascertain, so formidable was still the system of espionage, notwithstanding the precaution taken by Fouché to conceal from his successor the names of his most efficient spies. It was known that M. Czernischeff was looking out for a professor of mathematics,—doubtless to disguise the real motives for his stay in Paris by veiling them under the desire of studying the sciences. The confidant of Alexander had applied to a professor connected with a public office; and from that time all the steps of M. Czernischeff were known to the police. It was discovered that he was less anxious to question his instructor respecting the equations of a degree, or the value of unknown quantities, than to gain all the information he could about the different branches of the administration, and particularly the department of war. It *happened* that the professor knew some individuals employed in the public offices, who furnished him with intelligence, which he in turn communicated to M. Czernischeff, but not without making a report of it to the police; according to custom, instead of putting an end to this intrigue at once it was suffered fully to develop itself. Napoleon was informed of what was going on, and in this instance gave a new proof of his being an adept in the art of dissimulation, for, instead of testifying any displeasure against M. Czernischeff, he continued to receive him with the same marks of favour which

he had shown to him during his former missions to Paris. Being, nevertheless, desirous to get rid of him, without evincing a suspicion that his clandestine proceedings had been discovered, he entrusted him with a friendly letter to his brother of Russia, but Alexander was in such haste to reply to the flattering missive of his brother of France that M. Czernischeff was hurried back to Paris, having scarcely been suffered to enter the gates of St. Petersburg. I believe I am correct in the idea that Napoleon was not really displeased at the intrigues of M. Czernischeff, from the supposition that they afforded an indication of the hostile intentions of Russia towards France ; for, whatever he might say on this subject to his confidants, what reliance can we place on the man who formed the camp of Boulogne without the most distant intention of attempting a descent upon England, and who had deceived the whole world respecting that important affair without taking any one into his own confidence?

During the period of my stay in Paris the war with Spain and Portugal occupied much of the public attention ; and it proved in the end an enterprise upon which the intuition of Josephine had not deceived her. In general she intermeddled little with political affairs ; in the first place, because her doing so would have given offence to Napoleon ; and next, because her natural frivolity led her to give a preference to lighter pursuits. But I may safely affirm that she was endowed with an instinct so perfect as seldom to be deceived respecting the good or evil tendency of any measure which Napoleon engaged in ; and I remember she told me that when informed of the intention of the Emperor to bestow the throne of Spain on Joseph, she was seized with a feeling of indescribable alarm. It would be difficult to define that instinctive feeling which leads us to foresee the future ; but it is a fact that Josephine was endowed with this faculty in a more perfect degree than any other person I have ever known, and to her it was a fatal

gift, for she suffered at the same time under the weight of present and of future misfortunes.

I often visited her at Malmaison, as Duroc assured me that the Emperor had no objection to my doing so; yet he must have been fully aware that when Josephine and I were in confidential conversation he would not always be mentioned in terms of unqualified eulogy; and in truth, his first friend and his first wife might well be excused for sometimes commingling their complaints.

Though more than a twelvemonth had elapsed since the divorce grief still preyed on the heart of Josephine. "You cannot conceive, my friend," she often said to me, "all the torments that I have suffered since that fatal day! I cannot imagine how I survived it. You cannot figure to yourself the pain I endure on seeing descriptions of his *fêtes* everywhere. And the first time he came to visit me after his marriage, what a meeting was that! How many tears I shed! The days on which he comes are to me days of misery, for he spares me not. How cruel to speak of his expected heir. Bourrienne, you cannot conceive how heart-rending all this is to me! Better, far better to be exiled a thousand leagues from hence! However," added Josephine, "a few friends still remain faithful in my changed fortune, and that is now the only thing which affords me even temporary consolation." The truth is that she was extremely unhappy, and the most acceptable consolation her friends could offer her was to weep with her. Yet such was still Josephine's passion for dress, that after having wept for a quarter of an hour she would dry her tears to give audience to milliners and jewellers. The sight of a new hat would call forth all Josephine's feminine love of finery.[1] One day I remember that, taking advantage

[1] The amusing *femme de chambre* Mademoiselle Avrillion informs us that Josephine, after her divorce, amused her solitude with embroidering, and other little works of the kind. She says she was also very fond of reading, or of having books read out to her; but mademoiselle admits on fifty occasions that the principal occupation of the ex-Empress was the toilet, and that her taste for finery and expensive

of the momentary serenity occasioned by an ample display of sparkling gewgaws, I congratulated her upon the happy influence they exercised over her spirits, when she said, "My dear friend, I ought, indeed, to be indifferent to all this; but it is a habit." Josephine might have added that it was also an occupation, for it would be no exaggeration to say that if the time she wasted in tears and at her toilet had been subtracted from her life its duration would have been considerably shortened.

The vast extent of the French Empire now presented a spectacle which resembled rather the dominion of the Romans and the conquests of Charlemagne than the usual form and political changes of modern Europe.[1] In fact, for nearly two centuries, until the period of the Revolution, and particularly until the elevation of Napoleon, no remarkable changes had taken place in the boundaries of European States, if we except the partition of Poland, when two of the co-partitioners committed the error of turning the tide of Russia towards the west! Under Napoleon everything was overturned with astonishing rapidity: customs, manners, laws, were superseded

nick-nacks continued undiminished by time and many sorrows. Shortly after the divorce Josephine made a journey to the waters of Aix, in Savoy, and then a short tour in Switzerland. When she was at Coppet, where Madame de Staël was residing, she declined receiving the visit of that celebrated woman, as she feared that by so doing she would offend her former husband, the great Napoleon, who was in a state of open warfare with the author of *Corinne*.

[1] The so-called "French" armies of the time, drawn from all parts of the Empire and from the dependent States, represented the extraordinary fusion attempted by Napoleon. Thus, at the battle of Ocana there were at least troops of the following States, viz. Warsaw, Holland, Baden, Nassau, Hesse-Darmstadt, Frankfort, besides the Spaniards in Joseph's service. A Spanish division went to Denmark, the regiment from Isembourg was sent to Naples, while the Neapolitans crossed to Spain. Even the little Valais had to furnish a battalion. Blacks from San Domingo served in Naples, while sixteen nations, like so many chained dogs, advanced into Russia. Such troops could not have the spirit of a homogeneous army.

Already, in 1808, Metternich (vol. ii. p. 292) had written from Paris to his Court, "It is no longer the nation that fights: the present war (Spain) is Napoleon's war; it is not even that of his army." But Napoleon himself was aware of the danger of the Empire from its own extent. In the silence of his cabinet his secretary Meneval (tome iii. pp. 273, 274) sometimes heard him murmur, "*L'arc est trop longtemps tendu.*"

MASSÉNA.

(PRINCE OF ESSLING)

by new customs, new manners, and new laws, imposed by force, and forming a heterogeneous whole, which could not fail to dissolve, as soon as the influence of the power which had created it should cease to operate. Such was the state of Italy that I have been informed by an individual worthy of credit that if the army of Prince Eugène, instead of being victorious, had been beaten on the Piava, a deeply-organised revolution would have broken out in Piedmont, and even in the Kingdom of Italy, where, nevertheless, the majority of the people fully appreciated the excellent qualities of Eugène. I have been also credibly informed that lists were in readiness designating those of the French who were to be put to death, as well as those by whom the severe orders of the Imperial Government had been mitigated, and who were only to be banished. In fact, revolt was as natural to the Italians as submission to the Germans, and as the fury of despair to the Spanish nation. On this subject I may cite an observation contained in one of the works of Alfieri, published fifteen years before the Spanish war. Taking a cursory view of the different European nations he regarded the Spaniards as the only people possessed of "sufficient energy to struggle against foreign usurpation." Had I still been near the person of Napoleon I would most assuredly have resorted to an innocent artifice, which I had several times employed, and placed the work of Alfieri on his table open at the page I wished him to read. Alfieri's opinion of the Spanish people was in the end fully verified; and I confess I cannot think without shuddering of the torrents of blood which inundated the Peninsula; and for what? To make Joseph Bonaparte a King!

The commencement of 1811 was sufficiently favourable to the French arms in Spain, but towards the beginning of March the aspect of affairs changed. The Duke of Belluno, notwithstanding the valour of his troops, was

unsuccessful at Chiclana ;[1] and from that day the French army could not make head against the combined forces of England and Portugal. Even Masséna, notwithstanding the title of Prince of Eslingen (or Essling), which he had won under the walls of Vienna, was no longer "the favourite child of victory" as he had been at Zurich.

Having mentioned Masséna I may observe that he did not favour the change of the French Government on the foundation of the Empire. Masséna loved two things,—glory and money ; but as to what is termed honours, he only valued those which resulted from the command of an army ; and his recollections all bound him to the Republic, because the Republic recalled to his mind the most brilliant and glorious events of his military career. He was, besides, among the number of the Marshals who wished to see a limit put to the ambition of Bonaparte ; and he had assuredly done enough, since the commencement of the wars of the Republic, to be permitted to enjoy some repose, which his health at that period required. What could he achieve against the English in Portugal? The combined forces of England and Portugal daily augmented, while ours diminished. No efforts were spared by England to gain a superiority in the great struggle in which she was engaged; as her money was lavished profusely, her troops paid well wherever they went, and were abundantly supplied with ammunition and provisions : the French army was compelled, though far from possessing such ample means, to purchase at the same high rate, in order to keep the natives from joining the English party. But even this did not prevent numerous partial insurrections in different places, which rendered all communication with France extremely difficult. Armed bands continually carried off our dispersed soldiers ; and the presence of the British troops, supported by the money they spent in the country, excited the in-

[1] Barrosa.

habitants against us ; for it is impossible to suppose that, unsupported by the English, Portugal could have held out a single moment against France. But battles, bad weather, and even want, had so reduced the French force that it was absolutely necessary our troops should repose when their enterprises could lead to no results. In this state of things Masséna was recalled, because his health was so materially injured as to render it impossible for him to exert sufficient activity to restore the army to a respectable footing.

Under these circumstances Bonaparte sent Bertrand into Illyria to take the place of Marmont, who was ordered in his turn to relieve Masséna and take command of the French army in Portugal. Marmont on assuming the command found the troops in a deplorable state. The difficulty of procuring provisions was extreme, and the means he was compelled to employ for that purpose greatly heightened the evil ; at the same time insubordination and want of discipline prevailed to such an alarming degree that it would be as difficult as painful to depict the situation of our army at this period. Marmont, by his steady conduct, fortunately succeeded in correcting the disorders which prevailed, and very soon found himself at the head of a well-organised army, amounting to 30,000 infantry, with forty pieces of artillery, but he had only a very small body of cavalry, and those ill-mounted.

Affairs in Spain at the commencement of 1811 exhibited an aspect not very different from those of Portugal. At first we were uniformly successful, but our advantages were so dearly purchased that the ultimate issue of this struggle might easily have been foreseen, because when a people fight for their homes and their liberties the invading army must gradually diminish, while at the same time the armed population, emboldened by success, increases in a still more marked progression. Insurrection was now regarded by the Spaniards as a holy and sacred duty, to

which the recent meetings of the Cortès in the Isle of Leon had given, as it were, a legitimate character, since Spain found again, in the remembrance of her ancient privileges, at least the shadow of a Government—a centre around which the defenders of the soil of the Peninsula could rally.[1]

The Continental system was the cause, if not of the eventual fall, at least of the rapid fall of Napoleon. This cannot be doubted if we consider for a moment the brilliant situation of the Empire in 1811, and the effect simultaneously produced throughout Europe by that system, which undermined the most powerful throne which ever existed. It was the Continental system that Napoleon upheld in Spain, for he had persuaded himself that this system, rigorously enforced, would strike a death blow to the commerce of England; and Duroc besides informed me of a circumstance which is of great weight in this question. Napoleon one day said to him, "I am no longer anxious that Joseph should be King of Spain; and he himself is indifferent about it. I would give the crown to the first comer who would shut his ports against the English."

Murat had come to Paris on the occasion of the Empress' accouchement, and I saw him several times during his stay, for we had always been on the best terms; and I

[1] Lord Wellington gave Masséna a beating at Fuentes d'Onore on the 5th of May 1811. It was soon after this battle that Napoleon sent Marmont to succeed Masséna. Advancing on the southern frontier of Portugal the skilful Soult contrived to take Badajoz from a wavering Spanish garrison. About this time, however, General Graham, with his British corps, sallied out of Cadiz, and beat the French on the heights of Barrosa, which lie in front of Cadiz, which city the French were then besieging. Encouraged by the successes of our regular armies, the Spanish Guerillas became more and more numerous and daring. By the end of 1811 Joseph Bonaparte found so many thorns in his usurped crown that he implored his brother to put it on some other head. Napoleon would not then listen to his prayer. In the course of 1811 a plan was laid for liberating Ferdinand from his prison in France and placing him at the head of affairs in Spain, but was detected by the emissaries of Bonaparte's police. Ferdinand's sister, the ex-Queen of Etruria, had also planned an escape to England. Her agents were betrayed, tried by a military commission, and *shot*—the Princess herself was condemned to close confinement in a Roman convent.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

must do him the justice to say that he never assumed the King but to his courtiers, and those who had known him only as a monarch. Eight or ten days after the birth of the King of Rome, as I was one morning walking in the Champs Elysées, I met Murat. He was alone, and dressed in a long blue overcoat. We were exactly opposite the gardens of his sister-in-law, the Princess Borghèse. "Well, Bourrienne," said Murat, after we had exchanged the usual courtesies, "well, what are you about now?" I informed him how I had been treated by Napoleon, who, that I might not be in Hamburg when the decree of union arrived there, had recalled me to Paris under a show of confidence. I think I still see the handsome and expressive countenance of Joachim when, having addressed him by the titles of Sire and Your Majesty, he said to me, "Pshaw! Bourrienne, are we not old comrades? The Emperor has treated you unjustly; and to whom has he not been unjust? His displeasure is preferable to his favour, which costs so dear! He says that he made us Kings; but did we not make him an Emperor? To you, my friend, whom I have known long and intimately, I can make my profession of faith. My sword, my blood, my life belong to the Emperor. When he calls me to the field to combat his enemies and the enemies of France I am no longer a King, I resume the rank of a Marshal of the Empire; but let him require no more. At Naples I will be King of Naples, and I will not sacrifice to his false calculations the life, the wellbeing, and the interests of my subjects.[1] Let him not imagine that he can treat me as

[1] If we add to the irksomeness of a foreign rule the severity of the irregular courts-martial and military tribunals and the detested conscription law, which sent the young men of sunny Naples to perish by thousands in Northern Germany or the wilds of Poland and Russia, it will be understood how unpopular must have been Napoleon, who ordered all these things. M. de Bourrienne, however, does not overestimate the effects of the Continental system: it had reduced one-half of the Kingdom to beggary. In the rich oil country about Gallipoli, Taranto, and Bari, through a large portion of Apulia and Calabria, many people no longer pressed the olives that their rich groves furnished, as, owing to the exclusion of England, America, etc.,

he has treated Louis! For I am ready to defend, even against him, if it must be so, the rights of the people over whom he has appointed me to rule. Am I then an advance-guard King?"[1] These last words appeared to me peculiarly appropriate in the mouth of Murat, who had always served in the advance-guard of our armies, and I thought expressed in a very happy manner the similarity of his situation as a king and a soldier.

I walked with Murat about half an hour. In the course of our conversation he informed me that his greatest cause of complaint against the Emperor was his having first put him forward and then abandoned him. "Before I arrived in Naples," continued he, "it was intimated to me that there was a design of assassinating me. What did I do? I entered that city alone, in full daylight, in an open carriage, for I would rather have been assassinated at once than have lived in the constant fear of being so. I afterwards made a descent on the Isle of Capri, which succeeded. I attempted one against Sicily, and am certain it would have also been successful had the Emperor fulfilled his promise of sending the Toulon fleet to second my operations; but he issued contrary orders: *he enacted Mazarin, and wished me to play the part of the adventurous Duke of Guise.* But I see through his designs. Now that he has a son, on whom he has bestowed the title of King of Rome, he merely wishes the crown of Naples to be considered as a deposit in my hands. He regards Naples as a future

from the market, the price of the oil scarcely paid the expenses of its preparation. Murat, however, was always personally popular with a large portion of the Neapolitan nation.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

[1] The question here asked by Murat would have been answered by Napoleon in the affirmative; and indeed a great part of the difficulties of the Emperor and of the Kings set up by him was that these Sovereigns would not recognise that this was their real position. They were the leaders of the advanced guard, or wardens of the marches, of the Empire; and their pitiful, if natural and sometimes honourable, attempts to assume the status of independent monarchs, did much to ruin the Empire to which alone they owed their existence. If Spain, Holland, and Italy were to be independent it was not for Joseph, Louis, and Murat to head the struggle in these countries.

annexation to the Kingdom of Rome, to which I foresee it is his design to unite the whole of Italy. But let him not urge me too far, for I will oppose him, and conquer, or perish in the attempt, sword in hand."

I had the discretion not to inform Murat how correctly he had divined the plans of the Emperor and his projects as to Italy, but in regard to the Continental system, which, perhaps, the reader will be inclined to call my great stalking-horse, I spoke of it as I had done to the Prince of Sweden, and I perceived that he was fully disposed to follow my advice, as experience has sufficiently proved. It was in fact the Continental system which separated the interests of Murat from those of the Emperor, and which compelled the new King of Naples to form alliances amongst the Princes at war with France. Different opinions have been entertained on this subject; mine is, that the Marshal of the Empire was wrong, but the King of Naples right.

The Princes and Dukes of the Empire must pardon me for so often designating them by their Republican names. The Marshals set less value on their titles of nobility than the Dukes and Counts selected from among the civilians. Of all the sons of the Republic Regnault de St. Jean d'Angély was the most gratified at being a Count, whilst, among the fathers of the Revolution no one could regard with greater disdain than Fouché his title of Duke of Otranto;[1] he congratulated himself upon its possession only once, and that was after the fall of the Empire.

I have expressed my dislike of Fouché; and the reason of that feeling was, that I could not endure his system of making the police a government within a government. He had left Paris before my return thither, but I had frequent occasion to speak of that famous personage to Sa-

[1] This is in opposition to the story that Fouché took to his new dignity so kindly that, in recounting a conversation, he described Robespierre as addressing him as "Duc d'Otrante."

vary, whom, for the reason above assigned, I do not always term Duc de Rovigo. Savary knew better than any one the fallacious measures of Fouché's administration, since he was his successor. Fouché, under pretence of encouraging men of letters, though well aware that the Emperor was hostile to them, intended only to bring them into contempt by making them write verses at command. It was easily seen that Napoleon nourished a profound dislike of literary men,[1] though we must not conclude that he wished the public to be aware of that dislike. Those, besides, who devoted their pens to blazon his glory and his power were sure to be received by him with distinction. On the other hand, as Charlemagne and Louis XIV. owed a portion of the spendour of their reigns to the lustre reflected on them by literature, he wished to appear to patronise authors, provided that they never discussed questions relating to philosophy, the independence of mankind, and civil and political rights. With regard to men of science it was wholly different; those he held in real estimation ; but men of letters, properly so called, were considered by him merely as a sprig in his Imperial crown.

The marriage of the Emperor with an Archduchess of Austria had set all the Court poets to work, and in this contest of praise and flattery it must be confessed that the false gods were vanquished by the true God ; for, in spite of their fulsome verses, not one of the diciples of Apollo could exceed the extravagance of the Bishops in their pastoral letters. At a time when so many were striving to force themselves into notice there still existed a feeling of esteem in the public mind for men of supe-

[1] It would not be difficult to show that Napoleon had only a profonnd dislike for those literary men who used their pens in bitter attacks on him, or in that party warfare which it was his great object to put an end to. If studying the works of the great authors, loving to converse with those who could pardon his elevation, and pensioning both those who praised and those who attacked him, is any proof of liking literary men, he certainly liked them.

rior talent who remained independent amidst the general corruption; such was M. Lemercier, such was M. de Chateaubriand. I was in Paris in the spring of 1811, at the period of Chénier's death,[1] when the numerous friends whom Chateaubriand possessed in the second class of the Institute looked to him as the successor of Chénier. This was more than a mere literary question, not only on account of the high literary reputation M. de Chateaubriand already possessed, but of the recollection of his noble conduct at the period of Duc d'Enghien's death, which was yet fresh in the memory of every one; and, besides, no person could be ignorant of the immeasurable difference of opinion between Chénier and M. de Chateaubriand.

M. de Chauteaubriand obtained a great majority of votes, and was elected a Member of the Institute. This opened a wide field for conjecture in Paris. Every one was anxious to see how the author of the *Génie du Christianisme*, the faithful defender of the Bourbons, would bend his eloquence to pronounce the eulogium of a regicide. The time for the admission of the new Member of the Institute arrived, but in his discourse, copies of which were circulated in Paris, he had ventured to allude to the death of Louis XVI., and to raise his voice against the regicides. This did not displease Napoleon; but M. de Chateaubriand also made a profession of faith in favour of liberty, which, he said, found refuge amongst men of letters when banished from the politic body. This was great boldness

[1] Marie Joseph de Chénier died in 1811. He had been a fervid Republican, while his brother André had taken the opposite side and had been guillotined in 1794. As Joseph was not believed to have exerted himself to save his brother his opponents delighted to speak of him, by an intentional mistake, as "the brother of *Abel* Chénier." Savary, then Minister of Police, claims (tome v. p. 17) to have got Chateaubriand nominated to the Academy; see also Merlet (*Littérature Française*, 1800–15, tome i. p. 245) to same effect. Chateaubriand required some pressing to join what he called a den of philosophers, but his permitting his name to be put forward is not quite consistent with his resignation of his post after the death of the Duc d'Enghien, and with his furious attack in 1814 on the fallen Emperor. For a brief acconnt of the complimentary odes of the period see *Merlet*, tome i. p. 183, and *Savary*, tome v. p. 12.

for the time ; for though Bonaparte was secretly gratified at seeing the judges of Louis XVI. scourged by an heroic pen, yet those men held the highest situations under the Government. Cambacérès filled the second place in the Empire, although at a great distance from the first ; Merlin de Douai was also in power ; and it is known how much liberty was stifled and hidden beneath the dazzling illusion of what is termed glory. A commission was named to examine the discourse of Chateaubriand. MM. Suard, de Ségur, de Fontanes, and two or three other members of the same class of the Institute whose names I cannot recollect, were of opinion that the discourse should be read ; but it was opposed by the majority.

When Napoleon was informed of what had passed he demanded a sight of the address, which was presented to him by M. Daru. After having perused it he exclaimed, "Had this discourse been delivered I would have shut the gates of the Institute, and thrown M. de Chateaubriand into a dungeon for life." The storm long raged ; at length means of conciliation were tried. The Emperor required M. de Chateaubriand to prepare another discourse, which the latter refused to do, in spite of every menace. Madame Gay applied to Madame Regnault de St. Jean d'Angély, who interested her husband in favour of the author of the *Génie du Christianisme.* M. de Montalivet and Savary also acted on this occasion in the most praiseworthy manner, and succeeded in appeasing the first transports of the Emperor's rage. But the name of Chateaubriand constantly called to mind the circumstances which had occasioned him to give in his resignation ; and, besides, Napoleon had another complaint against him. He had published in the *Mercure* an article on a work of M. Alexandre de Laborde. In that article, which was eagerly read in Paris, and which caused the suppression of the *Mercure*, occurred the famous phrase which has been since so often repeated : "In vain a Nero triumphs :

Tacitus is already born in his Empire." This quotation leads me to repeat an observation, which, I believe, I have already made, viz. that it is a manifest misconception to compare Bonaparte to Nero. Napoleon's ambition might blind his vision to political crimes, but in private life no man could evince less disposition to cruelty or bloodshed. A proof that he bore little resemblance to Nero is that his anger against the author of the article in question vented itself in mere words. "What!" exclaimed he, "does Chateaubriand think I am a fool, and that I do not know what he means? If he goes on this way I will have him sabred on the steps of the Tuileries."[1] This language is quite characteristic of Bonaparte, but it was uttered in the first ebullition of his wrath. Napoleon merely threatened, but Nero would have made good his threat; and in such a case there is surely some difference between words and deeds.

The discourse of M. de Chateaubriand revived Napoleon's former enmity against him; he received an order to quit Paris. M. Daru returned to him the manuscript of his discourse, which had been read by Bonaparte, who cancelled some passages with a pencil. We can be sure that the phrase about liberty was not one of those spared by the Imperial pencil. However that may be, written copies were circulated with text altered and abbreviated;

[1] The account of the anger of Napoleon is rather exaggerated, and Chateaubriand himself seems to have been the author of the phrase about sabring him on the steps of the Tuileries. It was Napoleon who had suggested the nomination of Chateaubriand to the Institute; and that the Emperor was not ill-advised in objecting to the discourse presented to him for his inspection seems proved by the fact that Chateaubriand never published it among his works, nor gave any acknowledged text. Napoleon was, however, angry enough to give rise to an amusing scene. Daru, himself an author and a critic, brought the manuscript to the Emperor, who received him alone, and soon worked himself into a passion over the discourse. His furious apostrophes of the absent Chateaubriand were overheard in the antechamber, and believed to be addressed to Daru. Thus, when Daru reappeared, he found himself, to his surprise, shunned by all the men who on his entry had greeted him most warmly; each, however, on ascertaining the truth, assuring him that *they* had not been duped. See the description in Sainte Beuve's *Chateaubriand et son Groupe Littéraire*, tome ii. pp. 99–110.

and I have even been told that a printed edition appeared, but I have never seen any copies ; and as I do not find the discourse in the works of M. de Chateaubriand I have reason to believe that the author has not yet wished to publish it.

Such were the principal circumstances attending the nomination of Chateaubriand to the Institute. I shall now relate some others which occurred on a previous occasion, viz. on the election of an old and worthy visitor at Malmaison, M. Lemercier, and which will serve to show one of those strange inconsistencies so frequent in the character of Napoleon.

After the foundation of the Empire M. Lemercier ceased to present himself at the Tuileries, St. Cloud, or at Malmaison, though he was often seen in the *salons* of Madame Bonaparte while she yet hoped not to become a Queen. Two places were vacant at once in the second class of the Institute, which still contained a party favourable to liberty. This party, finding it impossible to influence the nomination of both members, contented itself with naming one, it being the mutual condition, in return for favouring the Government candidate, that the Government party should not oppose the choice of the liberals. The liberal party selected M. Lemercier, but as they knew his former connection with Bonaparte had been broken off they wished first to ascertain that he would do nothing to commit their choice. Chénier was empowered to inquire whether M. Lemercier would refuse to accompany them to the Tuileries when they repaired thither in a body, and whether, on his election, he would comply with the usual ceremony of being presented to the Emperor. M. Lemercier replied that he would do nothing contrary to the customs and usages of the body to which he might belong : he was accordingly elected. The Government candidate was M. Esménard, who was also elected. The two new members were presented to the Emperor on the

same day. On this occasion upwards of 400 persons were present in the *salon*, from one of whom I received these details. When the Emperor saw M. Lemercier, for whom he had long pretended great friendship, he said to him in a kind tone, "Well, Lemercier, you are now installed." Lemercier respectfully bowed to the Emperor, but without uttering a word of reply. Napoleon was mortified at this silence, but without saying anything more to Lemercier he turned to Esménard, the member who should have been most acceptable to him, and vented upon him the whole weight of his indignation in a manner equally unfeeling and unjust. "Well, Esménard," said he, "do you still hold your place in the police?"[1] These words were spoken in so loud a tone as to be heard by all present; and it was doubtless this cruel and ambiguous speech which furnished the enemies of Esménard with arms to attack his reputation as a man of honour, and to give an appearance of disgrace to those functions which he exercised with so much zeal and ability.

When, at the commencement of 1811, I left Paris I had ceased to delude myself respecting the brilliant career which seemed opening before me during the Consulate. I clearly perceived that since Bonaparte, instead of receiving me as I expected, had refused to see me at all, the calumnies of my enemies were triumphant, and that I had nothing to hope for from an absolute ruler, whose past injustice rendered him the more unjust. He now possessed what he had so long and ardently wished for,—a son of his own,

[1] For the connection of Esménard with the police as editor, etc., see Savary (tome v. p. 15), who praises him highly, and boasts that it was he who got him, and later Chateaubriand, into the Academy. Lemercier, who had been a favoured friend of General Bonaparte, withdrew from the Court and sent back his cross of the Legion of Honour on the foundation of the Empire. His writings in the subsequent years were not very successful, even allowing for the restraints of the censorship. "He sent," says Merlet (tome i. p. 263), "his pieces to the censor as a general launches his soldiers to the assault. He thus had more than five great dramas killed under him." Preserving his hostility during the time of Napoleon's power Lemercier seems to have regretted the Restoration, or at least he might have said with Hoffman when then asked why he did not write against Napoleon, "Because I have never flattered him."

an inheritor of his name, his power, and his throne. I must take this opportunity of stating that the malevolent and infamous rumours spread abroad respecting the birth of the King of Rome were wholly without foundation. My friend Corvisart, who did not for a single instant leave Maria Louisa during her long and painful labour, removed from my mind every doubt on the subject. It is as true that the young Prince, for whom the Emperor of Austria stood sponsor at the font, was the son of Napoleon and the Archduchess Maria Louisa as it is false that Bonaparte was the father of the first child of Hortense. The birth of the son of Napoleon was hailed with general enthusiasm.[1] The Emperor was at the height of his power from the period of the birth of his son until the reverse he experienced after the battle of the Moskowa. The Empire, including the States possessed by the Imperial family, contained nearly 57,000,000 of inhabitants; but the period was fast approaching when this power, unparalleled in modern times, was to collapse under its own weight.

[1] The reader will find some very interesting notices of this great event and the *fêtes* which followed, in the *Memoirs of the Duchess of Abrantes*, vol iii. p. 279. It appears from Madcmoiselle Avrillion's Memoirs that Napoleon was the first to announce to Josephine the birth of his son. "In such circumstances," said mademoiselle, "all that passes in the breast of a woman is inexplicable; the Empress testified the greatest and the most sincere joy at an event which was considered by almost all Frenchmen as an immense happiness for the Empire. . . . She showed me, with a sort of pride, the letter the Emperor had written her with his own hand, and in which he added, after having said, 'My dear Josephine, I have a son,' these other words, 'I am at the summit of my happiness.'

"'Yes!' said the Empress Josephine to me with visible emotion, though without any sign of jealousy or ill-humour, 'Yes! he must be very happy!' and then, after drying some tears that escaped her, she continued, 'and I also—I too ought to be very happy at the happiness of the Emperor—happy to see the fulfilment of the wishes of all France—I now gather the fruits of my painful sacrifices, since they have secured the prosperity of France.'"

The little King of Rome, Napoleon Francis Bonaparte, was born on the 20th of March 1811.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

CHAPTER XXVI

1811.

My return to Hamburg—Government Committee established there—Anecdote of the Comte de Chaban—Napoleon's misunderstanding with the Pope—Cardinal Fesch—Convention of a Council—Declaration required from the Bishops—Spain in 1811—Certainty of war with Russia—Lauriston supersedes Caulaincourt at St. Petersburg—The war in Spain neglected—Troops of all nations at the disposal of Bonaparte—Levy of the National Guard—Treaties with Prussia and Austria—Capitulation renewed with Switzerland—Intrignes with Czernischeff—Attacks of my enemies—Memorial to the Emperor—Ogier de la Saussaye and the mysterious box—Removal of the Pope to Fontainebleau—Anecdote of His Holiness and M. Denon—Departure of Napoleon and Maria Louisa for Dresden—Situation of affairs in Spain and Portugal—Rapp's account of the Emperor's journey to Dantzic—Mutual wish for war on the part of Napoleon and Alexander—Sweden and Turkey—Napoleon's vain attempt to detach Sweden from her alliance with Russia.

As I took the most lively interest in all that concerned the Hanse Towns, my first care on returning to Hamburg was to collect information from the most respectable sources concerning the influential members of the new Government.[1] Davoust was at its head. On his arrival he had established in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, in Swedish Pomerania, and in Stralsund, the capital of that province, military posts and custom-houses, and that in a time of profound peace with those countries, and without

[1] Bourrienne took an interest in Hamburg which it is difficult to explain unless he was, as his enemies asserted, engaged in Royalist plots and in underhand business there. In 1813 Davoust complained to the Emperor of his intrigues, and Napoleon replied that Bourrienne had been ordered to cease all correspondence with Hamburg, and declared that he would arrest him if he still wrote there. Even then, 30th June 1813, Napoleon urged Davoust to try to discover Bourrienne's robberies in order that he might be made to disgorge (*Erreurs*, tome ii. p. 241).

any previous declaration. The omnipotence of Napoleon, and the terror inspired by the name of Davoust, overcame all obstacles which might have opposed those iniquitous usurpations. The weak were forced to yield to the strong.

At Hamburg a Government Committee was formed, consisting of the Prince of Eckmuhl as President, Comte de Chaban, Councillor of State, who superintended the departments of the Interior and Finance, and of M. Faure, Councillor of State, who was appointed to form and regulate the Courts of Law. I had sometimes met M. de Chaban at Malmaison. He was distantly related to Josephine, and had formerly been an officer in the French Guards. He was compelled to emigrate, having been subjected to every species of persecution during the Revolution.[1]

M. de Chaban was among the first of the emigrants who returned to France after the 18th Brumaire. He was at first made Sub-Prefect of Vendôme, but on the union of Tuscany with France Napoleon created him a member of the Junta appointed to regulate the affairs of Tuscany. He next became Prefect of Coblentz and Brussels, was made a Count by Bonaparte, and was afterwards chosen a member of the Government Committee at Hamburg. M. de Chaban was a man of upright principles, and he discharged his various functions in a way that commanded esteem and attachment.[2]

[1] I recollect an anecdote which but too well depicts those disastrous times. The Comte de Chaban, being obliged to cross France during the Reign of Terror, was compelled to assume a disguise. He accordingly provided himself with a smock-frock, a cart and horses, and a load of corn. In this manner he journeyed from place to place till he reached the frontiers. He stopped at Rochambeau, in the Vendômais, where he was recognised by the Marshal de Rochambeau, who, to guard against exciting any suspicion among his servants, treated him as if he had really been a carman, and said to him, "You may dine in the kitchen."—*Bourrienne.*

[2] "If," says the Comte Alexandre de Puymaigre (p. 129), who was employed under Chaban in 1811 at Hamburg, "any one could soften these dispositions (of Marshal Davoust), not by his very limited means, but by the influence given by a patriarchal and reproachless life, true moderation, and undoubted honesty, it was the Comte de Chaban, Councillor of State, charged with the finances of the Northern Departments, lately annexed. He was loved and esteemed at Hamburg, where he often succeeded in reducing the burdens and in rendering the position less painful." Chaban died of typhus at Hamburg in 1812.

The Hanseatic Towns, united to the Grand Empire professedly for their welfare, soon felt the blessings of the new organisation of a regenerating Government. They were at once presented with the stamp-duty, registration, the lottery, the *droits réunis*, the tax on cards, and the *octroi*. This prodigality of presents caused, as we may be sure, the most lively gratitude; a tax for military quarters and for warlike supplies was imposed, but this did not relieve any one from having not only officers and soldiers, but even all the chiefs of the administration and their officials billeted on them. The refineries, breweries, and manufactures of all sorts were suppressed. The cash chests of the Admiralty, of the charity houses, of the manufactures, of the savings-banks, of the working classes, the funds of the prisons, the relief meant for the infirm, the chests of the refuges, orphanages, and of the hospitals, were all seized.

More than 200,000 men, Italian, Dutch, and French soldiers, came in turn to stay there, but only to be clothed and shod; and then they left newly clothed from head to foot. To leave nothing to be wished for Davoust, from 1812, established military commissions in all the thirty-second military division, before he entered upon the Russian campaign. To complete these oppressive measures he established at the same time the High Prevotal Court of the Customs. It was at this time that M. Eudes, the director of the ordinary customs, a strict but just man, said that *the rule of the ordinary customs would be regretted, "for till now you have only been on roses."* The professed judgments of *this court* were executed without appeal and without delay. From what I have just said the situation and the misery of the north of Germany, and the consequent discontent, can be judged.[1]

[1] In all this Davoust was only an instrument. He was then engaged in preparing the army for the Russian campaign, and the inevitable strain fell heavily on the unfortunate Hanse Towns. This is the other side of the description of the enormous preparations which fill so much of Thiers and other historians. As for the

During my stay in Hamburg, which on this occasion was not very long, Napoleon's attention was particularly engaged by the campaign of Portugal, and his discussions with the Pope. At this period the thunderbolts of Rome were not very alarming. Yet precautions were taken to keep secret the excommunication which Pius VII. had pronounced against Napoleon. The event, however, got reported about, and a party in favour of the Pope speedily rose up among the clergy, and more particularly among the fanatics. Napoleon sent to Savona the Archbishops of Nantes, Bourges, Treves, and Tours, to endeavour to bring about a reconciliation with His Holiness. But all their endeavours were unavailing, and after staying a month at Savona they returned to Paris without having done anything. But Napoleon was not discouraged by this first disappointment, and he shortly afterwards sent a second deputation, which experienced the same fate as the first. Cardinal Fesch, Napoleon's uncle, took part with the Pope. For this fact I can vouch, though I cannot for an answer which he is said to have made to the Emperor. I have been informed that when Napoleon was one day speaking to his uncle about the Pope's obstinacy the Cardinal made some observations to him on his (Bonaparte's) conduct to the Holy Father, upon which Napoleon flew into a passion, and said that the Pope and he were two old fools. "As for the Pope," said he, "he is too obstinate to listen to anything. No, I am determined he shall never have Rome again. . . . He will not remain at Savona, and where does he wish I should send him?"—"To Heaven, perhaps," replied the Cardinal.

The truth is, the Emperor was violently irritated against Pius VII. Observing with uneasiness the differences and difficulties to which all these dissensions gave rise, he was

seizure of all the cash, whatever might be its intended destination, this was certain to be done under the then great pressure. The same act on the part of the Russians, when they entered the town as allies, is recorded a little farther on by Bourrienne without the sneers he employs against Davoust.

anxious to put a stop to them. As the Pope would not listen to any propositions that were made to him, Napoleon convoked a Council, which assembled in Paris, and at which several Italian Bishops were present. The Pope insisted that the temporal and spiritual interests should be discussed together; and, however disposed a certain number of prelates, particularly the Italians, might be to separate these two points of discussion, yet the influence of the Church and well-contrived intrigues gradually gave preponderance to the wishes of the Pope. The Emperor, having discovered that a secret correspondence was carried on by several of the Bishops and Archbishops who had seats in the Council, determined to get rid of some of them, and the Bishops of Ghent, Troyes, Tournay, and Toulouse were arrested and sent to Vincennes. They were superseded by others. He wished to dissolve the Council, which he saw was making no advance towards the object he had in view, and, fearing that it might adopt some act at variance with his supreme wish, every member of the Council was individually required to make a declaration that the proposed changes were conformable to the laws of the Church. It was said at the time that they were unanimous in this individual declaration, though it is certain that in the sittings of the Council opinions were divided. I know not what His Holiness thought of these written opinions compared with the verbal opinions that had been delivered, but certain it is though still a captive at Savona, he refused to adhere to the concessions granted in the secret declarations.

The conflicts which took place in Spain during the year 1811 were unattended by any decisive results. Some brilliant events, indeed, attested the courage of our troops and the skill of our generals. Such were the battle of Albufera and the taking of Tarragona, while Wellington was obliged to raise the siege of Badajoz. These advantages, which were attended only by glory, encouraged Na-

poleon in the hope of triumphing in the Peninsula, and enabled him to enjoy the brilliant *fêtes* which took place at Paris in celebration of the birth of the King of Rome.

On his return from a tour in Holland at the end of October Napoleon clearly saw that a rupture with Russia was inevitable.[1] In vain he sent Lauriston as Ambassador to St. Petersburg to supersede Caulaincourt, who would no longer remain there: all the diplomatic skill in the world could effect nothing with a powerful Government which had already formed its determination. All the Cabinets in Europe were now unanimous in wishing for the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and the people no less ardently wished for an order of things less fatal to their trade and industry. In the state to which Europe was reduced no one could counteract the wish of Russia and her allies to go to war with France—Lauriston no more than Caulaincourt.

The war for which Napoleon was now obliged to prepare forced him to neglect Spain, and to leave his interests in that country in a state of real danger. Indeed, his occupation of Spain and his well-known wish to maintain himself there were additional motives for inducing the powers of Europe to enter upon a war which would necessarily divide Napoleon's forces. All at once the troops which were in Italy and the north of Germany moved towards the frontiers of the Russian Empire. From March 1811 the Emperor had all the military forces of Europe at his disposal. It was curious to see this union of nations, distinguished by difference of manners, lan-

[1] It should be remarked that Napoleon was far from being anxious for the war with Russia. Metternich (vol. ii. p. 492), writing on 26th March 1811, says "Everything seems to indicate that the Emperor Napoleon is at present still far from desiring a war with Russia. But it is not less true that the Emperor Alexander has given himself over, *nolens volens*, to the war party, and that he will bring about war, because the time is approaching when he will no longer be able to resist the reaction of the party in the internal affairs of his Empire, or the temper of his army. The contest between Count Romanzow and the party opposed to that Minister seems on the point of precipitating a war between Russia and France." This, from Metternich, is strong evidence.

guage, religion, and interests, all ready to fight for one man against a power who had done nothing to offend them. Prussia herself, though she could not pardon the injuries he had inflicted upon her, joined his alliance, but with the intention of breaking it on the first opportunity. When the war with Russia was first spoken of Savary and I had frequent conversations on the subject. I communicated to him all the intelligence I received from abroad respecting that vast enterprise. The Duc de Rovigo shared all my forebodings; and if he and those who thought like him had been listened to, the war would probably have been avoided. Through him I learnt who were the individuals who urged the invasion. The eager ambition with which they looked forward to Viceroyalties, Duchies, and endowments blinded them to the possibility of seeing the Cossacks in Paris.

The gigantic enterprise being determined on, vast preparations were made for carrying it into effect. Before his departure Napoleon, who was to take with him all the disposable troops, caused a *Sénatus-consulte* to be issued for levying the National Guards, who were divided into three corps. He also arranged his diplomatic affairs by concluding, in February 1812, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia, by virtue of which the two contracting powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their own possessions, and the European possessions of the Ottoman Porte, because that power was then at war with Russia. A similar treaty was concluded about the beginning of March with Austria, and about the end of the same month Napoleon renewed the capitulation of France and Switzerland. At length, in the month of April, there came to light an evident proof of the success which had attended M. Czernischeff's intrigues in Paris. It was ascertained that a clerk in the War Office, named Michel, had communicated to him the situation of the French forces in Germany. Michel was condemned to

death, for the time was gone by when Bonaparte, confident in his genius and good fortune, could communicate his plans to the spy of General Mélas.

In March 1812, when I saw that the approaching war would necessarily take Napoleon from France, weary of the persecutions and even threats by which I was every day assailed, I addressed to the Emperor a memorial explaining my conduct and showing the folly and wickedness of my accusers. Among them was a certain Ogier de la Saussaye, who had sent a report to the Emperor, in which the principal charge was, that I had carried off a box containing important papers belonging to the First Consul. The accusation of Ogier de la Saussaye terminated thus: "*I add to my report the interrogatories of MM. Westphalen, Osy, Chapeau Rouge, Aukscher, Thierry, and Gumprecht-Mares. The evidence of the latter bears principally on a certain mysterious box, a secret upon which it is impossible to throw any light, but the reality of which we are bound to believe.*" These are his words. The affair of the mysterious box has been already explained. I have already informed the reader that I put my papers into a box, which I buried lest it should be stolen from me.[1] But for that precaution I should not have been able to lay before the reader the autograph documents in my possession, and which I imagine form the most essential part of these volumes. In my memorial to the Emperor I said, in allusion to the passage above quoted, "This, Sire, is the most atrocious part of Ogier's report.

"Gumprecht being questioned on this point replies that the accuser has probably, as well as himself, seen the circumstance mentioned in an infamous pamphlet which

[1] This burial of the box has been mentioned by Bourrienne at the time of his disgrace in 1802. What possible right an ex-Secretary had to keep autograph documents, and why he should be so anxious to conceal them if they were his own property, and contained nothing that could be used against him to substantiate the charges for which he was disgraced, are points he does not allude to. His indignant denial of Ogier's statement is good.

appeared seven or eight years ago. It was, I think, entitled 'Le Secret du Cabinet des Tuileries,' and was very likely at the time of its appearance denounced by the police. In that libel it is stated, among a thousand other calumnies equally false and absurd, that '*When I left the First Consul I carried away a box full of important papers, that I was in consequence sent to the Temple, where your brother Joseph came to me and offered me my liberation, and a million of francs, if I would restore the papers, which I refused to do,*' etc. Ogier, instead of looking for this libel in Hamburg, where I read it, has the impudence to give credit to the charge, the truth of which could have been ascertained immediately: and he adds, '*This secret we are bound to believe.*' Your Majesty knows whether I was ever in the Temple, and whether Joseph ever made such an offer to me." I entreated that the Emperor would do me the favour to bring me to trial; for certainly I should have regarded that as a favour rather than to remain as I was, exposed to vague accusations; yet all my solicitations were in vain. My letter to the Emperor remained unanswered; but though Bonaparte could not spare a few moments to reply to an old friend, I learned through Duroc the contempt he cherished for my accusers. Duroc advised me not to be uneasy, and that in all probability the Emperor's prejudices against me would be speedily overcome; and I must say that if they were not overcome it was neither the fault of Duroc nor Savary, who knew how to rightly estimate the miserable intrigues just alluded to.

Napoleon was at length determined to extend the limits of his Empire, or rather to avenge the injuries which Russia had committed against his Continental system. Yet, before he departed for Germany, the resolute refusal of the Pope to submit to any arrangement urgently claimed his consideration. Savona did not appear to him a sufficiently secure residence for such a prisoner. He feared that when

all his strength should be removed towards the Niemen the English might carry off the Pope, or that the Italians, excited by the clergy, whose dissatisfaction was general in Italy, would stir up those religious dissensions which are always fatal and difficult to quell. With the view, therefore, of keeping the Pope under his control he removed him to Fontainebleau, and even at one time thought of bringing him to Paris.

The Emperor appointed M. Denon to reside with the Pope at Fontainebleau ; and to afford his illustrious prisoner the society of such a man was certainly a delicate mark of attention on the part of Napoleon. When speaking of his residence with Pius VII. M. Denon related to me the following anecdote. "The Pope," said he, "was much attached to me. He always addressed me by the appellation '*my son*,' and he loved to converse with me, especially on the subject of the Egyptian expedition. One day he asked me for my work on Egypt, which he said he wished to read ; and as you know it is not quite orthodox, and does not perfectly agree with the creation of the world according to Genesis, I at first hesitated ; but the Pope insisted, and at length I complied with his wish. The Holy Father assured me that he had been much interested by the perusal of the book. I made some allusion to the delicate points ; upon which he said, 'No matter, no matter, my son ; all that is exceedingly curious, and I must confess entirely new to me.' I then," continued M. Denon, "told His Holiness why I hesitated to lend him the work, which, I observed, he had excommunicated, together with its author. 'Excommunicated you, my son?' resumed the Pope in a tone of affectionate concern. 'I am very sorry for it, and I assure you I was far from being aware of any such thing.'"

When M. Denon related to me this anecdote he told me how greatly he had admired the virtues and resignation of the Holy Father ; but he added that it would nevertheless

have been easier to make him a martyr than to induce him to yield on any point until he should be restored to the temporal sovereignty of Rome, of which he considered himself the depositary, and which he would not endure the reproach of having willingly sacrificed. After settling the place of the Pope's residence Napoleon set off for Dresden, accompanied by Maria Louisa, who had expressed a wish to see her father.[1]

The Russian enterprise, the most gigantic, perhaps, that the genius of man ever conceived since the conquest of India by Alexander, now absorbed universal attention, and defied the calculations of reason. The Manzanares

[1] Come, you who would form a correct idea of the domination exercised by Napoleon over Europe, who desire to fathom the depth of terror into which the sovereigns of the Continent were plunged; come, transport yourselves with me to Dresden, and there contemplate that mighty Chief at the proudest period of his glory—so near to that of his humiliation!

The Emperor occupied the principal apartments of the Palace. He brought with him almost the whole of his household, and formed a regular establishment. The King of Saxony was nothing: it was constantly at Napoleon's apartments that the sovereigns and their families were assembled, by cards of invitation from the Grand Marshal of his Palace. Private individuals were sometimes admitted; I had myself that honour, on the day of my appointment to Poland. The Emperor held his levees as usual at nine. Then you should have seen in what numbers, with what submissive timidity, a crowd of potentates—mixed and confounded among the courtiers and often entirely overlooked by them—awaited in fearful expectation the moment of appearing before the new arbiter of their destinies! You should have heard the frivolous questions which the Emperor put to them, and the humble answers which they ventured to hazard! What Phædra said of Hippolytus may be justly applied to Napoleon's residence at Dresden:

> "Even at the altars where I seem'd to pray,
> This was the real god of all my vows."

Napoleon was, in fact, the god of Dresden, the only King among all the kings assembled there—the King of kings!—on *him* all eyes were turned; in *his* apartments, and around *his* person, were collected the august guests who filled the Palace of the King of Saxony. The throng of foreigners, of officers, of courtiers—the arrival and departure of couriers, crossing one another in every direction; the mass of people hurrying to the gates of the Palace at the least movement of the Emperor, crowding upon his steps, gazing at him with an air of mingled admiration and astonishment—the expectation of the future strongly painted in every face, the confidence on one side, the anxiety on the other—all these together presented the vastest and most interesting picture, the most brilliant and dazzling monument ever yet raised to the power of Napoleon! He had now certainly attained the zenith of his glory. He might hold his elevated station; but to surpass it seemed impossible" (*Histoire de l'Ambassade dans le Grand Duché de Varsovie, en* 1812, par M. de Pradt, Archevêque de Malines, alors Ambassadeur à Varsovie).

was forgotten, and nothing was thought of but the Niemen, already so celebrated by the raft of Tilsit. Thither, as towards a common centre, were moving men, horses, provisions, and baggage of every kind, from all parts of Europe. The hopes of our generals and the fears of all prudent men were directed to Russia. The war in Spain, which was becoming more and more unfortunate, excited but a feeble interest; and our most distinguished officers looked upon it as a disgrace to be sent to the Peninsula. In short, it was easy to foresee that the period was not far distant when the French would be obliged to recross the Pyrenees. Though the truth was concealed from the Emperor on many subjects, yet he was not deceived as to the situation of Spain in the spring of 1812. In February the Duke of Ragusa had frankly informed him that the armies of Spain and Portugal could not, without considerable reinforcements of men and money, hope for any important advantages since Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz had fallen into the hands of the English.

Before he commenced his great operations on the Niemen and the Volga Napoleon made a journey to Dantzic, and Rapp, who was then Governor of that city, informed me of some curious particulars connected with the Imperial visit. The fact is, that if Rapp's advice had been listened to, and had been supported by men higher in rank than himself, Bonaparte would not have braved the chances of the Russian war until those chances turned against him. Speaking to me of the Russians Rapp said, "They will soon be as wise as we are! Every time we go to war with them we teach them how to beat us." I was struck with the originality and truth of this observation, which at the time I heard it was new, thought it has been often repeated since.

"On leaving Dresden," said Rapp to me, "Napoleon came to Dantzic. I expected a dressing; for, to tell you the truth, I had treated very cavalierly both his custom-house

and its officers, who were raising up as many enemies to France as there were inhabitants in my Government. I had also warned him of all that has since happened in Russia, but I assure you I did not think myself quite so good a prophet. In the beginning of 1812 I thus wrote to him: 'If your Majesty should experience reverses you may depend on it that both Russians and Germans will rise up in a mass to shake off the yoke. There will be a crusade, and all your allies will abandon you. Even the King of Bavaria, on whom you rely so confidently, will join the coalition. I except only the King of Saxony. He, perhaps, might remain faithful to you; but his subjects will force him to make common cause with your enemies.' The King of Naples," continued Rapp, "who had the command of the cavalry, had been to Dantzic before the Emperor. He did not seem to take a more favourable view of the approaching campaign than I did. Murat was dissatisfied that the Emperor would not consent to his rejoining him in Dresden; and he said that he would rather be a captain of grenadiers than a King such as he was."

Here I interrupted Rapp to tell him what had fallen from Murat when I met him in the Champs Elysées "Bah!" resumed Rapp, "Murat, brave as he was, was a craven in Napoleon's presence! On the Emperor's arrival in Dantzic the first thing of which he spoke to me was the alliance he had just then concluded with Prussia and Austria. I could not refrain from telling him that we did a great deal of mischief as allies; a fact of which I was assured from the reports daily transmitted to me respecting the conduct of our troops. Bonaparte tossed his head, as you know he was in the habit of doing when he was displeased. After a moment's silence, dropping the familiar thee and thou, he said, 'Monsieur le Général, this is a torrent which must be allowed to run itself out. It will not last long. I must first ascertain whether Alexander decidedly wishes for war.' Then, suddenly changing the

subject of conversation, he said, 'Have you not lately observed something extraordinary in Murat? I think he is quite altered. Is he ill?'—'Sire,' replied I, 'Murat is not ill, but he is out of spirits.'—'Out of spirits! but why? Is he not satisfied with being a King?'—'Sire, Murat says he is no King.'—'That is his own fault. Why does he make himself a Neapolitan? Why is he not a Frenchman? When he is in his Kingdom he commits all sorts of follies. He favours the trade of England; that I will not suffer.'

"When," continued Rapp, "he spoke of the favour extended by Murat to the trade between Naples and England I thought my turn would come next; but I was deceived. No more was said on the subject, and when I was about to take my leave the Emperor said to me, as when in his best of humours, 'Rapp, you will sup with me this evening.' I accordingly supped that evening with the Emperor, who had also invited the King of Naples and Berthier. Next day the Emperor visited the fortress, and afterwards returned to the Government Palace, where he received the civil and military authorities. He again invited Murat, Berthier, and me to supper. When we first sat down to table we were all very dull, for the Emperor was silent; and, as you well know, under such circumstances not even Murat himself dared to be the first to speak to him. At length Napoleon, addressing me, inquired how far it was from Cadiz to Dantzic. 'Too far, Sire,' replied I. 'I understand you, Monsieur le Général, but in a few months the distance will be still greater.'—'So much the worse, Sire!' Here there was another pause. Neither Murat nor Berthier, on whom the Emperor fixed a scrutinising glance, uttered a word, and Napoleon again broke silence, but without addressing any one of us in particular: 'Gentlemen,' said he in a solemn and rather low tone of voice, 'I see plainly that you are none of you inclined to fight again. The King of

Naples does not wish to leave the fine climate of his dominions, Berthier wishes to enjoy the diversion of the chase at his estate of Gros Bois, and Rapp is impatient to be back to his hôtel in Paris.' Would you believe it," pursued Rapp, "that neither Murat nor Berthier said a word in reply? and the ball again came to me. I told him frankly that what he said was perfectly true, and the King of Naples and the Prince of Neufchâtel complimented me on my spirit, and observed that I was quite right in saying what I did. 'Well,' said I, "since it was so very right, why did you not follow my example, and why leave me to say all?' You cannot conceive," added Rapp, "how confounded they both were; and especially Murat, though he was very differently situated from Berthier."

The negotiations which Bonaparte opened with Alexander, when he yet wished to seem averse to war, resembled those oratorical paraphrases which do not prevent us from coming to the conclusion we wish. The two Emperors equally desired war; the one with the view of consolidating his power, and the other in the hope of freeing himself from a yoke which threatened to reduce him to a state of vassalage, for it was little short of this to require a power like Russia to close her ports against England for the mere purpose of favouring the interests of France. At that time only two European powers were not tied to Napoleon's fate—Sweden and Turkey. Napoleon was anxious to gain the alliance of these two powers. With respect to Sweden his efforts were vain; and though, in fact, Turkey was then at war with Russia, yet the Grand Seignior was not now, as at the time of Sebastiani's embassy, subject to the influence of France.

The peace, which was soon concluded at Bucharest, between Russia and Turkey increased Napoleon's embarrassment. The left of the Russian army, secured by the neutrality of Turkey, was reinforced by Bagration's corps from Moldavia: it subsequently occupied the right of

the Beresina, and destroyed the last hope of saving the wreck of the French army. It is difficult to conceive how Turkey could have allowed the consideration of injuries she had received from France to induce her to terminate the war with Russia when France was attacking that power with immense forces. The Turks never had a fairer opportunity for taking revenge on Russia, and, unfortunately for Napoleon, they suffered it to escape.[1]

Napoleon was not more successful when he sought the alliance of a Prince whose fortune he had made, and who was allied to his family, but with whom he had never been on terms of good understanding. The Emperor Alexander had a considerable corps of troops in Finland destined to protect that country against the Swedes, Napoleon having consented to that occupation in order to gain the provisional consent of Alexander to the invasion of Spain. What was the course pursued by Napoleon when, being at war with Russia, he wished to detach Sweden from her alliance with Alexander? He intimated to Bernadotte that he had a sure opportunity of retaking Finland, a conquest which would gratify his subjects and win their attachment to him. By this alliance Napoleon wished to force Alexander not to withdraw the troops who were in the north of his Empire, but rather to augment their numbers in order to cover Finland and St. Petersburg. It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured to draw the Prince Royal into his coali-

[1] This important treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey, through the mediation of Great Britain, was admirably conducted, and brought to a most successful issue by Lord Stratford, then Mr. S. Canning, a young man and a very young diplomatist. Lord Stratford de Redclyffe, like his cousin George Canning, gained high literary honours as well as political ones. He was the author of a magnificent ode on the fall of Bonaparte,—a production with which Lord Byron was enchanted. It is curious that a few years ago the Court of Russia should have positively refused to receive as British Ambassador the distinguished individual who once did their country such signal service. Such, however, was the fact, and after long delays and many heart-burnings, during which the Emperor Nicholas would state no motives for his almost unprecedented refusal, Lord Durham was appointed by the Cabinet to supply Sir Stratford Canning's place.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

tion. It was of little consequence to Napoleon whether Bernadotte succeeded or not. The Emperor Alexander would nevertheless have been obliged to increase his force in Finland; that was all that Napoleon wished. In the gigantic struggle upon which France and Russia were about to enter the most trivial alliance was not to be neglected. In January 1812 Davoust invaded Swedish Pomerania without any declaration of war, and without any apparent motive. Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proposed alliance, even had that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country? That was impossible; and Bernadotte took the part which was expected of him. He rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.

The Emperor Alexander wished to withdraw his force from Finland for the purpose of more effectively opposing the immense army which threatened his States. Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August 1812, at Abo, with the Prince Royal, to come to an arrangement with him for uniting their interests. I know that the Emperor of Russia pledged himself, whatever might happen, to protect Bernadotte against the fate of the new dynasties, to guarantee the possession of his throne, and promised that he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland. He even went so far as to hint that Bernadotte might supersede Napoleon. Bernadotte adopted all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made common cause against Napoleon. The Prince Royal's conduct has been much blamed, but the question resolved itself into one of mere political interest. Could Bernadotte, a Swede by adoption, prefer the alliance of an ambitious sovereign whose vengeance he had to fear, and who had sanctioned the seizure of Finland to that of a powerful monarch, his formidable neighbour, his protector

in Sweden, and whose hostility might effectually support the hereditary claims of young Gustavus? Sweden, in joining France, would thereby have declared herself the enemy of England. Where, then, would have been her navy, her trade, and even her existence?

CHAPTER XXVII.

1812.

Changeableness of Bonaparte's plans and opinions—Articles for the *Moniteur* dictated by the First Consul—The Protocol of the Congress of Châtillon—Conversations with Davoust at Hamburg—Promise of the Viceroyalty of Poland—Hope and disappointment of the Poles—Influence of illusion on Bonaparte—The French in Moscow—Disasters of the retreat—Mallet's conspiracy—Intelligence of the affair communicated to Napoleon at Smolensko—Circumstances detailed by Rapp—Real motives of Napoleon's return to Paris—Murat, Ney, and Eugène—Power of the Italians to endure cold—Napoleon's exertions to repair his losses—Defection of General York—Convocation of a Privy Council—War resolved on—Wavering of the Pope—Useless negotiations with Vienna—Maria Louisa appointed Regent.

It may now be asked whether Bonaparte, previous to entering upon the last campaign, had resolved on restoring Poland to independence. The fact is that Bonaparte, as Emperor, never entertained any positive wish to re-establish the old Kingdom of Poland, though at a previous period he was strongly inclined to that re-establishment, of which he felt the necessity. He may have said that he would re-establish the Kingdom of Poland, but I beg leave to say that that is no reason for believing that he entertained any such design. He had said, and even sworn, that he would never aggrandise the territory of the Empire! The changeableness of Bonaparte's ideas, plans, and projects renders it difficult to master them; but they may be best understood when it is considered that all Napoleon's plans and conceptions varied with his fortunes. Thus, it is not unlikely that he might at one time have considered the re-establishment of Poland as essential to

European policy, and afterwards have regarded it as adverse to the development of his ambition. Who can venture to guess what passed in his mind when dazzled by his glory at Dresden, and whether in one of his dreams he might not have regarded the Empire of the Jagellons as another gem in the Imperial diadem? The truth is that Bonaparte, when General-in-Chief of the army of Egypt and First Consul, had deeply at heart the avenging the dismemberment of Poland, and I have often conversed with him on this most interesting subject, upon which we entirely concurred in opinion. But times and circumstances were changed since we walked together on the terrace of Cairo and mutually deplored the death of young Sulkowski. Had Sulkowski lived Napoleon's favourable intentions with respect to Poland might perhaps have been confirmed. A fact which explains to me the coolness, I may almost say the indifference, of Bonaparte to the resurrection of Poland is that the commencement of the Consulate was the period at which that measure particularly occupied his attention. How often did he converse on the subject with me and other persons who may yet recollect his sentiments! It was the topic on which he most loved to converse, and on which he spoke with feeling and enthusiasm. In the *Moniteur* of the period here alluded to I could point out more than one article without signature or official character which Napoleon dictated to me, and the insertion of which in that journal, considering the energy of certain expressions, sufficiently proves that they could have emanated from none but Bonaparte. It was usually in the evening that he dictated to me these articles. Then, when the affairs of the day were over, he would launch into the future, and give free scope to his vast projects. Some of these articles were characterised by so little moderation that the First Consul would very often destroy them in the morning, smiling at the violent ebullitions of the preceding night. At other times I took

the liberty of not sending them to the *Moniteur* on the night on which they were dictated, and though he might earnestly wish their insertion I adduced reasons good or bad, to account for the delay. He would then read over the article in question, and approve of my conduct; but he would sometimes add, "It is nevertheless true that with an independent Kingdom of Poland, and 150,000 disposable troops in the east of France, I should always be master of Russia, Prussia, and Austria."—"General," I would reply, "I am entirely of your opinion; but wherefore awaken the suspicions of the interested parties? Leave all to time and circumstances."

The reader may have to learn, and not, perhaps, without some surprise, that in the protocol of the sittings of the Congress of Châtillon Napoleon put forward the spoliation of Poland by the three principal powers allied against him as a claim to a more advantageous peace, and to territorial indemnities for France. In policy he was right, but the report of foreign cannon was already loud enough to drown the best of arguments.

After the ill-timed and useless union of the Hanse Towns to France I returned to Hamburg in the spring of 1811 to convey my family to France. I then had some conversation with Davoust. On one occasion I said to him that if his hopes were realised, and my sad predictions respecting the war with Russia overthrown, I hoped to see the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland. Davoust replied that that event was probable, since he had Napoleon's promise of the Viceroyalty of that Kingdom, and as several of his comrades had been promised starosties. Davoust made no secret of this, and it was generally known throughout Hamburg and the north of Germany. But notwithstanding what Davoust said respecting Napoleon's intentions I considered that these promises had been conditional rather than positive.

On Napoleon's arrival in Poland the Diet of Warsaw,

assured, as there seemed reason to be, of the Emperor's sentiments, declared the Kingdom free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were pronounced to be null; and certainly the Diet had a right so to act, for it calculated upon his support. But the address of the Diet to Napoleon, in which these principles were declared, was ill received. His answer was full of doubt and indecision, the motive of which could not be blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia he had just guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon therefore declared that he could take no part in any movement or resolution which might disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish provinces forming a part of her Empire. To act otherwise, he said, would be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw her into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian provinces, Napoleon declared he would see what he could do, should Providence favour the good cause. These vague and obscure expressions did not define what he intended to do for the Poles in the event of success crowning his vast enterprises. They excited the distrust of the Poles, and had no other result. On this subject, however, an observation occurs which is of some force as an apology for Napoleon. Poland was successively divided between three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, with each of which Napoleon had been at war, but never with all three at once. He had therefore never been able to take advantage of his victories to re-establish Poland without injuring the interests of neutral powers or of his allies. Hence it may be concluded not only that he never had the positive will which would have triumphed over all obstacles, but also that there never was a possibility of realising those dreams and projects of revenge in which he had indulged on the banks of the Nile, as it were to console the departed spirit of Sulkowski.

Bonaparte's character presents many unaccountable incongruities. Although the most positive man that perhaps ever existed, yet there never was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In many circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same thing. He never indulged in greater illusions than at the beginning of the campaign of Moscow. Even before the approach of the disasters which accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, all sensible persons concurred in the opinion that the Emperor ought to have passed the winter of 1812–13 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises in the spring. But his natural impatience impelled him forward as it were unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an invisible demon stronger than even his own strong will. This demon was ambition. He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently understood its power, and how much is sometimes gained by delay. Yet Cæsar's *Commentaries*, which were his favourite study, ought to have shown him that Cæsar did not conquer Gaul in one campaign. Another illusion by which Napoleon was misled during the campaign of Moscow, and perhaps past experience rendered it very excusable, was the belief that the Emperor Alexander would propose peace when he saw him at the head of his army on the Russian territory. The prolonged stay of Bonaparte at Moscow can indeed be accounted for in no other way than by supposing that he expected the Russian Cabinet would change its opinion and consent to treat for peace. However, whatever might have been the reason, after his long and useless stay in Moscow Napoleon left that city with the design of taking up his winter quarters in Poland; but Fate now frowned upon Napoleon, and in that dreadful retreat the elements seemed leagued with the Russians to destroy the most formidable army ever commanded by one chief. To find a catastrophe in history comparable to that of the Beresina

we must go back to the destruction of the legions of Varus.

Nothwithstanding the general dismay which prevailed in Paris that capital continued tranquil, when by a singular chance, on the very day on which Napoleon evacuated the burning city of Moscow, Mallet attempted his extraordinary enterprise. This General, who had always professed Republican principles, and was a man of bold decided character, after having been imprisoned for some time, obtained the permission of Government to live in Paris in a hospital house situated near the Barrière du Trône. Of Mallet's conspiracy it is not necessary to say much after the excellent account given of it in the Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo. Mallet's plan was to make it be believed that Bonaparte had been killed at Moscow, and that a new Government was established under the authority of the Senate. But what could Mallet do? Absolutely nothing: and had his Government continued three days he would have experienced a more favourable chance than that which he ought reasonably to have expected. He asserted that the Emperor was dead, but an *estafette* from Russia would reveal the truth, resuscitate Napoleon, and overwhelm with confusion Mallet and his proclamations. His enterprise was that of a madman. The French were too weary of troubles to throw themselves into the arms of Mallet or his associate Lahorie, who had figured so disgracefully on the trial of Moreau. Yet, in spite of the evident impossibility of success, it must be confessed that considerable ingenuity and address marked the commencement of the conspiracy. On the 22d of October Mallet escaped from the hospital house and went to Colonel Soulier, who commanded the tenth cohort of the National Guard, whose barracks were situated exactly behind the hospital house. Mallet was loaded with a parcel of forged orders which he had himself prepared. He introduced himself to Soulier under the name of Gen-

eral La Motte, and said that he came from General Mallet.[1]

Colonel Soulier on hearing of the Emperor's death was affected to tears. He immediately ordered the adjutant to assemble the cohort and obey the orders of General La Motte, to whom he expressed his regret for being himself too ill to leave his bed. It was then two o'clock in the morning, and the forged documents respecting the Emperor's death and the new form of Government were read to the troops by lamplight. Mallet then hastily set off with 1200 men to La Force, and liberated the Sieurs Guidal and Lahorie, who were confined there. Mallet informed them of the Emperor's death and of the change of Government; gave them some orders, in obedience to which the Minister and Prefect of Police were arrested in their hôtel.

I was then at Courbevoie, and I went to Paris on that very morning to breakfast, as I frequently did, with the Minister of Police. My surprise may be imagined when

[1] General Mallet gave ont that the Emperor was killed nnder the walls of Moscow on the 8th of October; he could not take any other day withont incurring the risk of being contradicted by the arrival of the regular courier. The Emperor being dead, he concluded that the Senate ought to be invested with the supreme anthority, and he therefore resolved to address himself in the name of that body to the nation and the army. In a proclamation to the soldiers he deplored the death of the Emperor; in another, after announcing the abolition of the Imperial system and the Restoration of the Republic, he indicated the manner in which the Government was to be reconstructed, described the branches into which public anthority was to be divided, and named the Directors. Attached to the different documents there appeared the signatures of several Senators whose names he recollected but with whom he had ceased to have any interconrse for a great nnmber of years. These signatures were all written by Mallet, and he drew up a decree in the name of the Senate, and signed by the same Senators, appointing himself Governor of Paris, and commander of the troops of the first military division. He also drew np other decrees in the same form, which purported to promote to higher ranks all the military officers he intended to make instruments in the execution of his enterprise.

He ordered one regiment to close all the barriers of Paris, and allow no person to pass through them. This was done: so that in all the neighbouring towns from which assistance, in case of need, might have been obtained, nothing was known of the transactions in Paris. He sent the other regiments to occupy the Bank, the Treasury, and different Ministerial Offices. At the Treasury some resistance was made. The Minister of that Department was on the spot, and he employed the guard of his honsehold in maintaining his anthority. Bnt in the whole of the two regiments of the Paris Guard not a single objection was started to the execution of Mallet's orders (*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome vi. p. 20).

I learned from the porter that the Duc de Rovigo had been arrested and carried to the prison of La Force. I went into the house and was informed, to my great astonishment, that the ephemeral Minister was being measured for his official suit, an act which so completely denoted the character of the conspirator that it gave me an insight into the business.

Mallet repaired to General Hulin, who had the command of Paris. He informed him that he had been directed by the Minister of Police to arrest him and seal his papers. Hulin asked to see the order, and then entered his cabinet, where Mallet followed him, and just as Hulin was turning round to speak to him he fired a pistol in his face. Hulin fell: the ball entered his cheek, but the wound was not mortal. The most singular circumstance connected with the whole affair is, that the captain whom Mallet had directed to follow him, and who accompanied him to Hulin's, saw nothing extraordinary in all this, and did nothing to stop it. Mallet next proceeded, very composedly, to Adjutant-General Doucet's. It happened that one of the inspectors of the police was there. He recognised General Mallet as being a man under his supervision. He told him that he had no right to quit the hospital house without leave, and ordered him to be arrested. Mallet, seeing that all was over, was in the act of drawing a pistol from his pocket, but being observed was seized and disarmed. Thus terminated this extraordinary conspiracy, for which fourteen lives paid the forfeit; but, with the exception of Mallet, Guidal, and Lahorie, all the others concerned in it were either machines or dupes.

This affair produced but little effect in Paris, for the enterprise and its result were make known simultaneously. But it was thought droll enough that the Minister and Prefect of Police should be imprisoned by the men who only the day before were their prisoners. Next day I went to see Savary, who had not yet recovered from the

stupefaction caused by his extraordinary adventure. He was aware that his imprisonment, though it lasted only half an hour, was a subject of merriment to the Parisians.[1]

The Emperor, as I have already mentioned, left Moscow on the day when Mallet made his bold attempt, that is to say, the 19th of October.[2] He was at Smolensko when he heard the news. Rapp, who had been wounded before the entrance into Moscow, but who was sufficiently recovered to return home, was with Napoleon when the latter received the despatches containing an account of what had happened in Paris. He informed me that Napoleon was much agitated on perusing them, and that he launched into abuse of the ineffeciency of the police. Rapp added that he did not confine himself to complaints against the agents of his authority. "Is, then, my power so insecure," said he, "that it may be put in peril by a single individual, and a prisoner? It would appear that my crown is not fixed very firmly on my head if in my own capital the bold stroke of three adventurers can shake it. Rapp, misfortune never comes alone; this is the complement of what is passing here. I cannot be everywhere; but I must go back to Paris; my presence there is indispensable to reanimate public opinion. I must have men and money. Great successes and great victories will repair all. I must set off." Such were the motives which induced the Emperor to leave his army. It is not without indignation that I have heard his precipitate departure

[1] Savary's arrest was a rich subject for the wits of Paris. "I will qnote on this occasion," says Mademoiselle Avrillion, "a *bon-mot* that was repeated from one end of the city to the other: as every one knows, it was in the middle of the night that the Dnc de Rovigo was seized: the Dnchess, terrified by the noise she heard, rushed out of her bedroom *en deshabille*, which made the wags say that "La personne qni s'était le mieux montrée, dans l'affaire de Mallet, c'était la Dnchesse de Rovigo." See also the *Memoirs of Rapp*, p. 251.

[2] It was not on the 19th of October but on the night of the 22d of October that Mallet commenced his enterprise, which finished early on the 23d of October 1812; see *Thiers*, tome xiv. p. 526. Napoleon had left Moscow on the 19th, and on the 22d was approaching Malo-Jaroslawetz, of ill name for him, where on the 24th of October he was thrown off his intended line of retreat on to the same line as he had advanced by.

attributed to personal cowardice. He was a stranger to such feelings, and was never more happy than on the field of battle. I can readily conceive that he was much alarmed on hearing of Mallet's enterprise. The remarks which he made to Rapp were those which he knew would be made by the public, and he well knew that the affair was calculated to banish those illusions of power and stability with which he endeavoured to surround his government.

On leaving Moscow Napoleon consigned the wrecks of his army to the care of his most distinguished generals: to Murat, who had so ably commanded the cavalry, but who abandoned the army to return to Naples; and to Ney, the hero, rather than the Prince of the Moskowa, whose name will be immortal in the annals of glory, as his death will be eternal in the annals of party revenge. Amidst the general disorder Eugène, more than any other chief, maintained a sort of discipline among the Italians; and it was remarked that the troops of the south engaged in the fatal campaign of Moscow had endured the rigour of the cold better than those troops who were natives of less genial climates.[1]

Napoleon's return from Moscow was not like his returns from the campaigns of Vienna and Tilsit, when he came back crowned with laurels, and bringing peace as the reward of his triumphs. It was remarked that Napoleon's first great disaster followed the first enterprise he undertook after his marriage with Maria Louisa. This tended to confirm the popular belief that the presence of Josephine was favourable to his fortune; and superstitious as he sometimes was, I will not venture to affirm that he himself did

[1] On one occasion during his flight Napoleon owed his preservation from the Cossacks to a small body of Neapolitan cavalry that had contrived to keep itself mounted and in perfect order. The horses as well as the men from the southern extremity of Italy, from the banks of the Garigliano, the Volturno, and the Amato, resisted the inclemencies of the Russian winter much better than the French.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

not adopt this idea. He now threw off even the semblance of legality in the measures of his government: he assumed arbitrary power, under the impression that the critical circumstances in which he was placed would excuse everything. But, however inexplicable were the means to which the Emperor resorted to procure resources, it is but just to acknowledge that they were the consequence of his system of government, and that he evinced inconceivable activity in repairing his losses so as to place himself in a situation to resist his enemies, and restore the triumph of the French standard.

But in spite of all Napoleon's endeavours the disasters of the campaign of Russia were daily more and more sensibly felt. The King of Prussia had played a part which was an acknowledgment of his weakness in joining France, instead of openly declaring himself for the cause of Russia, which was also his. Then took place the defection of General York, who commanded the Prussian contingent to Napoleon's army. The King of Prussia, though no doubt secretly satisfied with the conduct of General York, had him tried and condemned; but shortly after that sovereign commanded in person the troops which had turned against ours. The defection of the Prussians produced a very ill effect, and it was easy to perceive that other defections would follow. Napoleon, foreseeing the fatal chances which this event was likely to draw upon him, assembled a privy council, composed of the Ministers and some of the great officers of his household. MM. de Talleyrand and Cambacérès, and the President of the Senate were present. Napoleon asked whether, in the complicated difficulties of our situation, it would be more advisable to negotiate for peace or to prepare for a new war. Cambacérès and Talleyrand gave their opinion in favour of peace, which, however, Napoleon would not hear of after a defeat; but the Duc de Feltre,[1] knowing how

[1] The Minister for the War Department, Clarke.

to touch the susceptible chord in the mind of Bonaparte, said that he would consider the Emperor dishonoured if he consented to the abandonment of the smallest village which had been united to the Empire by a *Sénatus-consulte*. This opinion was adopted, and the war continued.

On Napoleon's return to Paris the Pope, who was still at Fontainebleau, determined to accede to an arrangement, and to sign an act which the Emperor conceived would terminate the differences between them. But being influenced by some of the cardinals who had previously incurred the Emperor's displeasure Pius VII. disavowed the new *Concordat* which he had been weak enough to grant, and the Emperor, who then had more important affairs on his hands, dismissed the Holy Father, and published the act to which he had assented. Bonaparte had no leisure to pay attention to the new difficulties started by Pius VII.; his thoughts were wholly directed to the other side of the Rhine. He was unfortunate, and the powers with whom he was most intimately allied separated from him, as he might have expected, and Austria was not the last to imitate the example set by Prussia. In these difficult circumstances the Emperor, who for some time past had observed the talent and address of the Comte Louis de Narbonne, sent him to Vienna, to supersede M. Otto ; but the pacific propositions of M. de Narbonne were not listened to. Austria would not let slip the fair opportunity of taking revenge without endangering herself.

Napoleon now saw clearly that since Austria had abandoned him and refused her contingent he should soon have all Europe arrayed against him. But this did not intimidate him.

Some of the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine still remained faithful to him ; and his preparations being completed, he proposed to resume in person the command of the army which had been so miraculously reproduced. But before his departure Napoleon, alarmed at the recol-

lection of Mallet's attempt, and anxious to guard against any similar occurrence during his absence, did not, as on former occasions, consign the reins of the National Government to a Council of Ministers, presided over by the Arch-Chancellor. Napoleon placed my successor with him, M. Meneval, near the Empress Regent as Secrétaire des Commandemens (Principal Secretary), and certainly he could not have made a better choice.[1] He made the Empress Maria Louisa Regent, and appointed a Council of Regency to assist her.

[1] Meneval, who had held the post of Secretary to Napoleon from the time of Bourrienne's disgrace in 1802, had been nearly killed by the hardships of the Russian campaign, and now received an honourable and responsible but less onerous post. He remained with the Empress till 7th May 1815, when, finding that she would not return to her husband, he left her to rejoin his master.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

1813.

Riots in Hamburg and Lübeck—Attempted suicide of M. Konning—Evacuation of Hamburg—Dissatisfaction at the conduct of General St. Cyr—The Cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries—First appearance of the Cossacks—Colonel Tettenborn invited to occupy Hamburg—Cordial reception of the Russians—Depredations—Levies of troops—Testimonals of gratitude to Tettenborn—Napoleon's new army—Death of General Morand—Remarks of Napoleon on Vandamme—Bonaparte and Gustavus Adolphus—Junction of the corps of Davoust and Vandamme—Reoccupation of Hamburg by the French—General Hogendorff appointed Governor of Hamburg—Exactions and vexatious contributions levied upon Hamburg and Lübeck—Hostages.

A CONSIDERABLE time before Napoleon left Paris to join the army, the bulk of which was in Saxony, partial insurrections occurred in many places. The interior of France proper was indeed still in a state of tranquillity, but it was not so in the provinces annexed by force to the extremities of the Empire, especially in the north, and in the unfortunate Hanse Towns, for which, since my residence at Hamburg, I have always felt the greatest interest.[1] The intelligence I received was derived from such unquestion-

[1] The total destruction of the French ascendency was not looked on with entire satisfaction in Germany. Even Muffling, who says (p. 392) that the German armies advanced from Leipsic with the device, "Let all sinners be forgiven, and let there be no more hell" (sin being help to the French and hell their dominion?), allows that some Germans still adhered to Napoleon; and he points out (p. 393) that though the Princes hated Napoleon, there were great difficulties from their wish to retain the position they owed to him. Even as late as about 1825 a Prussian officer of high rank said to Niebuhr: "A war with France would be rather critical. The temper of the people on the Rhine has greatly improved no doubt, but it were well that many an inveterate old talker should die out before these provinces are made the seat of war" (*Perthes*, tome ii. p. 319).

able sources that I can pledge myself for the truth of what I have to state respecting the events which occurred in those provinces at the commencement of 1813; and subsequently I obtained a confirmation of all the facts communicated by my correspondence when I was sent to Hamburg by Louis XVIII. in 1815.

M. Steuve, agent from the Court of Russia, who lived at Altona apparently as a private individual, profited by the irritation produced by the measures adopted at Hamburg. His plans were so well arranged that he was promptly informed of the route of the Grand Army from Moscow, and the approach of the Allied troops. Aided by the knowledge and activity of Sieur Hanft of Hamburg, M. Steuve profited by the discontent of a people so tyrannically governed, and seized the opportunity for producing an explosion. Between eight and nine o'clock on the morning of the 24th of February 1813 an occurrence in which the people were concerned was the signal for a revolt. An individual returning to Hamburg by the Altona gate would not submit to be searched by a fiscal agent, who in consequence maltreated him and wounded him severely. The populace instantly rose, drove away the revenue guard, and set fire to the guard-house. The people also, excited by secret agents, attacked other French posts, where they committed the same excesses. Surprised at this unexpected movement, the French authorities retired to the houses in which they resided. All the respectable inhabitants who were unconnected with the tumult likewise returned to their homes, and no person appeared out of doors.

General Carra St. Cyr [1] had the command of Hamburg after the Prince of Eckmuhl's departure for the Russian campaign. At the first news of the revolt he set about

[1] General Carra St. Cyr is not to be confused with the Marshal Gouvion de St. Cyr; he fell into disgrace for his conduct at Hamburg at this time, and was not again employed by Napoleon. Under the Restoration he became Governor of French Guiana.

packing up his papers, and Comte de Chaban, M. Konning, the Prefect of Hamburg, and M. Daubignosc, the Director of Police, followed his example. It was not till about four o'clock in the afternoon that a detatchment of Danish hussars arrived at Hamburg, and the populace was then speedily dispersed. All the respectable citizens and men of property assembled the next morning and adopted means for securing internal tranquillity, so that the Danish troops were enabled to return to Altona. Search was then made for the ringleaders of the disturbance. Many persons were arrested, and a military commission, *ad hoc*, was appointed to try them. The commission, however, condemned only one individual, who, being convicted of being one of the most active rioters, was sentenced to be shot, and the sentence was carried into execution.

On the 26th February a similar commotion took place at Lübeck. Attempts were made to attack the French authorities. The respectable citizens instantly assembled, protected them against outrage, and escorted them in safety to Hamburg, where they arrived on the 27th. The precipitate flight of these persons from Lübeck spread some alarm in Hamburg. The danger was supposed to be greater than it was because the fugitives were accompanied by a formidable body of troops.

But these were not the only attempts to throw off the yoke of French domination, which had become insupportable. All the left bank of the Elbe was immediately in a state of insurrection, and all the official persons took refuge in Hamburg. During these partial insurrections everything was neglected. Indecision, weakness, and cupidity were manifested everywhere. Instead of endeavours to soothe the minds of the people, which had been long exasperated by intolerable tyranny, recourse was had to rigorous measures. The prisons were crowded with a host of persons declared to be suspected upon the mere

representations of the agents of the police. On the 3d of March a special military commission condemned six householders of Hamburg and its neighbourhood to be shot on the glacis for no other offence than having been led, either by chance or curiosity, to a part of the town which was the scene of one of the riots. These executions excited equal horror and indignation, and General Carra St. Cyr was obliged to issue a proclamation for the dissolution of the military commission by whom the men had been sentenced.

The intelligence of the march of the Russian and Prussian troops, who were descending the Elbe, increased the prevailing agitation in Westphalia, Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Pomerania, and all the French troops cantoned between Berlin and Hamburg, including those who occupied the coast of the Baltic, fell back upon Hamburg. General Carra St. Cyr and Baron Konning, the Prefect of Hamburg, used to go every evening to Altona.[1] The latter, worn out by anxiety and his unsettled state of life, lost his reason, and on his way to Hamburg, on the 5th of May, he attempted to cut his throat with a razor. His *valet de chambre* saved his life by rushing upon him before he had time to execute his design. It was given out that he had broken a blood-vessel, and he was conveyed to Altona, where his wound was cured, and he subsequently recovered from his derangement. M. Konning, who was a native of Holland, was a worthy man, but possessed no decision of character, and but little ability.

At this juncture exaggerated reports were circulated

[1] The Prefect, Baron von Konning, had just before assured the Government that his department professed the greatest devotion for the Emperor. This practical commentary on his statement was too much for him. Puymaigre (p. 145), who was on the spot, says that he attempted to hang himself, not to cut his throat, as Bourrienne says. "I was," continued Puymaigre, "surprised to see that later on he was one of the Ministers of Belgium. What is more surprising is that he retained his high functions for several years." Puymaigre (p. 149) defends Carra St. Cyr, saying that having only 1200 or 1500 men the General could not have maintained himself in a large town in a state of insurrection.

respecting the approach of a Russian corps. A retreat was immediately ordered, and it was executed on the 12th of March. General Carra St. Cyr having no money for the troops, helped himself to 100,000 francs out of the municipal treasury. He left Hamburg at the head of the troops and the enrolled men of the custom-house service. He was escorted by the Burgher Guard, which protected him from the insults of the populace ; and the good people of Hamburg never had any visitors of whom they were more happy to be rid.

This sudden retreat excited Napoleon's indignation. He accused General St. Cyr of pusillanimity, in an article inserted in the *Moniteur*, and afterwards copied by his order into all the journals. In fact, had General St. Cyr been better informed, or less easily alarmed, he might have kept Hamburg, and prevented its temporary occupation by the enemy, to dislodge whom it was necessary to besiege the city two months afterwards. St. Cyr had 3000 regular troops, and a considerable body of men in the custom-house service. General Morand could have furnished him with 5000 men from Mecklenburg. He might, therefore, not only have kept possession of Hamburg two months longer, but even to the end of the war, as General Lemarrois retained possession of Magdeburg. Had not General St. Cyr so hastily evacuated the Elbe he would have been promptly aided by the corps which General Vandamme soon brought from the Wesel, and afterwards by the very corps with which Marshal Davoust recaptured Hamburg.

The events just described occurred before Napoleon quitted Paris. In the month of August all negotiation was broken off with Austria, though that power, still adhering to her time-serving policy, continued to protest fidelity to the cause of the Emperor Napoleon until the moment when her preparations were completed and her resolution formed. But if there was duplicity at Vienna was there not folly, nay, blindness, in the Cabinet of the

Tuileries? Could we reasonably rely upon Austria? She had seen the Russian army pass the Vistula and advance as far as the Saale without offering any remonstrance. At that moment a single movement of her troops, a word of declaration, would have prevented everything. As, therefore, she would not avert the evil when she might have done so with certainty and safety, there must have been singular folly and blindness in the Cabinet who saw this conduct and did not understand it.

I now proceed to mention the further misfortunes which occurred in the north of Germany, and particularly at Hamburg. At fifteen leagues east of Hamburg, but within its territory, is a village named Bergdorff. It was in that village that the Cossacks were first seen. Twelve or fifteen hundred of them arrived there under the command of Colonel Tettenborn. But for the retreat of the French troops, amounting to 3000, exclusive of men in the custom-house service, no attempt would have been made upon Hamburg; but the very name of the Cossacks inspired a degree of terror which must be fresh in the recollection of every one. Alarm spread in Hamburg, which, being destitute of troops and artillery, and surrounded with dilapidated fortifications, could offer no defence. The Senator Bartch and Doctor Know took upon themselves to proceed to Bergdorff to solicit Colonel Tettenborn to take possession of Hamburg, observing that they felt sure of his sentiments of moderation, and that they trusted they would grant protection to a city which had immense commercial relations with Russia. Tettenborn did not place reliance on these propositions because he could not suppose that there had been such a precipitate evacuation; he thought they were merely a snare to entrap him, and refused to accede to them. But a Doctor Von Hess, a Swede, settled in Hamburg some years, and known to Tettenborn as a decided partisan of England and Russia, persuaded the Russian Commander to comply with the

wishes of the citizens of Hamburg. However, Tettenborn consented only on the following conditions:—That the old Government should be instantly re-established; that a deputation of Senators in their old costume should invite him to take possession of Hamburg, which he would enter only as a free and Imperial Hanse Town; that if those conditions were not complied with he would regard Hamburg as a French town, and consequently hostile. Notwithstanding the real satisfaction with which the Senators of Hamburg received those propositions they were restrained by the fear of a reverse of fortune. They, however, determined to accept them, thinking that whatever might happen they could screen themselves by alleging that necessity had driven them to the step they took. They therefore declared their compliance with the conditions, and that night and the following day were occupied in assembling the Senate, which had been so long dissolved, and in making the preparations which Tettenborn required.

At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th of March a picket of Cossacks, consisting of only forty men, took possession of a town recently flourishing, and containing a population of 120,000, but ruined and reduced to 80,000 inhabitants by the blessing of being united to the French Empire. On the following day, the 18th, Colonel Tettenborn entered Hamburg at the head of 1000 regular and 200 irregular Cossacks. I have described the military situation of Hamburg when it was evacuated on the 12th of March, and Napoleon's displeasure may be easily conceived. Tettenborn was received with all the honours usually bestowed upon a conqueror. Enthusiasm was almost universal. For several nights the people devoted themselves to rejoicing. The Cossacks were gorged with provisions and drink, and were not a little astonished at the handsome reception they experienced.

It was not until the expiration of three or four days that the people began to perceive the small number of the allied

troops. Their amount gradually diminished. On the day after the arrival of the Cossacks a detachment was sent to Lübeck, where they were received with the same honours as at Hamburg. Other detachments were sent upon different places, and after four days' occupation there remained in Hamburg only 70 out of the 1200 Cossacks who had entered on the 18th March.

The first thing their commander did was to take possession of the post-office and the treasuries of the different public offices. All the movable effects of the French Government and its agents were seized and sold. The officers evinced a true Cossack disregard of the rights of private property. Counts Huhn, Bussenitz, and Venechtern, who had joined Tettenborn's staff, rendered themselves conspicuous by plundering the property of M. Pyonnier, the Director of the Customs, and M. Gonse, the Postmaster, and not a bottle of wine was left in their cellars. Tettenborn laid hands upon a sum of money, consisting of upwards of 4000 louis in gold, belonging to M. Gonse, which had been lodged with M. Schwartz, a respectable banker in Hamburg, who filled the office of Prussian Consul. M. Schwartz, with whom this money had been deposited for the sake of security, had also the care of some valuable jewels belonging to Mesdames Carra St. Cyr and Daubignosc ; Tettenborn carried off these as well as the money. M. Schwartz remonstrated in his character of Prussian Consul, Prussia being the ally of Russia, but he was considered merely as a banker, and could obtain no redress. Tettenborn, like most of the Cossack chiefs, was nothing but a man for blows and pillage, but the agent of Russia was M. Steuve, whose name I have already mentioned.

Orders were speedily given for a levy of troops, both infantry and cavalry, to be called Hanseatic volunteers. A man named Hanft, who had formerly been a butcher, raised at his own expense a company of foot and one of lancers, of which he took the command. This undertaking,

which cost him 130,000 francs, may afford some idea of the attachment of the people of Hamburg to the French Government! But money, as well as men, was wanting, and a heavy contribution was imposed to defray the expense of enrolling a number of workmen out of employment and idlers of various kinds. Voluntary donations were solicited, and enthusiasm was so general that even servant-maids gave their rings. The sums thus collected were paid into the chest of Tettenborn's staff, and became a prey to dishonest appropriation. With respect to this money a Sieur Oswald was accused of not having acted with the scrupulous delicacy which Madame de Staël attributes to his namesake in her romance of *Corinne.*

Between 8000 and 10,000 men were levied in the Hanse Towns and their environs, the population of which had been so greatly reduced within two years. These undisciplined troops, who had been for the most part levied from the lowest classes of society, committed so many outrages that they soon obtained the surname of the *Cossacks of the Elbe;* and certainly they well deserved it.

Such was the hatred which the French Government had inspired in Hamburg that the occupation of Tettenborn was looked upon as a deliverance. On the colonel's departure the Senate, anxious to give him a testimonial of gratitude, presented him with the freedom of the city, accompanied by 5000 gold fredericks (105,000 francs), with which he was doubtless much more gratified than with the honour of the citizenship.

The restored Senate of Hamburg did not long survive. The people of the Hanse Towns learned, with no small alarm, that the Emperor was making immense preparations to fall upon Germany, where his lieutenants could not fail to take cruel revenge on those who had disavowed his authority. Before he quitted Paris on the 15th of April Napoleon had recalled under the banners of the army 180,000 men, exclusive of the guards of honour, and

it was evident that with such a force he might venture on a great game, and probably win it. Yet the month of April passed away without the occurrence of any event important to the Hanse Towns, the inhabitants of which vacillated between hope and fear. Attacks daily took place between parties of Russian and French troops on the territory between Lunenburg and Bremen. In one of these encounters General Morand was mortally wounded, and was conveyed to Lunenburg. His brother having been taken prisoner in the same engagement, Tettenborn, into whose hands he had fallen, gave him leave on parole to visit the General; but he arrived in Lunenburg only in time to see him die.

The French having advanced as far as Haarburg took up their position on the plateau of Schwartzenberg, which commands that little town and the considerable islands situated in that part of the river between Haarburg and Hamburg. Being masters of this elevated point they began to threaten Hamburg and to attack Haarburg. These attacks were directed by Vandamme, of all our generals the most redoubtable in conquered countries. He was a native of Cassel, in Flanders, and had acquired a high reputation for severity. At the very time when he was attacking Hamburg Napoleon said of him at Dresden, "If I were to lose Vandamme I know not what I would give to have him back again; but if I had two such generals I should be obliged to shoot one of them." It must be confessed that one was quite enough.[1]

[1] Dominique Vandamme, Comte d'Uneburg, distinguished himself in the wars of the Republic and of the Empire, and would have been made a Marshal in 1813, when his disaster at Kulm (perhaps partly produced by his knowledge that a great success would bring him his *bâton*) ruined his own career and Napoleon's best chance of success. He had, as Bourrienne says, the worst of characters, and when taken prisoner at Kulm was roughly treated by Alexander on account of his pillage. Intentionally or not, Vandamme, forgetting the story of the death of Paul II., took a bitter revenge by complaining that Alexander could not have treated him worse if he had assassinated his father. In 1814 Louis XVIII. was foolishly persuaded to have Vandamme rudely repulsed when he presented himself at the Tuileries with the other Generals of his rank. This was done at the time that the King ennobled the family

As soon as he arrived Vandamme sent to inform Tettenborn that if he did not immediately liberate the brother and brother-in-law of Morand, both of whom were his prisoners, he would burn Hamburg. Tettenborn replied that if he resorted to that extremity he would hang them both on the top of St. Michael's Tower, where he might have a view of them. This energetic answer obliged Vandamme to restrain his fury, or at least to direct it to other objects.

Meanwhile the French forces daily augmented at Haarburg. Vandamme, profiting by the negligence of the new Hanseatic troops, who had the defence of the great islands of the Elbe, attacked them one night in the month of May. This happened to be the very night after the battle of Lutzen, where both sides claimed the victory, and *Te Deum* was sung in the two hostile camps.[1] The advance of the French turned the balance of opinion in favour of Napoleon, who was in fact really the conqueror on a field of battle celebrated nearly two centuries before by the victory and death of Gustavus Adolphus. The *Cossacks of the Elbe* could not sustain the shock of the French; Vandamme repulsed the troops who defended Wilhelmsburg, the largest of the two islands, and easily took possession of the smaller one, Fidden, of which the point nearest the right bank of the Elbe is not half a gunshot distant from Hamburg. The 9th of May was a fatal day to the people of Hamburg; for it was then that Davoust, having formed his junction with Vandamme, appeared at the head of a corps of 40,000 men destined to reinforce Napoleon's Grand Army. Hamburg could not hold out against the considerable French force now as-

of Georges Cadoudal, the would-be assassin of Napoleon (*Thiers*, tome xviii. p. 356). Vandamme naturally joined Napoleon during the *Cent Jours*.

[1] The effect, however, of this battle, and of the forward movements of General Sebastiani and Marshal Davoust, was, that the allies were obliged to abandon the line of the Elbe; nor were their affairs fully retrieved until the decisive battle of Leipsic.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition*.

sembled in its neighbourhood. Tettenborn had, it is true, received a reinforcement of 800 Prussians and 2000 Swedes, but still what resistance could he offer to Davoust's 40,000 men? Tettenborn did not deceive himself as to the weakness of the allies on this point, or the inutility of attempting to defend the city. He yielded to the entreaties of the inhabitants, who represented to him that further resistance must be attended by certain ruin. He accordingly evacuated Hamburg on the 29th of May, taking with him his Hanseatic legions, which had not held out an hour in the islands of the Elbe, and accompanied by the Swedish Doctor Von Hess, whose imprudent advice was the chief cause of all the disasters to which the unfortunate city had been exposed.

Davoust was at Haarburg, where he received the deputies from Hamburg with an appearance of moderation; and by the conditions stipulated at this conference on the 30th of May a strong detachment of Danish troops occupied Hamburg in the name of the Emperor. The French made their entrance the same evening, and occupied the posts as quietly as if they had been merely changing guard. The inhabitants made not a shadow of resistance. Not a drop of blood was shed; not a threat nor an insult was interchanged. This is the truth; but the truth did not suit Napoleon. It was necessary to get up a pretext for revenge, and accordingly recourse was had to a bulletin, which proclaimed to France and Europe that *Hamburg had been taken by main force, with a loss of some hundred men.* But for this imaginary resistance, officially announced, how would it have been possible to justify the spoliations and exactions which ensued?[1]

[1] There appears to have been some real resistance; see *Puymaigre*, p. 152, who says that if the town had held out four days longer it would have been protected by the armistice of Pleiswitz, and would never have been reoccupied by the French. This, however, might have been a great gain to Napoleon, who suffered much in 1813 and 1814 from the loss of the garrisons in such places. Many of the inhabitants now left the town for fear of the revenge and exactions of the French.

The Dutch General, Hogendorff, became Governor of Hamburg in lieu of Carra St. Cyr, who had been confined at Osnabruck since his precipitate retreat. General Hogendorff had been created one of the Emperor's *aides de camp*, but he was neither a Rapp, a Lauriston, nor a Duroc. The inhabitants were required to pay all the arrears of taxes due to the different public offices during the seventy days that the French had been absent; and likewise all the allowances that would have been paid to the troops of the garrison had they remained in Hamburg. Payment was also demanded of the arrears for the quartering of troops who were fifty leagues off. However, some of the heads of the government departments, who saw and understood the new situation of the French at Hamburg, did not enforce these unjust and vexatious measures. The duties on registrations were reduced. M. Pyonnier, Director of the Customs, aware of the peculiar difficulty of his situation in a country where the customs were held in abhorrence, observed great caution and moderation in collecting the duties. Personal examination, which is so revolting and indecorous, especially with respect to females, was suppressed. But these modifications did not proceed from the highest quarter; they were due to the good sense of the subordinate agents, who plainly saw that if the Empire was to fall it would not be owing to little infractions in the laws of proscription against coffee and rhubarb.

If the custom-house regulations became less vexatious to the inhabitants of Hamburg it was not the same with the business of the post-office. The old manœuvres of that department were resumed more actively than ever. Letters were opened without the least reserve, and all the old post office clerks who were initiated in these scandalous proceedings were recalled. With the exception of the registrations and the customs the inquisitorial system, which had so long oppressed the Hanse Towns, was renewed; and yet the delegates of the French Govern-

ment were the first to cry out, "The people of Hamburg are traitors to Napoleon : for, in spite of all the blessings he has conferred upon them they do not say with the Latin poet, *Deus nobis hæc otia fecit.*"

But all that passed was trifling in comparison with what was to come. On the 18th of June was published an Imperial decree, dated the 8th of the same month, by virtue of which were to be reaped the fruits of the official falsehood contained in the bulletin above mentioned. To expiate the crime of rebellion Hamburg was required to pay an extraordinary contribution of 48,000,000 francs, and Lübeck a contribution of 6,000,000. The enormous sum levied on Hamburg was to be paid in the short space of a month, by six equal instalments, either in money, or bills on respectable houses in Paris.[1] In addition to this the new Prefect of Hamburg made a requisition of grain and provisions of every kind, wines, sailcloth, masts, pitch, hemp, iron, copper, steel, in short, everything that could be useful for the supply of the army and navy.

But while these exactions were made on property in Hamburg, at Dresden the liberties of individuals and even lives were attacked. On the 15th of June Napoleon, doubtless blinded by the false reports that were laid before him, gave orders for making out a list of the inhabitants of Hamburg who were absent from the city. He allowed them only a fortnight to return home, an interval too short to enable some of them to come from the places where they had taken refuge. They consequently remained absent beyond the given time. Victims were indispensable : but assuredly it was not Bonaparte who conceived the idea of hostages to answer for the men whom prudence kept

[1] Puymaigre (p. 153), who ought to be a good authority, puts the contribution at 100,000,000. Alison (chap. lxxix. para. 24, note) says 40,000,000 francs (or £1,600,000). In chap. xcv. para. 21 Alison puts the whole exactions by Davoust from 1st June 1813 to 23d April 1814 as 2,800,000 odd francs, besides goods, etc., the whole amounting to some £140,000 ; but his figures are doubtful. In any case the exaction is ackowledged by Puymaigre to have been beyond the powers of the town.

absent. Of this charge I can clear his memory. The hostages, were, however, taken, and were declared to be also responsible for the payment of the contribution of 48,000,000. In Hamburg they were selected from among the most respectable and wealthy men in the city, some of them far advanced in age. They were conveyed to the old castle of Haarburg on the left bank of the Elbe, and these men, who had been accustomed to all the comforts of life, were deprived even of necessaries, and had only straw to lie on. The hostages from Lübeck were taken to Hamburg: they were placed between decks on board an old ship in the port: this was a worthy imitation of the prison hulks of England. On the 24th of July there was issued a decree which was published in the *Hamburg Correspondant* of the 27th. This decree consisted merely of a proscription list, on which were inscribed the names of some of the wealthiest men in the Hanse Towns, Hanover, and Westphalia.

CHAPTER XXIX.

1813.

Napoleon's second visit to Dresden—Battle of Bautzen—The Congress at Prague—Napoleon ill advised—Battle of Vittoria—General Moreau—Rupture of the conferences at Prague—Defection of Jomini—Battles of Dresden and Leipsic—Account of the death of Duroc—An interrupted conversation resumed a year after—Particulars respecting Poniatowski—His extraordinary courage and death—His monument at Leipsic and tomb in the cathedral of Warsaw.

On the 2d of May Napoleon won the battle of Lutzen. A week after he was at Dresden, not as on his departure for the Russian campaign, like the Sovereign of the West surrounded by his mighty vassals: he was now in the capital of the only one of the monarchs of his creation who remained faithful to the French cause, and whose good faith eventually cost him half his dominions. The Emperor stayed only ten days in Dresden, and then went in pursuit of the Russian army, which he came up with on the 19th, at Bautzen. This battle, which was followed on the two succeding days by the battles of Wurtchen and Ochkirchen, may be said to have lasted three days—a sufficient proof that it was obstinately disputed. It ended in favour of Napoleon, but he and France paid dearly for it: while General Kirschner and Duroc were talking together the former was killed by a cannon-ball, which mortally wounded the latter in the abdomen.

The moment had now arrived for Austria to prove whether or not she intended entirely to desert the cause of Napoleon.[1] All her amicable demonstrations were lim-

[1] There is a running attack in *Erreurs* (tome ii. pp. 289–325) on all this part of the Memoirs, but the best account of the negotiations between France, Austria,

ited to an offer of her intervention in opening negotiations with Russia. Accordingly, on the 4th of June, an armistice was concluded at Pleiswitz, which was to last till the 8th of July, and was finally prolonged to the 10th of August.

The first overtures after the conclusion of the armistice of Pleiswitz determined the assembling of a Congress at Prague. It was reported at the time that the Allies demanded the restoration of all they had lost since 1805; that is to say, since the campaign of Ulm. In this demand Holland and the Hanse Towns, which had become French provinces, were comprehended. But we should still have retained the Rhine, Belgium, Piedmont, Nice, and Savoy. The battle of Vittoria,[1] which placed the whole of Spain at the disposal of the English, the retreat of Suchet upon the

and the Allies will be found in *Metternich*, vol. i. pp. 171-245. Metternich, with good reason, prides himself on the skill with which he gained from Napoleon the exact time, twenty days, necessary for the concentration of the Austrian armies: see especially pp. 194, 195. Whether the negotiations were consistent with good faith on the part of Austria is another matter; but one thing seems clear—the Austrian marriage ruined Napoleon. He found it impossible to believe that the monarch who had given him his daughter would strike the decisive blow against him. Without this belief there can be no doubt that he would have struck Austria before she could have collected her forces, and Metternich seems to have dreaded the result. "It was necessary, therefore, to prevent Napoleon from carrying out his usual system of leaving an army of observation before the Allied armies, and himself turning to Bohemia to deal a great blow at us, the effect of which it would be impossible to foresee in the present depressed state of the great majority of our men" (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 177). With our knowledge of how Napoleon held his own against the three armies at Dresden we may safely assume that he would have crushed Austria if she had not joined him or disarmed. The conduct of Austria was natural and politic, but it was only successful because Napoleon believed in the good faith of the Emperor Francis, his father-in-law. It is to be noted that Austria only succeeded in getting Alexander to negotiate on the implied condition that the negotiations were not to end in a peace with France. See *Metternich*, vol. i. p. 181, where, in answer to the Czar's question as to what would become of their cause if Napoleon accepted the Austrian mediation, he says that if Napoleon declines Austria will join the Allies. If Napoleon accepts, "the negotiations will most certainly show Napoleon to be neither wise nor just, and then the result will be the same. In any case we shall have gained the necessary time to bring our armies into such positions that we need not again fear a separate attack on any one of them, and *from which we may ourselves take the offensive*."

[1] The news of this decisive battle increased the difficulty of the French plenipotentiaries at Prague, and raised the demands of the Allies. It also shook the confidence of those who remained faithful to us.—*Bourrienne.*

Ebro, the fear of seeing the army of Spain annihilated, were enough to alter the opinions of those counsellors who still recommended war. Notwithstanding Napoleon's opposition and his innate disposition to acquire glory by his victories, probably he would not have been inaccessible to the reiterated representations of sensible men who loved their country, France, therefore, has to reproach his advisers. At this juncture General Moreau arrived; it has been said that he came at the solicitation of Bernadotte. This is neither true nor probable. In the first place, there never was any intimacy between Bernadotte and Moreau; and, in the next, how can it be imagined that Bernadotte wished to see Moreau Emperor! But this question is at once put at rest by the fact, that in the interview at Abo the Emperor of Russia hinted to Bernadotte the possibility of his succeeding Napoleon. It was generally reported at the time, and I have since learnt that it was true, that the French Princes of the House of Bourbon had made overtures to Moreau through the medium of General Willot, who had been proscribed on the 18th Fructidor; and I have since learned from an authentic source that General Moreau, who was then at Baltimore, refused to support the Bourbon cause. Moreau yielded only to his desire of being revenged on Napoleon; and he found death where he could not find glory.[1]

[1] Having mentioned the name of Moreau I may take this opportunity of correcting an error into which I fell while speaking of General Lajollais in connection with the conspiracy of Georges, etc. Some papers have fallen into my hands, proving beyond a doubt that General Lajollais was not an accomplice in the conspiracy.—*Bourrienne.*

Napoleon seems to have believed that it was a shot from one of the redoubts near Dresden, where he was present, which struck Moreau. Cathcart (*War in Russia and Germany*, pp. 229-231), who was an eye-witness, says that the shot came from a field-battery about a quarter of a mile distant. Napoleon, according to Cathcart, was then about a mile off: thus Thiers (tome xvi. p. 315) is wrong in saying that Moreau was "struck by a French bullet, fired, so to say, by Napoleon." Moreau's death put an end to an important disagreement between Metternich and the Emperor Alexander, who wished to take the title of Generalissimo of the Allied armies with Moreau, as his lieutenant, really in command. "When," says Metternich (vol. i. p. 207), "Alexander met me the next day he said to me, 'God has uttered His judgment: He was of your opinion.'" Readers of Metternich will remark how habitually Providence was of his opinion.

At the end of July the proceedings of the Congress at Prague were no further advanced than at the time of its assembling. Far from cheering the French with the prospect of a peace, the Emperor made a journey to Mayence; the Empress went there to see him, and returned to Paris immediately after the Emperor's departure. Napoleon went back to Dresden, and the armistice not being renewed, it died a natural death on the 17th of August, the day appointed for its expiration. A fatal event immediately followed the rupture of the conferences.[1] On the 17th of August Austria, wishing to gain by war as she had before gained by alliances, declared that she would unite her forces with those of the Allies. On the very opening of this disastrous campaign General Jomini went over to the enemy. Jomini belonged to the staff of the unfortunate Marshal Ney, who was beginning to execute with his wonted ability, the orders he had received. There was much surprise at his eagerness to profit by a struggle, begun under such melancholy auspices, to seek a fresh fortune, which promised better than what he had tried under our flag. Public opinion has pronounced judgment on Jomini.[2]

[1] It was on the 11th of August, not the 17th, that Metternich announced to Caulaincourt, Napoleon's plenipotentiary at Prague, that Austria had joined the Allies and declared war with France; see *Thiers*, tome xvi. p. 225. At midnight on 10th August Metternich had despatched the passports for the Comte Louis de Narbonne, Napoleon's Ambassador, and the war manifesto of the Emperor Francis; then he "had the beacons lighted which had been prepared from Prague to the Silesian frontier, as a sign of the breach of the negotiations, and the right (*i.e.* power) of the Allied armies to cross the Silesian frontier" (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 199).

[2] Jomini had been cruelly treated by Berthier, the chief of the staff, who had been always indisposed towards him. At the very time that Jomini, then chief of the staff to Ney, was expecting some well-won reward for his part in the battle of Bautzen, he received an order placing him in arrest for not having sent in a return delayed by the difficulty of getting the information from the divisions. Jomini, long discontented, now passed over to the Russians, and thenceforward acted as military adviser to Alexander. It is fair to remember that he was Swiss, not French, and that, when going over, he first placed all Ney's outposts in safety from a surprise. He defends himself in his own work (*Vie de Napoléon*, tome iv. p. 368, note), and says that even if he had been capable of revealing any plan of Napoleon he did not know it. See also Sainte Beuve (*le Général Jomini*), where the matter is treated at length. It would not be right to treat Jomini as a traitor, but to act against any

The first actions were the battle of Dresden, which took place seven days after the rupture of the armistice, and the battle in which Vandamme was defeated, and which rendered the victory of Dresden unavailing. I have already mentioned that Moreau was killed at Dresden.[1] Bavaria was no sooner rid of the French troops than she raised the mask and ranged herself among our enemies.

army with which he had served so long, and with whose triumphs he had been so connected, was a deplorable act in the life of that great writer. He was naturally looked on with great jealousy by his new comrades. He says Muffling (p. 82) proved himself that same day a sublime teacher indeed; but at the same time so unpractical on the field of battle that his advice was not asked again.

[1] The following is a contemporary account of the death of Moreau, whose military fame once rivalled that of Bonaparte. It is taken from a letter written by a British officer, and dated Toplitz, 4th September 1813.

"General Morean died yesterday. He was in the act of giving some opinion on military matters, while passing with the Emperor of Russia behind a Prussian battery to which two French batteries were answering, one in front and the other in flank, and Lord Cathcart and Sir R. Wilson were listening to him, when a ball struck his thigh and almost carried his leg off, passed through his horse, and shattered his other leg to pieces. He gave a deep groan at first, but immediately after the first agony of pain was over he spoke with the utmost tranquillity, and called for a cigar. They bore him off the field on a litter made of Cossacks' pikes, and carried him to a cottage at a short distance, which, however, was so much exposed to the fire that they were obliged, after just binding up his wounds, to remove him farther off to the Emperor's quarters, where one leg was amputated, he smoking the whole time. When the surgeon informed him that he must deprive him of the other leg he observed without showing any pain or peevishness, but in the calmest manner, that had he known that before his other was cut off he should have preferred dying. The litter on which they had hitherto conveyed him was covered with nothing but wet straw, and a cloak drenched through with rain, which continued in torrents the whole day. They now placed more cloaks over him, and laid him more comfortably in a good litter, in which he was carried to Dippoldeswalde; but long before his arrival there he was soaked through and through. He was brought, however, safely to Laun, where he seemed to be going on well, till a long conference which took place between him and three or four of the Allied generals, by which he was completely exhausted. Soon after this he became extremely ill, and hourly grew worse. Through the whole of his sufferings he bore his fate with heroism and grandeur of mind not to be surpassed, and appeared to those with whom he conversed to endure but little pain, so calm and so extremely composed was he. He died at six o'clock yesterday morning."—*Editor of 1836 edition.*

The following letter from General Moreau to his wife, after receiving his mortal wound, was communicated to the Editor of the 1836 edition by Sir J. Philippart:—

"*Ma chère amie—A la bataille de Dresde, il y a trois jours, j'ai eu les deux jambes emportées d'un boulet de canon. Ce coquin de Bonaparte est toujours heureux. On m'a fait l'amputation aussi bien que possible. Quoique l'armée ait fait un mouvement retrograde, ce n'est nullement par revers, mais pour se rapprocher du Général Blucher. Excuse mon griffonage; je t'aime et t'embrasse de tout mon cœur. Je charge Rapatel de finir.—V. M.*"

In October the loss of the battle of Leipsic decided the fate of France. The Saxon army, which had long remained faithful to us, went over to the enemy during the battle.[1] Prince Poniatowski perished at the battle of Leipsic in an attempt to pass the Elster.

I will take this opportunity of relating what I know respecting the death of two men who were both deeply and deservedly regretted—Duroc and Poniatowski.[2] Na-

[1] The battle of General Blucher, on the 16th, was followed by a complete and signal victory on the 18th, by the combined forces, over Bonaparte, at the head of his army, in the neighbonrhood of Leipsic. The collective loss of above 100 pieces of cannon, 60,000 men, and an immense number of prisoners; the desertion of the Saxon army, and also of the Bavarian and Würtemberg troops still remaining in the French ranks, consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry; many generals killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, among whom were Reynier, Valberg (?), Brune, Bertrand, and Lanriston, were some of the first-fruits of the glorious day of the 18th of October. These were followed by the capture by assault of the town of Leipsic; the magazines, the artillery, stores of the place, with the King of Saxony, all his Court, the garrison, and the rear-guard of the French army; the whole of the enemy's wounded, the number of whom exceeded 30,000, with the complete rout of the French army, it being entirely surrounded, and endeavouring to escape in all directions: snch were the prominent subjects of exultation. Bonaparte was fortunate enough to escape by rapid flight two hours before the entry into Leipsic of the Allied forces. . . .

During the action twenty-two guns of Saxon artillery, with two Westphalian regiments of hussars, and two battalions of Saxons, joined us from the enemy: the former were instantly led again into the field, our artillery and ammunition not being all bronght forward. . . .

The losses sustained in the last four days' combats could not with precision be stated; but they were averaged, on the part of the enemy, at 15,000 prisoners, without reckoning 23,000 sick and wounded found in the hospitals at Leipsic, 250 pieces of cannon, and 900 tumbrels. Prince Poniatowski, Generals Vial, Rochambeau, Dumoustier, Compans, and Latour-Maubourg were killed, and Ney, Marmont, and Souham wounded. Fifteen generals were made prisoners. The loss of the Allies was equally serious. The Prussian corps of d'York lost 5000 men; the Austrians enumerated no less than sixty officers of distinction killed in this sanguinary contest (Marquis of Londonderry's (*Narrative of the War in Germany and France*).

[2] Duroc, as has already been noted, was one of the earliest *aides de camp* and companions of Napoleon, and had accompanied him to Egypt, and indeed everywhere. He had been created Duc de Frioul and Grand Maréchal du Palais. *Marmont* (tome v. p. 109) says that a few moments before being hit Duroc showed a sort of despondency and disheartenment, and said to him, "My friend, the Emperor is insatiable for battles. We shall all fall, it is our destiny." The scene between Napoleon and him on his death-bed has been told differently. See *Marmont*, tome v. p. 110; *Ségur*, tome vi. p. 115; and *Thiers*, tome xv. p. 584; and even *Coignet*, p. 352. Whatever may have been said to the contrary, there must have been some strong affection between them. See Napoleon's letter to Madame de Montesquiou, when, perhaps with a remembrance of a famous Roman epitaph, he said, "The death of the Duc de Frioul has pained me. It is the only time in twenty years that he has not divined what would please me" (*Rémusat*, tome ii. p. 245, note). See also

poleon lamented Duroc chiefly because he was very useful to him. He, however, wished to make a parade of sensibility, and after having made up a tragical scene of Duroc's death he ordered a picture to be painted, to transmit the recollection of the event to posterity; with this view a suitable story was drawn up for a bulletin. This bulletin contained a high-flown account of the loss the Emperor had sustained; and the following set phrases were put into the mouth of the dying General: "My life has been devoted to your service, and I regret its loss because it might yet be useful to you. Yes, Sire, we shall one day meet again, but it will be thirty years hence, when you will have triumphed over your enemies, and realised all the hopes of your country. I have lived like an honourable man, and have nothing to reproach myself with. I leave behind me a daughter; your Majesty will be a father to her."[1] But there is not one word of truth in the bulletin account of Duroc's death. The words which he is said to have uttered in his last moments were invented, like those attributed to Desaix after the battle of Marengo. I suppose Napoleon borrowed from Homer the idea of making his heroes deliver speeches when at the point of death. The fact is, Duroc suffered the most excruciating agony, and under such circumstances a man is not likely to be very eloquent, or, indeed, inclined to speak much. I remember reading at the time a letter which came by an *estafette;* it was written by an individual who accompanied the Emperor, and was addressed to a Minister. The writer desires his friend not to place any reliance on the official account of Napoleon's visit to Duroc. He added that the latter, being at the moment in great suffering, and finding

Dumas, a fair representative of the general opinion of the army, not of the tittle-tattle of the Court, "The glorious death of the Grand Maréchal Duroc took from Napoleon his most trusty friend, whom he much liked: the man whose loyalty, noble independence, and enlightened counsels were so useful to him" (*Dumas*, tome iii. p. 506). His Duchy was given to his daughter.

[1] The Emperor faithfully carried out this wish, making a handsome provision for Mademoiselle Duroc. (See also the Will of Napoleon.)

that the Emperor prolonged his visit, turned impatiently on his left side, and said to the Emperor, motioning him with his right hand to withdraw, "Ah, Sire, at least leave me to die quietly."

I will here mention a fact which occurred before Duroc's departure for the campaign of 1812. I used often to visit him at the Pavillon Marsan, in the Tuileries, where he lodged. One forenoon, when I had been waiting for him a few minutes, he came from the Emperor's apartments, where he had been engaged in the usual business. He was in his court-dress. As soon as he entered he pulled off his coat and hat and laid them aside. "I have just had a conversation with the Emperor about you," said he. "Say nothing to anybody. Have patience, and you will be——" He had no sooner uttered these words than a footman entered to inform him that the Emperor wished to see him immediately. "Well," said Duroc, "I must go." No sooner was the servant gone than Duroc stamped violently on the floor, and exclaimed, "That . . . . never leaves me a moment's rest. If he finds I have five minutes to myself in the course of the morning he is sure to send for me." He then put on his coat and returned to the Emperor, saying, "Another time you shall hear what I have to tell you."

From that time I did not see Duroc until the month of January 1813. He was constantly absent from Paris, and did not return until the end of 1812. He was much affected at the result of the campaign, but his confidence in Napoleon's genius kept up his spirits. I turned the conversation from this subject and reminded him of his promise to tell me what had passed between the Emperor and himself relative to me. "You shall hear," said he. "The Emperor and I had been playing at billiards, and, between ourselves, he plays very badly. He is nothing at a game which depends on skill. While negligently rolling his balls about he muttered these words: 'Do you ever

see Bourrienne now?'—'Yes, Sire, he sometimes dines with me on diplomatic reception-days, and he looks so droll in his old-fashioned court-dress, of Lyons manufacture, that you would laugh if you saw him.'—'What does he say respecting the new regulation for the court-dresses?'—'I confess he says it is very ridiculous; that it will have no other result than to enable the Lyons manufacturers to get rid of their old-fashioned goods; that forced innovations on the customs of a nation are never successful.'—'Oh, that is always the way with Bourrienne; he is never pleased with anything.'—'Certainly, Sire, he is apt to grumble; but he says what he thinks.'—'Do you know, Duroc, he served me very well at Hamburg. He raised a good deal of money for me. He is a man who understands business. I will not leave him unemployed. Time must hang heavily on his hands. I will see what I can do for him. He has many enemies.'—'And who has not, Sire?'—'Many complaints against him were transmitted to me from Hamburg, but the letter which he wrote to me in his justification opened my eyes, and I begin to think that Savary had good motives for defending him. Endeavours are made to dissuade me from employing him, but I shall nevertheless do so at last. I remember that it was he who first informed me of the near approach of the war which we are now engaged in. I forget all that has been said against him for the last two years, and as soon as peace is concluded, and I am at leisure, I will think of him.'"

After relating to me this conversation Duroc said, "You must, of course, feel assured that I said all I think of you, and I will take an opportunity of reminding him of you. But we must we patient. Adieu, my dear friend; we must set off speedily, and Heaven knows when we shall be back again!" I wished him a successful campaign and a speedy return. Alas! I was doomed to see my excellent friend only once again.

Next to the death of Duroc the loss most sincerely re-

gretted during the campaign of 1813 was that of Prince Poniatowski. Joseph Poniatowski, a nepew of Stanislas Augustus, King of Poland, was born at Warsaw on the 7th of May 1763. At an early age he was remarkable for his patriotic spirit; but his uncle's influence gave him an apparent irresolution, which rendered him suspected by some of the parties in Poland. After his uncle had acceded to the Confederation of Targowitz Poniatowski left the service accompanied by most of his principal officers. But when, in 1794, the Poles endeavoured to repulse the Russians, he again repaired to the Polish camp and entered the army as a volunteer. His noble conduct obtained for him the esteem of his countrymen. Kosciusko gave him the command of a division, with which he rendered useful services during the two sieges of Warsaw. Immediately after the surrender of that capital Poniatowski went to Vienna. He refused the offers of Catherine and Paul to bear arms in the service of Russia.

Poniatowski retired to his estate near Warsaw, where he lived like a private gentleman until the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw revived the hopes of the Polish patriots. He then became War Minister. The Archduke Ferdinand having come, in 1809, with Austrian troops to take possession of the Duchy of Warsaw, Poniatowski, who commanded the Polish troops, which were very inferior in numbers to the Austrian force, obliged the latter, rather by dint of skilful manœuvring than by fighting, to evacuate the Grand Duchy. He pursued them into Galicia as far as Cracow.

After this honourable campaign he continued to exercise his functions as Minister until 1812. The war against Russia again summoned him to the head of the Polish army. After taking part in all the events of that war, which was attended by such various chances, Poniatowski was present at the battle of Leipsic. That battle, which commenced on the 14th of October, the anniversary of the fa-

mous battles of Ulm and of Jena, lasted four days, and decided the fate of Europe. Five hundred thousand men fought on a surface of three square leagues.

Retreat having become indispensable, Napoleon took leave at Leipsic of the King of Saxony and his family, whom he had brought with him from Dresden. The Emperor then exclaimed in a loud voice, "Adieu, Saxons," to the people who filled the market-place, where the King of Saxony resided. With some difficulty, and after passing through many turnings and windings, he gained the suburb of Runstadt and left Leipsic by the outer gate of that suburb which leads to the bridge of the Elster, and to Lindenau. The bridge was blown up shortly after he had passed it, and that event utterly prevented the retreat of the part of the army which was on the left bank of the Elster, and which fell into the power of the enemy. Napoleon was at the time accused of having ordered the destruction of the bridge immediately after he had himself passed it in order to secure his own personal retreat, as he was threatened by the active pursuit of the enemy. The English journals were unanimous on this point, and to counteract this opinion, which was very general, an article was inserted in the *Moniteur*.

Before passing the bridge of the Elster Napoleon had directed Poniatowski, in concert with Marshal Macdonald, to cover and protect the retreat, and to defend that part of the suburb of Leipsic which is nearest to the Borna road. For the execution of these orders he had only 2000 Polish infantry. He was in this desperate situation when he saw the French columns in full retreat, and the bridge so choked up with their artillery and waggons that there was no possibility of passing it. Then drawing his sword, and turning to the officers who were near him, he said, "Here we must fall with honour!" At the head of a small party of cuirassiers and Polish officers he rushed on the columns of the Allies. In this action he received a ball in his left

arm: he had already been wounded on the 14th and 16th. He nevertheless advanced, but he found the suburb filled with Allied troops.[1] He fought his way through them and received another wound. He then threw himself into the

[1] The Allies were so numerous that they scarcely perceived the losses they sustained. Their masses pressed down upon us in every direction, and it was impossible that victory could fail to be with them. Their success, however, would have been less decisive had it not been for the defection of the Saxons. In the midst of the battle, these troops having moved towards the enemy, as if intending to make an attack, turned suddenly round, and opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry on the columns by the side of which they had a few moments before been fighting. I do not know in what page of history such a transaction is recorded. This event immediately produced a great difference in our affairs, which were before in a bad enough train. I ought here to mention that before the battle the Emperor dismissed a Bavarian division which still remained with him. He spoke to the officers in terms which will not soon be effaced from their memory. He told them, that, "according to the laws of war, they were his prisoners, since their Government had taken part against him: but that he could not forget the services they had rendered him, and that they were therefore at liberty to return home." These troops left the army, where they were much esteemed, and marched for Bavaria.

The desertion of the Saxons to the enemy obliged the Emperor to order movements to which he would not otherwise have resorted, especially in so warm an action. These unexpected movements caused disorder, when that calmness and that cool determination by which so much may be done at the decisive moment of a battle were most wanting. It was now necessary to think of a retreat, which had, indeed, already begun, in consequence of the physical and moral exhaustion of the troops, which had maintained the contest since the morning under marked disadvantages.

After nearly the whole of the left and part of the centre had passed the Elster the Emperor himself crossed. He desired the artillery officer who had charge of the bridge, for the destruction of which preparations had been made, not to leave the spot, and not to put the match to the train until all the troops had passed over.

At first the corps proceeded along the bridge without any disagreeable accident, but such was the disorder that no one could tell whether or not his column was the last which had to pass. The enemy's sharpshooters were in advance; the pressure towards the bridge was great, and the confusion became extreme.

The officer left in charge of the bridge, not knowing what was the state of things on the enemy's side, ran towards a general officer to learn, if possible, from him how far the passage had been effected; but he was carried away by the crowd, and could not return. The artillerymen who were under his command, seeing German troops and Cossacks pushing forward, blew up the bridge without waiting for orders; and thus the right of the army, which kept the enemy's masses in check, was cut off.

The report of this unfortunate event soon spread through the ranks. The right was in its turn thrown into disorder, and an escape was sought through fields and marshes. This completed the disaster: the troops were made prisoners of war, and Generals Lauriston and Reynier were taken with them. Prince Joseph Poniatowski, recently made Marshal of France, had just at this moment gained the banks of the Elster. Though wounded, consulting only his courage, he plunged on horseback into the river, where he unfortunately perished. It was impossible to be more

Pleisse, which was the first river he came to. Aided by his officers, he gained the opposite bank, leaving his horse in the river. Though greatly exhausted he mounted another, and gained the Elster, by passing through M. Reichenbach's garden, which was situated on the side of that river. In spite of the steepness of the banks of the Elster at that part, the Prince plunged with his horse into the river: both man and horse were drowned, and the same fate was shared by several officers who followed Poniatowski's example. Marshal Macdonald was, luckily, one of those who escaped. Five days after a fisherman drew the body of the Prince out of the water. On the 26th of October it was temporarily interred at Leipsic, with all the honours due to the illustrious deceased. A modest stone marks the spot where the body of the Prince was dragged from the river. The Poles expressed a wish to erect a monument to the memory of their conntryman in the garden of M. Reichenbach, but that gentleman declared he would do it at his own expense, which he did. The monument consists of a beautiful sarcophagus, surrounded by weeping willows. The body of the Prince, after being embalmed, was sent in the following year to Warsaw, and in 1816 it was deposited in the cathedral, among the remains of the Kings and great men of Poland. The celebrated Thorwaldsen was commissioned to execute a monument for his tomb. Prince Poniatowski left no issue but a natural son, born in 1790. The royal race, therefore, existed only in a collateral branch of King Stanislas, namely, Prince Stanislas, born in 1754.[1]

brave than was this Prince: impetuous, magnanimous, and always amiable, he was as much esteemed by those against whom he combated as regretted by the party whom he served.

Thus terminated the fatal day of Leipsic: the result of which to France was the loss of a fine and numerous army and all her Allies (*Memoirs of the Duc de Rovigo*, tome vi. p. 179).

[1] Prince Joseph Poniatowski had only been made Marshal by Napoleon on the 16th October 1813, three days before he was drowned. He was the grandson of the Stanislas Poniatowski who followed Charles XII. into Turkey, and the nephew of Stanislas II. of Poland, the last King of Poland.

CHAPTER XXX.

1813.

Amount of the Allied forces against Napoleon—Their advance towards the Rhine—Levy of 280,000 men—Dreadful situation of the French at Mayence—Declaration of the Allies at Frankfort—Diplomatic correspondence—The Duc de Bassano succeeded by the Duke of Vicenza—The conditions of the Allies vaguely accepted—Caulaincourt sent to the headquarters of the Allies—Manifesto of the Allied powers to the French people—Gift of 30,000,000 from the Emperor's privy purse—Wish to recall M. de Talleyrand—Singular advice relative to Wellington—The French army recalled from Spain—The throne resigned by Joseph—Absurd accusation against M. Lainé—Adjournment of the Leglislative Body—Napoleon's Speech to the Leglislative Body—Remarks of Napoleon reported by Cambacérès.

When the war resumed its course after the disaster of Leipsic I am certain that the Allied sovereigns determined to treat with Napoleon only in his own capital, as he, four years before, had refused to treat with the Emperor of Austria except at Vienna. The latter sovereign now completely raised the mask, and declared to the Emperor that he would make common cause with Russia and Prussia against him. In his declaration he made use of the singular pretext, that the more enemies there were against Napoleon there would be the greater chance of speedily obliging him to accede to conditions which would at length restore the tranquillity of which Europe stood so much in need. This declaration on the part of Austria was an affair of no little importance, for she had now raised an army of 250,000 men. An equal force was enrolled beneath the Russian banners, which were advancing towards the Rhine. Prussia had 200,000 men; the

Confederation of the Rhine 150,000: in short, including the Swedes and the Dutch, the English troops in Spain and in the Netherlands, the Danes, who had abandoned us, the Spaniards and Portuguese, whose courage and hopes were revived by our reverses, Napoleon had arrayed against him upwards of a million of armed men. Among them, too, were the Neapolitans, with Murat at their head!

The month of November 1813 was fatal to the fortune of Napoleon. In all parts the French armies were repulsed and driven back upon the Rhine, while in every direction the Allied forces advanced towards that river. For a considerable time I had confidently anticipated the fall of the Empire; not because the foreign sovereigns had vowed its destruction, but because I saw the impossibility of Napoleon defending himself against all Europe, and because I knew that, however desperate might be his fortune, nothing would induce him to consent to conditions which he considered disgraceful. At this time every day was marked by a new defection. Even the Bavarians, the natural Allies of France, they whom the Emperor had led to victory at the commencement of the second campaign of Vienna, they whom he had, as it were, adopted on the field of battle, were now against us, and were the bitterest of our enemies.

Even before the battle of Leipsic, the consequences of which were so ruinous to Napoleon, he had felt the necessity of applying to France for a supply of troops; as if France had been inexhaustible. He directed the Empress Regent to make this demand; and accordingly Maria Louisa proceeded to the Senate, for the first time, in great state: but the glories of the Empire were now on the decline. The Empress obtained a levy of 280,000 troops, but they were no sooner enrolled than they were sacrificed. The defection of the Bavarians considerably augmented the difficulties which assailed the wreck of the

army that had escaped from Leipsic. The Bavarians had got before us to Hanau, a town four leagues distant from Frankfort; there they established themselves, with the view of cutting off our retreat; but French valour was roused, the little town was speedily carried, and the Bavarians were repulsed with considerable loss. The French army arrived at Mayence; if, indeed, one may give the name of army to a few masses of men destitute, dispirited, and exhausted by fatigue and privation. On the arrival of the troops at Mayence no preparation had been made for receiving them: there were no provisions, or supplies of any kind; and, as the climax of misfortune, infectious epidemics broke out amongst the men. All the the accounts I received concurred in assuring me that their situation was dreadful.

However, without counting the wreck which escaped from the disasters of Leipsic, and the ravages of disease; without including the 280,000 men which had been raised by a *Sénatus-consulte*, on the application of Maria Louisa, the Emperor still possessed 120,000 good troops; but they were in the rear, scattered along the Elbe, shut up in fortresses such as Dantzic, Hamburg, Torgau, and Spandau. Such was the horror of our situation that if, on the one hand, we could not resolve to abandon them, it was at the same time impossible to aid them. In France a universal cry was raised for peace, at whatever price it could be purchased. In this state of things it may be said that the year 1813 was more fatal to Napoleon than the year 1812. The disasters of Moscow were repaired by his activity and the sacrifices of France; but the disasters of Leipsic were irreparable!

I shall shortly speak of some negotiations in which, if I had chosen, I might have taken a part. After the battle of Leipsic, in which France lost, for the second time, a formidable army, all the powers allied against Napoleon declared at Frankfort, on the 9th of November, that they

would never break the bonds which united them; that henceforth it was not merely a Continental peace, but a general peace, that would be demanded; and that any negotiation not having a general peace for its object would be rejected. The Allied powers declared that France was to be confined within her natural limits,—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. This was all that was to remain of the vast Empire founded by Napoleon; but still it must be allowed it was a great deal, after the many disasters France had experienced, and when she was menaced with invasion by numerous and victorious armies. But Napoleon could not accede to such proposals, for he was always ready to yield to illusion when the truth was not satisfactory to him.

According to the proposals of the Allies at Frankfort,[1] Germany, Italy, and Spain were to be entirely withdrawn from the dominion of France. England recognised the freedom of trade and navigation, and there appeared no reason to doubt the sincerity of her professed willingness to make great sacrifices to promote the object proposed by the Allies. But to these offers a fatal condition was added, namely, that the Congress should meet in a town, to be declared neutral, on the right bank of the Rhine, where the plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent powers were to

[1] The proceedings at Frankfort should be read in *Metternich*, vol. i. pp. 212–220, where Metternich speaks of the difficulty in getting the Allies to act together. "The Russian army remained quiet and thonght its object gained. If Marshal Kutusow had been still living it would not have left the Oder." So much is often said as to the bad faith of Napoleon in these negotiations that one of Metternich's statements should be noted. "I proposed further to join with the idea of natural boundaries the offer of an immediate negotiation. As the Emperor Francis sanctioned my intention I laid it before their Majesties of Russia and Prussia. Both of them feared that Napoleon, trusting to the chances of the future, might by accepting the proposal with quick and energetic decision put an end to the affair" (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 214). The "affair" means here the war. The whole of Metternich's account is inconsistent with good faith in the Allies' proposals, and shows that Napoleon's remark on the proclamation was correct. "No one but Metternich can have concocted this document; talking of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees is a thorough piece of cunning. It could only enter into the head of a man who knows France as well as he does" (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 215).

assemble ; *but the course of the war was not to be impeded by these negotiations.*" [1]

The Duc de Bassano (Maret), who was still Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied, by order of Napoleon, to the overtures made by the Allies for a general Congress ; and stated that the Emperor acceded to them, and wished Mannheim to be chosen as the neutral town. M. Metternich replied in a note, dated Frankfort, the 25th of November, stating that the Allies felt no difficulty in acceding to Napoleon's choice of Mannheim for the meeting of the Congress ; but as M. de Bassano's letter contained no mention of the general and summary bases I have just mentioned, and which had been communicated to M. de St. Aignan at Frankfort, M. Metternich stated that the Allies wished the Emperor Napoleon to declare his determination respecting those bases, in order that insurmountable difficulties might not arrest the negotiations at their very outset. The Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt), who had just succeeded the Duc de Bassano, received this letter. Trusting to the declaration of Frankfort he thought he would be justified in treating on those bases ; he confidently relied on the consent of Napoleon. But the Allies had now determined not to grant the limits accorded by that declaration. Caulaincourt was therefore obliged to apply for fresh powers, which being granted, he replied, on the 2d of December, that Napoleon accepted the fundamental and summary bases which had been communicated by M. de St. Aignan. To this letter M. Metternich answered that the Emperors of Russia and Austria were gratified to find that the Emperor of France recognised the bases judged necessary by the Allies ; that the

[1] This system of negotiating and advancing was a realisation of Metternich's idea of copying Napoleon's own former procedure. "Let us hold always the sword in one hand, and the olive branch in the other ; always ready to negotiate, but only negotiating whilst advancing. Here is Napoleon's system : may he find enemies who will carry on war . . . as he would carry it on himself" (Metternich to Stadion, April 1809, *Metternich*, vol. ii. p. 346).

two sovereigns would communicate without delay the official document to their Allies, and that they were convinced that immediately on receiving their reply the negotiations might be opened without any interruption of the war.

We shall now see the reason why these first negotiations came to no result. In the month of October the Allies overthrew the colossal edifice denominated the French Empire. When led by victory to the banks of the Rhine they declared their wish to abstain from conquest, explained their intentions, and manifested an unalterable resolution to abide by them. This determination of the Allies induced the French Government to evince pacific intentions. Napoleon wished, by an apparent desire for peace, to justify, if I may so express myself, in the eyes of his subjects, the necessity of new sacrifices; which, according to his proclamations, he demanded only to enable him to obtain peace on as honourable conditions as possible. But the truth is, he was resolved not even to listen to the offers made at Frankfort. He always represented the limits of the Rhine as merely a compensation for the dismemberment of Poland and the immense aggrandisement of the English possessions in Asia. But he wanted to gain time, and, if possible, to keep the Allied armies on the right bank of the Rhine.

The immense levies made in France, one after the other, had converted the conscription into a sort of press-gang. Men employed in agriculture and manufactures were dragged from their labours; and the people began to express their dissatisfaction at the measures of Government more loudly than they had hitherto ventured to do; yet all were willing to make another effort, if they could have persuaded themselves that the Emperor would henceforth confine his thoughts to France alone. Napoleon sent Caulaincourt to the headquarters of the Allies, but that was only for the sake of gaining time, and inducing a belief that he was favourably disposed to peace.

The Allies having learned the immense levies of troops which Napoleon was making, and being well acquainted with the state of feeling in France, published the famous manifesto,[1] addressed to the French people, which was profusely circulated, and may be referred to as a warning to subjects who trust to the promises of Governments.

The good faith with which the promises in the manifesto were kept may be judged of from the Treaty of Paris. In the meantime the manifesto did not a little contribute to alienate from Napoleon those who were yet faithful to his cause ; for, by believing in the declarations of the Allies, they saw in him the sole obstacle to that peace which France so ardently desired. On this point, too, the Allies were not wrong, and I confess that I did not see without great surprise that the Duc de Rovigo, in that part of his Memoirs where he mentions this manifesto, reproaches those who framed it for representing the Emperor as a madman, who replied to overtures of peace only by conscription levies. After all, I do not intend to maintain that the declaration was entirely sincere ; with respect to the future it certainly was not. Switzerland was already tampered with, and attempts were made to induce her to permit the Allied troops to enter France by the bridge of Bâle. Things were going on no better in the south of France, where the Anglo-Spanish army threatened our frontiers by the Pyrenees, and already oc-

[1] This proclamation said that the Allied sovereigns wished France to be great, strong, and happy, and that they confirmed to the French Empire an extent of territory which France had never possessed under her Kings. It is often the custom to deride the French claims made by either of the Napoleons or by the Republic of 1870, that France had been relatively weakened by the increases of territory gained by all the other powers of Europe by the partition of Poland, the resettlement of Germany, the increase of the English colonial dominions, etc. A glance at any ordinary historical atlas, or the remembrance of the ease with which France was overthrown in 1870, would prove how true the statement was. As for the belief that if France could only be finally and permanently weakened a reign of peace would at last descend on Europe, it must be allowed that in the worst days under Napoleon Europe was not the vast camp of armed nations counting each other's strength, and ready for war in a week, which she has been under the German Continental supremacy.

cupied Pampeluna ; and at the same time the internal affairs of the country were no less critical than its external position. It was in vain to levy troops ; everything essential to an army was wanting. To meet the most pressing demands the Emperor drew out 30,000,000 from the immense treasure which he had accumulated in the cellars and galleries of the Pavillon Marsan at the Tuileries. These 30,000,000 were speedily swallowed up. Nevertheless it was an act of generosity on the part of Napoleon, and I never could understand on what ground the Legislative Body complained of the outlay, because, as the funds did not proceed from the Budget, there needed no financial law to authorise their application. Besides, why did these rigid legislators, who, while fortune smiled on Bonaparte, dared not utter a word on the subject, demand, previously to the gratuitous gift just mentioned, that the 350,000,000 in the Emperor's privy purse should be transferred to the Imperial treasury and carried to the public accounts? Why did they wink at the accumulation in the Tuileries of the contributions and exactions levied in conquered countries? The answer is plain : because there would have been danger in opposing it.

Amidst the difficulties which assailed the Emperor he cast his eyes on M. de Talleyrand. But it being required, as a condition of his receiving the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, that he should resign his office of Vice-Grand-Elector, M. de Talleyrand preferred a permanent post to a portfolio, which the caprice of a moment might withdraw. I have been informed that, in a conversation with the Emperor, M. de Talleyrand gave him the extraordinary advice of working upon the ambition of the English family of Wellesley, and to excite in the mind of Wellington, the lustre of whose reputation was now dawning, ambitious projects which would have embarrassed the coalition. Napoleon, however, did not adopt this proposition, the issue of which he thought too uncertain, and

above all, too remote, in the urgent circumstances in which he stood. Caulaincourt was then made Minister for Foreign Affairs, in lieu of M. Maret, who was appointed Secretary of State, an office much better suited to him.

Meanwhile the Emperor was wholly intent on the means of repelling the attack which was preparing against him. The critical circumstances in which he was placed seemed to restore the energy which time had in some measure robbed him of. He turned his eyes towards Spain, and resolved to bring the army from that country to oppose the Allies, whose movements indicated their intention of entering France by Switzerland. An event occurred connected with this subject calculated to have a decided influence on the affairs of the moment, namely, the renunciation by Joseph, King of Spain, of all right to the crown, to be followed by the return, as had been agreed on, of Ferdinand to his dominions. Joseph made this sacrifice at the instigation of his brother. The treaty was signed, but an inconceivable delay occurred in its execution, while the torrent, which was advancing upon France, rushed forward so rapidly that the treaty could not be carried into execution. Ferdinand, it is true, re-ascended his throne, but from other causes.

The Emperor was deeply interested in the march of the Allies. It was important to destroy the bridge of Bâle, because the Rhine once crossed masses of the enemy would be thrown into France. At this time I had close relations with a foreign diplomat whom I am forbidden by discretion to name. He told me that the enemy was advancing towards the frontier, and that the bridge of Bâle would not be destroyed, as it had been so agreed at Berne, where the Allies had gained the day. This astonished me, because I knew, on the other hand, from a person who ought to have been equally well informed, that it was hoped the bridge would be blown up. Being much inter-

ested in knowing the truth, I sent on my own account, an agent to Bâle who on his return told me that the bridge would remain.[1]

On the 19th of December the Legislative Body was convoked. It was on a Wednesday. M. Lainé was Vice-President under M. Régnier. A committee was appointed to examine and report on the communications of the Emperor. The report and conclusions of the committee were not satisfactory; it was alleged that they betrayed a revolutionary tendency, of which M. Lainé was absurdly accused of having been one of the promoters; but all who knew him must have been convinced of the falsehood of the charge. The Emperor ordered the report to be seized, and then adjourned the Legislative Body. Those who attentively observed the events of the time will recollect the stupor which prevailed in Paris on the intelligence of this seizure and of the adjournment of the Legislative Body. A thousand conjectures were started as to what new occurrences had taken place abroad, but nothing satisfactory was learned.

I considered this a great mistake. Who can doubt that if the Legislative Body had taken the frank and noble step of declaring that France accepted the conditions of Frankfort they would not have been listened to by the Allies? But the words, "You are dishonoured if you cede a single village acquired by a *Sénatus-consulte*," always resounded in Napoleon's ears: they flattered his secret thoughts, and every pacific proposal was rejected.[2]

The members of the adjourned Legislative Body went

[1] We here get a glimpse of some treacherous intrigue, part of the proceedings for which Bourrienne was afterwards thanked by Louis XVIII. How Bourrienne, a simple private individual, could be concerned in knowing that the bridge would be preserved for the use of the Allies, he does not inform us. He could have no proper reason for sending a private agent. If he wanted the information for his friend Savary he need not have provided the man. As for the passage of the Rhine at Bâle, see the note a few pages farther on.

[2] This unhappy sentiment must be compared with that of 1870, when he demands of Germany were met by the phrase, "Not a stone of our fortresses, not an inch of our territory." The Republic of 1870 yielded, Napoleon did not.

as usual to take leave of the Emperor, who received them on a Sunday, and after delivering to them the speech, which is very well known, dismissed *the rebels* with great ill-humour, refusing to hear any explanation. "I have suppressed your address," he began abruptly: "it was incendiary. I called you round me to do good—you have done ill. Eleven-twelfths of you are well-intentioned, the others, and above all M. Lainé, are factious intriguers, devoted to England, to all my enemies, and corresponding through the channel of the advocate Desèze with the Bourbons. Return to your Departments, and feel that my eye will follow you; you have endeavoured to humble me, you may kill me, but you shall not dishonour me. You make remonstrances; is this a time, when the stranger invades our provinces, and 200,000 Cossacks are ready to overflow our country? There may have been petty abuses; I never connived at them. You, M. Raynouard, you said that Prince Masséna robbed a man at Marseilles of his house. You lie! The General took possession of a vacant house, and my Minister shall indemnify the proprietor. Is it thus that you dare affront a Marshal of France who has bled for his country, and grown gray in victory? Why did you not make your complaints in private to me? I would have done you justice. We should wash our dirty linen at home, and not drag it out before the world. You call yourselves Representatives of the Nation. It is not true; you are only Deputies of the Departments; a small portion of the State, inferior to the Senate, inferior even to the Council of State. The Representatives of the People! I am alone the Representative of the People. Twice have 24,000,000 of French called me to the throne: which of you durst undertake such a burden? It had already overwhelmed (*écrasé*) your Assemblies, and your Conventions, your Vergniauds and your Guadets, your Jacobins and your Girondins. They are all dead! What, who are *you?* nothing—all authority is

in the Throne; and what is the Throne? this wooden frame covered with velvet?—no, *I* am the Throne! You have added wrong to reproaches. You have talked of concessions—concessions that even my enemies dared not ask! I suppose if they asked Champaigne you would have had me give them La Brie besides; but in four months I will conquer peace, or I shall be dead! You advise! how dare you debate of such high matters (*de si graves intérêts*)! You have put me in the front of the battle as the cause of war—it is infamous (*c'est une atrocité*). In all your committees you have excluded the friends of Government—extraordinary commission—committee of finance—committee of the address, all, all my enemies. M. Lainé, I repeat it, is a traitor; he is a wicked man, the others are mere intriguers. I do justice to the eleven-twelfths; but the factions I know, and will pursue. Is it, I ask again, is it while the enemy is in France that you should have done this? But nature has gifted me with a determined courage—nothing can overcome me. It cost my pride much too—I made that sacrifice; I—but I am above your miserable declamations—I was in need of consolation, and you would mortify me—but, no, my victories shall crush your clamours! In three months we shall have peace, and you shall repent your folly. I am one of those who triumph or die.

"Go back to your Departments. If any one of you dare to print your address I shall publish it in the *Moniteur* with notes of my own. Go; France stands in more need of me than I do of France. I bear the eleven-twelfths of you in my heart—I shall nominate the Deputies to the two series which are vacant, and I shall reduce the Legislative Body to the discharge of its proper duties. The inhabitants of Alsace and Franche Comté have more spirit than you; they ask me for arms, I send them, and one of my *aides de camp* will lead them against the enemy."

In after conversations he said of the Legislative Body

that "its members never came to Paris but to obtain some favours. They importuned the Ministers from morning till night, and complained if they were not immediately satisfied. When invited to dinner they burn with envy at the splendour they see before them." I heard this from Cambacérès, who was present when the Emperor made these remarks.

CHAPTER XXXI.

1813.

The flag of the army of Italy and the eagles of 1813—Entrance of the Allies into Switzerland—Summons to the Minister of Police—My refusal to accept a mission to Switzerland—Interviews with M. de Talleyrand and the Duc de Vicence—Offer of a Dukedom and the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour—Definitive refusal—The Duc de Vicence's message to me in 1815—Commencement of the siege of Hamburg—A bridge two leagues long—Executions at Lübeck—Scarcity of provisions in Hamburg—Banishment of the inhabitants—Men bastinadoed and women whipped—Hospitality of the inhabitants of Altona.

I AM now arrived at the most critical period in Napoleon's career. What reflections must he have made, if he had had leisure to reflect, in comparing the recollections of his rising glory with the sad picture of his falling fortune? What a contrast presents itself when we compare the famous flag of the army of Italy, which the youthful conqueror, Bonaparte, carried to the Directory, with those drooping eagles who had now to defend the aerie whence they had so often taken flight to spread their triumphant wings over Europe! Here we see the difference between liberty and absolute power! Napoleon, the son of liberty, to whom he owed everything, had disowned his mother, and was now about to fall. Those glorious triumphs were now over when the people of Italy consoled themselves for defeat and submitted to the magical power of that liberty which preceded the Republican armies. Now, on the contrary, it was to free themselves from a despotic yoke that the nations of Europe had in their turn taken up arms and were preparing to invade France.

With the violation of the Swiss territory by the Allied armies,[1] after the consent of the Cantons, is connected a fact of great importance in my life, and which, if I had chosen, might have made a great difference in my destiny. On Tuesday, the 28th of December, I dined with my old friend, M. Pierlot, and on leaving home I was in the habit of saying where I might be found in case I should be wanted. At nine o'clock at night an express arrived from the Minister of Police desiring me to come immediately to his office. I confess, considering the circumstances of the times, and knowing the Emperor's prejudices against me, such a request coming at such an hour made me feel some uneasiness, and I expected nothing less than a journey to Vincennes. The Duc de Rovigo, by becoming responsible for me, had as yet warded off the blow, and the supervision to which the Emperor had subjected me—thanks to the *good* offices of Davoust—consisted in going three times a week to show myself to Savary.

I accordingly, having first borrowed a night-cap, repaired to the hôtel of the Minister of Police. I was ushered into a well-lighted room, and when I entered I found Savary waiting for me. He was in full costume, from which I concluded he had just come from the Emperor. Advancing towards me with an air which showed he had no bad news to communicate, he thus addressed me: "Bourrienne, I have just come from the Emperor, who asked me where you were? I told him you were in Paris, and that I saw you often. 'Well,' continued the Em-

[1] The violation of Swiss neutrality by the Allies was carried out in defiance of the strongly expressed wishes of the Czar. When informed by Metternich that the Austrians had crossed the Rhine and that they had been joined by the Swiss, Alexander replied, "Success crowns the undertaking, it remains for success to justify what you have done. As one of the Allied Monarchs I have nothing more to say to you, but as a man I declare to you that you have grieved me in a way that you can never repair." The step was of course only justifiable on the then belief that all and everything was fair against Napoleon, yet, with a nearer approach to the feelings of his Allies, Alexander ended by asking as a favour that his Guard should be the first to cross the bridge at Bâle. See the whole story in *Metternich*, vol. i. pp. 216-223.

peror, 'bid him come to me, I want to employ him. It is three years since he has had anything to do. I wish to send him as Minister to Switzerland, but he must set off directly. He must go to the Allies. He understands German well. The King of Prussia expressed by letter satisfaction at his conduct towards the Prussians whom the war forced to retire to Hamburg. He knows Prince Wittgenstein, who is the friend of the King of Prussia, and probably is at Lorrach.[1] He will see all the Germans who are there. I confidently rely on him, and believe his journey will have a good result. Caulaincourt will give him his instructions.'"

Notwithstanding my extreme surprise at this communication I replied without hesitation that I could not accept the mission; that it was offered too late. "It perhaps is hoped," said I, "that the bridge of Bâle will be destroyed, and that Switzerland will preserve her neutrality. But I do not believe any such thing; nay, more, I know positively to the contrary. I can only repeat the offer comes much too late."—"I am very sorry for this resolution," observed Savary, "but Caulaincourt will perhaps persuade you. The Emperor wishes you to go the Duc de Vicence to-morrow at one o'clock; he will acquaint you with all the particulars, and give you your instructions."—"He may acquaint me with whatever he chooses, but I will not go to Lorrach."—"You know the Emperor better than I do, he wishes you to go, and he will not pardon your refusal."—"He may do as he pleases, but no consideration shall induce me to go to Switzerland."—"You are wrong: but you will reflect on the matter between this and to-morrow morning. Night will bring good counsel. At any rate, do not fail to go to-morrow at one o'clock to Caulaincourt, he expects you, and directions will be given to admit you immediately."

[1] Lorrach is a village two miles from Bâle, the place fixed on for the starting-point of the Austro-Russian army.—*Bourrienne.*

Next morning the first thing I did was to call on M. de Talleyrand. I told him what had taken place, and as he was intimately acquainted with Caulaincourt, I begged him to speak to that Minister in favour of my resolution. M. de Talleyrand approved of my determination not to go to Switzerland, and at one o'clock precisely I proceeded to M. de Caulaincourt's. He told me all he had been instructed to say. From the manner in which he made the communication I concluded that he himself considered the proposed mission a disagreeable one, and unlikely to be attended by any useful result. I observed that he must have heard from Savary that I had already expressed my determination to decline the mission which the Emperor had been pleased to offer me. The Duc de Vicence then, in a very friendly way, detailed the reasons which ought to induce me to accept the offer, and did not disguise from me that by persisting in my determination I ran the risk of raising Napoleon's doubts as to my opinions and future intentions. I replied that, having lived for three years as a private individual, unconnected with public affairs, I should have no influence at the headquarters of the Allies, and that whatever little ability I might be supposed to possess, *that* would not counterbalance the difficulties of my situation, and the opinion that I was out of favour. I added that I should appear at the headquarters without any decoration, without even that of the Cordon of the Legion of Honour to which the Emperor attached so much importance, and the want of which would almost have the appearance of disgrace ; and I said that these trifles, however slightly valued by reasonable men, were not, as he well knew, without their influence on the men with whom I should have to treat. "If that be all," replied Caulaincourt, "the obstacle will speedily be removed. I am authorised by the Emperor to tell you that he will create you a Duke, and give you the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour."

After these words I thought I was dreaming, and I was almost inclined to believe that Caulaincourt was jesting with me. However, the offer was serious, and I will not deny that it was tempting; yet I nevertheless persisted in the refusal I had given. At length, after some further conversation, and renewed, but useless, entreaties on the part of M. de Caulaincourt, he arose, which was a signal that our interview was terminated. I acknowledge I remained for a moment in doubt how to act, for I felt we had come to no understanding. M. de Caulaincourt advanced slowly towards the door of his cabinet. If I went away without knowing his opinion I had done nothing; addressing him, therefore, by his surname, "Caulaincourt," said I, "you have frequently assured me that you would never forget the services I rendered to you and your family at a time when I possessed some influence. I know you, and therefore speak to you without disguise. I do not now address myself to the Emperor's Minister, but to Caulaincourt. You are a man of honour, and I can open my heart to you frankly. Consider the embarrassing situation of France, which you know better than I do. I do not ask you for your secrets, but I myself know enough. I will tell you candidly that I am convinced the enemy will pass the Rhine in a few days.[1] The Emperor has been deceived: I should not have time to reach my destination, and I should be laughed at. My correspondents in Germany have made me acquainted with every particular. Now, Caulaincourt, tell me honestly, if you were in my place, and I in yours, and I should make this proposition to you, what determination would you adopt?"

I observed from the expression of Caulaincourt's countenance that my question had made an impression on him, and affectionately pressing my hand he said, "I would do as you do. Enough. I will arrange the business with

[1] I spoke thus to M. de Caulaincourt on a Wednesday. On the following Friday the Allied troops passed the Rhine.—*Bourrienne.*

the Emperor." This reply seemed to remove a weight from my mind, and I left Caulaincourt with feelings of gratitude. I felt fully assured that he would settle the business satisfactorily, and in this conjecture I was not deceived, for I heard no more of the matter.

I must here go forward a year to relate another occurrence in which the Duc de Vicence and I were concerned. When, in March 1815, the King appointed me Prefect of Police, M. de Caulaincourt sent to me a confidential person to inquire whether he ran any risk in remaining in Paris, or whether he had better remove. He had been told that his name was inscribed in a list of individuals whom I had received orders to arrest. Delighted at this proof of confidence, I returned the following answer by the Duc de Vicence's messenger: "Tell M. de Caulaincourt that I do not know where he lives. He need be under no apprehension: I will answer for him."

During the campaign of 1813 the Allies, after driving the French out of Saxony and obliging them to retreat towards the Rhine, besieged Hamburg, where Davoust was shut up with a garrison of 30,000 men, resolutely determined to make it a second Saragossa. From the month of September every day augmented the number of the Allied troops, who were already making rapid progress on the left bank of the Elbe. Davoust endeavoured to fortify Hamburg on so extended a scale that, in the opinion of the most experienced military men, it would have required a garrison of 60,000 men to defend it in a regular and protracted siege. At the commencement of the siege Davoust lost Vandamme, who was killed in a sortie at the head of a numerous corps which was inconsiderately sacrificed.[1]

It is but justice to admit that Davoust displayed great activity in the defence, and began by laying in large sup-

[1] Vandamme fought under Grouchy in 1815, and died several years afterwards. This killing him at Hamburg is one of the curious mistakes seized on by the Bonapartists to deny the authenticity of these Memoirs.

plies. General Bertrand was directed to construct a bridge to form a communication between Hamburg and Haarburg by joining the islands of the Elbe to the Continent along a total distance of about two leagues. This bridge was to be built of wood, and Davoust seized upon all the timber-yards to supply materials for its construction. In the space of eighty-three days the bridge was finished. It was a very magnificent structure, its length being 2529 toises, exclusive of the lines of junction, formed on the two islands.[1]

The inhabitants were dreadfully oppressed, but all the cruel measures and precautions of the French were ineffectual, for the Allies advanced in great force and occupied Westphalia, which movement obliged the Governor of Hamburg to recall to the town the different detachments scattered round Hamburg.

[1] After the general peace and the final return of the Bourbons to France, the Senate of Hamburg caused this bridge to be destroyed, on the ground that it was a dangerous medium of communication with the town. But the enormous expense necessary for keeping the bridge in repair was a consideration which had great weight in the determination of the Senate.—*Bourrienne.*

"Hamburg," says Puymaigre (one of the defenders), "was not so much a fortress as an intrenched camp, covered by the Elbe and the Elster on two points, and surrounded by a simple earthen rampart. The approaches were defended by several outer forts, especially by the fort Etoile, in front of Altona; but the Elbe and the Elster were soon frozen by a sudden frost of twenty degrees, which made it possible to cross the rivers" (*Puymaigre*, p. 155).

"Haarburg," he goes on to say, "an important port, was joined by a causeway raised fifteen feet above the Island of Wielhelsbourg, and having two flying bridges connecting it with the mainland at either end." This is the so-called bridge referred to by Bourrienne, and was created in six weeks by M. Jousselin. For a description of some of the fighting near this causeway see *De Gonneville*, vol. ii. pp. 104–147. By extraordinary energy Davoust defended his post, beating back the besiegers and keeping the city in perfect quiet. The measures he had to resort to, such as burning part of the suburbs, turning out the useless months, part of the inevitably cruel rules Davoust was bound to carry out,—made his conduct be bitterly attacked at the time, especially in England, where such matters were happily unknown in absence of invasion. Puymaigre, disliking Davoust personally, vouches for the Marshal having only done his duty; see *Puymaigre*, pp. 155–157. The defence, equally with the attack, of a large town, involves inevitable misery to the population, but it is hard to understand why all the blame is to fall on the defender. Davoust was, however, it must be allowed, a severe man. "As for me," said he, "when I am carrying on war I am obliged to leave my philauthropy in my wife's wardrobe" (*Diary of Henry Greville*, Second Series, p. 121).

At Lübeck the departure of the French troops was marked by blood. Before they evacuated the town, an old man, and a butcher named Prahl, were condemned to be shot. The butcher's crime consisted in having said, in speaking of the French, "Der teufel hohle sie" (the devil take them). The old man fortunately escaped his threatened fate, but, notwithstanding the entreaties and tears of the inhabitants, the sentence upon Prahl was carried into execution.

The garrison of Hamburg was composed of French, Italian, and Dutch troops. Their number at first amounted to 30,000, but sickness made great havoc among them. From sixty to eighty perished daily in the hospitals. When the garrison evacuated Hamburg in May 1814 it was reduced to about 15,000 men.[1] In the month of December provisions began to diminish, and there was no possibility of renewing the supply. The poor were first of all made to leave the town, and afterwards all persons who were not usefully employed. It is no exaggeration to estimate at 50,000 the number of persons who were thus exiled. The colonel commanding the gendarmerie at Hamburg notified to the exiled inhabitants that those who did not leave the town within the prescribed time would receive fifty blows with a cane and afterwards be driven out. But if penance may be commuted with priests so it may with gendarmes. Delinquents contrived to purchase their escape from the bastinado by a sum of money, and French gallantry substituted with respect to females the birch for the cane. I saw an order directing all female servants to be examined as to their health unless they could produce certificates

[1] To get more men Davoust impressed all the employés of the Government, etc., to their great disgust. He thus got some 1200 men, and drilled them to keep order inside the town. He could not, however, make them consider themselves soldiers. The Receiver-General, M. Garnié des Champs, was put on duty at his own door, and then begged that a real sentry might be put there, as he had much cash in his house: "He," said he, "could never pass for a real sentry." "Twelve Cossacks," says Puymaigre, one of their captains, "would have put my troop to flight;" see *Puymaigre*, p. 159.

from their masters. On the 25th of December the Government granted twenty-four hours longer to persons who were ordered to quit the town; and two days after this indulgence an ordinance was published declaring that those who should return to the town after once leaving it were to be considered as rebels and accomplices of the enemy, and as such condemned to death by a prevotal court. But this was not enough. At the end of December people, without distinction of sex or age, were dragged from their beds and conveyed out of the town on a cold night, when the thermometer was between sixteen or eighteen degrees; and it was affirmed that several old men perished in this removal. Those who survived were left on the outside of the Altona gates. At Altona they all found refuge and assistance. On Christmas-day 7000 of these unfortunate persons were received in the house of M. Rainville,[1] formerly *aide de camp* to Dumouriez, and who left France together with that general. His house, which was at Holstein, was usually the scene of brilliant entertainments, but it was converted into the abode of misery, mourning, and death. All possible attention was bestowed on the unfortunate outlaws; but few profited by it, and what is worse, the inhabitants of Altona suffered for their generosity. Many of the unfortunate persons were affected with the epidemic disease which was raging in Hamburg, and which in consequence broke out at Altona.

All means of raising money in Hamburg being exhausted, a seizure was made of the funds of the Bank of that city, which yet contained from seven to eight millions of marks. Were those who ordered this measure not aware that to seize on the funds of some of the citizens of Hamburg was an injury to all foreigners who had funds in the Bank?[2] Such is a brief statement of the vexations

[1] Apparently a somewhat capacious building?

[2] It is impossible to see how Davoust could have acted differently in this matter. "This pretended robbery," says *De Gonneville* (vol. ii. p. 149), "only took place in order to furnish the means of paying the army and providing for the expense. . . .

and cruelties which long oppressed this unfortunate city. Napoleon accused Hamburg of Anglomania, and by ruining her he thought to ruin England. Hamburg, feeble and bereft of her sources, could only complain, like Jerusalem when besieged by Titus: "*Plorans, ploravit in nocte.*"

Besides, this operation was performed in the most legal manner, by a commission composed of the superior servants of the said Bank, eminent merchants of the city, and generals and commissaries belonging to the army." That a general in a besieged city should leave his men and the contractors unpaid while money was idle in the Bank would be absurd. It was for the French Government afterwards to replace the sum spent in their service. The accusation made on such points against Davoust, while the Government of the Restoration left him undefended, alienated him, and had their effect in the *Cent Jours*; see *Thiers*, tome xviii. livre lv. p. 378. Davoust had similarly and necessarily seized all the wine (good wine, says Puymaigre) and the brandy to the amount of 3,000,000 francs, the merchants receiving bills afterwards paid by Louis XVIII. (*Puymaigre*, p. 161). Davoust is blamed because he did not surrender a town entrusted to him and which he was able to defend, and also because he did not let his garrison starve when he could not procure money from France. Hamburg was not evacuated by the French troops until May 1814, being only surrendered after the conclusion of peace.

CHAPTER XXXII.

1813-1814.

Prince Eugène and the affairs of Italy—The army of Italy on the frontiers of Austria—Eugène's regret at the defection of the Bavarians—Murat's dissimulation and perfidy—His treaty with Austria—Hostilities followed by a declaration of war—Murat abandoned by the French generals—Proclamation from Paris—Murat's success—Gigantic scheme of Napoleon—Napoleon advised to join the Jacobins—His refusal—Armament of the National Guard—The Emperor's farewell to the officers—The Congress of Châtillon—Refusal of an armistice—Napoleon's character displayed in his negotiations—Opening of the Congress—Discussions—Rupture of the Conferences.

I SHALL now proceed to notice the affairs of Italy and the principal events of the Viceroyalty of Eugène. In order to throw together all that I have to say about the Viceroy I must anticipate the order of time.

After the campaign of 1812, when Eugène revisited Italy, he was promptly informed of the more than doubtful dispositions of Austria towards France. He then made preparations for raising an army capable of defending the country which the Emperor had committed to his safeguard. Napoleon was fully aware how much advantage he would derive from the presence on the northern frontiers of Italy of an army sufficiently strong to harass Austria, in case she should draw aside the transparent veil which still covered her policy. Eugène did all that depended on him to meet the Emperor's wishes; but in spite of his efforts the army of Italy was, after all, only an imaginary army to those who could compare the number of men actually enrolled with the numbers stated in the lists. When, in July 1813, the Viceroy was informed of

the turn taken by the negotiations at the shadow of a Congress assembled at Prague, he had no longer any doubt of the renewal of hostilities; and foreseeing an attack on Italy he resolved as speedily as possible to approach the frontiers of Austria. He had succeeded in assembling an army composed of French and Italians, and amounting to 45,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. On the renewal of hostilities the Viceroy's headquarters were at Udine. Down to the month of April 1814 he succeeded in maintaining a formidable attitude, and in defending the entrance of his kingdom by dint of that military talent which was to be expected in a man bred in the great school of Napoleon, and whom the army looked up to as one of its most skilful generals.

During the great and unfortunate events of 1813 all eyes had been fixed on Germany and the Rhine; but the defection of Murat for a time diverted attention to Italy. That event did not so very much surprise me, for I had not forgotten my conversation with the King of Naples in the Champs Elysées, with which I have made the reader acquainted. At first Murat's defection was thought incredible by every one, and it highly excited Bonaparte's indignation. Another defection which occurred about the same period deeply distressed Eugène, for although raised to the rank of a prince, and almost a sovereign, he was still a man, and an excellent man. He was united to the Princess Amelia of Bavaria, who was as amiable and as much beloved as he, and he had the deep mortification to count the subjects of his father-in-law among the enemies whom he would probably have to combat. Fearing lest he should be harassed by the Bavarians on the side of the Tyrol, Eugène commenced his retrograde movement in the autumn of 1813. He at first fell back on the Tagliamento, and successively on the Adige. On reaching that river the army of Italy was considerably diminished, in spite of all Eugène's care of his troops. About the end of

November Eugène learned that a Neapolitan corps was advancing upon Upper Italy, part taking the direction of Rome, and part that of Ancona. The object of the King of Naples was to take advantage of the situation of Europe, and he was duped by the promises held out to him as the reward of his treason. Murat seemed to have adopted the artful policy of Austria; for not only had he determined to join the coalition, but he was even maintaining communications with England and Austria, while at the same time he was making protestations of fidelity to his engagements with Napoleon.[1]

When first informed of Murat's treason by the Viceroy the Emperor refused to believe it. "No," he exclaimed to those about him, "it cannot be! Murat, to whom I have given my sister! Murat, to whom I have given a

[1] Joachim was in treaty at the same time with England, France, Anstria, and the Viceroy of Italy, thinking by such means the better to conceal from them his true designs, if indeed he really had any fixed designs. The primary canse of all Joachim's aberrations was the extraordinary conduct pursued by Napoleon towards him, who one day treated him as a King, and the next scarcely showed him the respect due to his former *aide de camp*. Joachim wrote to the Emperor that he had 30,000 men ready to support their common cause. Napoleon answered that the 30,000 men were to be sent to the banks of the Po, where they were to await *his* further orders. This notification reached the King whilst he was visiting Pompeii with the Qneen. Murat tore the letter in pieces, threw it on the gronnd, stamped npon it, then gathering np the fragments he returned in haste to Naples and assembled his Ministers, to whom he said, "Gentlemen, the Emperor uses me in a most unwarrantable manner, and treats me with no more regard than if I were a Corporal." If, instead of acting in this cavalier manner, the Emperor had excited the self-love of Joachim by his usual praise, and pnt him at the head of all the Italians as well as of the French, then commanded by the Viceroy, to whom he might have given some other charge, the heroic King of Naples would have startled Vienna with an army of 100,000 men! But such fortune was not in store either for Italy or for France, inordinate ambition having already damped the genius of Napoleon. The year before the Emperor, in a remarkable order of the day, had vaunted Prince Engène to the skies at the expense of Joachim, and now he left these two rivals in Italy, where their mntual jealonsy paralysed the power of almost 150,000 men obtained out of the whole Peninsula, and of abont 30,000 Frenchmen stationed in Lombardy. The above-mentioned force nnder the command of an able general might have entirely changed the destiny of the Empire of France! (*Memoirs of General Pépé*, vol. i. p. 319: Bentley, 1846).

On learning the loss of the battle of Waterloo Murat exclaimed to his principal equerry, the Duke of Roccaromana, "Had I led the cavalry the battle wonld have been won." The same opinion was expressed by Napoleon at St. Helena, and many years later at Paris I heard General Flaxo assert a similar conviction (*Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 123).

throne! Eugène must be misinformed. It is impossible that Murat has declared himself against me!" It was, however, not only possible but true. Gradually throwing aside the dissimulation beneath which he had concealed his designs, Murat seemed inclined to renew the policy of Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the art of deceiving was deemed by the Italian Governments the most sublime effort of genius. Without any declaration of war, Murat ordered the Neapolitan General who occupied Rome to assume the supreme command in the Roman States, and to take possession of the country. General Miollis, who commanded the French troops in Rome, could only throw himself, with his handful of men, into the Castle of St. Angelo, the famous mole of Adrian, in which was long preserved the treasury of Sixtus V. The French General soon found himself blockaded by the Neapolitan troops, who also blockaded Civita Vecchia and Ancona.[1]

[1] The King put new blood into the public administration, not merely by the activity and firmness which he exerted but by his practical anxiety to give a proper direction to public affairs. The natural clemency of his character, which even conciliated those who were least likely to be moved by it, facilitated the execution of his intentions. On the first visit that Joachim made to Paris after the events just recited Napoleon exclaimed, when he saw him enter the *salon*, "*Voilà un roi qui ne recule jamais.*" Had Joachim better known how to organise his army and to maintain discipline between the French and the Neapolitan troops he would have succeeded in obtaining far better results. By nature generous, and by no means insensible to flattery, Joachim was extremely averse to inflicting punishment, and was prone to recompense not merely those who merited it but to reward others whose conduct should have entitled them to very different treatment. This happened because he could never resist the supplications of the courtiers, still less the entreaties of the ladies about the Court, and, like all princes, he was extremely liberal to those whom he termed *mes dévoués*, without reflecting that the less elevated a man is by nature the more devotion he affects to princes, and the more he flatters their power. The beauty of his person, the charm of his smile, the natural urbanity of his manner—to which, however, he was inclined to add more importance than was consistent with his proper dignity—and the richness of his dress, pleased the multitude and the army. The affability and gentleness of his manners, which were such as could not have been anticipated from a man of low birth, endeared him to the Court. In his youth, however, he had been placed in the College of Toulouse, and had availed himself to the utmost of the education bestowed upon him. I do not recollect ever having presented myself before him on my return from executing any of his orders without his expressing his thanks to me in the most amiable manner. One day he was returning from the Campo di Morte, when a woman in tears, and holding a petition in her hand, came forward to present it to him. The King's horse, frightened at the sight

The treaty concluded between Murat and Austria was definitively signed on the 11th of January 1814.[1] As soon as he was informed of it the Viceroy, certain that he should soon have to engage with the Neapolitans, was obliged to renounce the preservation of the line of the Adige, the Neapolitan army being in the rear of his right wing. He accordingly ordered a retrograde movement to the other side of the Mincio, where his army was cantoned. In this position Prince Eugène, on the 8th of February, had to engage with the Austrians, who had come up with him, and the victory of the Mincio arrested, for some time, the invasion of the Austrian army and its junction with the Neapolitan troops.

It was not until eight days after that Murat officially declared war against the Emperor; and immediately several general and superior officers, and many French troops, who were in his service, abandoned him, and repaired to the headquarters of the Viceroy. Murat made endeavours to detain them; they replied, that as he had declared war against France, no Frenchman who loved his country could remain in his service. "Do you think," returned he, "that my heart is less French than yours? On the contrary, I am much to be pitied. I hear of nothing but

of the paper, began to kick and rear, and ended by throwing his Majesty some distance from the spot. After swearing roundly in the French fashion, Joachim took the paper and granted its petition, which was the life of the poor woman's husband, who was to have been executed on the following day.

People of all classes, and even officers in the army, were in the habit of presenting themselves to the King as he passed through the streets with a petition in one hand and an inkstand in the other. The good King Joachim granted those requests with too much facility, not considering that far from increasing his popularity by such conduct his too easy compliance was calculated to awaken discontent and distrust of the efficiency of the laws (*Memoirs of General Pépé*, vol. i. p. 263: Bentley, 1846).

[1] On the 11th of January 1814 Austria by treaty guaranteed Naples to Murat, who was also to receive territory containing 400,000 souls from the Papal States. Murat on his part renounced his *claims* to Sicily, and furnished 30,000 men against Napoleon (*Martens*, tome ix. p. 660). This was a strange step on the part of Austria, who soon began to yield to the requests of Louis XVIII., that Murat should be overthrown. See Talleyrand's *Correspondence*, vol. ii. pp. 22, 26, 46, 83, and 135, remembering always the old affection of Metternich for Caroline Bonaparte, wife of Murat.

the disasters of the Grand Army. I have been obliged to enter into a treaty with the Austrians, and an arrangement with the English, commanded by Lord Bentinck, in order to save my Kingdom from a threatened landing of the English and the Sicilians, which would infallibly have excited an insurrection."

There could not be a more ingenuous confession of the antipathy which Joachim knew the Neapolitans to entertain towards his person and government.[1] His address to the French was ineffectual. It was easy to foresee what would ensue. The Viceroy soon received an official communication from Napoleon's War Minister, accompanied by an Imperial decree, recalling all the French who were in the service of Joachim, and declaring that all who were taken with arms in their hands should be tried by a court-martial as traitors to their country. Murat commenced by gaining advantages which could not be disputed. His troops almost immediately took possession of Leghorn and the citadel of Ancona, and the French were obliged to evacuate Tuscany.

The defection of Murat overthrew one of Banaparte's gigantic conceptions. He had planned that Murat and Eugène with their combined forces should march on the rear of the Allies, while he, disputing the soil of France with the invaders, should multiply obstacles to their advance ; the King of Naples and the Viceroy of Italy were to march upon Vienna and make Austria tremble in the heart of her capital before the timid million of her Allies, who measured their steps as they approached Paris, should desecrate by their presence the capital of France. When informed of the vast project, which, however, was but the dream of a moment, I immediately recognised that eagle glance, that power of discovering great resources in great calamities, so peculiar to Bonaparte.

[1] This is not quite correct : the Neapolitans, as a mass, did not entertain an antipathy towards Murat.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

Napoleon was yet Emperor of France ; but he who had imposed on all Europe treaties of peace no less disastrous than the wars which had preceded them, could not now obtain an armistice ; and Caulaincourt, who was sent to treat for one at the camp of the Allies, spent twenty days at Luneville before he could even obtain permission to pass the advanced posts of the invading army. In vain did Caulaincourt entreat Napoleon to sacrifice, or at least resign temporarily, a portion of that glory acquired in so many battles, and which nothing could efface in history. Napoleon replied, "I will sign whatever you wish. To obtain peace I will exact no condition ; but I will not dictate my own humiliation." This concession, of course, amounted to a determination not to sign or to grant anything.

In the first fortnight of January 1814 one-third of France was invaded, and it was proposed to form a new Congress, to be held at Châtillon-sur-Seine. The situation of Napoleon grew daily worse and worse. He was advised to seek extraordinary resources in the interior of the Empire, and was reminded of the fourteen armies which rose, as if by enchantment, to defend France at the commencement of the Revolution. Finally, a reconciliation with the Jacobins, a party who had power to call up masses to aid him, was recommended. For a moment he was inclined to adopt this advice. He rode on horseback through the surburbs of St. Antoine and St. Marceau, courted the populace, affectionately replied to their acclamations, and he thought he saw the possibility of turning to account the attachment which the people evinced for him. On his return to the Palace some prudent persons ventured to represent to him that, instead of courting this absurd sort of popularity it would be more advisable to rely on the nobility and the higher classes of society. "Gentlemen," replied he, "you may say what you please, but in the situation in which I stand

my only nobility is the rabble of the faubourgs, and I know of no rabble but the nobility whom I have created." This was a strange compliment to all ranks, for it was only saying that they were all rabble together.

At this time the Jacobins were disposed to exert every effort to serve him ; but they required to have their own way, and to be allowed freely to excite and foster revolutionary sentiments. The press, which groaned under the most odious and intolerable censorship, was to be wholly resigned to them. I do not state these facts from hearsay. I happened by chance to be present at two conferences in which were set forward projects infected with the odour of the clubs, and these projects were supported with the more assurance because their success was regarded as certain. Though I had not seen Napoleon since my departure for Hamburg, yet I was sufficiently assured of his feeling towards the Jacobins to be convinced that he would have nothing to do with them. I was not wrong. On hearing of the price they set on their services he said, "This is too much ; I shall have a chance of deliverance in battle, but I shall have none with these furious blockheads. There can be nothing in common between the demagogic principles of '93 and the monarchy, between clubs of madmen and a regular Ministry, between a Committee of Public Safety and an Emperor, between revolutionary tribunals and established laws. If fall I must, I will not bequeath France to the Revolution from which I have delivered her."

These were golden words, and Napoleon thought of a more noble and truly national mode of parrying the danger which threatened him. He ordered the enrolment of the National Guard of Paris, which was placed under the command of Marshal Moncey. A better choice could not have been made, but the staff of the National Guard was a focus of hidden intrigues, in which the defence of Paris was less thought about than the means of taking advantage

of Napoleon's overthrow. I was made a captain in this Guard, and, like the rest of the officers, I was summoned to the Tuileries, on the 23d of January, when the Emperor took leave of the National Guard previously to his departure from Paris to join the army.

Napoleon entered with the Empress. He advanced with a dignified step, leading by the hand his son, who was not yet three years old. It was long since I had seen him. He had grown very corpulent, and I remarked on his pale countenance an expression of melancholy and irritability.

The habitual movement of the muscles of his neck was more decided and more frequent than formerly. I shall not attempt to describe what were my feelings during this ceremony, when I again saw, after a long separation, the friend of my youth, who had become master of Europe, and was now on the point of sinking beneath the efforts of his enemies. There was something melancholy in this solemn and impressive ceremony. I have rarely witnessed such profound silence in so numerous an assembly. At length Napoleon, in a voice as firm and sonorous as when he used to harangue his troops in Italy or in Egypt, but without that air of confidence which then beamed on his countenance, delivered to the assembled officers an address which was published in all the journals of the time. At the commencement of this address he said, "I set out this night to take the command of the army. On quitting the capital I confidently leave behind me my wife and my son, in whom so many hopes are centred." I listened attentively to Napoleon's address, and, though he delivered it firmly, he either felt or feigned emotion. Whether or not the emotion was sincere on his part, it was shared by many present; and for my own part I confess that my feelings were deeply moved when he uttered the words, "I leave you my wife and my son." At that moment my eyes were fixed on the young Prince, and the interest with which he inspired me was equally unconnected with the splendour

which surrounded and the misfortunes which threatened him. I beheld in the interesting child not the King of Rome but the son of my old friend. All day long afterwards I could not help feeling depressed while comparing the farewell scene of the morning with the day on which we took possession of the Tuileries. How many centuries seemed the fourteen years which separated the two events!

It may be worth while to remind those who are curious in comparing dates that Napoleon, the successor of Louis XVI., and who had become the nephew of that monarch by his marriage with the niece of Marie Antoinette, took leave of the National Guard of Paris on the anniversary of the fatal 21st of January,[1] after twenty-five years of successive terror, fear, hope, glory, and misfortune.

Meanwhile, a Congress was opened at Châtillon-sur-Seine,[2] at which were assembled the Duke of Vicenza on the part of France, Lords Aderdeen and Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart[3] as the representatives of England, Count Razumowsky on the part of Russia, Count Stadion for Austria, and Count Humboldt for Prussia. Before the opening of the Congress, the Duke of Vicenza, in conform-

[1] Bourrienne makes a mistake here. The King was executed on the 21st of January 1793, and Napoleon, as indeed Bourrienne himself has just said, received the officers of the National Guard on the 23d of January 1814, and set out on the 25th of January. See also *Miot*, tome iii. pp. 369 and 371. Napoleon, even at such a time, was not likely to allow such a coincidence to happen: see the care with which in 1800 he avoided going to an ordinary party on the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire (*Junot*, tome i. p. 420).

[2] It should be remembered that at the time of the Congress of Châtillon the Allies were already in communication with the Royalist agents from Paris; and while, with more or less good faith, they were offering peace to Napoleon, they were listening to the offers of the friends of the Bourbons. The proceedings of the Royalists may have been natural; they were certainly unpatriotic, and the Allies were practically offered any terms if they upset the power of Napoleon. The Baron de Vitrolles (tome i. pp. 99 and 101) tells us in his Memoirs how he impressed on Metternich that the forces of Napoleon must be crushed if France were to pronounce for the Bourbons. In their eagerness as partisans they forgot that, the army once crushed, France lay at the feet of the Allies, who could then make their own terms.

[3] Afterwards the Marquis of Londonderry, who published an interesting account of the Congress.

ity with the Emperor's orders, demanded an armistice, which is almost invariably granted during negotiations for peace ; but it was now too late : the Allies had long since determined not to listen to any such demand. They therefore answered the Duke of Vicenza's application by requiring that the propositions for peace should be immediately signed. But these were not the propositions of Frankfort. The Allies established as their bases the limits of the old French monarchy. They conceived themselves authorised in so doing by their success and by their situation.

To estimate rightly Napoleon's conduct during the negotiations for peace which took place in the conferences at Châtillon it is necessary to bear in mind the organisation he had received from nature and the ideas with which that organisation had imbued him at an early period of life. If the last negotiations of his expiring reign be examined with due attention and impartiality it will appear evident that the causes of his fall arose out of his character. I cannot range myself among those adulators who have accused the persons about him with having dissuaded him from peace. Did he not say at St. Helena, in speaking of the negotiations at Châtillon, "A thunderbolt alone could have saved us : to treat, to conclude, was to yield foolishly to the enemy." These words forcibly portray Napoleon's character. It must also be borne in mind how much he was captivated by the immortality of the great names which history has bequeathed to our admiration, and which are perpetuated from generation to generation. Napoleon was resolved that his name should re-echo in ages to come, from the palace to the cottage. To live without fame appeared to him an anticipated death. If, however, in this thirst for glory, not for notoriety, he conceived the wish to surpass Alexander and Cæsar, he never desired the renown of Erostratus, and I will say again what I have said before, that if he committed

actions to be condemned, it was because he considered them as steps which helped him to place himself on the summit of immortality on which he wished to place his name. Witness what he wrote to his brother Jerôme, "*Better never to have lived than to live without glory;*" witness also what he wrote later to his brother Louis, "*It is better to die as a King than to live as a Prince.*" How often in the days of my intimacy with Bonaparte has he not said to me, "Who knows the names of those kings who have passed from the thrones on which chance or birth seated them? They lived and died unnoticed. The learned, perhaps, may find them mentioned in old archives, and a medal or a coin dug from the earth may reveal to antiquarians the existence of a sovereign of whom they had never before heard. But, on the contrary, when we hear the names of Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, Mahomet, Charlemagne, Henry IV., and Louis XIV., we are immediately among our intimate acquaintance." I must add, that when Napoleon thus spoke to me in the gardens of Malmaison he only repeated what had often fallen from him in his youth, for his character and his ideas never varied; the change was in the objects to which they were applied.

From his boyhood Napoleon was fond of reading the history of the great men of antiquity; and what he chiefly sought to discover was the means by which those men had become great. He remarked that military glory secures more extended fame than the arts of peace and the noble efforts which contribute to the happiness of mankind. History informs us that great military talent and victory often give the power, which, in its turn, procures the means of gratifying ambition. Napoleon was always persuaded that that power was essential to him, in order to bend men to his will, and to stifle all discussions on his conduct. It was his established principle never to sign a disadvantageous peace. To him a tarnished crown was no longer a crown. He said one day to M. de Caulain-

court, who was pressing him to consent to sacrifices, "Courage may defend a crown, but infamy never." In all the last acts of Napoleon's career I can retrace the impress of his character, as I had often recognised in the great actions of the Emperor the execution of a thought conceived by the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

On the opening of the Congress the Duke of Vicenza, convinced that he could no longer count on the natural limits of France promised at Frankfort by the Allies, demanded new powers. Those limits were doubtless the result of reasonable concessions, and they had been granted even after the battle of Leipsic ; but it was now necessary that Napoleon's Minister should show himself ready to make further concessions if he wished to be allowed to negotiate. The Congress was opened on the 5th of February, and on the 7th the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers declared themselves categorically. They inserted in the protocol that after the successes which had favoured their armies they insisted on France being restored to her old limits, such as they were during the monarchy before the Revolution ; and that she should renounce all direct influence beyond her future limits.

This proposition appeared so extraordinary to M. de Caulaincourt that he requested the sitting might be suspended, since the conditions departed too far from his instructions to enable him to give an immediate answer. The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers acceded to his request, and the continuation of the sitting was postponed till eight in the evening. When it was resumed the Duke of Vicenza renewed his promise to make the greatest sacrifices for the attainment of peace. He added that the amount of the sacrifices necessarily depended on the amount of the compensations, and that he could not determine on any concession or compensation without being made acquainted with the whole. He wished to have a general plan of the views of the Allies, and he requested that their

Plenipotentiaries would explain themselves decidedly respecting the number and description of the sacrifices and compensations to be demanded. It must be acknowledged that the Duke of Vicenza perfectly fulfilled the views of the Emperor in thus protracting and gaining time by subtle subterfuges, for all that he suggested had already been done.

On the day after this sitting some advantages gained by the Allies, who took Châtillon-sur-Marne and Troyes, induced Napoleon to direct Caulaincourt to declare to the Congress that if an armistice were immediately agreed on he was ready to consent to France being restored to her old limits. By securing this armistice Napoleon hoped that happy chances might arise, and that intrigues might be set on foot ; but the Allies would not listen to any such proposition.

At the sitting of the 10th of March the Duke of Vicenza inserted in the protocol that the last courier he had received had been arrested and detained a considerable time by several Russian general officers, who had obliged him to deliver up his despatches, which had not been returned to him till thirty-six hours after at Chaumont. Caulaincourt justly complained of this infraction of the law of nations and established usage, which, he said, was the sole cause of the delay in bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. After this complaint he communicated to the Congress the ostensible instructions of Napoleon, in which he authorised his Minister to accede to the demands of the Allies. But in making this communication M. de Caulaincourt took care not to explain the private and secret instructions he had also received. The Allies rejected the armistice because it would have checked their victorious advance ; but they consented to sign the definitive peace, which of all things was what the Emperor did not wish.

Napoleon at length determined to make sacrifices, and

the Duke of Vicenza submitted new propositions to the Congress. The Allies replied, in the same sitting, that these propositions contained no distinct and explicit declaration on the project presented by them on the 17th of February; that, having on the 28th of the same month, demanded a decisive answer within the term of ten days, they were about to break up the negotiations. Caulaincourt then declared verbally :—

1st. That the Emperor Napoleon was ready to renounce all pretension or influence whatever in countries beyond the boundaries of France.

2d. To recognise the independence of Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, and that as to England, France would make such concessions as might be deemed necessary in consideration of a reasonable equivalent.

Upon this the sitting was immediately broken up without a reply. It must be remarked that this singular declaration was verbal, and consequently not binding, and that the limits of France were mentioned without being specified. It cannot be doubted that Napoleon meant the limits conceded at Frankfort, to which he was well convinced the Allies would not consent, for circumstances were now changed. Besides, what could be meant by the *reasonable equivalent* from England? Is it astonishing that this obscurity and vagueness should have banished all confidence on the part of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers? Three days after the sitting of the 10th of March they declared they could not even enter into a discussion of the verbal protocol of the French Minister. They requested that M. de Caulaincourt would declare whether he would accept or reject the project of a treaty presented by the Allied Sovereigns,[1] or offer a counter-project.

The Duke of Vicenza, who was still prohibited, by secret

[1] The conditions of this treaty were the boundaries of France before the Revolution.—*Bourrienne.*

instructions from coming to any conclusion on the proposed basis, inserted in the protocol of the sitting of the 13th of March a very ambiguous note. The Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, in their reply, insisted upon receiving another declaration from the French Plenipotentiary, which should contain an acceptance or refusal of their project of a treaty presented in the conference of the 7th of February, or a counter-project. After much discussion Caulaincourt agreed to draw up a counter-project, which he presented on the 15th, under the following title: "Project of a definitive Treaty between France and the Allies." In this extraordinary project, presented after so much delay, M. de Caulaincourt, to the great astonishment of the Allies, departed in no respect from the declarations of the 10th of March. He replied again to the ultimatum of the Allies, or what he wished to regard as such, by defending a multitude of petty interests, which were of no importance in so great a contest; but in general the conditions seemed rather those of a conqueror dictating to his enemies than of a man overwhelmed by misfortune. As may readily be imagined, they were, for the most part, received with derision by the Allies.

Everything tends to prove that the French Plenipotentiary had received no positive instructions from the 5th of February, and that, after all the delay which Napoleon constantly created, Caulaincourt never had it in his power to answer, categorically, the propositions of the Allies. Napoleon never intended to make peace at Châtillon on the terms proposed. He always hoped that some fortunate event would enable him to obtain more favourable conditions.

On the 18th of March, that is to say, three days after the presentation of this project of a treaty, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies recorded in the protocol their reasons for rejecting the extraordinary project of the French Minister. For my part, I was convinced, for the

reasons I have mentioned, that the Emperor would never agree to sign the conditions proposed in the ultimatum of the Allies, dated the 13th of March, and I remember having expressed that opinion to M. de Talleyrand. I saw him on the 14th, and found him engaged in perusing some intelligence he had just received from the Duke of Vicenza, announcing, as beyond all doubt, the early signature of peace. Caulaincourt had received orders to come to a conclusion. Napoleon, he said, had given him a *carte blanche* to save the capital, and avoid a battle, by which the last resources of the nation would be endangered. This seemed pretty positive, to be sure; but even this assurance did not, for a moment, alter my opinion. The better to convince me, M. de Talleyrand gave me Caulaincourt's letter to read. After reading it I confidently said, "He will never sign the conditions." M. de Talleyrand could not help thinking me very obstinate in my opinion, for he judged of what the Emperor would do by his situation, while I judged by his character. I told M. de Talleyrand that Caulaincourt might have received written orders to sign, for the sake of showing them to the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, but that I had no doubt he had been instructed to postpone coming to a conclusion, and to wait for final orders. I added, that I saw no reason to change my opinion, and that I continued to regard the breaking up of the Congress as nearer than appearances seemed to indicate. Accordingly, three days afterwards, the Allies grew tired of the delay and the conferences were broken up. Thus Napoleon sacrificed everything rather than his glory. He fell from a great height, but he never, by his signature, consented to any dismemberment of France.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, convinced that these renewed difficulties and demands had no other object but to gain time, stated that the Allied powers, faithful to their principles, and in conformity with their previous

declarations, regarded the negotiations at Châtillon as terminated by the French Government. This rupture of the conferences took place on the 19th of March, six days after the presentation of the ultimatum of the Allied powers.[1] The issue of these long discussions was thus left to be decided by the chances of war, which were not very favourable to the man who boldly contended against armed Europe. The successes of the Allies during the conferences at Châtillon had opened to their view the road to Paris,[2] while Napoleon shrunk from the necessity of signing his own disgrace. In these circumstances was to be found the sole cause of his ruin, and he might have said, "*Tout est perdu, fors la gloire.*" His glory is immortal.

[1] The conviviality and harmony that reigned between the Ministers made the society and intercourse at Châtillon most agreeable. The diplomatists dined alternately with each other; M. de Caulaincourt liberally passing for all the Ministers, through the French advanced posts, convoys of all the good cheer in epicurean wines, etc., that Paris could afford; nor was female society wanting to complete the charm and banish *ennui* from the Châtillon Congress, which I am sure will be long recollected with sensations of pleasure by all the Plenipotentiaries there engaged (*Memoirs of Lord Burghersh*).

[2] The Emperor Alexander (of Russia) upon the slightest reverse gives orders to treat upon any terms, at the first sign of success he will listen to nothing (*De Vitrolles*, tome i. p. 82).

CHAPTER XXXIII.

1814.

Curious conversation between General Reynier and the Emperor Alexander—Napoleon repulses the Prussians—The Russians at Fontainebleau—Battle of Brienne—Sketch of the campaign of France—Supper after the battle of Champ Aubert—Intelligence of the arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême and the Comte d'Artois in France—The battle of the ravens and the eagle—Battle of Craonne—Departure of the Pope and the Spanish Princes—Capture of a convoy—Macdonald at the Emperor's headquarters—The inverted cipher—ANNEX.

I WAS always persuaded, and everything I have since seen has confirmed my opinion, that the Allies entering France had no design of restoring the House of Bourbon, or of imposing any Government whatever on the French people.[1] They came to destroy and not to found. That

[1] This statement is in complete agreement with the *Memoirs of the Baron de Vitrolles* (Paris, Charpentier, 1884), in which we read of the first communications of the Royalists in Paris with the Allies. Vitrolles saw Stadion, the Austrian Plenipotentiary at Châtillon, apparently on the 10th March 1814, and was told by him that if Napoleon acceded to conditions which gave the Allies sufficient guarantees, they only fought to obtain peace, and would seize it with eagerness. Metternich, a few days later, met him in the same way, remarking on the silence of France. "We have traversed France, we have lived in it for more than two months, and nothing like this has been shown to us. . . . We have found in the population with which we have mixed nothing of what you announce, neither need of repose, remembrance of former days, nor even any general expression of discontent with the Emperor." Though the Comte d'Artois was close to the Allies' headquarters they appeared not to know or to care anything about him or the other Princes. There is, however, some inconsistency between Vitrolles' description and Metternich's own account of his conversation with Alexander, apparently in January 1814. "Napoleon's power is broken and will not rise again. . . . When the overthrow of the Empire comes there will be only the Bourbons to take possession again of their undying rights" (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 228). Either Metternich dissembled very much with Vitrolles, or the silence of the occupied provinces had changed his ideas; see *De Vitrolles*, tome ii. pp. 76–112, and especially p. 312, where, when the Allies were in Paris, Dalberg tells him of the hesitation of Alexander and of the King of Prussia.

Writing long afterwards Metternich (vol. i. p. 244) says, "The form of government

which they wished to destroy from the commencement of their success was Napoleon's supremacy, in order to prevent the future invasions with which they believed Europe would still be constantly threatened. If, indeed, I had entertained any doubt on this subject it would have been banished by the account I heard of General Reynier's conversation with the Emperor Alexander. That General, who was made prisoner at Leipsic, was exchanged, and returned to France. In the beginning of February 1814 he passed through Troyes, where the Emperor Alexander then was. Reynier expressed a desire to be allowed to pay his respects to the Emperor, and to thank him for having restored him to liberty. He was received with that affability of manner which was sometimes affected by the Russian monarch.

On his arrival at Paris General Reynier called at the Duc de Rovigo's, where I had dined that day, and where he still was when I arrived. He related in my hearing the conversation to which I have alluded, and stated that it had all the appearance of sincerity on the Emperor's part. Having asked Alexander whether he had any instructions for Napoleon, as the latter, on learning that he had seen his Majesty would not fail to ask him many questions, he replied that he had nothing particular to communicate to him. Alexander added that he was Napoleon's friend, but that he had, personally, much reason to complain of his conduct; that the Allies would have nothing more to do with him; that they had no intention of forcing any Sovereign upon France; but that they would no longer acknowledge Napoleon as Emperor of the French. "For my part," said Alexander, "I can no longer place any con-

which Napoleon had introduced was agreeable to all France, but it was weary of wars, of which it could see no end. The return of the Bourbons was not longed for in the sense which the Royalists attributed to this feeling, and the Royalist party itself had much diminished during the course of five and twenty years. It was longed for by the friends of public order and political peace—that is, by the great majority of the nation."

fidence in him. He has deceived me too often." In reply to this Reynier made some remarks dictated by his attachment and fidelity to Bonaparte. He observed that Napoleon was acknowledged as Sovereign of France by every treaty. "But," added Reynier, "if you should persist in forcing him to resign the supreme power, whom will you put in his place?"—"Did you not choose him; why then can you not choose some one else to govern you? I repeat that we do not intend to force any one upon you: but we will have no more to do with Napoleon."

Several Generals were then named; and after Reynier had explained the great difficulties which would oppose any such choice, Alexander interrupted him saying, "But, General, there is Bernadotte.[1] Has he not been voluntarily chosen Prince Royal of Sweden; may he not also be raised to the same rank in France? He is your countryman; surely then you may choose him, since the Swedes took him, though a foreigner." General Reynier, who was a man of firm character, started some objections, which I thought at the time well founded; and Alexander put an end to the conversation by saying, rather in a tone of dissatisfaction, "Well, General, the fate of arms will decide."

The campaign of France forced Napoleon to adopt a kind of operations quite new to him. He had been accustomed to attack; but he was now obliged to stand on his defence, so that, instead of having to execute a previously conceived plan, as when, in the Cabinet of the Tuileries,

[1] Alexander said to the Baron de Vitrolles, on the 17th March 1814, at Troyes, "We have already carefully sought for what would suit France if Napoleon disappeared. Some time ago we thought of Bernadotte; his influence over the army, the favour in which he must be with the friends of the Revolution, had at one time fixed our views on him, but afterwards several motives have made us put him aside" (*Vitrolles*, tome i. p. 119). Alexander did not state the reasons against Bernadotte. The speech must have been striking to Vitrolles (who had come to plead the cause of the Bourbons), who had when a boy been taught fencing by Bernadotte, then a serjeant of the regiment "Royal Marine." It is due to Bernadotte that he when Marshal and Prince never forgot the kind way he had been received when serjeant by the family of Vitrolles, and it was to him that Vitrolles owed his removal from the list of emigrants (*Vitrolles' Introduction*, p. xiii.)

he traced out to me the field of Marengo, he had now to determine his movements according to those of his numerous enemies. When the Emperor arrived at Chalons-sur-Marne the Prussian army was advancing by the road of Lorraine. He drove it back beyond St. Dizier. Meanwhile the Grand Austro-Russian army passed the Seine and the Yonne at Montereau, and even sent forward a corps which advanced as far as Fontainebleau. Napoleon then made a movement to the right in order to drive back the troops which threatened to march on Paris, and by a curious chance he came up with the troops in the very place where he passed the boyish years in which he cherished what then seemed wild and fabulous dreams of his future fate. What thoughts and recollections must have crowded on his mind when he found himself an Emperor and a King, at the head of a yet powerful army, in the château of the Comte de Brienne, to whom he had so often paid his homage! It was at Brienne that he had said to me, thirty-four years before, "I will do these Frenchmen all the harm I can." Since then he had certainly changed his mind; but it might be said that fate persisted in forcing the man to realise the design of the boy in spite of himself. No sooner had Napoleon revisited Brienne as a conqueror than he was repulsed and hurried to his fall, which became every moment more certain.[1]

I shall not enter into any details of the campaign of France, because the description of battles forms no part of my plan. Still, I think it indispensable briefly to describe Napoleon's miraculous activity from the time of his leaving Paris to the entrance of the Allies into the capital. Few successful campaigns have enabled our Generals and the French army to reap so much glory as they gained during this great reverse of fortune. For it is possible to triumph without honour, and to fall with glory. The

[1] An engagement took place at Brienne, and Napoleon, with 15,000 men, kept 80,000 Russians in check for twelve hours.—*Bourrienne.*

chances of the war were not doubtful, but certainly the numerous hosts of the Allies could never have anticipated so long and brilliant a resistance. The theatre of the military operations soon approached so near to Paris that the general eagerness for news from the army was speedily satisfied, and when any advantage was gained by the Emperor his partisans saw the enemy already repulsed from the French territory. I was not for a moment deceived by these illusions, as I well knew the determination and the resources of the Allied sovereigns. Besides, events were so rapid and various in this war of extermination that the guns of the Invalides announcing a victory were sometimes immediately followed by the distant rolling of artillery, denoting the enemy's near approach to the capital.

The Emperor left Paris on the 25th of January, at which time the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia were assembled at Langres. Napoleon rejoined his Guard at Vitry-le-Français. On the second day after his departure he drove before him the Prussian army, which he had forced to evacuate St. Dizier. Two days after this the battle of Brienne was fought, and on the 1st of February between 70,000 and 80,000 French and Allied troops stood face to face. On this occasion the commanders on both sides were exposed to personal danger, for Napoleon had a horse killed under him, and a Cossack fell dead by the side of Marshal Blucher.

A few days after this battle Napoleon entered Troyes, where he stayed but a short time, and then advanced to Champaubert. At the latter place was fought the battle which bears its name. The Russians were defeated, General Alsufieff was made prisoner, and 2000 men and 30 guns fell into the hands of the French. After this battle the Emperor was under such a delusion as to his situation that while supping with Berthier, Marmont, and his prisoner, General Alsufieff, the Emperor said, "Another such victory as this, gentlemen, and I shall be on the Vistula."

Finding that no one replied, and reading in the countenances of his Marshals that they did not share his hopes, "I see how it is," he added, "every one is growing tired of war ; there is no more enthusiasm. The sacred fire is extinct." Then rising from the table, and stepping up to General Drouot, with the marked intention of paying him a compliment which should at the same time convey a censure on the Marshals, "General," said he, patting him on the shoulder, "we only want a hundred men like you, and we should succeed." Drouot replied, with great presence of mind and modesty, "Rather say a hundred thousand, Sire." This anecdote was related to me by the two principal persons who were present on the occasion.

Napoleon soon began to have other subjects of disquietude besides the fate of battles. He was aware that since the beginning of February the Duc d'Angoulême had arrived at St. Jean de Luz, whence he had addressed a proclamation to the French armies in the name of his uncle, Louis XVIII. ; and he speedily heard of the Comte d'Artois' arrival at Vesoul, on the 21st of February, which place he did not leave until the 16th of March following.

Meanwile hostilities were maintained with increased vigor over a vast line of operations. How much useless glory did not our soldiers gain in these conflicts ! In spite of prodigies of valour the enemy's masses advanced, and gradually concentrated, so that this war might be compared to the battles of the ravens and the eagle in the Alps. The eagle slays hundreds of his assailants—every blow of his beak is the death of an enemy, but still the vultures return to the charge, and press upon the eagle until they destroy him.

As the month of February drew to its close the Allies were in retreat on several points, but their retreat was not a rout. After experiencing reverses they fell back without disorder, and retired behind the Aube, where they rallied and obtained numerous reinforcements, which daily ar-

rived, and which soon enabled them to resume the offensive.

Still Napoleon continued astonishing Europe, leagued as it was against him. At Craonne, on the 7th of March, he destroyed Blucher's corps in a severe action, but the victory was attended by great loss to the conqueror.[1] Marshal Victor was seriously wounded, as well as Generals Grouchy and La Ferrière.

While Napoleon was resisting the numerous enemies assembled to destroy him it might be said that he was also his own enemy, either from false calculation or from negligence with respect to his illustrious prisoners, who, on his departure from Paris, had not yet been sent to their States. The Pope was then at Fontainebleau, and the Princes of Spain at Valençay. The Pope, however, was the first to be allowed to depart. Surely Bonaparte could never have thought of the service which the Pope might have rendered him at Rome, into which Murat's troops would never have dared to march had his Holiness been present there. With regard to the Spanish Princes Napoleon must have been greatly blinded by confidence in his fortune to have so long believed it possible to retain in France those useless trophies of defeated pretensions. It was, besides, so easy to get rid of the exiles of Valençay by sending them back to the place from whence they had been brought! It was so natural to recall with all speed the troops from the south when our armies in Germany began to be repulsed on the Rhine and even driven into France![2] With the aid of these veteran troops Napoleon

[1] Blucher, of conrse, was not destroyed, thongh he suffered from the dispersal of his forces. Jomini (tome iv. p. 556) sums up the day thns:—"The victory was ours (Napoleon's), but the losses we suffered made it fatal to us. Both sides had more thau 6,000 men *hors de combat:* this was little for the Allies, bnt was mnch for us." Iu fact, the Allies were then playing the same costly bnt snre game as was adopted by General Grant against Lee in Virginia. In the continual fighting the smaller force, however relatively smaller its loss, still was the greatest sufferer.

[2] Thongh Napoleon nndoubtedly suffered much from the loss of men left in the garrisons in Germany. etc., it must not be assumed that these were all veterans, though probably Dantzic and the Polish fortresses were largely occupied by men

and his genius might have again turned the scale of fortune. But Napoleon reckoned on the nation, and he was wrong, for the nation was tired of him. His cause had ceased to be the cause of France.

The latter days of March were filled up by a series of calamities to Napoleon. On the 23d the rear-guard of the French army suffered considerable loss. To hear of attacks on his rear-guard must indeed have been mortifying to Napoleon, whose advanced guards had been so long accustomed to open the path of victory! Prince Schwartzenberg soon passed the Aube and marched upon Vitry and Chalons. Napoleon, counting on the possibility of defending Paris, threw himself, with the velocity of the eagle, on Schwartzenberg's rear by passing by Doulevant and Bar-sur-Aube. He pushed forward his advanced guards to Chaumont, and there saw the Austrian army make a movement which he took to be a retreat; but it was no such thing. The movement was directed on Paris, while Blucher, who had re-occupied Chalons-sur-Marne, marched to meet Prince Schwartzenberg, and Napoleon, thinking to cut off their retreat, was himself cut off from the possibility of returning to Paris. Everything then depended on the defence of Paris, or, to speak more correctly, it seemed possible, by sacrificing the capital, to prolong for a few days the existence of the phantom of the Empire which was rapidly vanishing. On the 26th was fought the battle of Fère Champenoise, where, valour yielding to numbers, Marshals Marmont and Mortier were obliged to retire upon Sezanne after sustaining considerable loss.

It was on the 26th of March, and I beg the reader to

levied before the 1812 campaign; see, however, De Gonneville's description of his cuirassiers, who soon formed part of the garrison of Hamburg. The men had not any notion of the way to set about saddling their horses, and when mounted the whole regiment was unhorsed or dispersed through the fright of the horses when the men attempted to draw swords to return the compliment of a guard (*Gonneville*, vol. ii. pp. 99–101).

bear this date in mind, that Napoleon suffered a loss which, in the circumstances in which he stood, was irreparable.[1] At the battle of Fère Champenoise the Allies captured a convoy consisting of nearly all the remaining ammunition and stores of the army, a vast quantity of arms, caissons, and equipage of all kinds. The whole became the prey of the Allies, who published a bulletin announcing this important capture. A copy of this order of the day fell into the hands of Marshal Macdonald, who thought that such news ought immediately to be communicated to the Emperor. He therefore repaired himself to the headquarters of Napoleon, who was then preparing to recover Vitry-le-Français, which was occupied by the Prussians. The Marshal, with the view of dissuading the Emperor from what he considered a vain attempt, presented him with the bulletin.

This was on the morning of the 27th: Napoleon would not believe the news. "No!" said he to the Marshal, "you are deceived, this cannot be true." Then perusing the bulletin with more attention. "Here," said he, "look yourself. This is the 27th, and the bulletin is dated the 29th. You see the thing is impossible. The bulletin is forged!" The Marshal, who had paid more attention to the news than to its date, was astounded. But having afterwards shown the bulletin to Drouot, that General said, "Alas! Marshal, the news is but too true. The error of the date is merely a misprint, the 9 is a 6 inverted!" On what trifles sometimes depend the most important events. An inverted cipher sufficed to flatter Bonaparte's illusion, or at least the illusions which he wished to maintain among his most distinguished lieutenants, and to

[1] The battle of La Fère Champenoise was fought on the 25th not on the 26th March (see *Thiers*, tome xvii. p. 562), and was remarkable for two things. The artillery of the Allies fired on one another for some little time, and a column of French National Guards, 5000 odd strong, who had only joined the army ten days before, made a desperate and honourable resistance to the enormously superior forces brought against them; see Muffling, *Passages from my Life*, pp. 502, 503, and *Jomini*, tome iv. pp. 581, 582.

delay the moment when they should discover that the loss they deplored was too certain. On that very day the Empress left Paris.

[*ANNEX TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER.*]

It is even more than usually difficult to fix the number of troops brought into the field in the campaign of 1814 as both sides received reinforcements, and as a large part of the forces originally under Soult and Suchet were brought northwards. The following figures seem to agree with those given by the best authorities as the strength at the beginning of the year. The army of Bohemia, or the Grand Army of the Allies, under Schwarzenberg, was about 116,000 strong, and the Army of Silesia, composed of Russian and Prussian corps, under Blucher, about 88,000 strong, were opposed by Napoleon with some 8700 men. Napoleon was reinforced from time to time, but Schwarzenberg had a reserve of 5000 at Bâle (Hamley, *Operations of War*, p. 278). Soult, with about 40,000 men, faced Wellington with 100,000, of whom some 28,000 were employed at Bayonne. In Belgium Maison, with 12,000 men, faced the Duke of Saxe-Weimar with 2500, and in Italy Eugène, with 36,000, opposed an Austrian army of 70,000, eventually joined by Murat. The French troops which held the various fortresses in Germany were blockaded by superior numbers of the Allies. In the interior of France large levies were being made, and Augereau was sent to Lyons to command a force of young troops, increased by drafts from Suchet, to meet the Austrians under Bubna.

In this defensive campaign of 1814 the genius of Bonaparte displayed itself with wonderful brilliancy. According to the Marquis of Londonderry :—

"Napoleon, after the battles of Brienne and La Rothière, displayed, by his masterly movements with an inferior against *two* superior armies, and by braving his accumulated difficulties, that undonbted science in war which his bitterest enemies must accord to his genius. In proportion as his embarrassments increased he seemed to rise superior as an individual. Dnring his adverse fortune on the Elbe he appeared finctuating and irresolute, and his lengthened stay in untenable and disadvantageous positions was the cause of his fatal overthrow at Leipsic and of snbsequent misfortunes. Bnt now he appeared once more to have burst forth with all his talent and all his energies and mental resources."[1]

At the battle of La Rothière Napoleon exhibited great personal courage, and Lord Londonderry remarks :—

"Bonaparte was seen to encourage his troops and expose his person fearlessly during the combat, and Marshal Blncher's movement of his cavalry, which he himself led on, was spoken of in the highest terms. Napoleon, who at this period scarcely acted in any instance on common military calculation, drew up his army on the 1st of February in two lines on the great plain before La Rothière, occnpying the villages, and neglecting mnch stronger ground in his rear about Brienne, evidently showing that he meant to play a desperate game. He led on *la jeune garde* in person against Marshal Blucher's army, to wrest the village of La Rothière from the gallant corps of Sacken ; but three repeated efforts were ineffectual. All agreed that the enemy fought with great intrepidity. Bonaparte seemed to have set his political existence on a die, as he exposed himself everywhere: his horse was shot under him, and he had the mortification of witnessing the capture of a battery in charge of *la jeune garde*. Had Marshal Blucher not previonsly immortalised himself this day would have crowned him in the annals of fame, for whatever were the well-grounded apprehensions entertained by many for the result of the Prince of Würtemberg's attack on the right, the Marshal dauntlessly effected those combinations upon which the result of the day depended. The Russian artillery were spoken of in the highest terms: the ground was covered with snow, and so deep that they were obliged to leave one-half of their guns in the rear. Yet by harnessing double teams to the other half they contrived to bring those forward and get a sufficient nnmber into action.

[1] See Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814.

The Allies brought about 70,000 or 80,000 men into this battle ; the other corps of the army were not yet in line: the French were supposed to have about the same strength. The enemy's last attack on the village of La Rothière was at two o'clock on the morning of the 2d, immediately after which they commenced their retreat. Passing the Aube river, they took up a very strong rear-guard posi- in the neighbourhood of Lesmont."

CHAPTER XXXIV.

1814.

The men of the Revolution and the men of the Empire—The Council of Regency—Departure of the Empress from Paris—Marmont and Mortier—Joseph's flight—Meeting at Marmont's hôtel—Capitulation of Paris—Marmont's interview with the Emperor at Fontainebleau—Colonels Fabvier and Denys—The Royalist cavalcade—Meeting at the hôtel of the Comte de Morfontaine—M. de Chauteaubriand and his pamphlet—Deputation to the Emperor Alexander—Entrance of the Allied sovereigns into Paris—Alexander lodged in M. Talleyrand's hôtel—Meetings held there—The Emperor Alexander's declaration—My appointment as Postmaster-General—Composition of the Provisional Government—Mistake respecting the conduct of the Emperor of Austria—Caulaincourt's mission from Napoleon—His interview with the Emperor Alexander—Alexander's address to the deputation of the Senate—M. de Caulaincourt ordered to quit the capital.

The grandees of the Empire and the first subjects of Napoleon were divided into two classes totally distinct from each other. Among these patronised men were many who had been the first patrons of Bonaparte and had favoured his accession to Consular power. This class was composed of his old friends and former companions-in-arms. The others, who may be called the children of the Empire, did not carry back their thoughts to a period which they had not seen.[1] They had never known anything but Napoleon

[1] It is difficult to conceive the way in which the Bourbons had dropped out of the public knowledge at this time. When Davoust announced at Hamburg the recall of Louis XVIII. the soldiers thought it was the father of the Duc d'Enghien, or the son of Louis XVI. (*Puymaigre*, p. 167). De Fezensac writes that some officers could not understand who was meant, saying that the King was dead. It was much the same among the upper classes. The Marquise de Coigny, hearing the Bourbons mentioned, said, "I do not like Ghosts" ("*revenants*"). Metternich said in March 1814 to De Vitrolles that in the part of France the Allies had then crossed nothing showed any remembrance of former days, or even any general expression of discon-

and the Empire, beyond which the sphere of their ideas did not extend, while among Napoleon's old brothers-in-arms it was still remembered that there was once a country, a France, before they had helped to give it a master. To this class of men France was not confined to the narrow circle of the Imperial headquarters, but extended to the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the two oceans.

On the other hand, numbers of ardent and adventurous young men, full of enthusiasm for Bonaparte, had passed from the school to the camp. They were entirely opposed to Napoleon's downfall, because with his power would vanish those dreams of glory and fortune which had captivated their imaginations. These young men, who belonged to the class which I have denominated children of the Empire, were prepared to risk and commit everything to prolong the political life of their Emperor.

The distinction I have drawn between what may be called the men of France and the men of the Empire was not confined to the army, but was equally marked among the high civil functionaries of the State.[1] The old Republicans could not possibly regard Napoleon with the same eyes as those whose elevation dated only from Napoleon ; and the members of assemblies anterior to the 18th Brumaire could not entertain the same ideas as those whose notions of national franchises and public rights were derived from their seats as auditors in the Council of State. I know not whether this distinction between the men of two different periods has been before pointed out, but it serves to ex-

tent with Napoleon. As De Vitrolles himself says, the Bourbons had only been named once since Napoleon reigned, and then it was in the ditch of Vincennes; see *De Vitrolles*, tome i. pp. 23, 47, and 96.

[1] For a good description of a specimen of this class of men see Beugnot (vol ii. pp. 27–38), where he pictures one of the conventionalists, Jean Bon St. André, the Préfect of Mayence, disliking the frippery and despotism of the Empire, not afraid in the very presence of the Emperor to dwell on the temptation to throw him into the Rhine, and prophesying that Napoleon would bring France to disaster, but himself serving France faithfully, and dying from disease contracted in succouring the wounded, while others were dreaming of what they might gain from betraying their country.

plain the conduct of many persons of elevated rank during the events of 1814. With regard to myself, convinced as I was of the certainty of Napoleon's fall, I conceived that the first duty of every citizen was claimed by his country; and although I may incur censure, I candidly avow that Napoleon's treatment of me during the last four years of his power was not without some influence on my prompt submission to the Government which succeeded his. I, however, declare that this consideration was not the sole nor the most powerful motive of my conduct. Only those who were in Paris at the period of the capitulation can form an idea of the violence of party feeling which prevailed there both for and against Napoleon, but without the name of the Bourbons ever being pronounced. They were almost unknown to the new generation, forgotten by many of the old, and feared by the conventionalists; at that time they possessed only the frail support of the coteries of the Faubourg St. Germain, and some remains of the emigration. But as it is certain that the emigrants could offer only vain demonstrations and wishes in support of the old family of our Kings, they did little to assist the restoration of the Bourbons. Another thing equally certain is, that they alone, by their follies and absurd pretensions, brought about the return of Bonaparte and the second exile of Louis XVIII. in the following year.

On the 28th of March was convoked an extraordinary Council of Regency, at which Maria Louisa presided. The question discussed was, whether the Empress should remain in Paris or proceed to Blois. Joseph Bonaparte strongly urged her departure, because a letter from the Emperor had directed that in case of Paris being threatened the Empress-Regent and all the Council of Regency should retire to Blois. The Arch-Chancellor and the majority of the Council were of the same opinion, but one of the most influential members of the Council observed

to Joseph that the letter referred to had been written under circumstances very different from those then existing, and that it was important the Empress should remain in Paris, where she would, of course, obtain from the Emperor her father and the Allied sovereigns, more advantageous conditions than if she were fifty leagues from Paris. The adoption of this opinion would only have retarded for a few days a change which had become inevitable ; nevertheless it might have given rise to great difficulties. It must be admitted that for the interests of Napoleon it was the wisest counsel that could be suggested. However, it was overruled by Joseph's advice.

M. de Talleyrand, as a member of the Council of Regency, also received the order to quit Paris on the 30th of March. At this period I was at his house every day. When I went to him that day I was told he had started. However I went up, and remained some time in his hôtel with several of his friends who had met there. We soon saw him return, and for my part I heard with satisfaction that they had not allowed him to pass the barriers. It was said then, and it has been repeated since, that M. de Talleyrand was not a stranger to the gentle violence used towards him. The same day of this visit to M. de Talleyrand I also went to see the Duc de Rovigo (Savary), with the friendly object of getting him to remain, and to profit by his position to prevent disturbances. He refused without hesitating, as he only thought of the Emperor. I found him by his fireside, where there was a large fire, in which he was burning all the papers which might have compromised every one who had served his ministry (Police). I congratulated him sincerely on this loyal occupation : fire alone could purify the mass of filth and denunciations which encumbered the police archives.[1]

[1] Talleyrand was most anxious not to leave Paris, and he applied to Savary to obtain permission to remain. Savary refused, and told him that he ought to start, but unfortunately did not make sure that the Prince really did so. It is said that it was M. de Rémusat who carried out the little plot by which the willing Talleyrand

On the departure of the Empress many persons expected a popular movement in favour of a change of Government, but the capital remained tranquil. Many of the inhabitants, indeed, thought of defence, not for the sake of preserving Napoleon's government, but merely from that ardour of feeling which belongs to our national character. Strong indignation was excited by the thought of seeing foreigners masters of Paris—a circumstance of which there had been no example since the reign of Charles VII. Meanwhile the critical moment approached. On the 29th of March Marshals Marmont and Mortier fell back to defend the approaches to Paris. During the night the barriers were consigned to the care of the National Guard, and not a foreigner, not even one of their agents, was allowed to enter the capital.

At daybreak on the 30th of March the whole population of Paris was awakened by the report of cannon, and the plain of St. Denis was soon covered with Allied troops, who were debouching upon it from all points. The heroic valour of our troops was unavailing against such a numerical superiority. But the Allies paid dearly for their entrance into the French capital. The National Guard, under the command of Marshal Moncey, and the pupils of the Polytechnic School transformed into artillery men, behaved in a manner worthy of veteran troops. The conduct of Marmont on that day alone would suffice to immortalise him. The corps he commanded was re

was turned back from the barriers and left free to plan a new career for himself, much puzzled as he was to know which side to take; see *Savary*, tome vii. p. 21. A large portion of the dignitaries ordered to Blois did not go (see *Miot*, tome iii. p. 389), the feeling at Paris being the exact opposite to that entertained by Bengnot, who was then in the provinces at Lille. "I had long considered the Emperor as lost, but I had no notion that his misfortunes absolved me from my oaths (*Beugnot*, vol. ii. p. 89).

Bourrienne's pleasure at seeing Savary engaged in destroying the police records was most natural; his belief that Savary would at once leave his fallen master is characteristic, and resembles that of his friend Talleyrand, who tried to dissuade Meneval from accompanying the Empress into Austria; see *Meneval*, tome iii. p. 886. All this time Bourrienne was most busy. We shall find him a few pages farther on trying to lure over Marmont.

duced to between 7000 and 8000 infantry and 800 cavalry, with whom, for the space of twelve hours he maintained his ground against an army of 55,000 men, of whom it is said 14,000 were killed, wounded, and taken. Marshal Marmont put himself so forward in the heat of the battle that a dozen of men were killed by the bayonet at his side, and his hat was perforated by a ball. But what was to be done against overwhelming numbers!

In this state of things the Duke of Ragusa made known his situation to Joseph Bonaparte, who authorised him to negotiate.

Joseph's answer is so important in reference to the events which succeeded that I will transcribe it here.

If the Dukes of Ragusa and Treviso can no longer hold out, they are authorised to negotiate with Prince Schwartzenberg and the Emperor of Russia, who are before them.

They will fall back on the Loire. (Signed) JOSEPH.

MONTMARTRE, 30*th March* 1814,
¼ *past* 12 *oclock.*

It was not until a considerable time after the receipt of this formal authority that Marmont and Mortier ceased to make a vigorous resistance against the Allied army, for the suspension of arms was not agreed upon until four in the afternoon. It was not waited for by Joseph; at a quarter past twelve—that is to say, immediately after he had addressed to Marmont the authority just alluded to—Joseph repaired to the Bois de Boulogne to regain the Versailles road, and from thence to proceed to Rambouillet. The precipitate flight of Joseph astonished only those who did not know him. I know for a fact that several officers attached to his staff were much dissatisfied at his alacrity on this occasion.

In these circumstances what was to be done but to save Paris, which there was no possibility of defending two hours longer.[1] Methinks I still see Marmont when,

[1] Here Bourrienne follows the account given in the Memoirs of Marmont taken from

on the evening of the 30th of March, he returned from the field of battle to his hotel in the Rue de Paradis, where I was waiting for him, together with about twenty other persons, among whom were MM. Perregaux and Lafitte. When he entered he was scarcely recognisable : he had a beard of eight days' growth ; the greatcoat which covered his uniform was in tatters, and he was blackened with powder from head to foot. We considered what was best to be done, and all insisted on the necessity of signing a capitulation. The Marshal must recollect that the exclamation of every one about him was, "France must be saved." MM. Perregaux and Lafitte delivered their opinions in a very decided way, and it will readily be conceived how great was the influence of two men who were at the head of the financial world. They alleged that the general wish of the Parisians, which nobody had a better opportunity of knowing than themselves, was decidedly averse to a protracted conflict, and that France was tired of the yoke of Bonaparte. This last declaration gave a wider range to the business under consideration. The question was no longer confined to the capitulation of Paris, but a change in the government was thought of, and the name of the Bourbons was pronounced for the first time. I do not recollect which of us it was who, on hearing mention made of the possible recall of the old dynasty, remarked how difficult it would be to bring about a restoration without retrograding to the past. But I think I am perfectly correct in stating that M. Lafitte said, "Gentlemen, we shall have nothing to fear if we have a good constitution which will guarantee the rights of all." The majority of the meeting concurred in this wise opinion, which was not without its influence on Marshal Marmont.

the *National* of 8th August 1844. See *Ragusa*, tome vi. pp. 351–356, and Marmont's own account (tome vi. pp. 240–251). Marmont, who had one arm still in a sling from the wound received at Salamanca, and two fingers of the other hand injured, describes himself as having to charge at the head of a few men sword in hand.

During this painful meeting an unexpected incident occurred. One of the Emperor's *aides de camp* arrived at Marmont's. Napoleon, being informed of the advance of the Allies on Paris, had marched with the utmost speed from the banks of the Marne on the road of Fontainebleau. In the evening he was in person at Froidmanteau, whence he despatched his envoy to Marshal Marmont. From the language of the *aide de camp* it was easy to perceive that the state of opinion at the Imperial headquarters was very different from that which prevailed among the population of Paris. The officer expressed indignation at the very idea of capitulating, and he announced with inconceivable confidence the approaching arrival of Napoleon in Paris, which he yet hoped to save from the occupation of the enemy. The officer imformed us that Napoleon trusted to the people rising in spite of the capitulation, and that they would unpave the streets to stone the Allies on their entrance. I ventured to dissent from this absurd idea of defence, and I observed that it was madness to suppose that Paris could resist the numerous troops who were ready to enter on the following day; that the suspension of arms had been consented to by the Allies only to afford time for drawing up a more regular capitulation, and that the armistice could not be broken without trampling on all the laws of honour. I added that the thoughts of the people were directed towards a better future; that the French were tired of a despotic Government and of the distress to which continual war had reduced trade and industry; "for," said I, "when a nation is sunk to such a state of misery its hopes can only be directed towards the future; it is natural they should be so directed, even without reflection." Most of the individuals present concurred in my opinion, and the decision of the meeting was unanimous. Marshal Marmont has since said to me, "I have been blamed, my dear Bourrienne: but you were with me on the 30th of March

You were a witness to the wishes expressed by a portion of the principal inhabitants of Paris. I acted as I was urged to do only because I considered the meeting to be composed of men entirely disinterested, and who had nothing to expect from the return of the Bourbons."

Such is a correct statement of the facts which some persons have perverted with the view of enhancing Napoleon's glory. With respect to those versions which differ from mine I have only one comment to offer, which is, that I saw and heard what I describe.

The day after the capitulation of Paris Marmont went in the evening to see the Emperor at Fontainebleau. He supped with him. Napoleon praised his defence of Paris. After supper the Marshal rejoined his corps at Essonne, and six hours after the Emperor arrived there to visit the lines. On leaving Paris Marmont had left Colonels Fabvier and Denys to direct the execution of the capitulation. These officers joined the Emperor and the Marshal as they were proceeding up the banks of the river at Essonne. They did not disguise the effect which the entrance of the Allies had produced in Paris. At this intelligence the Emperor was deeply mortified, and he returned immediately to Fontainebleau, leaving the Marshal at Essonne.

At daybreak on the 31st of March Paris presented a novel and curious spectacle. No sooner had the French troops evacuated the capital than the principal streets resounded with cries of "Down with Bonaparte!"—"No conscription!"—"No consolidated duties (*droits réunis*)!" With these cries were mingled that of "The Bourbons for ever!"[1] but this latter cry was not repeated so fre-

[1] One of these scenes was formed by a practical joke played successfully by Talleyrand on the Abbé de Pradt, then Archbishop of Malines. He got the clever but tricky and flighty Archbishop to go in full dress into the streets, waving a white handkerchief and shouting "Vive le Roi," assuring him he would create a sensation. As was to be expected, Pradt, at first received favourably by some Royalists, was soon set on by Bonapartists, hustled, and sent back in a very dishevelled state. "M. de Talleyrand coolly heard him out, and answered, 'It is just as I told you; so

quently as the others: in general I remarked that the people gaped and listened with a sort of indifference. As I had taken a very active part in all that had happened during some preceding days I was particularly curious to study what might be called the physiognomy of Paris.[1] This was the second opportunity which had offered itself for such a study, and I now saw the people applaud the fall of the man whom they had received with enthusiasm after the 18th Brumaire. The reason was, that liberty was then hoped for, as it was hoped for in 1814. I went out early in the morning to see the numerous groups of people who had assembled in the streets. I saw women tearing their handkerchiefs and distributing the fragments as the emblems of the revived lily. That same morning I met on the Boulevards, and some hours afterwards on the Place Louis XV., a party of gentlemen who paraded the streets of the capital proclaiming the restoration of the Bourbons and shouting, "Vive le Roi!" and "Vive Louis XVIII.!" At their head I recognised MM. Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld, Comte de Froissard, the Duc de Luxembourg, the Duc de Crussol, Seymour, etc. The cavalcade distributed white cockades in passing along, and was speedily joined by a numerous crowd, who repaired to the Place Vendôme. The scene that was acted there is well known, and the enthusiasm of popular joy could scarcely excuse the fury that was directed against the effigy of the man whose misfortunes, whether merited or not, should have protected him from such outrages.[2] These excesses

dressed you could not fail to make a wonderful effect'" (*Beugnot*, vol. ii. pp. 112, 113). Such were said to be some of the acts of the head of the Provisional Government during the agony of France.

[1] The part Bourrienne says he took was of course against his former friend. "During the last days which preceded the entry of the Allies into Paris," says Meneval (tome iii. p. 366), "urged by the anxiety which tormented us, I often went to the office of M. de Lavalette, head of the Posts, to get news of the approach of the enemy. . . . I did not fail to find there M. de Bourrienne, who came with a less innocent object than mine, but who disguised it by exaggerated demonstrations of zeal."

[2] Among other things the people dragged down from the triumphal column in the Place Vendôme, the statue of Napoleon.—*Editor of* 1836 *edition.*

served, perhaps more than is generally supposed, to favour the plans of the leaders of the Royalist party, to whom M. Nesselrode had declared that before he would pledge himself to further their views he must have proofs that they were seconded by the population of Paris.

I was afterwards informed by an eye-witness of what took place on the evening of the 31st of March in one of the principal meetings of the Royalists, which was held in the hôtel of the Comte de Morfontaine, who acted as president on the occasion. Amidst a chaos of abortive propositions and contradictory motions M. Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld proposed that a deputation should be immediately sent to the Emperor Alexander to express to him the wish of the meeting. This motion was immediately approved, and the mover was chosen to head the deputation. On leaving the hôtel the deputation met M. de Chateaubriand, who had that very day been, as it were, the precursor of the restoration, by publsihing his admirable manifesto, entitled "Bonaparte and the Bourbons." He was invited to join the deputation; but nothing could overcome his diffidence and induce him to speak. On arriving at the hôtel in the Rue St. Florentin the deputation was introduced to Count Nesselrode, to whom M. Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld briefly explained its object; he spoke of the wishes of the meeting and of the manifest desire of Paris and of France. He represented the restoration of the Bourbons as the only means of securing the peace of Europe; and observed, in conclusion, that as the exertions of the day must have been very fatiguing to the Emperor, the deputation would not solicit the favour of being introduced to him, but would confidently rely on the good faith of his Imperial Majesty. "I have just left the Emperor," replied M. Nesselrode, "and can pledge myself for his intentions. Return to the meeting and announce to the French people that in compliance with their wishes his Imperial Majesty will use all his influence

to restore the crown to the legitimate monarch: his Majesty Louis XVIII. shall reascend the throne of France." With this gratifying intelligence the deputation returned to the meeting in the Rue d'Anjou.

There is no question that great enthusiasm was displayed on the entrance of the Allies into Paris. It may be praised or blamed, but the fact cannot be denied. I closely watched all that was passing, and I observed the expression of a sentiment which I had long anticipated when, after his alliance with the daughter of the Cæsars, the ambition of Bonaparte increased in proportion as it was gratified: I clearly foresaw Napoleon's fall. Whoever watched the course of events during the last four years of the Empire must have observed, as I did, that from the date of Napoleon's marriage with Maria Louisa the forms of the French Government became daily more and more tyrannical and oppressive. The intolerable height which this evil had attained is evident from the circumstance that at the end of 1813 the Legislative Body, throwing aside the mute character which it had hitherto maintained, presumed to give a lecture to him who had never before received a lecture from any one. On the 31st of March it was recollected what had been the conduct of Bonaparte on the occasion alluded to, and those of the deputies who remained in Paris related how the gendarmes had opposed their entrance into the hall of the Assembly. All this contributed wonderfully to irritate the public mind against Napoleon. He had become master of France by the sword, and the sword being sheathed, his power was at an end, for no popular institution identified with the nation the new dynasty which he hoped to found. The nation admired but did not love Napoleon, for it is impossible to love what is feared, and he had done nothing to claim the affections of France.

I was present at all the meetings and conferences which were held at M. de Talleyrand's hôtel, where the Emperor

Alexander had taken up his residence.[1] Of all the persons present at these meetings M. de Talleyrand was most disposed to retain Napoleon at the head of the Government, with restrictions on the exercise of his power. In the existing state of things it was only possible to choose one of three courses: first, to make peace with Napoleon, with the adoption of proper securities against him; second, to establish a Regency; and third, to recall the Bourbons.

On the 13th of March I witnessed the entrance of the Allied sovereigns into Paris, and after the procession had passed the new street of the Luxembourg I repaired straight to M. de Talleyrand's hôtel, which I reached before the Emperor Alexander, who arrived at a quarter-past

[1] For the extraordinary scene at the hôtel of Talleyrand all this time see *Beugnot*, vol. ii. pp. 96, 97. "It was a remarkable scene when M. de Talleyrand endeavonred to pass, with his awkward walk, from his bedroom to his library, to give an audience promised to some one who had been waiting for hours. He had to cross the *salon;* he was stopped by one, seized on by another, blockaded by a third, until, wearied ont, he returned to the place whence he had started, leaving the nnfortnnate man, whom he despaired of reaching, to remain in unavailing attendance." "It is difficult," says Vitrolles (tome i. p. 325), "to have an idea of what the Provisional Government was. It was held entirely in the bedchamber of M. de Talleyrand in the *entresol* of his hôtel. Some clerks collected under the direction of Dupont de Nemours, last and best of economists, formed the staff, and Roux-Laborie was the Secretary-General attached. M. de Talleyrand's room was open to every one he knew, men and women, and the conversation of every one who came or went took the place of real deliberations on State affairs. Some more or less clever passages to be published in the newspapers became the great work of the day, and this was called forming public opinion. Then, if an idea, among all those which passed in the heads of the comers and goers, struck the Prince de Talleyrand, he made a decree of it, and the members of the Government signed it on trust when they came in their turn to pay a visit to their president." The course of affairs gave Talleyrand's conduct a much greater air of decision than that waiter on events had any right to. For his great indecision and timidity see *De Vitrolles*, tome i., especially where Dalberg, who knew him well, says of him, "You do not know the ape; he would not risk burning the end of his paw, not even if all the chestnnts were for him alone" (p. 68). See also p. 347, where Talleyrand, when on the point of handing to De Vitrolles his letter for the Comte d'Artois, hears the Marshals Ney and Macdonald, and the Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt), annonnced to the Czar. "The Prince de Talleyrand immediately put back into his deepest pocket the letter intended for the Comte d'Artois, and taking me by the arm led me into the embrasure of a window. 'This is an incident,' said he to me, laying stress on the word to show that it was important; 'we must see what it will lead to; you cannot start at this moment. The Emperor Alexander does unexpected things; one cannot be the son of Paul I. with impunity."

one. When his Imperial Majesty entered M. de Talleyrand's drawing-room most of the persons assembled, and particularly the Abbé de Pradt, the Abbé de Montesquiou, and General Dessolles, urgently demanded the restoration of the Bourbons. The Emperor did not come to any immediate decision. Drawing me into the embrasure of a window, which looked upon the street, he made some observations which enabled me to guess what would be his determination. "M. de Bourrienne," said he, "you have been the friend of Napoleon, and so have I. I was his sincere friend ; but there is no possibility of remaining at peace with a man of such bad faith." These last words opened my eyes ; and when the different propositions which were made came under discussion I saw plainly that Bonaparte, in making himself Emperor, had made up the bed for the Bourbons.

A discussion ensued on the three possible measures which I have above mentioned, and which were proposed by the Emperor Alexander himself. I thought, if I may so express myself, that his Majesty was playing a part, when, pretending to doubt the possibility of recalling the Bourbons, which he wished above all things, he asked M. de Talleyrand what means he proposed to employ for the attainment of that object? Besides the French, there were present at this meeting the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzenberg, M. Nesselrode, M. Pozzo-di-Borgo, and Prince Liechtenstein. During the discussion Alexander walked about with some appearance of agitation. "Gentlemen," said he, addressing us in an elevated tone of voice, "you know that it was not I who commenced the war; you know that Napoleon came to attack me in my dominions. But we are not drawn here by the thirst of conquest or the desire of revenge. You have seen the precautions I have taken to preserve your capital, the wonder of the arts, from the horrors of pillage, to which the chances of war would have

consigned it.[1] Neither my Allies nor myself are engaged in a war of reprisals ; and I should be inconsolable if any violence were committed on your magnificent city. We are not waging war against France, but against Napoleon, and the enemies of French liberty. William, and you, Prince" (here the Emperor turned towards the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzenberg, who represented the Emperor of Austria), "you can both bear testimony that the sentiments I express are yours." Both bowed assent to this observation of Alexander, which his Majesty several times repeated in different words. He insisted that France should be perfectly free ; and declared that as soon as the wishes of the country were understood, he and his Allies would support them, without seeking to favour any particular government.

The Abbé de Pradt then declared, in a tone of conviction, that we were all Royalists, and that the sentiments of France concurred with ours. The Emperor Alexander, adverting to the different governments which might be suitable to France, spoke of the maintenance of Bonaparte on the throne, the establishment of a Regency, the choice of Bernadotte, and the recall of the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand next spoke, and I well remember his saying to the Emperor of Russia, "Sire, only one of two things is possible. We must either have Bonaparte or Louis XVIII. Bonaparte, if you can support him ; but you cannot, for you are not alone. . . . We will not have another soldier in his stead. If we want a soldier, we will keep the one we have ; he is the first in the world. After him any other who may be proposed would not have ten men to support him. I say again, Sire, either Bonaparte or Louis XVIII. Anything else is an intrigue."[2] These remarkable words

[1] One day the Emperor Alexander said, "History will record that Napoleon visited my capital, and that I have visited his."

[2] "The Bourbons are a principle, all the rest is only an intrigue," is the phrase generally attributed to Talleyrand. The skilful use he made of his new principle of legitimacy should be read at length in his correspondence with Louis XVIII. dur-

of the Prince de Benevento produced on the mind of Alexander all the effect we could hope for. Thus the question was simplified, being reduced now to only two alternatives; and as it was evident that Alexander would have nothing to do with either Napoleon or his family, it was reduced to the single proposition of the restoration of the Bourbons.

On being pressed by us all, with the exception of M. de Talleyrand, who still wished to leave the question undecided between Bonaparte and Louis XVIII., Alexander at length declared that he would no longer treat with Napoleon. When it was represented to him that that declaration referred only to Napoleon personally, and did not extend to his family, he added, "Nor with any member of his family." Thus as early as the 31st of March the restoration of the Bourbons might be considered as decided.

I cannot omit mentioning the hurry with which Laborie, whom M. de Talleyrand appointed Secretary to the Provisional Government, rushed out of the apartment as soon as he got possession of the Emperor Alexander's declaration. He got it printed with such expedition that in the space of an hour it was posted on all the walls in Paris; and it certainly produced an extraordinary effect. As yet nothing warranted a doubt that Alexander would not abide by his word. The treaty of Paris could not be anticipated; and there was reason to believe that France, with a new Government, would obtain more advantageous conditions

ing the Congress of Vienna (London, Bently, 1881, 2 vols.). In his mouth it became a weapon for obtaining the restoration to the Bourbons of their former crowns, etc. But the application of the principle was sometimes troublesome. It was not easy to demand at one and the same time that Naples should be restored to the Bourbons because it was held by them before the Revolution, and that Avignon should be retained by the Bourbons in virtue of its having been torn by the Revolution from the Pope.

Avignon had belonged to the Pope from 1348, when Pope Clement VI. bought it from the Comtesse de Provence. The French Republic annexed it in 1791, and the Pope ceded it in 1797. When all the other States were reclaiming their dominions there was no reason to urge against the Pope asking for his. A note, Talleyrand's *Correspondence*, vol. ii. p. 33 (Bentley, 1881), says that the Pope *did* claim it.

than if the Allies had treated with Napoleon. But this illusion speedily vanished.

On the evening of the 31st of March I returned to M. de Talleyrand's. I again saw the Emperor Alexander, who, stepping up to me, said, "M. de Bourrienne, you must take the superintendence of the Post-office department." I could not decline this precise invitation on the part of the Czar; and besides, Lavalette having departed on the preceding day, the business would have been for a time suspended; a circumstance which would have been extremely prejudicial to the restoration which we wished to favour.

I went at once to the hôtel in the Rue J. J. Rousseau, where, indeed, I found that not only was there no order to send out the post next day, but that it had been even countermanded. I went that night to the administrators, who yielded to my requests and, seconded by them, next morning I got all the clerks to be at their post. I reorganised the service, and the post went out on the 1st of April as usual. Such are my remembrances of the 31st of March.[1]

A Provisional Government was established, of which M. de Talleyrand was appointed President. The other members were General Beurnonville, Comte François de Jaucourt, the Duc Dalberg, who had married one of Maria Louisa's ladies of honour, and the Abbé de Montesquiou. The place of Chancellor of the Legion of Honour was given to the Abbé de Pradt. Thus there were two abbés among the members of the Provisional Government, and by a singular chance they happened to be the same who had officiated at the mass which was performed in the Champ de Mars on the day of the first federation.

[1] This conduct of Bourrienne's is the exact parallel of that of Lavalette in 1815, for which the Bourbons tried to shoot him. It should be noted that it was not for any love of order that Bourrienne obeyed the command of a foreign sovereign, but, as he owns, in favour of the Restoration he was working for, and whose want of gratitude he did not foresee.

Those who were dissatisfied with the events of the 31st of March now saw no hope but in the possibility that the Emperor of Austria would separate from his Allies, or at least not make common cause with them in favour of the re-establishment of the Bourbons. But that monarch had been brought up in the old policy of his family, and was imbued with the traditional principles of his Cabinet. I know for a fact that the sentiments and intentions of the Emperor of Austria perfectly coincided with those of his Allies. Anxious to ascertain the truth on this subject, I ventured, when in conversation with the Emperor Alexander, to hint at the reports I had heard relative to the cause of the Emperor of Austria's absence. I do not recollect the precise words of his Majesty's answer, but it enabled me to infer with certainty that Francis II. was in no way averse to the overthrow of his son-in-law, and that his absence from the scene of the discussions was only occasioned by a feeling of delicacy natural enough in his situation.[1]

Caulaincourt, who was sent by Napoleon to the headquarters of the Emperor Alexander, arrived there on the night of the 30th of March. He, however, did not obtain

[1] "Let France declare itself," said Metternich to De Vitrolles about the 12th of March 1814 at Troyes, "and we are ready to support it; no consideration shall stop us. Do you believe that we consider ourselves as tied by the interests of our Archduchess or by those of her son? Nothing of the sort: the safety of States is not sacrificed to family sentiments, and even the perspective of a Regency which should give power to the Empress and her son will not turn us from following the conditions necessary for the existence of the States of Europe" (*Vitrolles*, p. 100). This agrees with Metternich's answer to Napoleon on the 26th of June 1813. "The Emperor Francis will then dethrone his daughter?" asked Napoleon. "The Emperor," I replied, "knows nothing but his duty, and he will fulfil it. Whatever the fate of his daughter may be, the Emperor Francis is in the first place a monarch, and the interests of his people will always take the first place in his calculations" (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 191). But in January 1813 the temporary Foreign Secretary wrote from Paris to Caulaincourt at Luneville that "the letter of the Emperor Francis to his august daughter is pretty nearly in the same sense as that of M. de Metternich: the Emperor again protests that whatever may be the event, he will never separate the cause of his daughter and that of his grandson from that of France" (*Vitrolles*, tome i. p. 48). But this is exactly what he did do, and even to an extraordinary extent, in sending Napoleon to Elba and retaining the Empress and the King of Rome.

an interview with the Czar until after his Majesty had received the Municipal Council of Paris, at the head of which was M. de Chabrol. At first Alexander appeared somewhat surprised to see the Municipal Council, which he did not receive exactly in the way that was expected; but this coldness was merely momentary, and he afterwards addressed the Council in a very gracious way, though he dropped no hint of his ulterior intentions.

Alexander, who entertained a personal regard for Caulaincourt, received him kindly in his own character, but not as the envoy of Napoleon. "You have come too late," said the Czar. "It is all over. I can say nothing to you at present. Go to Paris, and I will see you there." These words perfectly enlightened Caulaincourt as to the result of his mission. His next interview with the Emperor Alexander at M. de Talleyrand's did not take place until after the declaration noticed in my last chapter. The conversation they had together remained a secret, for neither Alexander nor the Duke of Vicenza mentioned it; but there was reason to infer, from some words which fell from the Emperor Alexander, that he had received Caulaincourt rather as a private individual than as the ambassador of Napoleon, whose power, indeed, he could not recognise after his declaration. The Provisional Government was not entirely pleased with Caulaincourt's presence in Paris, and a representation was made to the Russian Emperor on the subject. Alexander concurred in the opinion of the Provisional Government, which was expressed through the medium of the Abbé de Pradt. M. de Caulaincourt, therefore, at the wish of the Czar, returned to the Emperor, then at Fontainebleau.

CHAPTER XXXV.

1814.

Situation of Bonaparte during the events of the 30th and 31st of March—His arrival at Fontainebleau—Plan of attacking Paris—Arrival of troops at Fontainebleau—The Emperor's address to the Guard—Forfeiture pronounced by the Senate—Letters to Marmont—Correspondence between Marmont and Schwartzenberg—Macdonald informed of the occupation of Paris—Conversation between the Emperor and Macdonald at Fontainebleau—Beurnonville's letter—Abdication on condition of a Regency—Napoleon's wish to retract his act of abdication—Macdonald, Ney, and Caulaincourt sent to Paris—Marmont released from his promise by Prince Schwartzenberg.

On the morning of the 30th of March, while the battle before the walls of Paris was at its height, Bonaparte was still at Troyes. He quitted that town at ten o'clock, accompanied only by Bertrand, Caulaincourt, two *aides de camp*, and two orderly officers. He was not more than two hours in travelling the first ten leagues, and he and his slender escort performed the journey without changing horses, and without even alighting. They arrived at Sens at one o'clock in the afternoon. Everything was in such confusion that it was impossible to prepare a suitable mode of conveyance for the Emperor. He was therefore obliged to content himself with a wretched cariole, and in this equipage, about four in the morning, he reached Froidmanteau, about four leagues from Paris. It was there that the Emperor received from General Belliard, who arrived at the head of a column of artillery, the first intelligence of the battle of Paris. He heard the news with an air of composure, which was probably affected to avoid discouraging those about him. He walked for about

a quarter of an hour on the high road, and it was after that promenade that he sent Caulaincourt to Paris. Napoleon afterwards went to the house of the postmaster, where he ordered his maps to be brought to him, and, according to custom, marked the different positions of the enemy's troops with pins, the heads of which were touched with wax of different colours. After this description of work, which Napoleon did every day, or sometimes several times a day, he repaired to Fontainebleau, where he arrived at six in the morning. He did not order the great apartments of the castle to be opened, but went up to his favourite little apartment, where he shut himself up, and remained alone during the whole of the 31st of March.[1]

In the evening the Emperor sent for the Duke of Ragusa, who had just arrived at Essonne with his troops. The Duke reached Fontainebleau between three and four o'clock on the morning of the 1st of April. Napoleon then received a detailed account of the events of the 30th from Marmont, on whose gallant conduct before Paris he bestowed much praise.

All was gloom and melancholy at Fontainebleau, yet the Emperor still retained his authority, and I have been informed that he deliberated for some time as to whether he should retire behind the Loire, or immediately hazard a bold stroke upon Paris, which would have been much more to his taste than to resign himself to the chances which an uncertain temporising might bring about. This latter thought pleased him; and he was seriously considering his plan of attack when the news of the 31st, and the unsuccessful issue of Caulaincourt's mission, gave him to understand that his situation was more desperate than he had hitherto imagined.

[1] This little apartment is situated on the first storey, parallel with what is called the Gallery of Francis I., where Monaldeschi was murdered by order of Queen Christina of Sweden.—*Bourrienne.*

Meanwhile the heads of his columns, which the Emperor had left at Troyes, arrived on the 1st of April at Fontainebleau, the troops having marched fifty leagues in less than three days, one of the most rapid marches ever performed. On the 2d of April Napoleon communicated the events of Paris to the Generals who were about him, recommending them to conceal the news lest it should dispirit the troops, upon whom he yet relied. That day, during an inspection of the troops, which took place in the court of the Palace, Bonaparte assembled the officers of his Guard, and harangued them as follows:—

Soldiers! the enemy has stolen three marches upon us, and has made himself master of Paris. We must drive him thence. Frenchmen, unworthy of the name, emigrants whom we have pardoned, have mounted the white cockade, and joined the enemy. The wretches shall receive the reward due to this new crime. Let us swear to conquer or die, and to enforce respect to the tri-coloured cockade, which has for twenty years accompanied us on the path of glory and honour.

He also endeavoured to induce the Generals to second his mad designs upon Paris,[1] by making them believe that he had made sincere efforts to conclude peace. He assured them that he had expressed to the Emperor Alexander his willingness to purchase it by sacrifices; that he had consented to resign even the conquests made during the Revolution, and to confine himself within the old limits of France. "Alexander," added Napoleon, "refused; and, not content with that refusal, he has leagued himself

[1] The plan of Napoleon to make a sudden and fresh attack on the Allies does not seem a mad one if the army had been ready to undertake it with ardour. Jomini (see tome iv. pp. 591, 592) seems to consider that at least better terms might have been got. Hamley (*Operations of War*, p. 290, edition of 1872, in which the campaign of 1814 should be studied) treats the attempt as impossible with officers weary of war and a country impatient of his rule. Thiers (tome xvii. p. 692) says that posterity will judge that success was at least likely. Marmont (tome vi. p. 253) says that Napoleon forgot that the Marne, with its bridges all destroyed, lay between him and the enemy, and he thenceforward seems to have considered that Napoleon was mad, and that his own duty was to betray him and France, and then (p. 260) to tenderly offer to look after his (the Emperor's) bodily comfort for the rest of his life.

with a party of emigrants, whom, perhaps, I was wrong in pardoning for having borne arms against France. Through their perfidious insinuations Alexander has permitted the white cockade to be mounted on the capital. We will maintain ours, and in a few days we will march upon Paris. I rely on you."[1]

When the boundless attachment of the Guards to the Emperor is considered it cannot appear surprising that these last words, uttered in an impressive tone, should have produced a feeling of enthusiasm, almost electrical, in all to whom they were addressed. The old companions of the glory of their chief exclaimed with one voice, "Paris! Paris!" But, fortunately, during the night, the Generals having deliberated with each other saw the frightful abyss into which they were about to precipitate France. They therefore resolved to intimate in discreet terms to the Emperor that they would not expose Paris to destruction, so that on the 3d of April, prudent ideas succeeded the inconsiderate enthusiasm of the preceding day.[2]

[1] An interesting acconnt of the events attendant npon the entrance of the Allies into Paris, and of the situation of Napoleon at Fontainebleau, from the pen of an eye-witness, will be fonnd in the third volume of the *Memoirs of Madame Junot* (Duchesse d'Abrantès), English edition of 1883.

[2] Efforts were making in the capital to effect a rising *en masse* of the populace in favour of Bonaparte. Had these efforts succeeded Paris would have been bombarded, and possibly left as miserable a heap of ruins as Moscow had been two years before. But the burghers, artisans, and even the mere mob were not disposed for such extremities.

Paris was now qnite tranquil; and notwithstanding several of Bonaparte's emissaries were in the city endeavouring to work on the people, with money and promises, to rise on the Allies, no instance of disorder occurred.

So nnch did M. de Caulaincourt at length despair of the possibility of Bonaparte's return that he sounded M. de Talleyrand and the Duc Dalberg as to the intention of the Allies with regard to his Emperor's future lot, as he considered him a lost man. The Senate met to deliberate and to pronounce their decision; bnt since the declaration of the Emperor Alexander, in the name of the Allies, they had but one course to adopt, which was to declare Bonaparte *hors de la loi*.

The National Guards, who had been commanded by Marshal Mouncey, were without a leader, he having fled. Count Montmorency remained, and what part he would take was yet uncertain. The brother-in-law to the late General Moreau was mentioned as likely to be placed at the head of the National Guards; but hitherto every arrangement was necessarily incomplete.

A report now arrived by a letter from Toulouse, of a great battle having been

The wreck of the army assembled at Fontainebleau, which was the remnant of 1,000,000 of troops levied during fifteen months, consisted only of the corps of the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot), Ney, Macdonald, and General Gerard, which altogether did not amount to 25,000 men, and which, joined to the remaining 7000 of the Guard, did not leave the Emperor a disposable force of more than 32,000 men. Nothing but madness or despair could have suggested the thought of subduing, with such scanty resources, the foreign masses which occupied and surrounded Paris.

On the 2d of April the Senate published a *Sénatus-consulte*, declaring that Napoleon had forfeited the throne, and abolishing the right of succession, which had been established in favour of his family. Furnished with this act, and without awaiting the concurrence of the Legislative Body, which was given next day, the Provisional Government published an address to the French armies. In this address the troops were informed that they were no longer the soldiers of Napoleon, and that the Senate released them from their oaths. These documents were widely circulated at the time, and inserted in all the public journals.

fought on the 23d ult. between Lord Wellington and Marshal Soult, in which the latter had been completely defeated, and driven into Toulouse, with only one piece of artillery left.

The decision of the Senate, who met on the 1st of April, declared that as Napoleon Bonaparte had deserted the government of France, they felt themselves called upon to choose another chief, and that they were unanimous in calling to the throne their legitimate sovereign, Louis XVIII.

The management of every new measure undoubtedly lay with the Emperor of Russia, and the confidential Cabinet which he had formed. . . . In an incidental conversation I had with M. de Talleyrand at this period he told me that steps were taking to communicate with all the French troops and fortresses. He believed strongly in a movement among the troops favourable to the new order of things. Marmont and Lefebvre were the Marshals who it was thought would declare first. On the other hand, it was said Bonaparte had an immense number of emissaries in Paris. M. Girardin, Marshal Berthier's *aide de camp*, was in the city with large sums of money at his disposal: some hundreds of the Old Guard had been introduced into Paris to head an insurrection, and Bonaparte was determined, at any risk, *de se faire jour dans Paris*.

These various histories amused the alarmists of the day, but an excessive tranquillity and even indifference reigned around (*Lord Londonderry's Narrative*).

The address of the Senate was sent round to the Marshals, and was of course first delivered to those who were nearest the capital; of this latter number was Marmont, whose allegiance to the Emperor, as we have already seen, yielded only to the sacred interests of his country. Montessuis was directed by the Provisional Government to convey the address to Marmont, and to use such arguments as were calculated to strengthen those sentiments which had triumphed over his dearest personal affections. I gave Montessuis a letter to Marmont, in which I said:—

"My dear Friend—An old acquaintance of mine will convey to you the remembrances of our friendship. He will, I trust, influence your resolution: a single word will suffice to induce you to sacrifice all for the happiness of your country. To secure that object you, who are so good a Frenchman and so loyal a knight, will not fear either dangers or obstacles. Your friends expect you, long for you, and I trust will soon embrace you."

Montessuis also took one from General Dessolles, whom the Provisional Government had appointed Governor of the National Guard in the room of Marshal Moncey, who had left Paris on the occupation of the Allies. General Dessolles and I did not communicate to each other our correspondence, but when I afterwards saw the letter of Dessolles I could not help remarking the coincidence of our appeal to Marmont's patriotism. Prince Schwartzenberg also wrote to Marmont to induce him to espouse a cause which had now become the cause of France. To the Prince's letter Marmont replied, that he was disposed to concur in the union of the army and the people, which would avert all chance of civil war, and stop the effusion of French blood; and that he was ready with his troops to quit the army of the Emperor Napoleon on the condition that his troops might retire with the honours of war, and that the safety and liberty of the Emperor were guaranteed by the Allies.

After Prince Schwartzenberg acceded to these conditions Marmont was placed in circumstances which obliged him to request that he might be released from his promise.

I happened to learn the manner in which Marshal Macdonald was informed of the taking of Paris. He had been two days without any intelligence from the Emperor, when he received an order in the handwriting of Berthier, couched in the following terms: "The Emperor desires that you halt wherever you may receive this order." After Berthier's signature the following words were added as a postscript: "You, of course, know that the enemy is in possession of Paris." When the Emperor thus announced, with apparent negligence, an event which totally changed the face of affairs, I am convinced his object was to make the Marshal believe that he looked upon that event as less important than it really was. However, this object was not attained, for I recollect having heard Macdonald say that Berthier's singular postscript, and the tone of indifference in which it was expressed, filled him with mingled surprise and alarm. Marshal Macdonald then commanded the rear-guard of the army which occupied the environs of Montereau. Six hours after the receipt of the order here referred to Macdonald received a second order directing him to put his troops in motion, and he learned the Emperor's intention of marching on Paris with all his remaining force.

On receiving the Emperor's second order Macdonald left his corps at Montereau and repaired in haste to Fontainebleau. When he arrived there the Emperor had already intimated to the Generals commanding divisions in the corps assembled at Fontainebleau his design of marching on Paris. Alarmed at this determination the Generals, most of whom had left in the capital their wives, children, and friends, requested that Macdonald would go with them to wait upon Napoleon and endeavour to dissuade him from his intention. "Gentlemen," said the Marshal,

"in the Emperor's present situation such a proceeding may displease him. It must be managed cautiously. Leave it to me, gentlemen, I will go to the château."

Marshal Macdonald accordingly went to the Palace of Fontainebleau, where the following conversation ensued between him and the Emperor, and I beg the reader to bear in mind that it was related to me by the Marshal himself. As soon as he entered the apartment in which Napoleon was the latter stepped up to him and said, "Well, how are things going on?"—"Very badly, Sire."—"How? . . . badly! . . . What then are the feelings of your army?"—"My army, Sire, is entirely discouraged . . . appalled by the fate of Paris."—"Will not your troops join me in an advance on Paris?"—"Sire, do not think of such a thing. If I were to give such an order to my troops I should run the risk of being disobeyed."—"But what is to be done? I cannot remain as I am; I have yet resources and partisans. It is said that the Allies will no longer treat with me. Well! no matter. I will march on Paris. I will be revenged on the inconstancy of the Parisians and the baseness of the Senate. Woe to the members of the Government they have patched up for the return of their Bourbons; that is what they are looking forward to. But to-morrow I shall place myself at the head of my Guards, and to-morrow we shall be in the Tuileries."

The Marshal listened in silence, and when at length Napoleon became somewhat calm he observed, "Sire, it appears, then, that you are not aware of what has taken place in Paris—of the establishment of a Provisional Government, and——"—"I know it all: and what then?"—"Sire," added the Marshal, presenting a paper to Napoleon, "here is something which will tell you more than I can." Macdonald then presented to him a letter from General Beurnonville, announcing the forfeiture of the Emperor pronounced by the Senate, and the determi-

nation of the Allied powers not to treat with Napoleon, or any member of his family. "Marshal," said the Emperor, before he opened the letter, "may this be read aloud?" —"Certainly, Sire." The letter was then handed to Barré, who read it. An individual who was present on the occasion described to me the impression which the reading of the letter produced on Napoleon. His countenance exhibited that violent contraction of the features which I have often remarked when his mind was disturbed. However, he did not lose his self-command, which indeed never forsook him when policy or vanity required that he should retain it; and when the reading of Beurnonville's letter was ended he affected to persist in his intention of marching on Paris. "Sire," exclaimed Macdonald, "that plan must be renounced. Not a sword would be unsheathed to second you in such an enterprise."

After this conversation between the Emperor and Macdonald the question of the abdication began to be seriously thought of. Caulaincourt had already hinted to Napoleon that in case of his abdicating personally there was a possibility of inducing the Allies to agree to a Council of Regency. Napoleon then determined to sign the act of abdication, which he himself drew up in the following terms:—

The Allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to leave France, and even to lay down his life for the welfare of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, those of the Regency of the Empress, and the maintenance of the laws of the Empire. Given at our Palace of Fontainebleau, 2d April 1814.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

After having written this act the Emperor presented it to the Marshals, saying, "Here, gentlemen! are you satisfied?"

This abdication of Napoleon was certainly very useless, but in case of anything occurring to render it a matter of importance the act might have proved entirely illusory. Its meaning might appear unequivocal to the generality of people, but not to me, who was so well initiated in the cunning to which Napoleon could resort when it suited his purpose. It is necessary to observe that Napoleon does not say that "he descends from the throne," but that "he is *ready* to descend from the throne." This was a subterfuge, by the aid of which he intended to open new negotiations respecting the form and conditions of the Regency of his son, in case of the Allied sovereigns acceding to that proposition. This would have afforded the means of gaining time.

He had not yet resigned all hope, and therefore he joyfully received a piece of intelligence communicated to him by General Allix. The General informed the Emperor that he had met an Austrian officer who was sent by Francis II. to Prince Schwartzenberg, and who positively assured him that all which had taken place in Paris was contrary to the wish of the Emperor of Austria. That this may have been the opinion of the officer is possible, and even probable. But it is certain from the issue of a mission of the Duc de Cadore (Champagny), of which I shall presently speak, that the officer expressed merely his own personal opinion. However, as soon as General Allix had communicated this good news, as he termed it, to Napoleon, the latter exclaimed to the persons who were about him, "I told you so, gentlemen. Francis II. cannot carry his enmity so far as to dethrone his daughter. Vicenza, go and desire the Marshals to return my act of abdication. I will send a courier to the Emperor of Austria."

Thus Bonaparte in his shipwreck looked round for a saving plank, and tried to nurse himself in illusions. The Duke of Vicenza went to Marshals Ney and Macdonald, whom he found just stepping into a carriage to proceed to

Paris. Both positively refused to return the act to Caulaincourt, saying, "We are sure of the concurrence of the Emperor of Austria, and we take everything upon ourselves." The result proved that they were better informed than General Allix.

During the conversation with Marshal Macdonald which has just been described the Emperor was seated. When he came to the resolution of signing the abdication he arose and walked once or twice up and down his cabinet. After he had written and signed the act he said, "Gentlemen, the interests of my son, the interests of the army, and above all, the interests of France, must be defended. I therefore appoint as my commissioners to the Allied powers the Duke of Vicenza, the Prince of the Moskowa, and the Duke of Ragusa. . . . Are you satisfied?" added he, after a pause. "I think these interests are consigned to good hands." All present answered, as with one voice. "Yes, Sire." But no sooner was this answer pronounced than the Emperor threw himself upon a small yellow sofa, which stood near the window, and striking his thigh with his hand with a sort of convulsive motion, he exclaimed, "No, gentlemen: I will have no Regency! With my Guards and Marmont's corps I shall be in Paris to-morrow." Ney and Macdonald vainly endeavoured to undeceive him respecting this impracticable design. He rose with marked ill-humour, and rubbing his head, as he was in the habit of doing when agitated, he said in a loud and authoritative tone, "Retire."

The Marshals withdrew, and Napoleon was left alone with Caulaincourt. He told the latter that what had most displeased him in the proceedings which had just taken place was the reading of Beurnonville's letter. "Sire," observed the Duke of Vicenza, "it was by your order that the letter was read."—"That is true. . . . But why was it not addressed directly to me by Macdonald?"—"Sire, the letter was at first addressed to Marshal Mac-

donald, but the *aide de camp* who was the bearer of it had orders to communicate its contents to Marmont on passing through Essonne, because Beurnonville did not precisely know where Macdonald would be found." After this brief explanation the Emperor appeared satisfied, and he said to Caulaincourt, "Vicenza, call back Macdonald."

The Duke of Vicenza hastened after the Marshal, whom he found at the end of the gallery of the Palace, and he brought him back to the Emperor. When Macdonald returned to the cabinet the Emperor's warmth had entirely subsided, and he said to him with great composure, "Well, Duke of Tarantum, do you think that the Regency is the only possible thing?"—"Yes, Sire."—"Then I wish you to go with Ney to the Emperor Alexander, instead of Marmont; it is better that he should remain with his corps, to which his presence is indispensable. You will therefore go with Ney. I rely on you. I hope you have entirely forgotten all that has separated us for so long a time."—"Yes, Sire, I have not thought of it since 1809."—"I am glad of it, Marshal, and I must acknowledge to you that I was in the wrong." While speaking to the Marshal the Emperor manifested unusual emotion. He approached him and pressed his hand in the most affectionate way.

The Emperor's three Commissioners—that is to say, Marshals Macdonald and Ney and the Duke of Vicenza—had informed Marmont that they would dine with him as they passed through Essonne, and would acquaint him with all that had happened at Fontainebleau. On their arrival at Essonne the three Imperial Commissioners explained to the Duc of Ragusa the object of their mission, and persuaded him to accompany them to the Emperor Alexander. This obliged the Marshal to inform them how he was situated. The negotiations which Marmont had opened and almost concluded with Prince Schwartzenberg were rendered void by the mission which he had joined,

and which it was necessary he should himself explain to the Commander of the Austrian army. The three Marshals and the Duke of Vicenza repaired to Petit Bourg, the headquarters of Prince Schwartzenberg, and there the Prince released Marmont from the promise he had given.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

1814.

Unexpected receipts in the Post-office Department—Arrival of Napoleon's Commissioners at M. de Talleyrand's—Conference of the Marshals with Alexander—Alarming news from Essonne—Marmont's courage —The white cockade and the tri-coloured cockade—A successful stratagem—Three Governments in France—The Duc de Cadore sent by Maria Louisa to the Emperor of Austria—Maria Louisa's proclamation to the French people—Interview between the Emperor of Austria and the Duc de Cadore—The Emperor's protestation of friendship for Napoleon—M. Metternich and M. Stadion—Maria Lonisa's departure for Orleans—Blucher's visit to me—Audience of the King of Prussia—His Majesty's reception of Berthier, Clarke, and myself—Bernadotte in Paris—Cross of the Polar Star presented to me by Bernadotte.

After my nomination as Director-General of the Post-office the business of that department proceeded as regularly as before. Having learned that a great many intercepted letters had been thrown aside I sent, on the 4th of April, an advertisement to the *Monteur*, stating that the letters to and from England or other foreign countries which had been lying at the Post-office for more than three years would be forwarded to their respective addresses. This produced to the Post-office a receipt of nearly 300,000, francs, a fact which may afford an idea of the enormous number of intercepted letters.

On the night after the publication of the advertisement I was awakened by an express from the Provisional Government, by which I was requested to proceed with all possible haste to M. de Talleyrand's hôtel. I rose, and I set off immediately, and I got there some minutes before

the arrival of the Emperor's Commissioners. I went up to the *salon* on the first floor, which was one of the suite of apartments occupied by the Emperor Alexander. The Marshals retired to confer with the monarch, and it would be difficult to describe the anxiety—or, I may rather say, consternation—which, during their absence, prevailed among some of the members of the Provisional Government and other persons assembled in the *salon* where I was.

While the Marshals were with Alexander I learned that they had previously conversed with M. de Talleyrand, who observed to them, "If you succeed in your designs you will compromise all who have met in this hôtel since the 1st of April, and the number is not small. For my part, take no account of me, I am willing to be compromised." I had passed the evening of this day with M. de Talleyrand, who then observed to the Emperor Alexander in my presence, "Will you support Bonaparte? No, you neither can nor will. I have already had the honour to tell your Majesty that we can have no choice but between Bonaparte and Louis XVIII.; anything else would be an intrigue, and no intrigue can have power to support him who may be its object. Bernadotte, Eugène, the Regency, all those propositions result from intrigues. In present circumstances nothing but a new principle is sufficiently strong to establish the new order of things which must be adopted. *Louis XVIII. is a principle.*"

None of the members of the Provisional Government were present at this conference, for no one was willing to appear to influence in any way the determination of the chief of the coalition upon the subject of this important mission.[1] General Dessolles alone, in quality of commander of the National Guard of Paris, was requested to be present. At length the Marshals entered the *salon*

[1] In the account of the next few days Bourrienne follows pretty closely the Memoirs of Marmont (Paris, Perrotin, 1857, nine tomes).

where we were, and their appearance created a sensation which it is impossible to describe; but the expression of dissatisfaction which we thought we remarked in their countenances restored the hopes of those who for some hours had been a prey to apprehensions. Macdonald, with his head elevated, and evidently under the influence of strong irritation, approached Beurnonville, and thus addressed him, in answer to a question which the latter had put to him. "Speak not to me, sir; I have nothing to say to you. You have made me forget a friendship of thirty years!" Then turning to Dupont, "As for you, sir," he continued in the same tone, "your conduct towards the Emperor is not generous. I confess that he has treated you with severity, perhaps he may even have been unjust to you with respect to the affair of Baylen, but how long has it been the practice to avenge a personal wrong at the expense of one's country?" [1]

These remarks were made with such warmth, and in so elevated a tone of voice, that Caulaincourt thought it necessary to interfere, and said, "Do not forget, gentlemen, that this is the residence of the Emperor of Russia." At this moment M. de Talleyrand returned from the interview with the Emperor which he had had after the departure of the Marshals, and approaching the group formed round Macdonald, "Gentlemen," said he, "if you wish to dispute and discuss, step down to my apartments." —"That would be useless," replied Macdonald; "my comrades and I do not acknowledge the Provisional Government." The three Marshals, Ney, Macdonald, and Marmont, then immediately retired with Caulaincourt, and went to Ney's hôtel, there to await the answer which the Emperor Alexander had promised to give them after consulting the King of Prussia.

Such was this night-scene, which possessed more

[1] General Dupont, beaten by the Spaniards, surrendered, with 20,000 men, at Baylen (in Andalusia), on the 22d of July 1808.

dramatic effect than many which are performed on the stage. In it all was real: on its *dénouement* depended the political state of France, and the existence of all those who had already declared themselves in favour of the Bourbons. It is a remarkable fact, and one which affords a striking lesson to men who are tempted to sacrifice themselves for any political cause, that most of those who then demanded the restoration of the Bourbons at the peril of their lives have successively fallen into disgrace.

When the Marshals and Caulaincourt had retired we were all anxious to know what had passed between them and the Emperor of Russia. I learned from Dessolles, who, as I have stated, was present at the conference in his rank of commander of the National Guard of Paris, that the Marshals were unanimous in urging Alexander to accede to a Regency. Macdonald especially supported that proposition with much warmth; and among the observations he made I recollect Dessolles mentioned the following:—"I am not authorised to treat in any way for the fate reserved for the Emperor. We have full powers to treat for the Regency, the army, and France; but the Emperor has positively forbidden us to specify anything personally regarding himself." Alexander merely replied, "That does not astonish me." The Marshals then, resuming the conversation, dwelt much on the respect which was due to the military glory of France. They strongly manifested their disinclination to abandon the family of a man who had so often led them to victory; and lastly, they reminded the Emperor Alexander of his own declaration, in which he proclaimed, in his own name as well as on the part of his Allies, that it was not their intention to impose on France any government whatever.

Dessolles, who had all along declared himself in favour of the Bourbons, in his turn entered into the discussion with as much warmth as the partisans of the Regency. He represented to Alexander how many persons would be

compromised for merely having acted or declared their opinions behind the shield of his promises. He repeated what Alexander had already been told, that the Regency would, in fact, be nothing but Bonaparte in disguise. However, Dessolles acknowledged that such was the effect of Marshal Macdonald's powerful and persuasive eloquence that Alexander seemed to waver; and, unwilling to give the Marshals a positive refusal, he had recourse to a subterfuge, by which he would be enabled to execute the design he had irrevocably formed without seeming to take on himself alone the responsibility of a change of government. Dessolles accordingly informed us that Alexander at last gave the following answer to the Marshals: "Gentlemen, I am not alone; in an affair of such importance I must consult the King of Prussia, for I have promised to do nothing without consulting him. In a few hours you shall know my decision." It was this decision which the Marshals went to wait for at Ney's.

Most of the members of the Provisional Government attributed the evasive reply of the Emperor Alexander to the influence of the speech of Dessolles. For my part, while I do justice to the manner in which he declared himself on this important occasion, I do not ascribe to his eloquence the power of fixing Alexander's resolution, for I well know by experience how easy it is to make princes appear to adopt the advice of any one when the counsel given is precisely that which they wish to follow. From the sentiments of Alexander at this time I had not the slightest doubt as to the course he would finally pursue, and I considered what he said about consulting the King of Prussia to be merely a polite excuse, by which he avoided the disagreeable task of giving the Marshals a direct refusal.

I therefore returned home quite satisfied as to the result of the Emperor Alexander's visit to the King of Prussia. I knew, from the persons about the Czar, that he

cherished a hatred, which was but too well justified, towards Bonaparte. Frederick William is of too firm a character to have yielded to any of the considerations which might on this subject have been pressed on him as they had been on the Emperor of Russia. But, besides that the King of Prussia had legitimate reasons for disliking Napoleon, policy would at that time have required that he should appear to be his enemy, for to do so was to render himself popular with his subjects. But the King of Prussia did not need to act under the dictates of policy; he followed his own opinion in rejecting the propositions of the Marshals, which he did without hesitation, and with much energy.

While the Marshals had gone to Paris Bonaparte was anxious to ascertain whether his Commissioners had passed the advanced posts of the foreign armies, and in case of resistance he determined to march on Paris, for he could not believe that he had lost every chance. He sent an *aide de camp* to desire Marmont to come immediately to Fontainebleau: such was Napoleon's impatience that instead of waiting for the return of his *aide de camp* he sent off a second and then a third officer on the same errand. This rapid succession of envoys from the Emperor alarmed the general who commanded the different divisions of Marmont's corps at Essonne. They feared that the Emperor was aware of the Convention concluded that morning with Prince Schwartzenberg, and that he had sent for Marmont with the view of reprimanding him. The fact was, Napoleon knew nothing of the matter, for Marmont, on departing for Paris with Macdonald and Ney, had left orders that it should be said that he had gone to inspect his lines. Souham, Lebrun des Essarts, and Bordessoulle, who had given their assent to the Convention with Prince Schwartzenberg, deliberated in the absence of Marmont, and, perhaps being ignorant that he was released from his promise, and fearing the vengeance of Napoleon, they de-

termined to march upon Versailles. On arriving there the troops not finding the Marshal at their head thought themselves betrayed, and a spirit of insurrection broke out among them. One of Marmont's *aides de camp*, whom he had left at Essonne, exerted every endeavour to prevent the departure of his general's corps, but, finding all his efforts unavailing, he hastened to Paris to inform the Marshal of what had happened. When Marmont received this news he was breakfasting at Ney's with Macdonald and Caulaincourt: they were waiting for the answer which the Emperor Alexander had promised to send them. The march of his corps on Versailles threw Marmont into despair. He said to the Marshals, "I must be off to join my corps and quell this mutiny;" and without losing a moment he ordered his carriage and directed the coachman to drive with the utmost speed. He sent forward one of his *aides de camp* to inform the troops of his approach.

Having arrived within a hundred paces of the place where his troops were assembled he found the generals who were under his orders advancing to meet him. They urged him not to go farther, as the men were in open insurrection. "I will go into the midst of them," said Marmont. "In a moment they shall either kill me or acknowledge me as their chief." He sent off another *aide de camp* to range the troops in the order of battle. Then, alighting from the carriage and mounting a horse, he advanced alone, and thus harangued his troops: "How! Is there treason here? Is it possible that you disown me? Am I not your comrade? Have I not been wounded twenty times among you? . . . Have I not shared your fatigues and privations? And am I not ready to do so again?" Here Marmont was interrupted by a general shout of "Vive le Maréchal! Vive le Maréchal!"[1]

[1] Marmont's conduct at this time has been much debated, but it may easily be summed up. He was not a politician, but a soldier entrusted with an important command by a man who had raised him and overwhelmed him with benefits. "Large allowances, which were unceasingly increased, considerable gifts, and all the advan-

The alarm caused among the members of the Provisional Government by the mission of the Marshals was increased by the news of the mutiny of Marmont's troops. During the whole of the day we were in a state of tormenting anxiety. It was feared that the insurrectionary spirit might spread among other corps of the army, and the cause of France again be endangered. But the courage of Marmont saved everything. It would be impossible to convey any idea of the manner in which he was received by us at Talleyrand's when he related the particulars of what had occurred at Versailles.[1]

On the evening of the day on which Marmont had acted so nobly it was proposed that the army should adopt the white cockade. In reply to this proposition the Marshal

tages of a brilliant position," are his own words when he reproaches his wife for treating him as he treated his Emperor (*Raguse*, tome vii. p. 62). He entered into secret negotiations with the Allies. What the nature of the negotiations were we can best judge by this. During his absence Napoleon sent repeatedly for him, or for the next senior officer. Marmont's generals, acquainted with his plans, became alarmed, and carried off their men into the enemy's lines, Souham saying, "Better to kill the devil than to be killed by him." If they and Marmont were not engaged in a treasonable and disgraceful plot, what possible cause of alarm had they more than the other officers, who, pressing Napoleon to abdicate, still refrained from treachery? The poor soldiers found out the treason of their leaders, and attempted to return to their right place. Marmont succeeded in bringing them back into the snare. "This," says he (tome vi. p. 269), "was the reward of my generous confidence in them." The reward of the confidence of Napoleon in him he does not tell us of, but hints that he wished to go to Elba to care for the comforts of the man he betrayed. Some extenuation of his conduct may be found in the fact that he seems to have thought Napoleon mad at the time. Speaking of the 1st of April (tome vi. p. 253) he says, "From this moment I was struck by the complete derangement which had replaced his ordinary clearness and that power of reasoning which was so habitual with him." He seems to have really believed this, for he said to Metternich in September 1819, "Since the last time that I heard Napoleon speak, before he became mad, this is the first reasonable conversation I have heard" (*Metternich*, vol. iii. p. 335). Also, neither he nor any of the men labouring to upset Napoleon seem to have dreamt of the way in which they were laying France, helpless, at the feet of the Allies. But the tricky plea that, while he was acting thus, Napoleon had, without Marmont's knowledge, already abdicated, could never save Marmont in a court of honour. See the whole matter fairly put in *Thiers*, livre liii. tome xvii. pp. 717, 718. Weakening the French army in the face of the Allies was weakening France; and if it were right, necessary, and honourable to betray Napoleon, it certainly was not right, necessary, or honourable to betray France.

[1] When I returned that night to M. de Talleyrand's I was made much of and complimented, every one asking me for details of what had occurred (*Raguse*, tome vi. p. 269).

said, "Gentlemen, I have made my troops understand the necessity of serving France before all things. They have, consequently, returned to order, and I can now answer for them. But what I cannot answer for is to induce them to abandon the colours which have led them to victory for the last twenty years. Therefore do not count upon me for a thing which I consider to be totally hostile to the interests of France. I will speak to the Emperor Alexander on the subject." Such were Marmont's words. Every one appeared to concur in his opinion, and the discussion terminated. For my own part, I find by my notes that I declared myself strongly in favour of Marmont's proposition.

The Marshal's opinion having been adopted, at least provisionally, an article was prepared for the *Moniteur* in nearly the following terms :—

> The white cockade has been, during the last four days, a badge for the manifestation of public opinion in favour of the overthrow of an oppressive Government: it has been the only means of distinguishing the partisans of the restoration of the old dynasty, to which at length we are to be indebted for repose. But as the late Government is at an end, all colours differing from our national colours are useless: let us, therefore, resume those which have so often led us to victory.

Such was the spirit of the article, though possibly the above copy may differ in a few words. It met with the unqualified approbation of every one present. I was therefore extremely surprised, on looking at the *Moniteur* next day, to find that the article was not inserted. I knew not what courtly interference prevented the appearance of the article, but I remember that Marmont was very ill pleased at its omission. He complained on the subject to the Emperor Alexander, who promised to write, and in fact did write, to the Provisional Government to get the article inserted. However, it did not appear, and in a few days we obtained a solution of the enigma, as we might perhaps

have done before if we had tried. The Emperor Alexander also promised to write to the Comte d'Artois, and to inform him that the opinion of France was in favour of the preservation of the three colours, but I do not know whether the letter was written, or, if it was, what answer it received.

Marshal Jourdan, who was then at Rouen, received a letter, written without the knowledge of Marmont, informing him that the latter had mounted the white cockade in his corps. Jourdan thought he could not do otherwise than follow Marmont's example, and he announced to the Provisional Government that in consequence of the resolution of the Duke of Ragusa he had just ordered his corps to wear the white cockade. Marmont could now be boldly faced, and when he complained to the Provisional Government of the non-insertion of the article in the *Moniteur* the reply was, "It cannot now appear. You see Marshal Jourdan has mounted the white cockade: you would not give the army two sets of colours!"

Marmont could make no answer to so positive a fact. It was not till some time after that I learned Jourdan had determined to unfurl the white flag only on the positive assurance that Marmont had already done so. Thus we lost the colours which had been worn by Louis XVI., which Louis XVIII., when a Prince, had adopted, and in which the Comte d'Artois showed himself on his return to the Parisians, for he entered the capital in the uniform of the National Guard. The fraud played off by some members of the Provisional Government was attended by fatal consequences; many evils might have been spared to France had Marmont's advice been adopted.

At the period of the dissolution of the Empire there might be said to be three Governments in France, viz. the Provisional Government in Paris, Napoleon's at Fontainebleau, and the doubtful and ambulatory Regency of Maria Louisa. Doubtful and ambulatory the Regency might

well be called, for there was so little decision as to the course to be adopted by the Empress that it was at first proposed to conduct her to Orleans, then to Tours, and she went finally to Blois. The uncertainty which prevailed respecting the destiny of Maria Louisa is proved by a document which I have in my possession, and of which there cannot be many copies in existence. It is a circular addressed to the prefects by M. de Montalivet, the Minister of the Interior, who accompanied the Empress. In it a blank is left for the seat of the Government, to which the prefects are desired to send their communications. In the copy I possess the blank is filled up with the word "Blois" in manuscript.

As soon as Maria Louisa was made acquainted with the events that had taken place around Paris she sent for the Duc de Cadore,[1] and gave him a letter addressed to the Emperor of Austria, saying, "Take this to my father, who must be at Dijon. I rely on you for defending the interests of France, those of the Emperor, and above all those of my son." Certainly Maria Louisa's confidence could not be better placed, and those great interests would have been defended by the Duc de Cadore *si defendi possent*.

After the departure of the Duc de Cadore Maria Louisa published the following proclamation, addressed to the French people :—

BY THE EMPRESS REGENT.

A Proclamation.

The events of the war have placed the capital in the power of foreigners. The Emperor has marched to defend it at the head of his armies, so often victorious. They are face to face with the en-

[1] Jean Nompère de Champagny, Duc de Cadore. One of the most worthy of Napoleon's Ministers. Minister of the Interior from 1804 to August 1807, then Minister of Foreign Affairs to April 1811, then honourably shelved as Intendant Général de la Couronne, and in 1814 appointed Secretary of the Regency.

emy before the walls of Paris. From the residence which I have chosen, and from the Ministers of the Emperor, will emanate the only orders which you can acknowledge. Every town in the power of foreigners ceases to be free, and every order which may proceed from them is the language of the enemy, or that which it suits his hostile views to propagate. You will be faithful to your oaths. You will listen to the voice of a Princess who was[1] consigned to your good faith, and whose highest pride consists in being a Frenchwoman, and in being united to the destiny of the sovereign whom you have freely chosen. My son was less sure of your affections in the time of our prosperity; his rights and his person are under your safeguard.

(By order) MONTALIVET. (Signed) MARIA LOUISA.

BLOIS, 3*d April* 1814.

It is to be inferred that the Regency had within three days adopted the resolution of not quitting Blois, for the above document presents no blanks, nor words filled up in writing. The Empress' proclamation, though a powerful appeal to the feelings of the French people, produced no effect. Maria Louisa's proclamation was dated the 4th of April, on the evening of which day Napoleon signed the conditional abdication, with the fate of which the reader has already been made acquainted. M. de Montalivet transmitted the Empress' proclamation, accompanied by another circular, to the prefects, of whom very few received it.

M. de Champagny, having left Blois with the letter he had received from the Empress, proceeded to the headquarters of the Emperor of Austria, carefully avoiding those roads which were occupied by Cossack troops. He arrived, not without considerable difficulty, at Chanseaux,

[1] I was informed that when the document was printed and presented to the Empress she drew her pen through the word *was*, and made the sentence read as follows: "You will listen to the voice of a Princess who *has consigned herself* to your good faith," etc. The unfortunate Princess did all she could to rally to her cause, and above all to the cause of her son, those whose resolutions were still wavering, and the truth is that, personally, Maria Louisa inspired real interest even in those who, from policy or regard for France, were most actively labouring to overthrow the Imperial despotism.—*Bourrienne.*

where Frances II. was expected. When the Emperor arrived the Duc de Cadore was announced, and immediately introduced to his Majesty. The Duke remained some hours with Francis II., without being able to obtain from him anything but fair protestations. The Emperor always took refuge behind the promise he had given to his Allies to approve whatever measures they might adopt. The Duke was not to leave the Emperor's headquarters that evening, and, in the hope that his Majesty might yet reflect on the critical situation of his daughter, he asked permission to take leave next morning. He accordingly presented himself to the Emperor's levee, when he renewed his efforts in support of the claims of Maria Louisa. "I have a great affection for my daughter, and also for my son-in law," said the Emperor. "I bear them both in my heart, and would shed my blood for them."—"Ah, Sire!" exclaimed M. de Champagny, "such a sacrifice is not necessary."—"Yes, Duke, I say again I would shed my blood, I would resign my life for them, but I have given my Allies a promise not to treat without them, and to approve all that they may do. Besides," added the Emperor, "my Minister, M. de Metternich, has gone to their headquarters, and I will ratify whatever he may sign."

When the Duc de Cadore related to me the particulars of his mission, in which zeal could not work an impossibility, I remarked that he regarded as a circumstance fatal to Napoleon the absence of M. de Metternich and the presence of M. Stadion at the headquarters of the Emperor of Austria. Though in all probability nothing could have arrested the course of events, yet it is certain that the personal sentiments of the two Austrian Ministers towards Napoleon were widely different. I am not going too far when I affirm that, policy apart, M. de Metternich was much attached to Napoleon.[1] In support of this assertion

[1] This attachment of Metternich to Napoleon was much believed in at the time; see *De Vitrolles*, tome i. pp. 69 and 78.

I may quote a fact of which I can guarantee the authenticity. When M. de Metternich was complimented on the occasion of Maria Louisa's marriage he replied, "To have contributed to a measure which has received the approbation of 80,000,000 men is indeed a just subject of congratulation." Such a remark openly made by the intelligent Minister of the Cabinet of Vienna was well calculated to gratify the ears of Napoleon, from whom, however, M. de Metternich in his personal relations did not conceal the truth. I recollect a reply which was made by M. de Metternich at Dresden after a little hesitation. "As to you," said the Emperor, "you will not go to war with me. It is impossible that you can declare yourself against me. That can never be."—"Sire, we are not now quite allies, and some time hence we may become enemies." This hint was the last which Napoleon received from Metternich, and Napoleon must have been blind indeed not to have profited by it. As to M. Stadion, he entertained a profound dislike of the Emperor. That Minister knew and could not forget that his preceding exclusion from the Cabinet of Vienna had been due to the all-powerful influence of Napoleon.

Whether or not the absence of Metternich influenced the resolution of Francis II., it is certain that that monarch yielded nothing to the urgent solicitations of a Minister who conscientiously fulfilled the delicate mission consigned to him. M. de Champagny rejoined the Empress at Orleans, whither she had repaired on leaving Blois. He found Maria Louisa almost deserted, all the Grand Dignitaries of the Empire having successively returned to Paris after sending in their submissions to the Provisional Government.

I had scarcely entered upon the exercise of my functions as Postmaster-General when, on the morning of the 2d of April, I was surprised to see a Prussian general officer enter my cabinet. I immediately recognised him as

General Blucher. He had commanded the Prussian army in the battle which took place at the gates of Paris. "Sir," said he, "I consider it one of my first duties on entering Paris to thank you for the attention I received from you in Hamburg. I am sorry that I was not sooner aware of your being in Paris. I assure you that had I been sooner informed of this circumstance the capitulation should have been made without a blow being struck. How much blood might then have been spared!"—"General," said I, "on what do you ground this assurance?"—"If I had known that you were in Paris I would have given you a letter to the King of Prussia. That monarch, who knows the resources and intentions of the Allies, would, I am sure, have authorised you to decide a suspension of arms before the neighbourhood of Paris became the theatre of the war."—"But," resumed I, "in spite of the good intentions of the Allies, it would have been very difficult to prevent resistance. French pride, irritated as it was by reverses, would have opposed insurmountable obstacles to such a measure."—"But, good heavens! you would have seen that resistance could be of no avail against such immense masses."—"You are right, General; but French honour would have been defended to the last."—"I am fully aware of that; but surely you have earned glory enough!"—"Yet our French susceptibility would have made us look upon that glory as tarnished if Paris had been occupied without defence. . . . But under present circumstances I am well pleased that you were satisfied with my conduct in Hamburg, for it induces me to hope that you will observe the same moderation in Paris that I exercised there. The days are past when it could be said, Woe to the conquered."—"You are right; yet," added he, smiling, "you know we are called the northern barbarians."—"Then, General," returned I, "you have a fair opportunity of showing that that designation is a libel."

Some days after Blucher's visit I had the honour of being

admitted to a private audience of the King of Prussia. Clarke and Berthier were also received in this audience, which took place at the hôtel of Prince Eugène, where the King of Prussia resided in Paris. We waited for some minutes in the *salon*, and when Frederick William entered from his cabinet I remarked on his countenance an air of embarrassment and austerity which convinced me that he had been studying his part, as great personages are in the habit of doing on similar occasions. The King on entering the *salon* first noticed Berthier, whom he addressed with much kindness, bestowing praises on the French troops, and complimenting the Marshal on his conduct during the war in Germany. Berthier returned thanks for these well-merited praises, for though he was not remarkable for strength of understanding or energy of mind, yet he was not a bad man, and I have known many proofs of his good conduct in conquered countries.

After saluting Berthier the King of Prussia turned towards Clarke, and his countenance immediately assumed an expression of dissatisfaction. He had evidently not forgotten Clarke's conduct in Berlin. He reminded him that he had rendered the Continential system more odious than it was in itself, and that he had shown no moderation in the execution of his orders. "In short," said his Majesty, "if I have any advice to give you, it is that you never again return to Prussia." The King pronounced these words in so loud and decided a tone that Clarke was perfectly confounded. He uttered some unintelligible observations, which, however, Frederick William did not notice, for suddenly turning towards me he said, with an air of affability, "Ah! M. de Bourrienne, I am glad to see you, and I take this opportunity of repeating what I wrote to you from Königsberg. You always extended protection to the Germans, and did all you could to alleviate their condition. I learned with great satisfaction what you did for the Prussians whom the fate of war drove into Hamburg; and

I feel pleasure in telling you, in the presence of these two gentlemen, that if all the French agents had acted as you did we should not, probably, be here." I expressed, by a profound bow, how much I was gratified by this complimentary address,[1] and the king, after saluting us, retired.

About the middle of April Bernadotte arrived in Paris. His situation had become equivocal, since circumstances had banished the hopes he might have conceived in his interview with the Emperor Alexander at Abo. Besides, he had been represented in some official pamphlets as a traitor to France, and among certain worshippers of our injured glory there prevailed a feeling of irritation, and which was unjustly directed towards Bernadotte.

I even remember that Napoleon, before he had fallen from his power, had a sort of national protest made by the police against the Prince Royal of Sweden. This Prince had reserved an hôtel in the Rue d'Anjou, and the words, "Down with the traitor! down with the perjurer," were shouted there; but this had no result, as it was only considered an outrage caused by a spirit of petty vengeance.

While Bernadotte was in Paris I saw him every day. He but faintly disguised from me the hope he had entertained of ruling France; and in the numerous conversations to which our respective occupations led I ascertained, though Bernadotte did not formally tell me so, that he once had strong expectations of succeeding Napoleon.

Pressed at last into his final intrenchments he broke through all reserve and confirmed all I knew of the interview of Abo.

I asked Bernadotte what he thought of the projects which were attributed to Moreau; whether it was true that he had in him a competitor, and whether Moreau had aspired to the dangerous honour of governing France. "Those reports," replied the Prince Royal of Sweden, "are devoid of foundation: at least I can assure you that in

[1] At the expense of his countryman.

the conversations I have had with the Emperor Alexander, that sovereign never said anything which could warrant such a supposition. I know that the Emperor of Russia wished to avail himself of the military talents of Moreau in the great struggle that had commenced, and to enable the exiled general to return to his country, in the hope that, should the war prove fortunate, he would enjoy the honours and privileges due to his past services."

Bernadotte expressed to me astonishment at the recall of the Bourbons, and assured me that he had not expected the French people would so readily have consented to the Restoration. I confess I was surprised that Bernadotte, with the intelligence I knew him to possess, should imagine that the will of subjects has any influence in changes of government!

During his stay in Paris Bernadotte evinced for me the same sentiments of friendship which he had shown me at Hamburg. One day I received from him a letter, dated Paris, with which he transmitted to me one of the crosses of the Polar Star, which the King of Sweden had left at his disposal. Bernadotte was not very well satisfied with his residence in Paris, in spite of the friendship which the Emperor Alexander constantly manifested towards him. After a few days he set out for Sweden, having first taken leave of the Comte d'Artois. I did not see him after his farewell visit to the Count, so that I know not what was the nature of the conversation which passed between the two Princes.[1]

[1] Metternich (vol. i. p. 208) says, "It does not admit of a doubt that the Crown Prince (Bernadotte) had personal designs on the throne of France. Even if his operations in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 did not furnish the actual proof of the existence of this pretension, the words spoken by him would be equivalent to a confession." Receiving news of the victory of Grosbeeren, "Bernadotte cried out enthusiastically, 'La France au plus digne.'—'Grands Dieux!' answered Pozzo, 'la France est à moi.' The Crown Prince was silent." Metternich (vol. i. p. 225) says that at Langres, in 1814, Bernadotte was at once suggested if any person except a Bourbon or the son of Napoleon were to hold the crown. De Vitrolles (tome i. p. 462) dates Bernadotte's hopes of the crown from his interview with the Czar at Abo in 1812, when only Lord Cathcart, the English Ambassador, was present. It

was this pretension on the part of Bernadotte that made him so anxious to avoid striking any great blow in 1813 with his Swedes against the French. Muffling (p. 82), after describing how Blucher, being informed of the daily progressive measures which the Crown Prince adopted to prove to the French army that he acted not only as their countryman but as their friend, and how far he was from wishing to destroy them by his Swedes, or to shed their blood, says that Blucher marched to his right to obviate all political high treason. "Thus one of the three Frenchmen summoned by the sovereigns to assist them in conquering Napoleon had to be watched by an army of 100,000 men!" "It was to Lord Stewart's threat to withdraw the English subsidy if Bernadotte would not advance to Leipsic that," says Muffling (p. 87), "the plains of Breitenfeld are indebted for the honour of being trodden by a successor of the great King of Sweden." Blucher's suspicions may have had some foundation. See *Marmont*, tome vii. pp. 26-28, where he says that Bernadotte, in 1814, was in communication with General Maison, commanding a French corps in Flanders (a former *aide de camp* of his), and offered to disarm the Prussian corps under his orders, and then to pass over to the French. He only required from Napoleon a promise in writing to procure for him another sovereignty if he thus lost his claims to the throne of Sweden. Napoleon refused to sign the engagement himself, offering that it should be signed by his brother Joseph; and the affair thus fell to the ground from want of mutual confidence. Napoleon let Alexander receive Bernadotte's communication, and the Czar informed Bernadotte that he forgave him on account of his previous conduct, but made him engage to leave France at once. So says Marmont, without professing to have seen any proofs, but remarking that the sudden departure of Bernadotte from Paris was thus explained. For the feelings of the Restoration as to Bernadotte's retention of his position in 1815, see Talleyrand's *Correspondence*, vol. ii. pp. 6, 7, where a distinction is drawn between him and Murat. "It is," says Talleyrand, "an evil, a very great evil, that that man should have been called upon to succeed to the throne of Sweden. But it is an evil which, if ever it can be remedied at all, can only be remedied by time, and the events that time will bring."

REMARKS ON THE MAP.

It is an interesting question to consider what in Napoleon's mind was to be the real extent of his dominions. By comparing the map of the French Empire given in this volume with what we know of Napoleon's ideas it appears clear that he had formed a well-considered plan of dominion, not only practicable, but which he had actually carried out almost to completion; though, like many of his plans, well grounded in itself, it suffered from the extravagant and rash attempts which often ruined the results of his usually prudent course. France, spreading to the Rhine, holding the passages of that river, extending to the Pyrenees and the Alps, and threatening England by her possession of Belgium and Holland, was to form a compact centralised State able to throw her armies with overwhelming force on any country daring to rebel. The greater part of Germany was to be composed of small States, each far too weak in itself to oppose the dominant power, but still large enough to look with jealousy on any attempt of its neighbours to absorb it. French laws and customs introduced into this Confederation, misnamed "of the Rhine," would have gradually assimilated it to France; and in a hundred years it might have been as difficult to separate it from France as it was with Alsace in 1870. Here the power of France was to stop at all events for a long period. As he himself said to Metternich in 1808, "I only wish for direct influence in Europe to the banks of the Rhine, and indirectly as far as the Elbe, the Inn, and the Isonzo. The thing is quite simple; I think I am the stronger for not going as far as the Vistula, but keeping myself more concentrated. Prussia will become the strongest power of the second order. . . . I do not desire to extend my influence beyond the natural line I have pointed out to you" (*Metternich*, vol. ii. p. 256). Here we have Napoleon in one of his best moods. Prussia and Austria, outlying States, too weak to resist, were to be left till in course of time the rising tide of French influence would overflow their frontiers and they too would assume the same position as Bavaria already held. The Austrian marriage probably saved Austria from further dismemberment. She was to remain a State nominally of the first order: indeed, by giving up her Polish provinces, she was to regain her lands on the east of the Adriatic as well as the former Venetian dominions there; that is, she was to receive the lands shown on the map as in the possession of Napoleon as the Illyrian provinces. Further, she had hopes held out to her of receiving part of Turkey; see *Metternich*, vol. i. p. 137. Thus Austria would

have then held the position into which she was forced in 1866,—that of a State watching Russia, abandoning all hope of increasing her dominions in Germany, and looking for any further increase towards Turkey. The Duchy of Warsaw, increased by the Polish provinces of Russia and Austria, would have been in fact, and probably in name, a revived Poland, watching Russia and looking to France for protection.

The North of Italy, gradually formed into one State, would have, in course of time as the old petty jealousies died out (a long process, as Napoleon knew), become a State strong enough to aid France, but too weak to be able to stand alone. Scattered as it were ronnd the Continent, the dependent Kings of Sweden, Denmark, Naples, and Spain were to look to France for their protection.

It is important to remember that almost the whole of this was actnally accomplished by Napoleon at the time when he threw away all the results of his labours by his mad attack on Spain. Metternich himself acknowledges that the middle of Germany was contented. "The people of those German States whose territory had been enlarged by the peace of Presburg (1805) and the peace of Vienna (1809) were contented with these and the protection of the conqueror of the world. . . . In Austria . . . the expression 'German feeling' had no more meaning than a myth" (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 166). See also Metternich's confession of Austria's weakness even in 1813 (*Metternich*, vol. i. p. 177). There remained one thing —the inevitable attack on Russia. If we can imagine this carried out in the way we know Napoleon originally planned, a slow, gradual advance, supported by the new Polish State which was to grow up behind the army, the whole movement unhurried by the pressure in Spain, and his full prestige undimmed by the Spanish troubles, we must feel sure that Russia never could have withstood the shock. The ultimate defeat of Napoleon is no argument against the success of his really great plan: he fell not so mnch by the efforts of the Allies as from his own errors. He had placed France in a situation where she only required ordinary statesmanship and ordinary military talents to enable her to retain dominion over the Continent. The common error of believing that he aimed at making the whole of Europe in his time an integral part of his Empire hardly needs refutation.

It will be seen that the map presents some inconsistencies with this view of the Empire. But most of these can be explained. Napoleon held the Illyrian provinces, partly for a temporary purpose, to cut off Austria from the sea and so to carry out his Continental system,—chiefly to eventually use them as a bribe to Austria

to yield her own Polish provinces and to consent to the revival of Poland. The annexation of the North of Germany was due to the wish to carry out the Continental system, and it is hardly possible that it was intended to be permanent. These lands would have probably been used for exchanges.

The retention by Napoleon of part of the North of Italy is not quite so easy to explain. It was probably partly due to his tendency to display a curious jealousy and distrust of his own creations. By the retention of these lands he retained a hold over the new Kingdom of Italy. But, what is more likely to have been his chief motive, he made the task of that Kingdom easier by lessening the number of the States she had to absorb. He himself, we know, was much impressed with the time required for the growth of a really national feeling in Italy; and the presence of the French in Italy was alike a protection against Austria and a pressure exerted for the unification of the rest of the North of Italy. These lands would probably soon have been given to the Kingdom of Italy.

It is not so safe to prophesy what were his intentions in announcing and commencing the annexation of the provinces of Spain on the left of the Ebro. This measure was certainly partly intended as a threat to the Spaniards if they continued their resistance, to show them they might have to bear with a greater disaster than a foreign King, and it was partly induced by the greater facility for governing the provinces under direct French rule than through the weak Joseph.

This, however, is the only real difficulty the map presents. We there see a thoroughly practicable scheme for the permanent maintenance of French ascendency over the Continent.

In some maps Catalonia is shown as actually part of the French Empire. This is an error. Though the decree for the annexation was given, and though that province was made one of the Military Governments practically removed from the power of Joseph, the last formal step, that of annexing it by *Sénatus-consulte*, was never taken. The matter can be followed in detail in Du Casse's *Memoirs of Joseph*, tomes, vii. viii. In what is probably the best authority—Spruner-Menke, *Hand Atlas*, dritte auflage, Gotha, Perthes, 1880, map 56—Catalonia is left to Spain.

The following list of the more important annexations made under the actual government of Napoleon may be interesting. 1800, Country on left of Sesia taken from Piedmont and given to the Cisalpine Republic. Louisiana to west of Mississippi, with New Orleans, ceded by Louis XV. to Spain, is now given back by Spain, but is sold by France to the United States in 1803. 1801, Austria

confirms the possession by France of the left bank of the Rhine, and again cedes Austrian Lombardy to the Cisalpine Republic; Tuscany formed into Kingdom of Etruria. 1802, Elba and Piedmont on right of the Sesia. 1805, Genoa; Austria cedes to Kingdom of Italy her share of the Venetian mainland possessions, Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, Bouches du Cattaro, and the mainland to the Adige. 1806, Neufchâtel, Berg, and Cleves (Anspach ceded by Prussia to France but exchanged with Bavaria for Berg). 1808, Flushing, Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany (or Kingdom of Etruria) annexed to France, and Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino to the Kingdom of Italy. 1809, part of Carinthia, Trieste, Istria, Carniola, etc., ceded by Austria. 1810, Holland, the Hanse Towns (Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen) with northern coast line of Germany, Ratisbon, the Valais, the Papal States, and Rome; Ragusa. 1812, Dantzic. The dates of annexation here given are those of the formal *Sénatus-consulte;* the annexation was often carried ont by a decree of earlier date. If this list be compared with that of the various Republics (vol. ii. p. 447), and with the description of the Kingdom of Westphalia (vol. ii. p. 390) and of the Graud Duchy of Warsaw (vol. ii. p. 277), the map will be the better understood.

THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

"As far back as the winter of 1810 Napoleon formed the project of attacking Russia, and of reducing her to the state of dependence which had become the lot of the great German monarchies. He originally intended to declare war in the spring or summer of 1811, and to limit his efforts to a campaign on the Niemen; but as his preparations were not then complete, and the hesitating policy of the Russian Cabinet, alarmed at the prospect before it, seemed to assure him time to mature his plans, he delayed the enterprise till the following year, and finally decided that it should assume the most formidable proportions. Napoleon's general design, apart from the extravagance of the original conception, was marked by the profound skill in stratagem, the clear insight, and the admirable combinations which almost always distinguished his strategy. Though he continued the exhausting contest in Spain, he resolved to collect and draw together an army of such overwhelming strength that it could safely attempt to subdue Russia, and, compelling Austria and Prussia to join him, to move it gradually to the banks of the Niemen, and launch it thence into the heart of the Russian Empire. The positions he held upon the Vistula, and almost upon the Russian frontier, would enable him, he confidently hoped, to screen this operation for a considerable time; his domination over Northern Germany would give him the means of directing his masses in security from the Rhine and the Elbe; and between the vacillations of the Czar and the truce and submission of Europe, he calculated that he would succeed in reaching the Niemen in commanding force without encountering real opposition. The difficulties of the immense distances, the barren soil, and the climate of Russia remained yet to be met and conquered; but he had coped with them in 1807, and he would make sufficient provision against them. The great trading ports on the North German seaboard should be made the basis of his operations; vast magazines should be formed in them, and their supplies be sent into Russia by water-carriage along the Frische Haff; and without foregoing a bold offensive, the army should bear along with it the means of subsistence in ample quantities together with all its other material. 'The obstacles in my way are great,' wrote Napoleon, in a confidential letter, when ruminating on his vast project, 'but with the appliances I can command we shall be able to devour all obstacles'

"The later months of 1811 and the first of the succeeding year

were employed by Napoleon in preparations for carrying out this gigantic design. France answered bravely his summons to arms, and masses of conscripts were added to the legions which, though terribly thinned by the havoc and privations of war, still contained soldiers of Marengo and Austerlitz. At the same time the call to the field was obeyed throughout all parts of the Empire; the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine were ordered to muster their contingents; armed men were raised and collected in thousands in Poland, in Holland, in the wilds of Illyria, and even in the conquered provinces of Spain; a great army was marshalled in Italy and held in readiness to cross the Alps; and treaties were made with Austria and Prussia, by which these Powers pledged themselves to furnish considerable additions to the huge force which was being directed against their old ally. Meanwhile, Germany being nearly as much under the control of Napoleon as France itself, arrangements were made on a great scale for the transport and subsistence of troops along the space from the Elbe to the Niemen; the granaries of Poland were moved to the seaboard, and accumulated in numerous *depôts* from the Oder and Vistula to the Pregel; the important fortresses of Dantzic and Königsberg were strengthened and made vast places of arms capable of satisfying the needs of whole *corps d'armée*, and abundantly provided with magazines and warlike material of all kinds; the navigation of the Frische Haff and Curische Haff was carefully surveyed and connected with that of the Pregel and Niemen; and carriages, waggons, and carts were constructed in thousands to bear the supplies of the host which was destined to move into the plains of Russia.

"Though it was of course impossible to conceal them altogether, Napoleon masked these immense preparations with extraordinary dexterity and art; and whatever may be thought of his good faith, his conduct was marked with the highest ability. While he strained every nerve to accomplish his objects he deceived the Czar, only too anxious to conjure away what appeared destruction, with the pretence of negotiation and peace; he assured him that the condition of Germany was the real cause of his great armaments; and such was the success of his guile that his dispositions were far advanced and his troops in motion at all points before Alexander was convinced of the truth. By the early spring of 1812 the Emperor had more than 600,000 men in readiness for the intended enterprise; and under his guidance this enormous force, still widely scattered throughout the Empire, was gradually directed towards the theatre of operations. While Eugène Beauharnais with the Italian army crossed the Brenner and rallied the Bavarian contin-

gent, Davoust, with the vanguard of the main host, advanced to the Vistula across Germany, connecting himself with a Polish corps under Poniatowski, in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and with the armies of the North German cities : the remaining divisions of the immense array drawing together from the Rhine, the Maine, and the Elbe, and marching forward in dense procession. 420,000 men were destined to begin the invasion and to cross the Niemen in the first instance ; 200,000 being kept in second line to maintain the communications, to observe Germany, and to supply the inevitable waste of war ; and, with the Austrian and Prussian contingents, not less than 650,000 soldiers were marshalled under the Imperial eagles in March and April 1812. The advance of these enormous masses across Germany towards the Russian frontier was purposely made methodical and slow, for Napoleon wished to preserve the appearance of negotiating till the last moment; he was anxious not to fatigue his troops; and he had resolved not to open the campaign until the summer growth of the herbage should enable his myriads of horses to subsist in the plains of Poland and Lithuania. When, however, his host had been collected within a short distance of the Russian frontier, his intention was to strike rapidly at once ; and, notwithstanding the difficulties in his way, he hoped that his operations would be as brilliant as those of Jena and Friedland" (*Temple Bar*, "The Campaign of Moscow," vol. lxiii. pp. 97–99).

Napoleon's own means of transport was not neglected, and a special carriage was built for him at Brussels, and elaborately fitted up with every convenience for a long campaign. A very complete account of this vehicle will be found in Captain Malet's *Annals of the Road* (London, Longmans, 1876).

"Napoleon's carriage taken at Waterloo was presented to the Prince Regent, by whom it was afterwards sold to a Mr. Bullock for £2500. It eventually found its way to Madame Tussaud's Waxwork Exhibition, where it may still be seen.

"This very curious and convenient chariot was built by Symons of Brussels for the Russian campaign, and is adapted for the various purposes of a pantry and a kitchen, for it has places for holding and preparing refreshments which, by the aid of a lamp, could be heated in the carriage. It served also for a bedroom, a dressing-room, an office, etc.

"The seat is divided into two by a partition about six inches high. The exterior of this ingenious vehicle is of the form and dimensions of our large English travelling chariot, except that it has a projection in front of about two feet, the right-hand half of which

is open to the inside to receive the feet, thus forming a bed, while the left-hand half contained a store of various useful things.

"Beyond the projection in front, and nearer to the horses, was the seat for the coachman, contrived so as to prevent the driver from viewing the interior of the carriage, and yet so placed as to afford those within a clear sight of the horses and of the surrounding country. Beneath this seat was a receptacle for a box, about two and a half feet in length and four inches deep, containing a bedstead of polished steel which could be fitted up in a couple of minutes. Over the front windows was a roller blind of canvas, which when pulled down excluded rain while it admitted air.

"On the ceiling of the carriage is a network for carrying small travelling requisites. In a recess there was a *secrétaire*, ten inches by eighteen, which contained nearly a hundred articles presented to Napoleon by Maria Louisa, under whose care it was fitted up with every luxury and convenience that could be imagined. It contained, besides the usual requisites for a dressing-box (most of which were of solid gold), a magnificent breakfast service with plates, candlesticks, knives, forks, spoons, a spirit lamp for making breakfast in the carriage, a gold case for Napoleon's gold washhand basin, a number of essence bottles, and a variety of minute articles, such as needles and thread.

"At the bottom of this toilet-box, in a recess, were found, in 1815, 2000 gold Napoleons—on the top of it were writing materials, a liqueur case, a wardrobe, writing desk, maps, telescopes, pistols, etc., a large silver chronometer, by which the watches of the army were regulated, two merino mattresses, a travelling cap, a sword, an uniform, and an imperial mantle and headdress" (p. 18).

END OF VOL. III.

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Napoleon, Emperor of the French
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